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Greenland MEETING POINT: Chief Emeka Anyaoku 
"A Commonwealth realistic and imaginative 
enough to be guided by the knowledge that 
our constituencies are not only of the present 
generation, but also the future unborn of this 
world'. This was the goal which Chief Emeka 
Anyaoku of Nigeria pledged to work for when 
he took office as Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth in July 1990. In an interview 
with The Courier, Chief Anyaoku explains his 
vision of the Commonwealth's role and 
expresses his views on a number of current 
international issues. Pages 3 to 5. 
ACP-EEC — Council of Ministers 
The ACP-EEC Council of Ministers met in Brussels in May. Included on 
the agenda were the implementation of Lomé IV, problems relating to 
raw materials and relations between Community and ACP States as the 
Single Market of 1993 approaches. The discussions were an opportunity 
for the ACPs to restate their fear of being 'marginalised' in favour of 
Eastern Europe, and for the Community to reassure its partners of its 
intention to continue with and intensify cooperation under the Lomé 
Convention. Pages 6 to 7. 
COUNTRY REPORTS 
BENIN: As the first country to hold a national conference aimed at 
arranging the transition towards a democratic regime, Benin is now very 
much a test case, both for other African states and for donor countries. 
The former are seeking inspiration from the measures taken to solve the 
economic and in­
stitutional crisis 
while the latter 
are looking to 
draw conclusions 
from Benin's ex­
perience in order 
better to adapt 
their aid policy. 
Pages 18 to 28.' 
WESTERN SAMOA: The last couple of years have been quite 'stormy' 
for Western Samoa. Both in 1989 and 1990, cyclones hit this Pacific 
paradise, and Ofa in particular struck hard in February 1990, causing 
about USS 140 million damage. Yet another issue has given even more 
cause for heated debate: the introduction of universal suffrage. Approved 
by plebiscite in October 1990. last April's elections were 'historic', as 
the first ever in 
the country to be 
held under un­
iversal franchise. 
Pages 29 to 42. 
DOSSIER: Human rights, 
democracy and development 
A political subject whose economic consequences are debated but real. 
Are human rights universal? In addition to formal democracy, what are 
the minimum conditions for pluralism? What is the connection between 
democracy and development? A difficult question, but given that policy 
choices influence development, they should be exercised democratically. 
In the Dossier, we look — in as objective a manner as possible — at 
possible answers to these questions. Pages 48 to 84. 
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Jacques Delors in Dakar: interdependence and solidarity 
Commission President Jacques Delors and Vice-President Manuel Marin made an official visit to Senegal from 30 April to 
3 May ¡991 at the invitation of Abdou Diouf the President of the Republic. The visit, Jacques Delors' first to an ACP country 
since taking up his post, was particularly important bearing in mind the way the political and economic situation in Africa is 
developing. 
On 2 May, he made a major speech on interdependence and solidarity to members of the Senegalese parliament, Government 
and diplomatic corps. 
' We must first get the measure of this interdependence ', lie said, for only then 'will we have a better idea of the source of the new 
development awareness emerging in Africa and elsewhere — which must also be the basis for a completely renewed partnership 
between Europe and Africa '. 
A changing world means adaptation and solidarity 
For Mr Delors, adaptation is an imperative and it demands solidarity. 
'It is impossible to stay on the sidelines in a changing world. There is no frontier, no protection and no specific model to dispense 
us from the effort involved in the internationalisation of trade'. 
Solidarity has first to emerge on the economic front, where stability is threatened by 'incoherent decisions taken piecemeal in 
the name of monetary order, liberalisation of trade andredistribution of financial resources ' and by the failure of the organisations 
responsible for regulating the commodity markets, where supervision, transparency and cooperation should be the order of the 
day. 
The European Community is responding to interdependence by getting organised. 'I am not setting this up as an example in 
itself, Jacques Delors said. 'I am giving it as an example of a far wider trend which goes well beyond it '. 
The Single Market of 1992 began as a desire for collective adaptation, dictated by the need to boost competitivity to cope with 
the internationalisation of technology, financing and markets. 
The Single European Act, ratified in ¡987, was the institutional reflexion of this need and it triggered cooperation, solidarity 
and openness. 
Economic and monetary union and political union should be interpreted in the light of these 'dialectics of opening and 
solidarity... The Community is open of necessity and its solidarity is both a tradition and an ideal... By means of this dual 
movement, it is in fact preparing to make a better job of its part in world interdependence'. 
New development awareness is born 
This, first of all, Jacques Delors said, breaks with the past in two ways, by: 
— rejecting 'romantic visions which inspire over-volunlarist policies and are based mainly on the determination of the central 
authorities'; 
— denouncing 'exclusive recourse to assistance, which prevents the people from taking responsibility for their own development '. 
The structural challenges are simultaneously global and more particular to Africa. The global ones include the trends in 
commodity prices and the debt ( 'Africa's debt is equal to its GDP — the highest percentage in the world') and there are others 
related to Africa, demography and the environment ( 'in Africa, cooperation with the whole world has to be used urgently to break 
through the vicious circle of poverty and the destruction of the natural environment'). 
But there is no point in tackling structural problems unless democracy is seen as vital — although it must be clear that 
'démocratisation is not a process forced upon us by events in Eastern Europe or new political conditions from outside '. Democracy 
is needed primarily because 'counterweights are required to prevent structural reform from leading to other sorts of arbitrariness 
and new frustrations. Everyone has to be involved, from political leaders to the man in the street'. 
None of this will be possible without some practical organisation of interdependence, which naturally includes the responsibility 
of the countries of the North, but also a further world cooperation drive, particularly at regional level. 
Africa and the European Community — the basis for a new partnership 
Mr Delors maintains that, together, A CPs and Europeans have a joint vision and the means of achieving it — hence we can also 
set ourselves a target. 
The Lomé Convention, a 'model of cooperation based on contracts, mutual respect and duration' which is constantly being 
adapted, suggests encouraging initiatives with the help of our new partnership and making human rights and man himself the 
ultimate foundation of our process of cooperation. 'Now, clearly, the furthering of democracy and economic and social 
development are inseparable'. 
Jacques Delors ended his speech by defending the need for 'solidarity in development' as something which would 'link all 
initiatives, draw them together into a common philosophy and strongly question the developed countries, starting with the 
European Community '. 
Dominique David 
Editor MEETING POINT 
Chief Emeka ANYAOKU 
Commonwealth Secretary-
General 
democracy — a guiding 
principle of the 
Commonwealth
9 
Chief Emeka Anyaoku of Nigeria is a man with long 
experience of international relations. In 1959, he joined the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation and he went on 
to work for the Nigerian diplomatic service in 1962. In 
1977, after 11 years in the Commonwealth Secretariat, he 
was appointed Deputy Secretary-General responsible for 
international affairs and administration. He has also served 
briefly as his country's Foreign Minister. On 1 July 1990, 
Chief Anyaoku took over from Sir Shridath (Sonny) 
Ramphal as Commonwealth Secretary-General having 
been chosen for the top post the previous October by the 
Heads of Government, meeting in Kuala Lumpur. 
In his acceptance speech, Chief Anyaoku pledged to work 
towards 'A Commonwealth realistic and imaginative 
enough to be guided... by the knowledge that our 
constituencies are not only of the present generation, but 
also the future unborn of this world'. 
In this interview with The Courier, Chief Anyaoku gives 
his own vision of the Commonwealth's future role and 
discusses some of the current development issues facing his 
organisation and the world in general. 
► How would you characterise the 
current role of the Commonwealth and 
what do you think the future holds? Will 
the Commonwealth still be here in 50 years 
time ? 
- The Commonwealth has a unique 
capacity to bridge racial, ideological and 
economic divides and inequalities, as­
sisted by its common language, common 
professional and institutional heritage, 
and cooperative spirit. It is a capacity of 
increasing value in a world that is seeing a 
resurgence in ethnic and racial loyalties 
and new nationalisms which are begin­
ning to threaten the stability and cohe­
sion of established nation states. With its 
diversity of cultures and communities, 
the Commonwealth could be a catalyst 
for new forms of consensual cooperation 
and bridge-building among nations and 
between communities within nations. It 
could also play a significant role in 
promoting conflict resolution. 
Looking ahead, I am convinced that 
the Commonwealth will continue to have 
a distinctive and enlarging scope. In 
deciding on its future roles, it will 
concentrate on issues which can be 
tackled by drawing on recognised Com­
monwealth strengths and characteristics. 
For example, it will maintain its commit­
ment to assisting its developing member 
countries in a variety of practical ways, 
bilaterally and multilaterally through the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and its tech­
nical cooperation agency. It will also 
assist member countries in their reform 
efforts by providing policy advice and 
other practical support in the form of 
technical assistance for development 
projects. 
You asked me about the position in 50 
years time. I would say that as long as the 
world needs instruments for promoting 
true multilateralism, there will continue 
to be a role for the Commonwealth. If it is 
not there in 50 years it will only be 
because the UN has fully succeeded in 
becoming the instrument of genuine 
global consensus, in which the collective 
interests of countries and peoples, both 
large and small, and irrespective of 
geography, form the basis for global 
action. 
► How important is the UK now within 
the Commonwealth given its tendency to be 
isolated on a number of issues in recent 
years? Has there been any noticeable 
change since John Major became Prime 
Minister? 
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— I don't believe that this question 
reflects an accurate reading of Britain's 
standing in, and relations with, the 
Commonwealth. In relation to South 
Africa, it is not sufficiently recognised 
that Britain has been unwavering in its 
support for the Commonwealth objective 
of the abolition of apartheid. There is of 
course, disagreement on means but 
Britain is by no means alone in disagree­
ing about the means of achieving certain 
Commonwealth objectives. The British 
Government and people have, over the 
years, continued to give important sup­
port to Commonwealth initiatives. For 
example, we now have on the table, far-
reaching proposals to address the in­
debtedness problems of many low-
income countries — the Trinidad and 
Tobago Terms. These resulted from an 
initiative taken by John Major in Sep­
tember 1990, when he was Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, under the premiership of 
his predecessor. I began my term of office 
last year as Secretary General with very 
good relations with Margaret Thatcher 
and look forward to excellent relations 
with John Major. 
► Although the Trinidad Terms are 
more liberal than previous schemes to ease 
indebtedness, some would argue that they 
are still unrealistic in that they will require 
an increasing level of repayments in the 
future. For some of the poorest countries it 
is difficult to imagine this being feasible. 
— I think we should be quite clear on 
one thing — it is certainly not an ideal 
solution. But on the basis that half a loaf 
is better than none, it is undoubtedly an 
improvement. If you look at the details, it 
proposes doubling the write-off element 
from one third to two thirds, lengthening 
the period of repayment from 14 to 25 
years and an initial five year period when 
interest will be capitalised. These are 
definite improvements on what we had in 
Toronto. Having said this, I would agree 
that we need a lot more if the debt 
problem is to be tackled as successfully as 
we all wish. 
► Last year, the Commonwealth laun-
ched an Equity Fund of $56m for the 
purpose of investing in Commonwealth 
developing countries. Can you explain how 
the fund works? 
— This is an initiative which, in a 
modest way, can make a direct contri­
bution to capital flows to developing 
countries. Its aim is to channel private 
portfolio equity investment from long 
term investors in industrial countries to 
emerging capital markets of Common­
wealth developing countries. Compar­
able country equity funds already exist 
and most of them are doing well. The 
particular twist the CEF seeks to add is to 
give investors a much wider range of 
investment opportunities by including 
some of the smaller markets and coun­
tries where current difficulties conceal 
great long term potential. The Fund must 
channel its resources to countries only on 
a commercial basis. It has already begun 
to invest in places such as Malaysia and 
India and other countries which should 
benefit include Kenya, Nigeria and Pak­
istan — places where there are either 
existing or emerging stock markets. 
There is also a plan to extend the 
investment activities of the Fund to 
smaller countries of the Commonwealth 
which often get neglected in terms of 
foreign investment. 
► The Commonwealth Fund for Tech-
nical Cooperation is one of the better 
known facilities established by the organis-
ation. How effective has it been given that 
the resources are limited? Does the fact 
that it is replenished by voluntary contri-
butions cause any problems ? 
- When you have voluntary contri­
butions, you need to go fund raising from 
time to time but a measure of its success 
can be seen in the growth of the fund 
itself. When it was first launched in 1971, 
its budget was £400,000. This year, the 
planned expenditure is £30 million. The 
demand for its services has been on the 
increase for some time. 
The CFTC is now established as a 
leading international technical assistance 
agency in the transfer of technology from 
one developing country to another. Be­
cause it operates flexibly and very cost 
effectively, it is able to provide wide-
ranging technical assistance directed to 
the development priorities of govern­
ments. It is something which operates 
very much on a mutual assistance basis. 
► The Commonwealth has a good 
reputation for its work in facilitating 
student exchanges, ¡n recent years, how-
ever, concern has been expressed over the 
impact of hugely increased fees in the 
traditional host countries. Has the Com-
monwealth been able to do anything to 
alleviate this problem ? 
— Student mobility within the Com­
monwealth has certainly fallen in the last 
decade, at a time when internationally, it 
has been rising and this is clearly a matter 
of concern. A Standing Committee on 
Student Mobility was established in 1981 
and it has issued a number of reports, 
detailing possible measures to remedy the 
effects of fee increases for overseas 
students. 
There are now more scholarships being 
given on a multilateral basis. The Com­
monwealth Fellowship and Scholarship 
Programme is expanding, there are more 
bilateral awards by some donor countries 
and we have begun the 'Commonwealth 
of Learning' initiative which is intended 
to use distance education techniques to 
help bridge the gap. Notwithstanding 
these measures, the concern still exists. In 
the end, it is important that Com­
monwealth students should be able to 
move freely about the Commonwealth in 
the same way as in Europe. The EC, as 
you know, has the Erasmus Programme 
and we are very keen to explore ways in 
which a similar programme could be 
introduced in the Commonwealth at 
some date in the future. 
► Have you had any feedback on such 
an idea from countries such as the UK, 
Canada or Australia? 
- They remain in sympathy with the 
objectives that I have talked about but we 
have yet to see a change in the laws and 
policies that make foreign students pay 
much more than home students — and I 
think that is the crux of the matter. 
► What was the object of your recent 
meeting at the World Bank ? 
- Apart from addressing the Inter­
national Development Conference, I 
called on Barber Conable of the World 
Bank and Michel Camdessus of the IMF. 
We have good relations with both bodies 
and work closely in many areas of mutual 
interest. I used my visit as an opportunity 
to strengthen these relations and to 
discuss issues of ongoing concern to 
Commonwealth countries. These in­
cluded the development crisis in sub­
sanaran Africa, debt relief particularly in 
connection with the proposed Trinidad 
and Tobago Terms, adjustment program­
mes, foreign investment policies and 
promotion, and environmental issues. MEETING POINT 
I was particularly keen also, to discuss 
the work of the Commonwealth Expert 
Group on Global Economic and Political 
Change and its Impact on the Develop­
ment Process, in which the Bank and the 
Fund are participating. It is the first time 
we have worked together with them on a 
major study. Both the Bank and the Fund 
are important institutions to us. Their 
roles are constantly discussed and re­
viewed at meetings of Commonwealth 
finance ministers and it is therefore, quite 
useful for us to have close working 
relations with them. 
► Your predecessor, in his ¡989 
Report, spoke of democracy as 'a Com-
monwealth ethic at the very heart of 
Commonwealth reality'. Do you think that 
the current upsurge of democratic senti-
ment in Africa is likely to be permanent ? 
Do you see a link between democracy and 
sustainable economic development? 
- The late 1980s have seen a reasser­
tion of democracy in many parts of the 
world including Africa. There is now a 
deep awareness worldwide of the faults 
and limitations of non-democratic poli­
tical and economic systems. And it is 
increasingly recognised that development 
will prove to be neither sustainable nor 
equitable, unless citizens are secure in 
their economic and political rights and 
are able to participate fully in the 
development process. In Africa, this is 
leading to the abandonment of the 
command in favour of the free market 
economic system and movement to poli­
tical pluralism in a number of hitherto 
single party states. I believe that this trend 
stands a good chance of becoming per­
manent especially if the development and 
economic targets of the countries con­
cerned are significantly realised. It may 
be different if, having embraced these 
democratic trends, there is then no 
noticeable improvement in economic and 
development performance. 
I do see a link between democracy and 
sustainable development. Indeed, as the 
South Commission observed in its recent 
report, the state is best able to perform its 
functions when there is a national con­
sensus on the goals and purposes of 
development, and on the apportionment 
of the costs as well as the benefits. 
Democratic institutions which allow full 
participation and through which such a 
consensus can be reached are therefore, 
not only an objective of people-oriented 
development, but its very means as well. 
An autocratic-ruled country can, for a 
period, attain high growth but in the long 
run this becomes threatened by political 
instability. 
Democracy is indeed, one of the 
guiding principles of the Commonwealth, 
as enshrined in the 1971 Singapore 
Declaration. We have in the last seven 
months been able to work in ways aimed 
at strengthening the democratic process 
in a number of Commonwealth coun­
tries. At their request, we have sent teams 
of observers, for instance, to Malaysia 
and Bangladesh to observe their national 
elections. Recently, we sent an advance 
team to Guyana to observe their election 
preparations. We are doing all this in the 
belief that the electoral process which is 
crucial to the sustenance of democratic 
institutions needs to be strengthened and 
the presence of observers from the Com­
monwealth has been shown to be very 
helpful in doing this. 
► What is your view about the relax-
ation of sanctions against South Africa at 
the present time ? 
- Sanctions were introduced as a 
means of bringing about an end to the 
inhuman apartheid system. They were 
designed to bring the South African 
Government to the negotiating table and 
to keep it there until fundamental and 
irreversible change in South Africa had 
been secured. 
The Committee of Commonwealth 
Foreign Ministers which met recently to 
review the situation, welcomed the steps 
taken so far by President De Klerk but 
stressed that sanctions should begin to be 
relaxed, only after the South African 
Government has implemented the under­
takings it has made to remove the 
obstacles to negotiation with the true 
representatives of the African majority 
population. These include the release of 
all political prisoners, the return of the 
exiles, the actual repeal of the legislative 
pillars of apartheid and a review of the 
repressive security laws. It is a fact that 
these obstacles have still not been effect­
ively removed. Hence, the position of the 
Commonwealth - - minus Britain of 
course — is that it would be premature to 
relax sanctions now. 
► Would you anticipate a democratic 
South Africa reapplying to join the Com-
monwealth ? 
— South Africa was a member of the 
Commonwealth until 1961 when it had to 
leave because of its apartheid policy. I 
would expect a non-racial, democratic 
South Africa to be warmly welcomed 
back to the Commonwealth. 
► A number of African countries are, 
once again, suffering from severe famine 
exacerbated by internal conflicts. How 
optimistic are you about an adequate 
response from the developed nations ? Do 
you think that there is a place for un-
requested humanitarian intervention, even 
where it raises issues of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity ? 
— The response to the grave situation 
in some parts of Africa is far from 
satisfactory. There seems sometimes to be 
too much of a political element in the 
response of donor.governments to situ­
ations requiring a humanitarian res­
ponse. However, at the level of the 
people, I am glad to say that the response 
has been better. We saw in London 
recently, the Wembley concert to raise 
funds for the Kurds and what a success it 
seems to have been. Among govern­
ments, a hopeful element is the recog­
nition that more needs to be done for 
Africa. 
I would be happy to see the day when 
the practice of global multilateralism 
would mean that the international re­
sponse to natural disasters and humani­
tarian needs cannot be inhibited by issues 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
But we must admit that until we have a 
practice of genuine multilateralism that 
is, international policies that take full 
account of the views of smaller and 
disadvantaged countries — these issues 
will continue to be raised. 
► What do you think about the poss-
ibility of a global, humanitarian 'strike 
force', perhaps under UN auspices, which 
would have the capacity to respond im-
mediately to crises? 
— I would hope that we can get there 
and that the United Nations will, in time, 
develop the capacity to react quickly to 
cases that call for massive humanitarian 
assistance from abroad. But we cannot 
afford to have such interventions decided 
simply by the more powerful states or 
some other groups of countries. It must 
be on the basis of genuine international 
consensus.O 
Interview by Simon HORNER 
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ACP-EEC Council of Ministers in Brussels discusses 
start-up of Lomé IV and cooperation for 1993 
The ACP-EEC Council of Minis­
ters held its 16th meeting in Brussels 
on 6 and 7 May under the co-
chairmanship of Luxembourg's Ag­
riculture Minister René Steichen on 
the Community side and Rwandan 
Planning Minister Augustin Ngira-
batware for the ACPs. 
On the agenda of this Council 
meeting were the big issues of ACP-
EEC cooperation — entry into force 
of Lomé IV, commodities, the ACP 
debt, Southern Africa and other 
international issues. 
Lomé IV — sticking to the 
deadlines 
Previous Lomé Conventions have not 
always taken effect within the legal time 
limits and transitional measures have had 
to be extended as a result. But the serious 
economic problems facing the ACPs and 
a desire to avoid having more than one 
EDF going at the same time makes Lomé 
IV implementation an urgent matter for 
all concerned in the Group and the 
Community alike. 
The ratification procedures whereby 
the agreement can come into force were 
well under way on the ACP side in May, 
as 47 of the 69 countries had completed 
the formalities, although the Community 
had only scored five out of 12 at the time. 
All the Member States and at least two 
thirds of the ACPs have to ratify and 
deposit their instruments of ratification 
before the agreement can be implemen­
ted. The ACPs had already done this by 
May and the Community was anxious to 
assure them that the Member States 
would have done likewise by 1 July, when 
the transitional measures expired and the 
new Convention was scheduled to take 
effect ('). 
What the Community was aiming at, 
Commission Development Director-
General Dieter Frisch explained, was to 
stick to the dates laid down for implemen­
tation of the Convention — particularly, 
as Manuel Marin pointed out. now that 
(') At the time of publication, only one Member 
State had not been able to complete its ratification, 
due to a more complicated process. 
Community aid programming was al­
ready well ahead in most ACP States (bar 
the new ones and those in which the 
political situation was such as to preclude 
indicative programmes). 
Mr Frisch also announced that Stabex 
operations, a sensitive subject as far as the 
ACPs were concerned, should not have 
the ups and downs of previous Conven­
tions, given the way payments were 
developing. 
Commodities 
There was broad discussion here, with 
the Community stressing that studies 
would be a good way of investigating the 
PMDT (processing, marketing, distri­
bution and transport) side of the ACP 
products laid down in Lomé IV - - ie 
cotton, wood, tea, iron, cocoa and 
bauxite (for which an economic study was 
also thought to be helpful). 
The Community deplored the fact that 
two large countries, the USA and 
Malaysia, one a consumer and the other a 
producer of cocoa, had not yet joined the 
International Cocoa Agreement. It also 
thought, however, that no further cocoa 
agreement should see the light of day 
until the attendant financial problems 
had been solved. 
The Council again said how important 
it thought the International Coffee Ag­
reement was. In a declaration to this 
effect, it regretted that negotiations for a 
new Agreement containing economic 
clauses had not yet begun and called upon 
all members of the Agreement to do their 
utmost to see that this happened soon so 
that a fresh Agreement could be con­
cluded at the ordinary session of the 
International Coffee Council in London 
in September 1992. 
Sugar and bananas 
The Member States were unable to 
agree to the ACP request for compens­
ation for the Community's dwindling 
sugar beet prices. This drop was reflected 
in a decline in the price offered for ACP 
cane sugar, the guaranteed price for 
which was fixed according to Article 5(4) 
of the Sugar Protocol, which said that it 
should be 'negotiated annually, within 
the price range obtaining in the Com­
munity...'. 
The ACP sugar spokesman, Mauritian 
Minister Dulloo, said that exporters 
wanted ECU 30 million-worth of com­
pensation from the Community. Mr 
Steichen pointed out that there was no 
direct tie-up between the Community's 
price policy and compensation for any 
losses and that the Community was in 
fact encouraging people to look for a 
global solution to the problems of ACP 
export sugar costs. Freight alone rep­
resented 10% of the price the ACPs were 
being offered, Mr Dulloo said. 
The Community repeated that it would 
respect its commitments vis-à-vis the 
ACPs, particularly when it came to 
preference and access to the Portuguese 
market in the case of a common agricul­
tural policy reform or a GATT agree­
ment. 
The ACPs were still worried about the 
banana trade and their position on the 
Community market being compromised 
in 1993 if traditional, guaranteed outlets 
in some of the Member States disap­
peared as a result of the single market. 
The Community had not yet adopted a 
common position on this rather delicate 
subject given the economic implications, 
but the President of the EEC Council said 
that the Community noted the ACPs' 
explanations and concern. 
Debt 
Discussions of the ACP debt to the 
Community have reached stalemate. The 
ACPs still want the Twelve simply to 
write off their borrowings, but the Com­
munity has to think of its position on the 
international scene, where it goes for a 
case-by-case approach in conjunction 
with the other international organis­
ations. The ACPs' debt to the Com­
munity is smaller than their domestic and 
other debts, the President of the EEC 
Council said and Europe was trying to 
lighten the Group's burden by having 
92% of Lomé IV financing in the form of 
grants, instead of the 75% of previous 
Conventions. 
The international situation — South 
Africa and adjustment — was also on the 
agenda. The Community again made it 
clear that cooperation with Eastern 
Europe and Latin America and Asia A CP-EEC 
The A CP Council of Ministers meeting shortly before the joint Council 
would not be developed to the detriment 
of the ACPs. When it came to trends in 
South Africa, it said, positive measures 
were an important sign of encouragement 
for the Government's drive to abolish all 
the apartheid legislation and it was 
interested to see that there was a poss­
ibility of direct negotiation between 
South Africa and Namibia on Walvis Bay 
and the islands off the Namibian coast. 
One programme of reform 
Manuel Marin pointed to one or two 
misunderstandings on structural adjust­
ment, particularly over eligibility, EEC 
relations with the IBRD and the IMF and 
the Commission contribution to SPA (the 
special programme of assistance for 
Africa). In the programming process, he 
said, the Commission had concentrated 
on the 35 or so countries defined under 
the Convention as automatically eligible-
countries, ie those already getting finan­
cial or other support for adjustment from 
the principal funders. The eligibility of 
other countries embarking on 'auto­
nomous' processes of adjustment de­
pended upon a joint assessment de­
monstrating that the criteria laid down in 
the Convention actually were being met. 
As far as the other misunderstandings 
(relations with the other institutio.ns and 
SPA) were concerned, Mr Marin said the 
Community could not embark on adjust­
ment operations without coordinating 
closely with the other donors, par­
ticularly those whose job it was to back 
up the process. 
There could only be one programme of 
reform in any given country -- 'your 
programme. Our job is to stand alongside 
you and make sure that this programme 
- the contents of which you will have 
negotiated with the World Bank and the 
IMF — really does include the essential 
things laid down in the Convention'. 
'It is coordination with these insti­
tutions very early on in the process which 
will enable us to ensure this coherence 
and to defuse any problems'. 
'We want neither to align ourselves on 
the positions of these institutions nor to 
subject our financing to decisions in 
which we have not been involved', the 
Commissioner said. As in the past, the 
Community would be actively involved in 
the IBRD-coordinated programme and 
the Commission felt that it would be able 
to mobilise about ECU 1 billion in Lomé 
IV resources to support adjustment in 
countries eligible for this programme. 
At the ACP Council of Ministers 
ACP Ministers met to discuss internal 
matters — and, of course, items on the 
agenda of the joint Council — a few days 
before the ACP-EEC meeting and, once 
again, spent a lot of time on the operation 
and finances of their Secretariat General 
in Brussels. 
They looked at the reorganisation and 
staff problems of the Secretariat, both of 
which are closely related to the financial 
situation, which is critical and showing 
no improvement over previous years — a 
serious matter which forced them to 
consider a variety of solutions, ranging 
from a solemn appeal for the States to pay 
their contributions to a quest for external 
financing to cover at least 90% of the 
budget. 
ACP Ministers also looked at the entry 
into force of Lomé IV, expressing satis­
faction at the speed with which so many 
countries had completed the ratification 
formalities. 
Jamaica offered to host the next ACP 
and ACP-EEC Council of Ministers in 
Kingston in May 1992.0 
LUCIEN PAGNI 
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Programming Lomé IV 
by Michael LAIDLER (*) 
grammes. This agreement is only reached 
after lengthy discussions between the 
delegates in the ACP countries and their 
ACP counterparts. Programming is not a 
one-off exercise. It is the natural climax to 
the ongoing exchange of policy views, 
which is the hallmark of a relationship 
between partners who, for the most part, 
have been working together now for 
almost two decades. 
Once again, the period of programming has been in full swing. With the 
signature of Lomé IV in December 1989, the way was cleared for that all-
important exercise in consultation between the Community and the ACP States 
as to how the Convention will be applied individually to them over the five year 
period covered by the 1st Protocol to the Convention. Since mid 1990, intense 
activity has been taking place between the Commission (in consultation with 
Community Member States) and the ACP capitals to draw up the strategic 
planning documents known as 'National Indicative Programmes'. As the 
operation draws towards its close, this short article seeks to answer some simple 
questions about the process which, although at the heart of EEC/ACP 
cooperation, has sometimes given rise in the past to uncertainties and even 
misunderstandings. It will also try briefly to give a view as to why programming is 
such an essential step in the life of the Convention, how it has evolved to its 
present stage, what is new under Lomé IV, what and who is involved, and the 
results of the current exercise so far. 
Why do we have programming? 
At the heart of the programming 
philosophy lies the notion that each ACP 
state is entitled to clear and early indi­
cation as to the amount and type of 
Community assistance it can count on 
under each Convention. This is not just to 
simplify the bookkeeping or budgetary 
process; but to ensure that Community 
support is geared to the country's own 
priorities and to the optimal use of 
internal resources and external financial 
assistance. As you can imagine, this is no 
simple affair in today's climate of social 
and economic reform. The process often 
requires extremely complex discussions 
covering macro-economic strategies, sec­
toral policies, government commitments 
and undertakings in numerous fields. 
And all this must be coordinated both 
within the ACP state and with other 
donors, notably the Bretton Woods 
institutions in cases where structural 
adjustment is in process. But the effort 
required by this dialogue on strategies 
(*) Head of Division. West Africa Coastal States 
in the Directorate General for Development. 
and policies is worthwhile, even essential ; 
since, when completed satisfactorily, it 
establishes a very clear statement of how 
Community assistance will best be 
directed. This will take into account past 
performance, new priorities, economic 
and social considerations, other sources 
of support etc. This statement also 
defines clearly the respective responsibi­
lities of both parties in ensuring the 
success of the programmes. On the 
Community side this commitment gen­
erally takes the shape of a guarantee to 
provide financial and technical inputs. 
On the ACP side the commitments cover 
undertakings at both macro-economic 
and sectoral level. Most programmes 
include specific references to human 
rights development, environmental ques­
tions and a commitment to realise the full 
potential of women in the development 
process. 
It is important to bear in mind that 
programming is not intended primarily to 
establish a list of projects for financing. 
Rather, it sets out agreement on the 
priority sectors and defines jointly the 
objectives and conditions, including a 
timetable, to ensure the strongest and 
most effective management of the pro-
How does programming work 
and who decided it should work 
that way? 
Formally, the programming process is 
of course laid down by the Convention 
itself. Articles 281 to 284 lay down the 
ground rules. In brief they are: 
— Each ACP state has from the Com­
munity a clear indication of the total 
amount of programmable resources (') 
from which it will benefit under the 
Convention, including the first allocation 
of structural adjustment support where 
this applies. This information was com­
municated to all ACP States early in 
1990. 
- The ACP state is responsible for 
drawing up its own draft indicative 
programme which is then submitted to 
the Community and discussed between 
the two parties bearing in mind the 
sovereign right of the ACP states to 
determine their own policies. 
The draft indicative programme has to 
contain information about the develop­
ment priorities of the ACP state con­
cerned, define the focal sector or sectors 
for Community assistance, set out the 
most appropriate means for meeting the 
objectives of those focal sectors and, if 
possible earmark national projects or 
programmes, (especially if these follow 
up on on-going programmes already 
being financed from Community sour­
ces). 
— After being discussed, the indicative 
programme, which is signed by both 
parties, has to specify the agreed focal 
sector (or sectors), the agreed measures, a 
timetable for implementation, the frame­
work and conditions for structural ad­
justment support (where this applies) and 
(') Programmable resources are those which can 
be planned in advance and, for obvious reasons, 
exclude Stabex, Sysmin and Emergency aid which by 
their nature respond to given circumstances which are 
impossible to predict. ACP- EEC 
information about the ACP state's 
priorities in terms of regional cooper­
ation. 
- The indicative programme has to be 
kept flexible to take account of changes in 
the situation and shifts in priority. 
These basic, short and fairly self-
evident formal requirements are in fact 
the distillation of many years of debate, 
experience, evaluation and not a little 
political controversy. Under the first two 
Lomé Conventions programming was a 
relatively straightforward attempt to 
establish priorities on the basis of the 
most expedient projects. The choice was 
often dictated by such criteria as the 
degree of readiness of the project, the 
need to balance political pressure for 
funds, a 'spread of sectoral coverage' and 
sometimes just plain luck! With the 
greater significance of resources available 
from the EDF, it became increasingly 
necessary to target that assistance in such 
a way as to focus its impact and to ensure 
a long term partnership in specified areas 
of support. That is why under Lomé III it 
was decided that the lion's share of 
Community assistance should be concen­
trated on a small number of sectors (even 
just one), which can also mean geograp­
hical sectors; and also that both sides 
would have to agree between them how 
best to achieve their objectives in that 
sector, and set their agreement out clearly 
in the indicative programme. 
Moreover, it was agreed that the ACP 
states and the Community stood a better 
chance of success if proper coordination 
was ensured with other funders interested 
in the sector. All this required a much 
increased level of frankness and com­
pleteness in discussion. This gave rise to 
the famous expression 'policy dialogue' 
which was the subject of much con­
troversy at the time ; but which has now 
become a routine part of our cooperation 
and which is better described as a 
'dialogue on policies'. 
It is very important to realise that this 
concept of sectoral or focal concentration 
remains central to today's programming 
process. None of the innovations under 
Lomé IV Convention (cf. below) have in 
any way diluted the three principles of 
— dialogue 
— focalisation 
— coordination. 
And all this has been decided by 
common accord between the ACP as a 
whole and the Community. Sometimes 
Mr Giovanni Livi, Director Eastern and Southern Africa shaking hands with 
Professor Simon Mbilinyi, Principal Secretary at the Ministry of Finance, 
immediately after the signing of Tanzania's Lomé IV indicative programme 
the comment is heard that the 'Com­
mission's rules are complicated'. Well, 
they may sound complicated because of 
the complexity of the development chal­
lenge; but, first, they are not 'the Com­
mission's rules' (but those laid down by 
the negotiations) and secondly, is it really 
so complicated to agree together how best 
to use scarce resources? 
Structural Adjustment 
Much has been written about this 
aspect of the new Convention and this is 
not the place to enter into the theory and 
practice of macro-economic and sectoral 
reform policies. Nevertheless, Lomé IV 
provides, for the first time, for specific 
resources to be earmarked from the EDF 
in support of ACP states who are under­
taking programmes of structural adjust­
ment. And the first allocations of those 
resources are made for eligible states at 
the beginning of the Convention period. 
It follows therefore that this important 
aspect of cooperation has to be dealt with 
in depth as part of the programming 
process. At first sight, this may seem to 
add unmanageable dimensions to what 
was already a complicated scenario. 
In practice this is not so. The nature of 
the Lomé III type of programming, 
concentrating as it did on sectoral 
priorities, dialogue and mutual commit­
ment, has lent itself naturally to a logical 
extension into the macro-economic 
sphere. Indeed, without specifically 
saying so, Lomé III had already involved 
the Community in many cases in those 
questions (Remember that general and 
sectoral import programmes were al­
ready a prominent feature of Lomé III). 
Under the new Convention the dialogue, 
extended to cover macro-economic con­
siderations, notably debt, public expendi­
ture, money management, and the social 
consequences of adjustment (where the 
Community's grant resources can play a 
particularly useful role) has considerably 
enriched the nature of the relationship, 
not only between Commission and ACP 
states but also with Member States and 
the Bretton Woods institutions. 
This has certainly not been without 
difficulties for the Commission which, 
with its limited manpower resources, has 
had to participate fully in this enlarged 
debate which imposes disciplined and 
well informed monitoring of changing 
and complex issues. Although the Com­
mission has organised itself to set up a 
small group of adjustment specialists to 
help with this work, the additional work 
load for all the services involved in 
Lomé IV has been significant, (as it has 
also been, of course, in the ACP states 
themselves). 
It is worth emphasising that, in their 
approach to the structural adjustment 
aspects of Lomé IV, the programmers 
have made conscious efforts to ensure 
that these are seen as part of an integrated 
approach. Structural reform is not an 
add-on, or a separate development tool. 
Adjustment is an essential part of the 
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development process, designed to remove 
short- and medium-term barriers to 
growth. As such, it is important to relate 
it to the medium and longer term sectoral 
strategies defined in programming and 
vice versa. They are part and parcel of the 
same overall series of objectives. Looked 
at in this light, programming becomes a 
global exercise, coherent both in terms of 
its components and of the activities and 
inputs of the government and their 
development partners, internal as well as 
external. 
Decentralised cooperation 
In contrast, seemingly, to the macro-
economic aspects of Lomé cooperation, it 
is interesting to note that the Lomé 
negotiations were concerned at the same 
time to extend the scope of the Conven­
tion so that assistance could be used for 
the benefit of the maximum number of 
people. In the jargon, this has been 
dubbed decentralised cooperation, and is 
covered by articles 20-22 of the Conven­
tion. The aim is to widen participation in 
the activities of the Convention to include 
decentralised authorities, rural and vil­
lage groupings, cooperatives, NGOs and 
any local organisation with useful ideas 
and schemes. It also aims to increase the 
scope for participation from within the 
Community by involving European par­
tners such as NGOs and other groups and 
associations, such as towns, in this 
process of decentralised cooperation. The 
detailed implementation of this new 
aspect of the Convention will require 
empirical experimentation, but the prin­
ciple of this kind of approach has been 
reinforced during the programming pro­
cess. Aside from the obvious intrinsic 
importance of this departure, it is par­
ticularly significant at a time when many 
ACP states are in a period of social and 
political change and when the role of such 
organisations is frequently at the heart of 
such change. 
Political and social change 
The decentralisation concept adds an 
undeniable new political flavour to the 
life of the Convention. Indeed, the whole 
process of programming has taken place 
against the backdrop of the remarkable 
process of political evolution, notably in 
Eastern Europe and in Africa and the 
great importance attached to these issues 
by European Community public opinion. 
This has inevitably been present in the 
minds of all concerned with program­
ming, not least Commissioner Marin and 
the senior officials who have, over the last 
few months, been involved in the process 
of signing indicative programmes in the 
ACP capitals. (A process which is 
frequently staged in a very political 
context). Clearly the Community has a 
vocation to promote human rights and 
support political change which reflects 
the legitimate aspirations of the people. 
Lomé is the expression of a political 
Bringing the benefits of the Convention to the people is a principal aim. 
Above a cooperative in Burundi 
attitude and we cannot pretend that 
politics do not have a role to play in its 
implementation. The mutual concerns of 
the partners have been frankly discussed 
in that context during programming. 
Results of Lomé IV 
programming 
The 'complexity' of all this has not 
stood in the way of an extremely success­
ful programming process. The ACP 
states, recognising the benefits of sectoral 
concentration have responded quickly 
and effectively in carrying out their 
responsibility to agree draft indicative 
programmes in discussion with the EC 
Delegates. It is very significant that the 
sectoral approach of Lomé III has been 
confirmed under Lomé IV and rural 
development (involving important social 
and environmental components), roads, 
socio-economic infrastructure and the 
development of human resources once 
again form the backbone of cooperation 
under the Lomé system. 
The Commission has, on the basis of 
those discussions, been able to coordinate 
with the Member States both on a 
bilateral basis (often in the European 
capitals) and in the EDF Committee, on 
the outlines of the proposed program­
ming approach in the large majority of 
ACP states. Consultations with other 
donors, notably the World Bank and 
IMF have been intense. Nearly 50 in­
dicative programmes were signed in time 
for the ACP/EEC Council meeting in 
May 1991 and the very demanding 
deadlines set by Development Com­
missioner Marin for the early completion 
of the process will in essence have been 
met without losing sight of the need to 
maintain quality. Given the complex 
issues involved, political and economic 
uncertainties within some ACP states and 
the staffing shortfalls imposed on all 
concerned, this is a remarkable achie­
vement. The men and women involved in 
the ACP states, in the Member States and 
within the Commission services have 
made special efforts to reach this stage. 
That they have done so is a tribute to the 
fact that the programming system has 
been accepted by all as a tool which 
respects the mutual rights of all the 
parties, provides the most realistic chance 
of success in an uncertain world, but 
which most of all reflects the sometimes 
forgotten uniqueness of the Lomé 
system.O M.L. 
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Contact between firms easier thanks 
to ACP-EEC industrial fora 
by Martin MINGUELLA (*) 
The EEC-West Africa industrial forum 
has been held in Dakar every two years 
since 1974. This event, run under the aegis 
of ECOWAS and the Commission of the 
European Communities and almost en­
tirely financed by the EEC, has become a 
tradition in the region. The 10th forum, 
marking almost 20 years of existence, is in 
1992, which is something for the Com­
munity and ECOWAS to be proud of, as 
few African events have been as regular as 
this. 
Central Africa is also host to a two-
yearly, UDEAC-EEC industrial forum 
for members and observers of the Econ­
omic Community of Central African 
States. This event, first run in 1985, has 
been held in Libreville twice and 
Yaoundé once and will be returning to 
Libreville again in December of this year. 
The original idea was just to promote 
foreign investments in the ACP States, 
but these industrial meetings have ad­
apted to trends in the international 
economic environment and the ACPs and 
the most recent ones have not only 
focused on investment promotion, but. 
above all, on encouraging a whole range 
of technical, financial and commercial 
techniques which companies can use to 
cooperate. 
The investors' forum of the 1970s has 
gradually become an industrial forum in 
which partnership takes precedence over 
investment. 
Aims and design 
The industrial fora were created to 
enhance industrial promotion and ACP-
EEC company cooperation. 
Article 83 of Lomé IV says: 'The 
Community shall contribute in a spirit of 
mutual interest to the development of 
ACP-EEC and intra-ACP enterprises by 
way of information and industrial pro­
motion activities. The aim of such ac­
tivities shall be to... organise the contacts 
required in the industrial sphere between 
policy-makers, promoters and economic 
operators from the Community and the 
ACP States...'. 
The aims of fora, a deliberately broad 
definition, are to 'foster... industrial 
cooperation between enterprises in the 
Member States of the Community and in 
the ACP States', by providing an or­
ganised framework to facilitate contact 
and negotiations between African project 
promoters and potential European part­
ners, as well as between African business­
men in the region. This cooperation may 
be technical, financial or commercial. 
An ACP-EEC industrial forum, which 
lasts four days, is the culmination of a 
year's hard work in an average of 25 
countries (the 12 Member States of the 
EEC plus the 16 members of ECOWAS 
or the 11 members and observers of 
ECCAS) and followed up for about 12 
months afterwards. 
Organisation 
More than 20 different organisations 
are directly involved here, including: 
— institutions which support the ACP-
EEC fora, i.e. UDEAC in the case of 
Central Africa, ECOWAS in the case of 
(*) Principal administrator at the Commission of 
the European Communities. 
A forum is an organised framework to facilitate contact and negotiations between 
African project promoters and potential European partners 
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The Europe- West African Industrial Forum is run at the Dakar international trade 
fair site 
West Africa and the Commission of the 
European Communities in all cases. The 
Commission also takes care of the general 
organisation and coordination of the 
operation ; 
— institutions which help, i.e. the CDI 
and UNIDO; 
— consultancies employed by the Com­
mission, in particular to identify prom­
oters and projects in the ACP region and 
promote the forum in the EEC. 
There are three stages to a forum -
preparation, the forum itself and follow-
up. 
Preparation involves, basically: 
— identifying ACP project promoters 
and promoting the forum in the ACP 
region in question, a task usually per­
formed by industrial promotion bodies in 
the ACP States involved, with the help of 
consultants; 
— promoting the forum in the Member 
States of the EEC and identifying poten­
tial European partners for ACP prom­
oters already identified, usually done by 
the consultants, together with the Euro­
pean promotion bodies. The crucial thing 
in the running of the event itself is to have 
the material organisation taken care of by 
a promotion unit from the host country. 
There are two important elements 
here: 
— bilateral meetings between ACP pro­
ject promoters and potential European 
partners, a job normally organised on 
computer, given that there are something 
like 200 projects and 1500-2000 meetings. 
Getting participants together in an or­
ganised framework to discuss pre-identi-
fied cooperation projects is the funda­
mental point of the event: 
— a partnership day organised jointly by 
the Commission and the CDI (see box). 
The main phases of monitoring are: 
— a first appraisal directly the event is 
over to look at the organisation and 
results via a survey (run by the consult­
ants hired to help with the organisation) 
of the businessmen who took part ; 
— a second such appraisal by the same 
consultants in the three months after the 
event, with a view to a progress report of 
each project at the end of the following 
March (fora usually take place in De­
cember) ; 
— an in-depth appraisal which the Com­
mission entrusts to the CDI. The aim here 
is to produce a precise report to enable 
the CDI to take stock of negotations 
between African promoters and potential 
European partners and then help them 
put their cooperation operations into 
practice, which may involve the provision 
of technical assistance, training schemes 
or assistance with preparing bankable 
dossiers. 
Partnership 
days 
The formula used for these sessions was 
very popular with forum participants, 
mainly for two reasons. 
First of all, the presentation of success­
ful partnerships by the businessmen who 
have negotiated them enables participants 
to take a proper, pragmatic look at the 
problems which have to be tackled before a 
cooperation operation can be a success. It 
is also an opportunity for them to learn 
from the technical, financial and commer­
cial solutions which the partners have 
found for these problems. 
An African journalist and various CD1 
officers run the case presentation session 
and ensure that the talks with the business­
men arc flexible and spontaneous. 
Secondly, the examples highlight the 
need to take a wide range of partnership 
formulae into account. The case analyses 
use the same terms as the speakers at the 
seminar, thereby showing that, in partner­
ship operations, there is a distinction to be 
made between 'engaged' and 'married' and 
that it is as well, if not essential, to have the 
'engagement' before the 'marriage'. 
One important thing to be learned from 
these meetings is that there is a whole range 
of technical, financial and commercial 
possibilities, involving different degrees of 
commitment, for inter-firm cooperation. 
Results 
An independent consultant's recent 
evaluation of the fora shows that results 
are very satisfactory when it comes to 
ACP-EEC firms participating and getting 
into contact, to participants exchanging 
information and to obtaining know-how 
about negotiating agreements between 
firms and creating a culture and a spirit of 
enterprise in the recipient ACP States. 
There were more than 500 participants 
(250 Europeans and 250 ACPs) at 
DAKAR-90, the 9th EEC-West Africa 
Industrial Forum, for example, and there 
were about 2000 officially organised 
meetings to enable them to discuss the 
250 or so projects put forward at the 
event. 
The results in terms of practical 
cooperation operations triggered by the 
fora are, however, very modest, in par­
ticular because of a crisis-ridden econ­
omic environment which is not very 
conducive to cooperation between firms. 
Financing difficulties are the commonest 
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obstacle to seeing this sort of operation 
through. 
However, it must be remembered that 
it takes time to see the practical outcome 
of cooperation between firms in the EEC 
and the developing countries, ACPs 
especially, and it is too early to draw any 
firm conclusions at this stage. 
Outlook 
The Commission has looked at the 
outcome of the assessment of the indus­
trial fora and is planning to look into the 
idea of extending these events, at the 
request of the competent regional author­
ities, along three main lines: 
-geographically, by organising forum-
type industrial promotion activities in 
other regions; 
— sectorally, by focusing some schemes 
in more specific areas (agro-food, mining, 
timber and export industries). 
Fora as a contribution to 
industrialisation in the ACP 
States 
It is worth pointing out that an 
industrial forum is an instrument of 
industrial promotion bringing ACP and 
European businessmen together and its 
main virtue is to provide an organised 
framework to make this job easier. 
We mention this again here to under­
line that these events do not claim to solve 
all the ACPs' industrialisation problems. 
The aims and the nature of the fora are 
not such as to have a direct influence on 
other essential aspects of the ACP indus­
trialisation process. It is also worth 
remembering that businessmen and or­
ganisations have in many cases expected 
more of these operations than they can 
actually offer. 
Industrial fora should be promotion 
operations run as part of the programmes 
of ACP-EEC industrial cooperation and 
support for the ACP private sector for 
which Lomé IV offers a range of possibi­
lities. 
A look at one or two basics of an ACP 
company support policy, highlighting the 
possibilities offered by the Convention, is 
perhaps useful here. 
PROJECT — rehabilitation of a 
margarine plant in Senegal 
Type of partnership 
A licensing, long-term technical assistance and marketing agreement between a Senegalese 
firm, SONACOS, and the Portuguese SNS. 
Profile of the partnership 
ACP: SONACOS 
SONACOS has a margarine production plant 140 km outside Dakar able to turn out 4500 
tonnes p.a. It has 20 years' experience in margarine manufacture, based on a contract with a 
multinational group and this came to an end in 1988, at which time production stopped. 
EEC: SNS (Sociedade Nacional de Sabões) 
SNS, which is based in Lisbon, produces and markets a wide range of products, including 
soaps, table oil, margarine, polish and varnish, glycerine, hygienic preparations, conservation 
and cleansing products, supplies for baking and pastry-making and for the paint industry, 
resin, glue and paper and PVC (for mineral water bottles). 
It also provides a wide range of services — economic studies, market surveys, technical and 
management assistance, assistance with marketing etc. 
Others involved 
ICEP (the Portguese external trade institute), Portugal's equivalent to the CDI. 
This first financed a diagnosis of the Senegalese firm and then covered the costs of starting 
up the plant again. 
CDI 
This identified the Portuguese partner with the help of the ICEP, cofinanced the diagnosis and 
collaborated in the negotiations to finalise agreements between the two parties. It then 
cofinanced the costs of starting up the plant again. 
Project summary 
Relaunching margarine production in Senegal with the help of a European firm. 
The two partners met at the EEC-West Africa Industrial Forum in December 1988 and 
were invited to a working meeting at the CDI. 
The Senegalese and the Portuguese companies signed a letter of intent and an ICEP-CDI 
cofinanced diagnosis mission went out to Dakar, following which the European partner made 
specific proposals about starting the plant up again. These were as follows: 
- technical: formulation and quality of the margarine (and the raw materials), 
rehabilitation and start-up programme, long-term technical assistance; 
— commercial: testing the market, packaging, advertising, distribution, brand etc. 
In May 1990, negotiations were held with CDI and ICEP support in Portugal to come up 
with a licence agreement involving long-term technical assistance and help with marketing. 
In June 1990, the European partner began test producing margarine in Europe to try out on 
the market. The programme to rehabilitate and start-up the Senegalese plant then began with 
cofinancing from the CDI and the ICEP. 
SNS and SONACOS also signed two other agreements: 
— an agreement on sub-contracting production for export to third countries; 
— a letter of intent on setting up a joint venture to manufacture other products. 
Features of the partnership 
The agreement between the two partners, which is more than an ordinary licence contract, 
is in three parts: 
— preparation and re-start of the Senegalese production unit; 
— transfer of know-how in all (technical, commercial, management etc) areas in the 
medium term (four years), paid for from royalties based on the turnover of the Senegalese 
plant; 
— possibility of one-off activities by SNS, at SONACOS' request, for developments 
planned later. 
Financially speaking, this new agreement costs the Senegalese company less and is more 
flexible to apply. 
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The first area to look at is the ACPs' 
legal and institutional environment. 
This is very important, because involv­
ing the private sector in the development 
drive, particularly the SME promotion 
side of it, means providing a climate 
conducive to national and foreign invest­
ment and to the creation and develop­
ment of firms. 
So improvements to the economic, 
legal and tax environment, and to the 
institutional framework, will often be 
called for to ensure that the firms have 
favourable conditions to work in, with 
SMEs and big firms on an equal footing. 
This is a key area for the Community to 
back up ACP effort. 
Indeed, in Article 111 of Title VIU of 
the Convention (Enterprise develop­
ment), the Community and the ACP 
States recognise the need for technical 
assistance with improving the legal and 
tax framework in which firms have to 
operate. 
The second point has to do with SME 
financing. 
SME access to finance (risk capital and 
medium- and long-term credit) has to be 
improved as a basic means of offering 
encouragement to firms. 
New methods of encouraging joint 
ventures and of spreading firms
1 tech­
nological, industrial and commercial 
risks have to be found (risk capital comes 
in here) and it is important to try to adapt 
medium- and long-term financing (work-
Official flag of the Dakar Fair 
ing capital included) and guarantee sys­
tems to the special needs of the SME. 
Lomé IV puts particular emphasis on 
aid for the mobilisation of national 
savings, the development of financial 
intermediaries and technical assistance 
with the reorganisation and reform of 
financial institutions. 
When new SME financing instruments 
are set up and additional resources 
channelled through the financial inter­
mediaries, training and technical assist­
ance programmes will be needed to 
improve the hitter's operational skills. 
A third important subject in any 
private sector support policy is to develop 
businessmen's skills and make ACP firms 
more competitive on both local and 
export markets. It is vital to encourage 
chambers of commerce and professional 
bodies to do more in the company 
development process and this is covered 
by Article 111 of the Convention men­
tioned earlier. 
Two key factors, management and 
technology, are worthy of particular 
mention here. 
An effort should be made to identify 
the management problems and specific 
solutions of ACP firms in the various 
areas of company strategy, human re­
sources, marketing, financing and pro­
duction. 
Lomé IV (Article 111 (d)) provides for 
technical assistance with setting up spe­
cific programmes to train and develop the 
skills of heads of firms, particularly in 
small firms and the informal sectors. 
As regards technology, which is the 
other factor of competitiveness, an in­
crease in the technological autonomy of 
the ACP firms is fundamental. This 
means not only supporting the transfer of 
appropriate technology, but making a 
sustained effort to absorb and adapt it 
and, above all, to develop and distribute 
local technology. 
So schemes are needed to help firms to 
identify and set up adapted technology 
and local technological institutions to 
develop appropriate processes for both 
local and export markets.O M.M. 
14 Manufacturing parastatals 
so dismal after ali 
not 
by Barbara GROSH (*) 
As the wave of privatisation sweeps across Africa under various structural 
adjustment programmes, the debate has also come to the fore as to whether 
public or private enterprises make greater economic sense. In this article, which 
is admittedly technical, Barbara Grosh analyses a study of manufacturing in 
Kenya and comes down firmly in favour of government participation, albeit 
mostly in joint ventures. 
Many believe that government owner­
ship of commercial firms leads to inef­
ficiency, protection and politicisation. 
Some believe that African economies will 
only improve when many parastatals 
(firms owned by the government) are 
privatised. 
A recent data set for Kenya shows a 
more positive role for government par­
ticipation. Within the same industry, 
public firms and joint ventures were 
generally more efficient and less pro­
tected than private firms. 
There is little reason to expect either 
greater efficiency or greater profitability 
from selling government shares in joint 
ventures, or from totally divesting purely 
public firms. Taking private partners in 
purely public firms may lead to better 
performance. 
The data 
During 1985 the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning and the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry directed a 
study of the manufacturing sector in 
Kenya. The survey covered 77 manu­
facturing firms during 1984. Managers 
were interviewed and each firm com­
pleted a 17-page questionnaire with 
information on revenue, costs and ca­
pacity utilisation. We use those data here 
to analyse the impact of private versus 
public ownership. 
The sample covered about 33% of net 
manufacturing output and 28% of manu­
facturing employment, with firms in 10 
manufacturing industries. Between 20% 
and 45% of the employees were covered 
in all but two industries. For these two — 
(*) The author is Assistant Professor of Public 
Administration and Senior Research Associate, 
Metropolitan Studies Program. Syracuse University. 
A longer version of this article appeared in the 
Development Policy Review, Vol. 8. ( 1990). 43-58. For 
information on parastatals in other sectors in Kenya, 
see the author's book Public Enterprises in Kenya: 
What Works, What Doesn't and Why. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder. Colorado. 1991. 
wood and furniture, and electrical and 
transport equipment — the coverage was 
only 5% and 7%, respectively. 
The firms in the sample fell into three 
groups. Twelve were purely private, some 
owned by multinationals and some by 
Kenyan entrepreneurs. The government 
owned the rest of the firms either partly or 
wholly via one or more of Kenya's 
parastatal Development Finance Insti­
tutions (DFIs), the Industrial and Com­
mercial Development Corporation, the 
Industrial Development Bank, or the 
Development Finance Company of 
Kenya. The President of Kenya appoints 
the top managers of firms owned wholly 
by DFIs. Managers of joint ventures are 
appointed by their Boards of Directors, 
which include DFI staff and representat­
ives of the private partner. 
Table 1 : Average measures of performance, 
by industry and ownership 
Industry 
1. Paper & packaging 
Joint venture 
Private 
2. Wood & furniture 
Joint venture 
Private 
3. Food Processing 
Public 
Joint venture 
Private 
4. Beverages & tobacco 
Public 
Private 
5. Chemicals 
Public 
Joint venture 
Private 
6. Textiles 
Public 
Joint venture 
Private 
7. Clothing, footwear, 
other textile & leather 
products 
Public 
Private 
8. Metal & metal pro­
ducts 
Public 
Joint venture 
Private 
9. Non-metallic minerals 
Public 
Private 
10. Electrical & transport 
equipment & misc. 
manufactures 
Public 
Joint venture 
Private 
ERP*(%) 
-30.4 
-13.8 
-13.6 
-29.6 
-2.7 
4.1 
-2.1 
-4.1 
17.2 
38.1 
49.0 
-9.4 
94.4 
-17.9 
616.8 
-38.2 
51.0 
-61.6 
34.0 
169.0 
-11.7 
104.8 
425.1 
50.3 
521.4 
DRC* 
1.54 
1.71 
0.97 
0.94 
0.28 
0.91 
1.51 
0.81 
1.18 
0.82 
1.08 
0.99 
2.31 
1.16 
16.56 
2.68 
1.00 
1.53 
1.78 
5.20 
1.30 
2.05 
3.02 
1.66 
4.16 
Notes: Averages are means, weighted by value added. 
* See over for explanations. 
ROR* (%) 
2.7 
3.5 
8.3 
missing 
121.8 
19.1 
5.5 
20.2 
13.3 
32.1 
24.5 
9.8 
9.9 
2.1 
0.6 
-4.5 
35.7 
-1.9 
6.3 
3.7 
2.5 
12.8 
52.8 
29.2 
33.7 
N* 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
9 
1 
3 
2 
3 
10 
4 
2 
1 
1 
7 
1 
4 
6 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
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Analysis 
We make three sets of comparisons: 
public versus private firms, joint ventures 
versus private firms and public firms 
versus joint ventures. We compare the 
firms in terms of protection, efficiency 
and profitability. We compare firms 
within industries. The data reporting 
these comparisons are shown in Table 1. 
Public versus private 
Public firms were generally less pro­
tected and more profitable and efficient 
than private firms in the same sector. 
There were public firms in eight of the ten 
industries. In all except the chemical 
industry, the public firms showed a lower 
average rate of effective protection than 
did the private firms. In five industries 
public firms suffered negative effective 
protection. 
The effective rate of protection (ERP) 
shows the degree to which trade restric­
tions encourage manufacture in Kenya. 
The ERP measures by how much factor 
costs (labour, rent, interest) for the stage 
of production done in Kenya could 
exceed costs for that same stage of 
production elsewhere, while the locally 
produced goods remain competitive on 
the local market because of tariffs. A 
positive ERP indicates local costs can be 
higher, while a negative ERP means that 
local firms must have lower cost margins 
to remain competitive in their home 
market. 
Efficiency can be measured using the 
domestic resource cost ratio (DRC). The 
DRC ratio compares the value of re­
sources consumed in domestic produc­
tion with value added, both in social 
prices. The term 'social prices' refers here 
to world prices for traded goods or to 
shadow prices for non-traded inputs. A 
DRC less than one means that value 
added is greater than the international 
value of resources consumed. Such a firm 
uses resources efficiently by world stan­
dards. A DRC greater than one means 
that the value of resources consumed to 
produce locally was more than the value 
added. In such cases, local production 
drains the economy more than would 
import. 
Public firms were more efficient on 
average than private firms in all but one 
industry-clothing, footwear, and other 
textile and leather products. In three of 
the eight industries public firms per­
formed efficiently by world standards 
Table 2 : Distribution of capital stock by industry grouping and 
ownership classification 
(percentage of capital) 
Public 
INDUSTRIES WITH NO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION* 
Paper & packaging 
Wood & furniture 
Food processing 
2.1 
Joint ven. 
68.2 
INDUSTRIES WITH MODERATE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION'' 
Beverages & tobacco 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
HIGHLY PROTECTED INDUSTRIES': 
Clothing, footwear, etc. 
Metal & metal products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Elee. & transport equip. 
Total portfolio 
Total investment (KSH M) 
Number of firms 
Average investment per firm 
a Average ERP ranged from -27% to 2%. 
b Average ERP ranged from 14% to 35%. 
c Average ERP ranged from 50% to 112%. 
85.8 
12.5 
100.0 
1,306.9 
12 
108.9 
19.9 
11.9 
100.0 
6,690.5 
18 
352.1 
Private 
35.6 
27.7 
36.7 
100.0 
5,409.8 
43 
128.8 
(DRC was less than one). In the other five 
industries, the public firms were inef­
ficient by world standards, but (in all but 
one) were more efficient than their 
private competitors. 
In five of the eight industries, public 
firms were more profitable on average 
than their private counterparts. Their 
rates of return (ROR) are shown in the 
fourth column of Table 1. The public 
firms were less profitable in three as a 
result of lower protection. Only in the 
clothing industry did public firms have 
lower profits which could be ascribed to 
lower levels of efficiency. There, negative 
effective protection compounded the 
public firm's lower profits, while private 
firms enjoyed positive protection. Profit­
ability was measured using the total 
return to capital, including interest costs 
and profits, divided by the replacement 
cost of capital. 
Joint ventures versus 
private firms 
Joint ventures were more efficient than 
private firms in five out of seven indus­
tries. They were also generally less 
protected, but because of their greater 
efficiency, joint ventures always achieved 
rates of return which approximated or 
exceeded those of private firms. There 
were joint ventures in seven industries. In 
four of these, the joint ventures ex­
perienced nil or negative effective protec­
tion. The joint ventures had average rates 
of effective protection which were both 
positive and greater than those of the 
private firms in only one industry, chemi­
cals. Thus privatising the public portion 
of joint ventures would probably not 
increase efficiency or profitability. 
Public versus joint venture 
In five industries there are both public 
firms and joint ventures. In two of those 
- textiles, and electrical and transport 
equipment and miscellaneous manufac­
tures - - the joint ventures had much 
lower effective protection. They were also 
much more efficient than the public firms, 
suggesting an argument for partial priv­
atisation. The joint ventures reported 
lower average profit rates than did the 
public firms, so partial privatisation 
would probably not increase profits. 
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'There is evidence that joint ventures perform better than purely public firms' 
Table 3 : Quantity index of manufacturing production 
(1976 = 100) 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Industries with no effective protection 
Index 132.7 
% change 
Industries with moderate effective protection 
Index 155.5 
% change 
Highly protected industries 
Index 353.7 
% change 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
Index 163.6 
% change 
140.2 
5.7 
176.4 
13.4 
316.3 
-10.6 
170.3 
4.1 
145.9 
4.0 
186.2 
5.6 
293.0 
-7.4 
178.2 
4.6 
160.8 
10.2 
203.4 
9.2 
277.5 
-5.3 
188.7 
5.9 
175.7 
9.3 
222.7 
9.5 
270.6 
-2.5 
199.4 
5.7 
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1988. 
Capacity utilisation — 
key to efficiency 
Public and private firms are less ef­
ficient than joint ventures mainly because 
of lower capacity utilisation. On average, 
joint ventures had 92% capacity utilis­
ation, and their average DRC of .96 
showed them to be efficient by inter­
national standards. In contrast, public 
firms averaged only 68% capacity utilis­
ation and their DRC of 1.41 showed 
inefficiency. Had their capacity utilis­
ation risen to 100%, their DRC would 
have fallen to 1.05, i.e., they would almost 
have been efficient. Private firms had the 
lowest average capacity utilisation, 61%, 
and the highest average DRC, 1.46. Had 
they been able to operate at full capacity 
their DRC would have fallen to .96, i.e., 
they would have been efficient. 
One reason capacity utilisation was 
low was cyclical. In 1984 Kenya ex­
perienced the worst drought in its history, 
with depressing effects on demand in 
many sectors, especially durable goods 
sectors. Since 1984 public firms have 
probably improved their capacity utilis­
ation, while private firms have probably 
had theirs fall. This conclusion stems 
from evidence in Tables 2 and 3. Public 
firms had 85% of their capital invested in 
sectors with moderate protection. Those 
same sectors have had rapid output 
growth since 1984, so capacity utilisation 
is probably up. Private firms had 36% of 
their capital invested in highly protected 
industries. Those industries have shown 
declining output since 1984, undoubtedly 
causing falling capacity utilisation. 
Conclusion 
The parastatal DFIs seem to have 
played a positive role in Kenya. They 
seem to have been especially effective in 
their joint ventures with private firms. 
These joint ventures have been efficient in 
most sectors, and.never much less ef­
ficient than the private sector. They have 
also functioned with near zero average 
rates of protection, and made modest 
profits. In contrast the private sector has 
invested a substantial part of its portfolio 
in highly protected industries, shown low 
levels of capacity utilisation and inef­
ficiency. It may be that government 
partnership has served as a form of 
reassurance to private partners, inducing 
them to invest in sectors where the payoff 
period is longer. The private partners 
may feel more confident that the re­
gulatory environment will be consistent 
when the state has a stake than when it 
has none. When private firms are nervous 
about the investment climate they look 
for higher protection and shorter payoff 
periods. 
There is evidence that joint ventures 
perform better than purely public firms. 
Joint ventures have the bulk of their 
investments in unprotected industries 
while public firms have the bulk of their 
investment in industries with moderate 
protection. However, even within the 
same sector, the joint ventures performed 
better than the public firms in two of the 
five industries. This may well be because 
of the way managers are appointed. 
Public firms' managers are appointed 
politically and may be either less qualified 
technically or simply more subject to 
various political pressures which negat­
ively affect the efficiency of their firm. 
Private partners may push for technically 
qualified managers and resist political 
pressure. Enlisting their aid may be a 
good strategy for parastatal DFIs.O 
B.G. 
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BENIN  The democratic model 
Democratic rebirth — as this resolutely modernistic work displays 
February 1990. Months of striking have 
brought the State to its knees. The 
Government takes the unprecedented step 
of calling a national conference ranging 
across the political spectrum in an attempt 
to handle the crisis. The conference, which 
has very broad powers, opts for a de-
mocratic approach based on human rights 
anda multiparty system and lays down new 
democratic guidelines. A new constitution 
enshrining the new democratic principles is 
adopted during the year that follows and 
municipal, legislative and presidential 
elections are organised. Nicèphore Soglo, 
the Prime Minister of the transitional 
period, becomes President, but ill health 
forces him to go to France for treatment as 
soon as he is sworn in. While convalescing, 
he appoints Désiré Vieyra Minister of 
State for Defence and for the Coordination 
of Government Action. 
'Benin is an experimental laboratory 
both for the financial backers and the 
other countries of Africa". The speaker, 
who has followed the democratic process 
closely, knows exactly what he is talking 
about, because his country is financing a 
major development programme in Benin. 
And indeed the Béninois experiment, 
universally agreed to be an outstanding 
example of its kind, has become 'a model 
for all those wanting their countries to 
avoid murderous upheavals of the sort 
which have led to interminable bloodshed 
in Liberia and Somalia'. 
The idea of a national conference as a 
way of freeing the bottlenecks caused by 
single-party dictatorship and autocratic 
management left Cotonou and spread all 
over the continent. Every opponent from 
Yaoundé to Conakry and N'Djamena to 
Lomé is now anxious for these exercises 
in collective exorcism, a mixture of 
vehement denunciation and contrite self-
criticism against a background of socio­
economic autopsies leading up to a 
general consensus on how to get out of 
the impasse. Some countries — Gabon 
and Congo, for example — have already 
had their conferences and have taken 
their emulation of Benin to the extent of 
having a man of the church in charge. 
Others — Niger, Mali and the CAR -
are in the midst of their preparations, 
with a trip to Cotonou more or less a 
must. The Gabonese were in fact the first 
to go on an official trip and they were 
followed by the Malians, while the 
Congolese have been unofficially and 
those from Niger were expected in Benin 
at the time of writing. 
The common concern of all these 
visitors is. of course, to get Benin's 
infallible recipe, not just for organising 
and running a National Conference of the 
Live Forces of the Nation (which is what 
llicsc sessions arc officiali) called), bul 
for scrupulously implementing the deci­
sions the meeting takes — i.e. drafting 
and adopting a new constitution based on 
a multi-party system, legislative and 
presidential elections and respect for 
human rights. 
Constraints of democracy 
Benin's peaceful transition, ruffled 
only by clashes of political ambition in 
the Government (sometimes impeding 
State action), the occasional failure to 
stick to the agreed election timetable and 
one or two (in some cases violent) 
controversies at the polls, was thanks to 
the maturity of the country's political 
class. And everyone agrees on the par­
ticular effort made by the trio at the top 
during the transitional period - Pre­
sident Mathieu Kérékou, who was 
courageous and clear-sighted enough to 
lay his power open to question to avoid 
the sort of carnage which occurred 
elsewhere (he was rewarded with amnesty 
for all his deeds during his 17 years in 
power), Nicèphore Soglo. the former PM, 
who, as Head of Government, had to put 
the decisions of the national conference 
into practice and start up the state 
apparatus again (his compatriots showed 
their appreciation by electing him Pre­
sident of the Republic), and Monsignor 
Isidore De Souza, whose moral au-
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thority, negotiating skills and innate 
sense of State worked wonders at the 
crucial time of the conference and then at 
the head of the High Council of the 
Republic, the legislative body of the 
transitional period. 
Will all African countries seeking 
inspiration from the Béninois model find 
men such as these when the time comes? 
Let us hope so. But they are not the only 
ones to be watching what is going on in 
Benin. The funders too, of both bilateral 
and multilateral aid, are monitoring the 
situation closely, for others will be able to 
use the answers Benin finds to the 
problems of those hypertrophic civil 
services, unemployed graduates, bank­
rupt state firms and ill-adapted education 
systems which dog all the countries of 
Africa to one extent or another. What 
was sometimes brutal economic reorgani­
sation has been wrought in Africa in the 
recent past, of course, but in most cases it 
has been imposed from the top by 
authoritarian regimes little concerned 
with the state of mind of the general 
public. 
But things are quite different in Benin 
now. People do not hesitate to go out into 
the street and make their claims, trade 
unions are properly organised and re­
gularly say what they think and the 
political parties — 14 of them stood in the 
elections — are active once more. So how 
can austerity measures be applied, even if 
everyone agrees, or claims to, that they 
are unavoidable? How can they be 
applied when they will, perforce, involve 
an even greater deterioration in the 
standard of living of already very poorly 
paid people? Democracy has its own 
constraints, as we know, especially the 
need for negotiation with employers and 
workers (with all the imponderables this 
entails), who may not always agree that 
certain issues are urgent. 
Rumour or reality? 
The Government may well have hesi­
tated to take certain steps when elections 
were on the horizon, which is perfectly 
understandable, but now that the voting 
is over and the men and the institutions 
are there, the time of big decisions is upon 
it. So it is unfortunate that, just at this 
moment, a cog in the well-oiled ma­
chinery of Benin's move to democracy 
should go awry. The new President, 
Nicèphore Soglo, has been sick and was 
hospitalised in France, according to 
official sources with typhoid fever and a 
bout of sciatica, and it could not have 
been worse timed. It has meant that the 
state of grace normally following pre­
sidential elections was not used for the 
most delicate reorganisational measures 
involving pruning the civil service to 
release money for investment. State 
revenue is just enough to cover the civil 
servants' pay at the moment, but only 
just. There is nothing left, not even for a 
drop of petrol or a ream of paper. The 
situation is obviously unbearable. 
The most extraordinary rumours have 
been circulating about the President's 
illness. Nicèphore Soglo, they say, is 
under a spell cast by his political oppon­
ents (this is not Africa for nothing), or 
suffering from poison taken at an election 
meeting and afflicted with a strange 
malady which^disappears as soon as he 
goes abroad but is doubly severe when he 
puts his foot back on Béninois soil, thus 
preventing him from doing his job. In 
May, well-informed people in Cotonou 
were «iviim details of an imminent 
President Nicèphore Soglo visiting 
Brussels in January 
announcement of a vacant presidency, 
without so much as a blush when they 
were told that the constitution did not 
allow for such a procedure in case of 
temporary incapacity of the President. 
House of intellectuals 
But all these rumours, which Mr 
Soglo's brief television appearances did 
nothing to dispel, ultimately created an 
unhealthy climate in Benin in the early 
winter and the new national assembly did 
nothing to help the situation by dragging 
out the discussion of its rules of pro­
cedure and delaying setting up its com­
mittees. Many people, including Monsig­
nor De Souza, saw the MPs' shillyshally­
ing as an attempt at buying time until the 
President came back to negotiate possible 
seats in the Government — a far more 
attractive prospect than heading a par­
liamentary committee. Such dilatory 
manoeuvring was child's play for a House 
that the Béninois with a mixture of pride 
and embarrassment, called the most 
intellectual parliament in the world. 
Almost all the 62 MPs are graduates, 
which, Robert Dossou, MP, told me, is 
because of a voting system whereby the 
heads of lists, who are always chosen 
from among the intellectual élite, are 
always elected. 
The MPs are not the last to complain 
about this imbalance in national rep­
resentation. Albert Tevodjéré, for ex­
ample, the former deputy director general 
of the ILO and the leader of the Our 
Common Cause party, has no hesitation 
in saying that an extra House is called for, 
a sort of senate, for all those 'who do not 
necessarily speak French, because all the 
other institutions, the executive, the 
legislative and the constitutional bodies 
are for the privileged'. 
Although the majority of these MPs 
support government action (48 of them 
have voted for Nicèphore Soglo at one 
time or another), the rest hesitate to come 
down frankly on the side of the oppo­
sition — if what State Minister Désiré 
Vieyra says is anything to go by. Is this 
because the programmes of the different 
parties are all based on the same crisis and 
propose very similar solutions? Or do 
people believe that the state of the 
economy is such that there has to be a 
consensus on the difficult measures that 
need taking? Some people, like Monsig­
nor De Souza, are calling for a govern­
ment of national unity or at least a 
common programme and it would be 
paradoxical if Benin's political class, 
which rightly fought the single party 
system, indirectly resuscitated it by being 
united. At all events, it is 'easy to be an 
opponent today', as Robert Dossou 
points out, 'because the problems facing 
us have built up over the past 30 years and 
they will not be sorted out overnight'... 
which means that there will be plenty of 
room for discontent which can be used to 
change people's opinions for some time 
to come. 
Surrealistic debate 
But with or without an opposition, 
there is one problem that the new 
Government has to tackle as a matter of 
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urgency and that is the student problem. 
For some time now, the university in 
Benin has been in a state of upheaval and 
has even been closed on a number of 
occasions. The students' main complaint 
is delay in the payment of their grants and 
university assistance -- there are four 
months outstanding this year (two made 
available recently), nine for 1989 (the 
famous 'blank' year) and, most curiously, 
one for 1985 (May, the month of the 
strike). The Minister of Education. 
Paulin Houtoundji. says this last claim is 
'ridiculous', because only 40 of the 250 
potential beneficiaries are still following 
courses, the rest having been working or 
looking for work for years. 
The grants debate takes an occasional 
totally surrealistic turn. An award of 
CFAF 25 000 (and slightly more for some 
professional establishments) per month 
goes to 2490 of the 9000 students enrolled 
in higher education. CFAF 100 000 per 
year goes to a further 1500 students if 
they are aged no more than 24 on 31 
December in the first year of enrolment 
and have a mark of 11.5 out of 20 in the 
end of year examinations. The students 
fought hard for an age limit of 39, and 
then 35, before resigning themselves to 
the idea of accepting this lower figure — 
whereas 24-year old baccalaureate-hol-
ders in most other countries of Africa 
have no chance of this sort of state help 
and are sometimes not even allowed to 
enrol at all because places are so short. 
The Béninois students who were the 
spearhead of the dispute which forced 
President Kérékou to agree to the idea of 
a national conference feel they have been 
forgotten in all the changes. The workers, 
they say. have been paid for the month's 
strike. The Government is apparently not 
against paying some of the arrears, but. 
with structural adjustment, it only has 
CFAF 900 million for its home students. 
However, the Minister of Education was 
keen to point out that 'grants are not 
wages, contrary to what the students 
think. They are not a right, any more than 
the university is a parking lot for people 
to sit about while looking for something 
better'. 
The only worthwhile suggestion, as he 
sees it, is to transform Benin's school 
system in accordance with the wishes of 
the education authorities, putting greater 
emphasis on vocational training and the 
standard of teaching. Education as de-
signed to train civil servants at the 
beginning of the century is no longer what 
is needed now the civil service has reached 
saturation point. Here, as in many 
African countries, the diagnosis is cor-
rect, but the difficulty is breaking with a 
system which has created the problem but 
is still popular because of its successes in 
the past. 
Educational reform is a necessity 
nonetheless. There are already 4000 
young graduates looking for work and 
their ranks are swelling all the time, 
although the economy cannot find the 
welders or plumbers or electricians or 
modem farmers it needs. 
First dividends 
The schooling problem is undeniably 
one of the most difficult to solve. For-
tunately for the Government, other, 
apparently equally difficult things the 
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Savers have more and more confidence in the new banks 
Paulin Houtoundji, 
Minister of Education 
banks, for example — are moving along 
the right lines. New private institutions 
have in fact sprung up on the ruins of the 
three national hanks which were 
liquidated because 75% of their port­
folios were irrecoverable (there were 
more than CFAF 124 billion-worth of 
doubtful claims). With democracy, the 
savers' confidence, damaged by having 
their deposits frozen when the state banks 
collapsed, has returned too. Four new 
banks have taken in upwards of CFAF 50 
billion (almost half of it for the Bank of 
Africa, in which Béninois are majority 
shareholders) in a year. The fact that 
savers are beginning to switch home 
funds long in the hands of Togolese 
bankers to help their own country's 
development is encouraging, ofthat there 
is no doubt, and if the movement were to 
gather momentum. Benin would be cash­
ing the first dividends of its new regime of 
freedom. 
It has already had spinoff in the shape 
of more sollicitousness amongst the 
fundeis (the famous 'most democratic' of 
them) during the process of creating the 
new institutions. But their political inter­
est will not last forever, particularly since 
Benin no longer has a monopoly on the 
move over to democracy, and the central 
issue — too much state spending — now 
has to be tackled as a matter of urgency. 
It would be a drama for the future of 
democracy in Benin if political compli­
cations, even triggered by perfectly na­
tural causes, caused any further delay in 
the settling of this problem. AT. 
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Monsignor de Souza: 
'People are too selfish and they do not show enough 
love for their country' 
Everyone in Benin is convinced that much of the success 
of the National Conference was due to Monsignor Isidore 
de Souza, that rotund, good-natured, mischievous and 
highly moral man who masterminded the debates, and it 
came as no surprise when he was made President of the 
High Council of the Republic, the nation's legislative body 
for the transitional period, after the meeting — which lie 
had in fact attended by chance when he stepped into the 
breach as an eleventh-hour replacement for the bishops' 
representative. Believers may well see this as the hand of 
destiny. 
In this interview, Monsignor de Sottra talks about the main 
economic problems lite transitional government has had to tackle. 
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► Monsignor, did the national con-
ference perhaps neglect the economy a 
little bit...? 
- There were two crises. First of all. 
there was the economic crisis - - the 
worst, the biggest and the hardest to do 
anything about. On top ofthat essentially 
economic and therefore social crisis, there 
was a political crisis and everyone in 
Benin believed the two were linked — bar 
the Head of State, who spent a lot of time 
in one of his speeches saying that he had 
not called the National Conference to go 
in for pointless political discussions, but 
because there was an economic crisis he 
wanted to find answers to. The crisis, to 
his mind, was essentially an economic 
one. I told him that there was a political 
crisis on top of it, as must have been 
obvious from the fact that the students 
and civil servants were unwilling to call 
off their strike until the political system 
had been changed. This political crisis 
was the star of the show and I have to say 
that the National Conference paid a lot 
more attention to the star than to the 
economic backdrop, although not with­
out making some hints —but only 
hints — as to how the basic crisis might 
be handled. It called for the civil service to 
be reformed, for example. 
► Do you mean pruned? 
— Indeed I do, because one ofthe main 
reasons for our crisis is that every bit of 
Benin's State revenue goes into paying 
the civil servants, although they and their 
families only make up 10% ofthe nation 
and we have 90% of the population 
paying the taxes which make up the State 
budget and only 10% getting the benefit. 
That's not right. There are the services 
which that 10% render to the nation and 
the economic and social effects of their 
wages, obviously, but it would have been 
better to have the State's income doing 
more. The civil service is enormous and it 
is easy to see why, because the State in 
fact thought it had to recruit everyone 
who had been to university into the civil 
service. It systematically took on all new 
graduates, without any idea of planning 
requirements or possibilities. You can't 
do that. There is no country in the world 
that can systematically give jobs to all its 
graduates. 
► / think the message has got across 
now and the students understand... 
— No, they don't. Not all of them. And 
there are people who have got into the 
civil service with forged diplomas or no 
qualifications at all. If we check on 
diplomas strictly, I think, we can cut out 
at least a third of the civil service, or at 
least reduce the staff who have only got 
the certificate of primary education 
instead of the baccalaureate they claim. 
They are classified in the light of their 
diplomas, after all. 
► But why hasn't this been done over 
the past year? 
— The executive should have set up a 
commission to do it, but it had to tackle 
the immediate problem of finding wages. 
► A nd there were the elections, weren 't 
there, because if you lay offa third of the 
civil service, you have that many more 
dissatisfied people, don't you? 
- It is a complicated problem. I have 
to say. We Béninois are very complicated, 
as our present President of the Republic 
so often says. We want one thing and we 
want the opposite at the same time. We 
want to rationalise the civil service 
without laying anyone off and it can't be 
done. Yet we are very good at opposing 
Goverment action. I realise that we shall 
find that we haven't done anything like 
that which the National Conference 
asked when we take stock of this trans­
itional period. As an economic measure 
too there was the privatisation of our 
State firms, but that has been done. 
► These were healthier firms, were 
they:' 
- There are some privatisations which 
I don't personally agree with at all and the 
privatisation of the BCB, the Banque 
Commerciale du Benin, is one of them. I 
am neither a banker nor an economist, 
but I still think that we were stupid to 
liquidate the BCB. It wasn't even priv­
atised. More privatisation is on the cards 
- the La Béninoise brewery, for ex­
ample. Privatising that would be a lesser 
evil, but liquidating it would be another 
mistake. When companies ofthat sort go 
broke in a country where a lot of beer is 
drunk, it has to be due to bad manage­
ment. If it were run properly, it would 
make a profit. 
► That looks as if you've developed a 
taste for political action 
- I was already talking like that before 
I started in this business. 
The Courier no.  July-August 1991  21 BENIN 
► Yes, but it probably didn 't get you 
anywhere at the time... 
— It doesn't even now, because I'm not 
on the executive. I tried to oppose BCB 
liquidation as much as I could, but 1 
failed. 
► They say the election campaign had 
much more to do with people than with 
ideas or programmes... 
— What I am about to say doesn't 
apply just to Benin. It applies to nearly all 
of Africa. For the moment, we are 
electing men, not choosing programmes. 
This is a dominant feature of Africa. 
Some of our parties proposed program­
mes, but they looked so much alike that, 
if you read one, you'd read the lot, as they 
were all based on the same economic, 
social and political analysis. And the 
candidates themselves didn't insist much 
on their programmes either. Even the 
President elect never mentioned his. He 
hasn't got one. 
► Is this structural adjustment? 
— By no means. Structural adjustment 
isn't a programme. It's now that the 
programme has to be designed and I hope 
it will be drawn up not just by him and the 
one or two parties which back him. I hope 
it will emerge from a national concensus. 
► You are for a government of national 
unity ? 
— I'm talking about programmes, not 
governments. If I were President of the 
Republic, I wouldn't try and form a 
government right away. I'd start by 
trying to get some national consensus on 
a government programme and I'd call a 
mini-conference of about 60 people for 
this purpose; economists, experts and 
leading figures who hold the traditional 
power and are far stronger than the 
President in some fields, the leaders of all 
the parties represented in the National 
Assembly. And once the programme was 
ready, I'd ask them how many ministers 
they thought we needed to supervise 
implementation, insisting on the need to 
keep the numbers down on the grounds of 
austerity — to 10, perhaps, but certainly 
not 20 or even 17. Only afterwards would 
I tell them to leave my hands free to form 
my government to do all the things we 
had planned together. This Conference 
will be always kept in mind in all the draft 
decrees, so everyone will have the im­
pression that it is his particular pro­
gramme which is being implemented. 
► Who knows? People may well listen 
to you, but doesn't the North-South 
polarisation which appeared in this latest 
election campaign go against this kind of 
consensus ? 
— Apparently, intellectually, yes. But 
psychologically and tactically, no. On the 
contrary, it may provide a solution for 
North-South polarisation. The fact of 
getting the people in North and South 
alike to say what they think, to meet and 
to discuss together, on the other hand, is 
going to foster cohesion. 
► Would you then put the moral 
authority which you enjoy in this country at 
the service of a government to explain that 
the State cannot do it all? 
— I haven't waited to do so. I met the 
students again last week (') and told 
them, inter alia, that there was no point in 
asking for the arrears for 1990, the year in 
which they did no studying, because the 
Government did not have the means to 
pay them. One of the things I called for 
was a social truce, with the trade unions 
dropping their claims and all of us trying 
to build the country together — the only 
way to get what they want. Even if they 
overturned the Government, the change 
wouldn't bring an immediate, automatic, 
magic answer to their claims. We have to 
stop the country going from government 
to government. We mustn't start on 
another series of coups d'etat every three 
or four months. 
► Do you think there could be another 
coup d'état in Benin after all you've been 
through ? 
— I have no illusions. There might not 
be another military coup, but there is 
nothing to say there won't be a civilian 
one. When you overturn one government 
after another, you may make people want 
more, army included — although we have 
practical evidence that this is no answer. 
Until we have decided to make an effort 
and make sacrifices and get resolutely 
down to work, there will be no answer. 
► Does that mean people have not yet 
got down to work again ? 
- Frankly, I have to say that I have 
seen nothing serious or permanent de­
signed to build the country so far. People 
are not disinterested enough, nor do they 
love their country enough. We aren't 
nationalists. We are individualists and 
egoists. We have to congratulate the 
transitional Government and its head. 
(') The interview was on 6 May. 
the present President ofthe Republic, for 
setting people to work — but they are not 
yet working as they ought and they never 
will until every Béninois is convinced that 
his State is no welfare State. The State is 
there to try and give everyone the best 
living conditions, in cohesion, in peace 
and in tranquillity. But no-one is con­
vinced of this yet. People — students, civil 
servants and peasants — expect the State 
to do everything for them. But it can't. 
Where would it get the money? 
► The fact that the President is sick 
and absent is' creating a void at the 
moment... 
— It would be wrong for the period we 
are currently living through to last too 
long. This is why I personally am praying 
and asking people to pray to the Lord to 
make the President ofthe Republic better 
and restore him to full health soon, so 
that everyone can focus on him in the 
building of our country. Why are the M Ps 
marking time in their discussions on the 
rules of procedure? I think — and 1 mean 
think, not assert - - that one of the 
reasons for this is the fact that the new 
President isn't there and hasn't yet 
formed his Government. People cannot 
hold two posts — you can either be an 
MP or a minister — so there is every point 
in letting things hang fire, because, if they 
choose now they may well be biting their 
fingers tomorrow. So they are waiting 
and, to my mind, waiting is not in the 
country's interests. Wc are putting our 
personal interests before the State's 
interests and I am free to say so because I 
am not fishing for anything. 1 have not 
got my eye on any jobs or any material 
advantages and that is my strength. 
► To hear you talk, you could almost 
forget that you are one ofthe heads ofthe 
church in Benin. Is the church in your 
country finding recruitment difficult at the 
moment ? 
- No. Quite the contrary. Under the 
previous régime, we lost our schools and 
they wanted to confine us to the vestry 
and the church and this was highly 
beneficial to the church. The less freedom 
we had, the more the ranks ofthe faithful 
swelled and now we are forced to push 
out the walls a little bit so everyone can 
get in. It's not just the Catholic church 
either. It's the same for the Protestants, 
for the sects and for the Moslems. Saying 
that there was no God in our country was 
enough to make everyone say that He was 
there. O 
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State Minister Désiré Vieyra: 
'Aid will not be misappropriated
! 
Nicèphore Soglo felt the draught, as they say in Cotonou, 
when several of his Ministers angled for the presidency, and 
he wanted to have government action coordinated by 
someone in whom he had entire confidence. He could not 
have done better. For Désiré Vieyra is his brother-in-law 
and, having been head of mission to the Prime Minister 
during the transitional period, he has a solid grasp of the 
priority issues in the country. In this interview in Cotonou in 
May, when President Soglo was still convalescing in 
France, Désiré Vieyra answered The Courier's questions. 
► The political transition went 
very smoothly indeed, but we have 
not seen any economic results yet. 
Why is this? 
- We are at the end of the 
transitional period and we have 
achieved all we set out to do. We 
have had elections and the insti­
tutions are there. We have got it 
almost completely right. But you 
don't get economic results until the 
medium term at least. It takes more 
than 12 months to get over 17 or 18 
years of muddling and silting up 
and militaro-Marxism and corrup­
tion and confusion — one legisla­
ture at least. 
► You are going to have to force 
austerity measures on a population 
which has already been through a lot 
and wants something better? 
- Were I cynical, I should say 
that you have to amputate a gan­
grenous leg if you want to 
save the patient. There were 9000 people 
in the civil service when Mr Kérékou 
came to power and, 17 years later, there 
are 47 000. And I am not counting the 
State companies, where there are another 
8000 ex-civil servants who will want 
integrating, or the army, which has 
swollen from 2000 to 12 000. What can 
we do? The World Bank has us on life 
support and it is forcing us to perform a 
number of clearly defined tasks, includ­
ing pruning the civil service. If the drastic 
measures of the structural adjustment 
programme are to be applied, something 
has to go. The social side of structural 
adjustment has not escaped us and we 
have been trying to cushion the effects as 
far as possible with the World Bank and 
the IMF. We got these institutions to take 
decisions they declined to take before by 
making them realise that they had to help 
us keep the social problems down if they 
wanted us to make a success of the move 
to democracy. They are asking us to 
liberalise, to reorganise the State com­
panies or to close some of them down and 
none of it is easy. But it has to be done. As 
we have always said, if you are ill, you 
don't blame the doctor. And if he gives 
you something to make you better, you 
take it, even if it does taste nasty. 
► Will the President have 
liamentary support he needs 
through these reforms? 
the par-
to car rv 
- We have got everyone who ever 
supported Nicèphore Soglo's application 
for the presidency together and checked 
on this and I don't think there will be any 
problems. Better still, I have talked to lots 
of MPs and found that the difficult thing 
today, paradoxically enough, is to locate 
someone willing to be in the opposition. 
► You are going to find yourself 
hack in a single party situation... 
- And we can't have that... 
although I have talked with some 
very sound people and they are 
wondering why I am anxious to see 
them in the opposition. 'For the 
time being', they say, 'the Pre­
sident-elect hasn't done anything 
we object to. You can't force us. 
We shall join the opposition if we 
want to'. The argument stands up 
intellectually, of course, but my 
answer is that there has to be an 
opposition nonetheless, otherwise 
we shall be back in a single party 
system. But I repeat that the 
problem today is not finding a 
parliamentary majority. It's find­
ing an opposition. 
► That is perhaps because all the 
parties are forced to have one and 
lite same programme — structural 
adjustment. 
— Perhaps it is. But they don't all agree 
on the programme. It came under a lot of 
attack during the election campaign. A 
great deal of ink flowed over the idea of 
targeted departures, for example. 
► The unions are not keen on the 
redundancies either, are they...? 
- No they aren't, but you have to 
realise that the whole value and origi­
nality of the new régime is its trans­
parency. We are putting our cards on the 
table. 'There they are. Look. Is that a 
good enough hand to win all the bids? 
Reasonably speaking, no. So choose your 
priorities'. That is how we stand with the 
unions and let me assure you that it 
works, it really does. That is all there is to 
it. Democracy. You tell the truth, you 
discuss things and you say, 'we are all in 
the same boat. What shall we do?' 
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► And they say, 'yes, but you've got to 
redeploy those who are leaving'... 
— It isn't easy. We are getting some­
thing done. The country was in complete 
disorder, as you know, and the whole 
system of control was overthrown for 
reasons you can guess and we are now 
putting it back together. And what do we 
find? That the civil service is full of 
ghosts. But once we have audited, I am 
sure we will get back on our feet again. 
► Like many other African countries, 
Benin is short on own resources, isn't it, 
particularly with the costs of running a 
modern State, and this undermines any 
attempt at development planning... 
— That is absolutely right, because we 
are forced to rely on the outside world, on 
the funders. That is the way it is for the 
time being. Our only hope is that, if we 
boost our income and are stringent about 
spending, we can release something for 
investment within the decade. We shall 
manage if we can return the lost virtues of 
hard work, staying power, ingenuity and 
initiative to the Béninois nation, to which 
I am proud to belong. We can do so, we 
believe, by liberalising, but above all by 
governing transparently. 
► And by setting an example ? 
— Yes. I was telling the German 
Deputy Foreign Minister recently that he 
could rest assured that any aid we 
received would be used to the best 
possible effect and that not a penny of it 
would find its way into a foreign bank 
account. If any member of the Govern­
ment did that, he would not only lose his 
job immediately. He would be thrown 
into prison. The President would tell you 
the same thing if he was there. We are 
unyielding on this. 
► What about the funds which have 
already disappeared ? 
— We are trying to get them back. We 
realise that the people are impatient, but 
this money is sitting in foreign banks 
which see no point in releasing it and will 
do all they can to hang on to it. If we want 
to get it back, our applications have to be 
absolutely watertight, which is why we 
are taking our time in drawing them up. 
► Is there any idea how much is 
involved? 
- No, but it's a huge amount. 
► Ten billion or so ? 
— We're talking of tens of billions. No 
Government ever had so much money as 
the one that preceded us. In this very 
room, before my very eyes, the Libyan 
Ambassador told Nicèphore Soglo just 
how much his country had given Benin — 
and it was CFAF 45 billion — before 
asking where it had gone. But we should 
have been asking him, because we weren't 
there at the time and we didn't know what 
the money was for, or where it went or to 
whom... and there are plenty more cases 
like it, you can be sure of that. We can 
perhaps only get a small amount of it 
back, but when we have finished getting 
our case together, everyone who has 
pocketed funds will be paying the price 
one way or another, because it would be 
immoral to let people going on swindling 
the nation. 
► Some people say that the democratic 
process will be threatened unless you get 
rapid results on the economic front, ¡s that 
true ? 
- It could be. The people are im­
patient and not unreasonably so. They 
have had 17 years of deprivation and 
shortage and they want everything — and 
they want it now. The Government has to 
make them realise that economic re­
covery takes time and they have to be 
patient. But patience is unknown in our 
countries, as you know. When life ex­
pectancy is short, people are impatient, 
apparently, because they have no idea 
what the future has in store. But we are 
going to try and teach the people patience 
and hard work and patriotism. 
► Is that the latest motto ? 
- No, it isn't. I put it like that, hard 
work and patriotism, because I have 
travelled all over Africa and found that 
patriotism is something we Africans lack. 
We do not love our countries — apart 
from the Ethiopians, who go on dreaming 
of home even when they have become 
refugees. 
► Is it a good thing or a bad thing, 
overall, to have Nigeria the giant next 
door ? 
— Both. We cannot do without it, even 
if we are having enormous problems for 
the time being. Once upon a time it was a 
good thing, because the N aira was so 
strong that the Nigerians came here to do 
their shopping. That was when the 
previous Government earned all that 
money. And what did it do with it? God 
only knows. Now we have the other 
extreme. The Naira has been devalued 
and we go and do our shopping over 
there. Just wander about the streets of 
Cotonou and you see black market petrol 
on sale everywhere. We are doing our 
best, but we have not managed to put an 
end to it and I really wonder whether 
there is any point in trying to do so 
drastically when so many people with no 
other form of income live off illegal 
trading. That is the problem with the 
giant Nigeria. We have to live with it. 
► Then there arc all those attempts at 
industrial development which will be stifled 
by competition front similar contraband 
goods from Nigeria... 
It all depends. Nigeria may well 
have plenty of possibilities, but it does 
have a problem too, as it cannot meet the 
needs of its own population. If you 
produce goods of a high standard, Ni­
geria will buy them whatever the price 
because it does not currently turn out 
enough for its 110 million people. Even 
with all its breweries, it still buys beer 
from us, because it doesn't produce 
enough itself. We have to make the most 
of this by setting up the proper structures. 
Nigeria is still a big market, which is why 
I say it is both a good thing and a bad 
thing. 
► Will you be leaving politics after this 
interim period, or moving up? 
- I have always said that you cannot 
serve the people in every job. I was head 
of mission for a year and very few people 
even knew I existed. Now I am coordi­
nating government action and if the 
President came back tomorrow and said I 
ought to go somewhere else. I should feel 
neither frustrated nor diminished. If I 
have to go back into the cabinet, I shall go 
back into the cabinet. The essential thing 
is to have the country's interests at 
heart.O Interview by A.T. 
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The budgetary nightmare 
Admitting today what could not be 
admitted yesterday changes nothing. 
'Benin is on life support from its funders'. 
These are the words of Désiré Vieyra, the 
State Minister who coordinates govern­
ment affairs, and indeed the country can 
no longer afford even the basics. Petrol 
for official cars for the foreign observers 
who oversaw the elections was un­
believably, beyond it and only recently it 
had to look for CFAF 700 million every 
month to top up the civil service wage bill. 
That is a thing ofthe past now it has just 
(and only just, the World Bank says) 
enough resources of its own to pay staff, 
although all other operating expenditure 
- office supplies and 'phone calls, for 
example, and the investment program­
mes of course -- has to be financed, 
directly or indirectly, by external aid. 
This hurts the nation's pride and cannot 
therefore be expected to last, particularly 
since there is no guarantee that the 
donors' political interest in Benin's young 
democracy will not wane. 
The Government can only hope to 
escape from this impossible situation by 
spending less ór earning more. It has in 
fact decided to do both, but in a crisis 
situation of this magnitude, it will not be 
easy. Any pruning of the already poor 
civil service pay is politically out of the 
question and cutting back on the wage 
bill therefore means cintine back on staff. 
There were only 9000 civil servants 19 
years ago, but there are 47 000 now, plus 
12 000 soldiers (as against only 2000 in 
1972) and 4550 students, who look upon 
their study awards and educational assist­
ance as virtual salaries. The target for 
1994 is 8000 departures from the civil 
service. Similar reductions are foreseen 
on the military side, with a French-
financed plan for a cut of 800 personnel 
due to begin soon. 
With State company reorganisation 
triggering acute unemployment and 
4000-6000 graduates in search of jobs, the 
Government has taken infinite care with 
the squeeze that is the main component of 
its structural adjustment programme. 
There have even been terminological 
precautions. It began by talking about 
'voluntary departure' from the civil 
service and produced a plan to trim staff 
numbers by 2500, but the CFAF 3.9 
billion available to fund it (CFAF 3.7 
billion from the Community and the rest 
from Germany) only covered 1590 per­
sonnel. Paul Dossou, Minister for Plan­
ning and Economic and Financial Af­
fairs, said that some funders were unwil­
ling to help with this first batch of 
redundancies because they thought the 
average cost of CFAF 2.7 million was 
excessive. And the State had lost many of 
its expensively trained university pro­
fessors, engineers, statisticians and other 
staff, for whom retirement was a real gold 
mine, with some of them getting more 
than CFAF 10 million. 
The Government learnt its lesson from 
this and launched the idea of 'targeted 
departures', from which cadres who are 
vital to the proper functioning of the 
administration are excluded, but this was 
attacked from all sides and did not 
survive the election campaign, so now the 
message is "reinforced voluntary de­
partures'. But whatever the term, the aim 
is still to cut the State wage bill by some 
CFAF 1200 billion, this being one ofthe 
commitments the Government has made 
to the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The unions will not hear of anything 
other than voluntary departures either. 
The first conversions of former civil 
servants were not a great success, they 
maintain, and their suggestion is a series 
of measures ranging from the laying off of 
all contract staff to cutting back on State 
Two ways of combatting unemployment — black-market petrol sales in the informal 
sector and labour-intensive road improvements 
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spending, checking on civil servants' 
paper qualifications and dismissing all 
the 'economic thieves'. One point on 
which Paul Dossou agrees with them is 
the need to check on diplomas — and 
make sure that they are being used by the 
right people. 'A check through the files in 
the Ministry of Labour and Finance has 
revealed that 300 people were being paid 
in error and we are probably still paying 
1900 deceased and departed officials' -
roughly this year's departure target... so 
other solutions will have to be found for 
1992. 
Firmer control 
Boosting State revenue is not easy. 
How can cash-strapped firms pay tax? 
Customs and excise are expected to be the 
best proposition here, for Benin has 
traditionally had a flourishing re-export 
trade with Sahel countries in the interior 
and neighbouring Nigeria especially. 
Fraud-control measures - - exemption 
restriction and control, faster customs 
and documentation procedures, better 
technical assistance structures, computer 
management of customs operations and 
checks on imports in foreign ports of 
origin with predetermined duties and 
levies — are on the drawing board or 
already being implemented. 
This should go hand in hand with 
firmer controls on Benin's land frontiers. 
They have been wide open so far and a 
whole range of goods, electrical ap-
paratus, electronic equipment, beverages, 
clothing, detergent and so on, regularly 
crosses the border, especially the one with 
Nigeria. The busiest trade, however, is in 
petroleum products. The streets of Co-
tonou and the road to Porto Novo are 
lined with petrol stations, most of them 
with only a few litre bottles on a rickety 
table by a drum, with the indispensable 
funnel of course, and all supplied by this 
particularly lucrative black market. SO-
NACOP, the official national oil market-
ing company, sells petrol at CFAF 165 
per litre, but it only costs CFAF 100 from 
these new-style garages and the nearer 
they are to the frontier, the more the price 
drops, going down to as little as CFAF 60 
or even CFAF 45 in Nigeria on the other 
side. Many Béninois fill their cars up 
abroad. One banker I heard of says he 
goes twice a week and pays CFAF 2500 
for 50 litres every time instead of the 
CFAF 8250 it would have cost if his sense 
of civic duty had won the day over the 
family budget. 
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Paul Dossou, Minister of Planning and 
Economic and Financial Affairs 
Two thirds of Benin's petroleum sup-
plies are black market imports. The other 
third comes from SONACOP, which 
virtually has nothing but embassies and 
other official departments on its books 
now and is losing an estimated CFAF 5 
billion a year because of it. But what the 
State loses in tax revenue, it gains in social 
peace, because this trade provides a living 
for thousands of Béninois with no other 
form of income. 
This is why the Government has not 
put a sudden end to it, as Minister Désiré 
Vieyra readily admits, although it is 
trying to contain it by making the 
occasional example of big-time black 
marketeers. It is also trying to regulate 
the different components of this informal 
sector, which has expanded in such a 
remarkable manner. Without this host of 
small activities, from fast food by the 
roadside to car repairs and hawkers of 
every kind, the Béninois would find life 
much more difficult. 
The informal sector does not just offer 
plenty of work in a country where jobs are 
short. It also offers good money. Drivers 
of those latter-day rickshaws, the Zemid-
jan ('take me quick') motorcycles, which 
reign supreme in the Cotonou taxi short-
age, can earn as much as CFAF 4000 per 
day if they own their own machines. So it 
is easy to see why the State wants a special 
tax system to get what it can from the 
informal economy. But will it keep its 
dynamism...? 
The CFAF-Naira tandem 
Many people see the nourishing self-
employed sector as one of the most 
promising answers to the unemployment 
crisis. But its expansion, like the future of 
the whole Béninois economy, is irrevoc-
ably bound up with what goes on in 
neighbouring Nigeria, for the economic 
situation in that vast market of 110 
million consumers has a direct effect on 
economic activity in Benin. In the early 
1970s when Nigeria had its oil boom, for 
example, the Naira was at its peak, the re-
export trade prospered as never before 
and the country 'had never earned so 
much money', as Désiré Vieyra put it. But 
there was a complete slump when the 
frontier was closed in the mid-1980s. 
Trade between the two countries is 
currently hampered by the exaggerated 
disparity between the CFAF and the 
Naira since the large-scale devaluation of 
the latter — which has made Nigerian 
goods particularly cheap to Béninois 
buyers but has pushed up the price of 
Benin's exports to the Nigerian market. 
This, and the permeability of the frontier, 
means that 'very few industrial units 
make a profit', as Lucien Giòie, the 
treasurer of Benin's employers' associ-
ation who is in charge of SME-SMI 
promotion, told me, 'because they are the 
victims of competition Ironia weak Naira 
and Nigerian products which have the 
benefit of economies of scale. So agricul-
ture is the only opening for the SM Es. 
because Nigeria will always have to 
import food'. 
Although only half its arable land is 
under crop, in fact, Benin is self-sufficient 
food-wise and it could, apparently, 
become a food exporter fairly easily if the 
farmers had the right incentives. One of 
the rare successes recently has been in the 
agricultural sector, with the spectacular 
recovery of cotton production, which had 
slumped to around 20 000 t only a few 
years ago. and was up at 180 000 t this 
year. 
But it is the entrepôt trade (Burkina 
Faso has just built vast storage facilities 
in the port of Cotonou) and the services 
sector which are expected to do the most 
for the 4.5 million Béninois in their little 
113 000 km
2 country whose highly educ-
ated cadres once earned it the title of the 
Latin Quarter of Africa. The democracy 
Benin has undertaken, so originally, to 
create cannot but help it along the way. 
But first it has to solve its budgetary 
nightmare, o 
AT. 
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Unique context for EEC-Benin 
cooperation 
by Michel PERETTI (*) 
The climax of Benin's move to demo­
cracy came on 4 April with the investiture 
ofthe President ofthe Republic, who had 
been elected by universal suffrage. 
It followed an economic, social and 
political crisis which culminated in 1989 
in the collapse ofthe banks, a civil service 
wage stoppage and a general strike which 
brought the country to its knees. 
This made a special context for de­
velopment cooperation and, as far as the 
recent past at least is concerned, a unique 
one from the démocratisation point of 
view too. Now however, with many 
countries in the same boat, it would be as 
well to see how the Lomé instruments 
were used to support and back up the 
changes in Benin. 
(*) The author is the Commission Delegate to 
Benin. 
Working towards democracy 
Social peace again 
There was a general strike in December 
1989. The claims were financial — the 
workers wanted their wages and back pay 
— and political too, as there was a call for 
amnesty, for separation of the trade 
unions and the single party and of the 
party and the State and for official 
business to be run along more moral 
lines. 
The priority of Government, industry, 
workers and cooperation partners was to 
revive social peace and get the country 
back to work. 
The Commission of the European 
Communities had already decided to 
back up the international community's 
drive to help the Government (with about 
CFAF 9 billion), but since it was keen to 
see a return to political and social peace in 
Benin, it also indicated it was willing to 
Michel Peretti (left) with Monsignor de Souza 
make an extra effort and, once the 
decisions involved in bringing back social 
peace had been taken and the Govern­
ment and civil service representatives 
negotiated an agreement to bring the 
situation back to normal, an almost 
CFAF 1.4 billion was released in addi­
tion, to help pay the wage bill. 
So the Commission made an entirely 
exceptional contribution to recurrent 
State spending in a crisis situation with a 
donation from the structural adjustment 
facility and reallocation of part of the 
national indicative programme funds to a 
rural development programme. 
The fact that civil service wages were 
paid, political claims met with the High 
Council of the Republic and a trans­
itional Government set up put things 
back to normal, which was the basis for 
the next step in the democratic process, 
the elections. 
Free elections 
Election results must be watertight if 
they are to have any meaning. The 
authorities of the transitional period — 
the High Council ofthe Republic and the 
Government, that is — therefore asked 
for observers from parliaments and other 
institutions in friendly countries to help 
and the European Parliament responded 
by sending Henri Saby, Chairman of the 
Committee on Development, to check on 
conditions during the legislative elec­
tions. 
Righting the situation 
With society at peace once more, the 
vital and urgent thing was to get the new 
reforms going so the books could gradu­
ally be balanced again. Basically, the idea 
was to reduce the public spending deficit, 
much of which was due to the fact that the 
wage bill was in no way compatible with 
State revenue. 
The first step in the civil service 
reorganisation scheme, and one which 
brought the annual wage bill down by 
4%, was the Commission's channelling of 
resources from the Lomé III national 
indicative programme into a CFAF 
3.7 billion voluntary departure operation 
under which 1500 permanent staff left 
their jobs with an average of CFAF 
2 480 000 in their pockets. 
Traditional cooperation 
It is important to realise that im­
plementation of the national indicative 
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CONTRIBUTION TO STATE BUDGET 
— start of school year 89-90 
— study awards 
— pension arrears 
— wages for permanent civil servants (May & August 1990) 
REORGANISATION OF THE BANKS 
— standard reimbursement of deposits in excess of CFAF 50,000 
(CFAF 50,000 per saver) 
— unfreezing of Benin Social Security Office claims 
— bank's social fund 
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE PROGRAMME 
— allowances for 750 staff 
— allowances for 750 staff 
(CFAF million ι 
3 375 
600 
200 
1200 
1 375 
1370 
1000 
300 
70 
3 740 
1910 
1 830 
rtF=r*uEii..inuF= 
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During Lomé II and III, a considerable 
amount of Community finance went to 
the public health sector 
programme, focused on social and infra-
structure schemes, continued during this 
time in spite of all the problems. In a 
period of economic crisis, of course, it is 
the most underprivileged sections of the 
population which are the hardest hit, but 
the health operation, covering the whole 
of the health service in the two coastal 
provinces where 33% of the population 
live, was to maintain basic treatment and 
ultimately guarantee care at a price 
everyone could afford. 
Benin is traditionally a transit point for 
the Sahel countries and Nigeria, with 
import dues making up almost 30% of 
Slate revenue, so it is vital for the 
economy to keep up its transport infra-
structure. The Community has continued 
to finance highway rehabilitation with 
this in mind, by paying 50% ofthe costs 
of the network of asphalted roads. 
Cooperation in the new context 
The Lomé IV national indicative pro-
gramme, signed in February, combines 
ECU 83 million-worth of erants, ECU 
COMMUNITY AID UNDER LOME 
Lomé II 
— rural development 
— road infrastructure 
— health 
— miscellaneous 
Lomé IH 
— rural development 
— road infrastructure 
— health 
— structural adjustment 
(ECU million) 
66 
31% 
35% 
16% 
13% 
117.11 
21% 
35% 
4% 
40% 
12 million-worth of risk capital and an 
ECU 13 million contribution from the 
structural adjustment facility. 
The idea is to make a further effort to 
right the nation's major economic and 
financial balance by helping with the 
structural adjustment programme and 
consolidating road infrastructure, health 
and agriculture operations financed pre-
viously. 
Structural adjustment 
Support for structural adjustment will 
be provided via import programmes. 
These should make for the speedy mobili-
sation of counterpart funds which can be 
used to reorganise the civil service, 
finance labour-intensive job creation to 
mop up unemployment in the towns and 
cover health, education and other spend-
ing in the social sector. 
Decentralised cooperation 
Now that Benin has its democratic 
institutions, it is important to encourage 
the people to take part in developing the 
economy so as to give full expression to 
democracy. Decentralised cooperation 
will be the order ofthe day in all sectors 
other, of course, than the major infra-
structure. 
Where there is a demand for it, par-
ticipatory development will involve a 
wide range of local partners (decentral-
ised authorities, firms, trade unions, 
teaching centres, research centres and 
rural and village associations) acting on 
their own initiative or in conjunction with 
European NGOs. 
Benin's changes and new democratic 
framework have triggered hopes and 
expectations at home and abroad. What 
the country has to do now with the 
help of its cooperation partners, amongst 
whom the Community and the Member 
States play a leading financial part — is 
show that democracy works. 
This means that the rights and oblig-
ations which democracy confers must be 
understood, that social peace must be 
assured and that the various sections of 
the population must be encouraged to 
take an active part in the development 
process. It also means having a de-
mocratic process whereby the public will 
accept the difficult decisions involved in 
balancing the nation's books and re-
organising the economy. M.P. 
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The Fale Fono or Parliament House 
Universal suffrage at last 
The Courier 
To say that the past few years have been 'stormy' in 
Western Samoa, is probably putting it mildly. 
Cyclone Cina which hit the Polynesian island state in 
early 1989, is usually referred to as having been of 
only 'mild force', certainly when compared to cyclone 
Ofa which struck this Pacific paradise in February 
Í990. Although loss of life was fortunately limited, the 
damage was widespread — estimated by the author-
ities at US$140 million, compared with'a 1989 GDP 
of only about US$110 million. 
While the aftermath of Ofa is still very noticeable, 
there was another issue which was even more on the 
minds of the heavily politicised Samoans: universal 
suffrage. Long before independence, which Western 
Samoa achieved as the first Polynesian State in 1962, 
this had been a subject of sometimes heated debate. 
Time and again, there had been attempts to change the 
electoral system, whereby only matai or titled family 
heads were allowed to vote, into one of universal 
suffrage. Time and again such a change had been 
fought off out of some undue fear that it would attack 
the core itself of the faa-Samoa or Samoan way of life. 
At last, in October 1990 it became the issue of a 
plebiscite, the results of which led to a change in the 
Electoral Act : all Western Samoans of twenty-one 
years or more would now be able to cast their vote, 
every three years, for one ofthe 47 Members of their 
national Fono or Parliament. And so they did, on 
Friday 5 April 1991, in elections which are now being 
labelled as 'historic '. 
'A simple and sunny heaven'? 
Those were the words of the world 
famous writer Robert Louis Stevenson, 
when referring to the place where he spent 
the last few years of his life. Author of 
such classics as 'Treasure Island' and 'Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde', he was buried in 
1894 on a hilltop near the capital Apia. 
Both his former house, now the residence 
of Western Samoa's Head of State 
Malietoa Tanumafili II and his grave now 
figure high on many a tourist's agenda as 
a sort of literary pilgrimage. 
Western Samoa is certainly a sunny 
place, occupying an almost central po­
sition in the South Pacific, lying just east 
ofthe international dateline (GMT-11), 
some 2900 km north-east of New Zealand 
and 4200 km south-west of Hawaii. Fiji is 
1270 km to the west and Pago Pago, 
American Samoa only 130 km to the east. 
Samoa is in fact, the larger, westerly 
portion of the Samoa archipelago, the 
eastern part being nowadays, the only US 
territory south of the Equator, sharing 
the same culture and language as their 
western brethern. 
The country covers a total surface of 
2841 km
2 which is mainly accounted for 
by the two largest islands, Savaii (1708 
km
2) and Upolu (1118 km
2). The re­
mainder is made up of 7 smaller islands of 
which only two are inhabited. The main 
islands, of volcanic origin, are mountain­
ous with rugged forested interiors, frin-
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ged by coral reefs and crystal clear waters. 
'It is sheer beauty, so pure it is difficult to 
breathe in it", wrote the somewhat lyrical 
poet Rupert Brooke. 
A quarter of the total population of 
about 161 000, lives on Savaii, while most 
others (70%) live on Upolu, where they 
are heavily concentrated around Apia. 
Due to large net emigration flows, the 
natural population growth has had virtu­
ally no effect on total population which 
remained stable throughout the last 
decade. An estimated 100 000 Samoans 
live abroad, mainly in New Zealand. 
Australia and the USA and many 
Samoans still receive secondary and 
tertiary education in New Zealand. Ac­
cording to some, there are more Samoans 
living in Auckland than in their own 
capital Apia... 
All in all, it may well not be such a 
'simple' heaven — Western Samoa is said 
to have the highest suicide rate in the 
world,' a quite surprising feature for a 
society where Christianity is deeply en­
trenched. Churches of such inspiration 
are to be found everywhere and the sheer 
numbers speak for themselves: there is 
one church per 167 inhabitants. And yet, 
half the children are said to be born 
outside marriage. The latter does not 
mean that the country shares the views of 
such anthropologists as Margaret Mead. 
Quite the contrary as is revealed in the 
following quotation which appeared in 
the 14 May issue of the Government 
published SA VALI news bulletin 'Like 
The old house of the writer Robert Louis 
Stevenson ('Treasure Island'), now the 
residence of Western Samoa's Head of 
State Malietoa Tanumafili II 
when Margaret Mead came to Samoa 
looking for a panacea for adolescent 
problems in her country, and returned to 
America with 'Growing Up in Samoa' 
and falsely reported that there was free 
love and sex under every coconut tree 
here and the American people went all 
'coconut' with sex while the Samoans 
continued with their taboo on free sex, 
and a desire to see proof of virginity on 
the night of the marriage'. 
The ancient history of the Samoan 
islands may be difficult to retrace, yet the 
Samoan language goes down as being the 
oldest existent form of Polynesian speech, 
which may be one reason to call this the 
"cradle of Polynesia'. Most local myths 
and legends contain references to Fijian 
influence. In the middle of the fifth 
century, legends mention the powerful 
ruler Pili, whose sons, after his death, 
entered into a not-so-brotherly quarrel 
for power. Around 950 A.D., the Tui 
Tonga conquered Samoa and ruled over 
it for over 300 years, until Samoans 
finally united their forces and threw them 
out. One can only wonder whether 
today's underlying rivalry, sometimes 
expressed in a friendly way through a 
good game of rugby, at times less friendly 
through outright clashes between young 
Tongans and Samoans in Auckland, goes 
back to these early stages? 
The islands were first visited by Euro­
peans in the early 18th century and most 
sources refer to Dutch explorer Jacob 
Roggeveen as the 'discoverer' in 1722. 
Later in that century, French navigators 
such as de Bougainville called in on the 
archipelago. It was not until 1830 that 
missionaries from the London Mis­
sionary Society settled to propagate their 
message and values. By the mid-19th 
century, German planters and traders 
were beginning to make their way to these 
parts of the world, making Apia their 
main centre of Pacific interests. Other 
Western nations, the United States and 
the United Kingdom in particular, 
showed an increasing interest. Each one 
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manœuvered to establish its influence by 
exploiting the divisions between the 
traditional Samoan factions that were 
squabbling for power and control. The 
three powers involved, the USA, the UK 
and Germany finally ended up, at the 
turn of the century, making a deal which 
split the archipelago into two parts: the 
Eastern part went to the USA and 
Western Samoa came under German 
administration. Samoans, even no­
wadays, may regret the split, but they had 
no say in the 'deal' as they were weakened 
then by their internal divisions. At the 
outbreak of World War I, New Zealand 
occupied Western Samoa and in 1918 
they were granted a mandate over the 
territory by the League of Nations. After 
World War II, the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council made it a UN Trust 
Territory administered again by New 
Zealand. As of 1954, internal self-govern­
ment was progressively introduced and 
by October 1960, an independence Con­
stitution was adopted. Thus, Western 
Samoa became the first independent 
Polynesian State on 1 January 1962. At 
that particular moment in history, 
Western Samoa had two joint Heads of 
State, being two of the four paramount 
chiefs: when Tupua Tamasese Meaole 
died in April 1963, Malietoa Tanumafili 
II became the sole Head of State, with 
functions analogous to those ofa consti­
tutional monarch. He will hold the office 
for life; thereafter the Head of State will 
be elected by the Legislative Assembly for 
a five-year term. 
Universal suffrage and the 
dignity of the matai 
What precedes is clear proof that in 
Western Samoa, modern government is 
intricately intertwined with custom and 
tradition. The 'faa-Samoa' or Samoan 
way of life stands quite apart from all 
other societies in the Pacific by its 
distinctive system of chieftainships. 
There is a pyramidal hierarchy of graded 
titles of mainly two kinds: titular and 
orator chiefs, and traditional authority is 
vested in so-called matai, the heads of 
extended families or aiga. Each extended 
family appoints by consensus, at least one 
matai, who in turn is assisted by one or 
two orators who serve him in numerous 
tasks and duties in the village. At fami K 
level, there is a sorl of built-in social 
security system whereby the matai looks 
after the well-being of all his aigct-
members. The notion of consensus is 
important as unlike in other Pacific 
The main islands, of volcanic origin, are 
mountainous with rugged forested 
interiors 
States, there is no segregation here: every 
Samoan can be elected to be a chief by his 
family; he is not born to it, nor does he 
automatically inherit the title. Yet the 
role of a matai is not to be under­
estimated : the holder of such a title has 
nearly complete authority over the use of 
customary land, and their responsibilities 
in economic, social and political affairs is 
widespread. Each ofthe 362 villages has 
its own fono or council where matai meet 
and exercise legal powers vis-à-vis village 
rules. All untitled men, young and old, 
belong to the faa-taulelea, a village 
organisation which not only serves their 
own families but also the village as a 
whole. 
'It is sheer beauty, so pure it is difficult 
to breathe in it' — a lyrical description 
by the poet, Rupert Brooke 
Politically speaking, until the last 
elections, it was really a question of'to be 
or not to be... a matai. Voting was in fact 
restricted to the matai: they elected, every 
three years, 45 out ofthe 47 members of 
the Fono or National Parliament, the 
remaining two being elected by the 
universal suffrage of some 2000 voters on 
the individual voters' roll, citizens mostly 
part-Samoan or of other origins. 
Yet the main strength of the matai 
system, as the lynchpin of Samoan society 
over the years became, in political terms, 
its major weakness as, through a drama­
tic multiplication of titles, it began to 
undermine itself. Whereas before the 
1962 Independence, few young men were 
given a matai title, normally having to 
wait their turn until the old matai died, 
over the years more and more titles were 
created. By doing so, some felt they 
could, as it were, buy the allegiance of a 
series of new voters. The figures rose 
quite dramatically : there were only about 
13 000 matai in the mid-1980s, but by the 
time of the October 1990 plebiscite on 
universal suffrage, the number of matai 
registered at the Land and Titles Court 
was over 20 000, and a few thousands 
more were still unregistered as they were 
being disputed or challenged. Says 'The 
Savali Bulletin' on this issue: '... people 
have been sick of all the corruption 
arising out of some candidates' selfish 
pursuit of power for personal gain and 
prestige. They saw the creation of matai 
titles as the sign of nothing else but pure 
greed, and they demanded solutions. 
Some members of Parliament who fell to 
the same temptation of creating more 
matai to gain more votes in elections, 
have genuinely regretted their mistakes. 
They did not know at the time that they 
had opened a Pandora's box of viruses 
which would affect the body of Samoan 
culture and customs, let alone politics, for 
many years after'. 
It is against this background that the 
long battle to achieve universal suffrage 
(see also the Prime Minister's interview 
which follows), and the positive outcome 
of the October 1990 plebiscite has to be 
seen. It is really not for lack of trying that 
it took so long to bring about universal 
suffrage. There was uncertainty in the 
minds of many people, mostly stemming 
from fear of the unknown. There were 
also hardliners who strongly opposed the 
whole idea and succeeded in fighting it off 
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Each of the 362 villages has its own fono or council where matai meet and exercise 
legal powers vis-à-vis village rules 
for many years. According to The Savait 
'they believed that universal suffrage 
would erode the dignity and authority of 
the matai, because they believed that 
when the taulelea; untitled men, and 
women were entitled to vote, it was the 
same as giving them the right to sit and 
speak in the council of chiefs and orators, 
90% of whom are men. This, to them, is 
like controlling the affairs ofthe villages. 
from under the breadfruit and coconut 
trees and not from within the house ofthe 
council of chiefs. Where then is the faa-
Samoa, the hardliners asked'. 
The fear for erosion of the dignity of 
the matai from within through unduly 
multiplying titles, obviously put more 
weight in the balance as was shown in the 
October 1990 Plebiscite. Of the two 
questions put to the people, the one on 
the opportunity of introducing a bica-
meral system was rejected, yet when 
asked to grant everyone 21 years of age 
and over the right to vote, there was a 
majority in favour. Changes to the 
Electoral Act thus allowed an historic 
step towards full démocratisation, raising 
the number of voters from 20 000 matai 
only to about 56 000 --■ '21 plussers'. 
Though some tried to cast doubts until 
the last minute, evoking the possibility of 
violence on election day. the 5 April 
polling process witnessed nothing of that 
kind; a further proof of what Prime 
Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana calls 'the 
political maturity of the country'. 
Women and young people have been the main beneficiaries ofthe adoption of 
universal suffrage 
That is not to say there were no 
surprises. On the contrary. The Leader of 
the outgoing Opposition for instance, 
who holds one of Samoa's four para-
mount titles, lost his seat to a newcomer. 
Under the 'matai only' voting system, 
matai loyalty would probably have been 
strong enough to carry him through. 
Linder universal suffrage, neglect of one's 
own constituency - - as he admitted 
himself — is an error rarely forgiven to 
any politician. 
Universal suffrage could definitely give 
a further boost to a more solidly en-
trenched 'party' system. Indeed, until well 
into the 1980s one could not really talk of 
political parties but rather of like-minded 
factions of matai representatives. Within 
45 days of the three-yearly elections a 
system which certainly keeps politics 
lively — a majority in the Fono, elects, by 
secret ballot, both the Speaker and Prime 
Minister, the latter having then the task 
of selecting the other eight Cabinet 
Ministers. Loyalties to the two main 
parties, the Human Rights Protection 
Party (HRPP) — the winner again last 
time round — and the Samoa National 
Development Party (SNDP) usually 
called the Coalition, have been known to 
shift relatively easily, and members or 
whole factions 'crossing the floor' have 
often added spice to the political debate. 
It is not surprising therefore that for the 
second lime, candidates had to sign a 
contract 'binding' them to their party and 
providing for very stiff penalities in the 
event of desertion. Of course, every 
contract has it weak points and some 
might say they are much loo one-sided... 
Back to business 
Now that most ofthe political dust has 
settled, the new HRPP Government will 
have to get on with what Prime Minister 
Tofilau Evi Alesana calls 'the tasks of 
nation building'. As he declared in his 
speech at the swearing-in ceremony of his 
new Cabinet on 14 May. apart from a 
major reconstruction programme, tack-
ling the damaging effects on infrastruc-
ture of cyclone Ofa, as well as efforts to be 
undertaken in the productive and social 
sectors, 'the greatest emphasis possible 
will be placed on the development ofthe 
private sector'. 'My own experience has 
shown too often that our country's 
economic growth and the generation of 
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Total damage caused by cyclone Ofa in February 1990 was estimated at US$140 million 
new jobs for our young people leaving 
school, can only be expedited if we are to 
create a more favourable investment 
climate for our entrepreneurs generally'. 
he argued. 
That might be easier said than done 
as there are a number of major con­
straints to any development. Without 
being exhaustive, there are the problems 
caused by geography and climate, such as 
the distance from overseas markets, the 
rugged interior, the occasional droughts 
and of course the exposure to cyclones; 
the natural resource base essentially 
limits potential to agriculture, including 
forestry, fisheries and tourism. The 
economy is still largely dominated by 
agriculture which represents about half of 
GDP. Mostly still at subsistence level, 
and marked by low productivity, it 
nevertheless provides well over 80% of 
the country's export earnings. However, 
it falls short of providing enough employ­
ment opportunities, pushing some ofthe 
most skilled and enterprising manpower 
to emigrate, causing shortages of labour 
here and there. Most of the major crops, 
dominant both in terms of domestic 
consumption and exports, have been 
hampered by adverse conditions, be ¡I 
coconuts, cocoa or bananas, and in effect, 
only taro stood out as a winner over the 
past few years. 
Finance Minister Tuilaepa Saude 
could not agree more that there have been 
and still are problems in the agricultural 
sector: 'We have obviously not yet fully 
recovered from cyclone Ofa which not 
only damaged a lot of infrastructure, but 
also affected very badly most of the tree 
crops. But it wasn't just Ofa: since the 
latter half of 1985 we have had to face 
persistent low international prices, which 
by no means provide an incentive to our 
producers. Only coconut cream and taro 
export receipts grew significantly, yet 
even for the latter, market outlets, mainly 
in New Zealand. Australia and the USA, 
are limited and one must beware of 
oversupplying and possible price drops'. 
Ofa really could not have done more to 
expose the vulnerability of this small 
island economy. Not allowing for the cost 
of lost agricultural production — difficult 
to estimate at the time — the total bill 
Tuilaepa Sailele, 
Minister of finance 
'... it wasn't just Ofa; since the latter 
half of 1985, we have had to face 
persistent low international prices...' 
came to some US$140 million. Whole 
villages were flattened, thousands were 
made homeless, schools and hospitals 
were destroyed, power and water supplies 
were cut off, an inter-island ferry was 
grounded, port facilities were smashed 
and those parts ofthe roads that were left, 
became a nightmare for brakes and 
suspension. Repair works to roads in 
particular will still require massive invest­
ment and the Prime Minister bluntly 
admits in an interview (which follows), 
that 'had the state of infrastructure been 
the issue ofthe last elections, we wouldn't 
have won...'. 
Economic performance, with a GDP 
growth rate already floating between 
- 1 % and 1 % in the latter part of the 
1980s, obviously suffered much from 
Ofa's devastating effects. Together with 
deteriorating terms of trade, Ofa sharply 
widened deficits in both last year's 
merchandise trade account as well as the 
current account of the balance of pay­
ments. Export earnings dropped by 30% 
to only 21 million Tala or Western 
Samoan dollars ('), while imports rose by 
9% to an all-time high of WSS186 
million. Quite surprisingly, however, the 
overall balance of payments showed a 
surplus of WSS38 million, up 15% over 
the previous year. Not only did external 
assistance rise sharply; Samoans abroad 
were also moved by the devastation 
caused by Ofa and their remittances 
reached almost WSS92 million allowing 
their families to undertake necessary 
rehabilitation works. Their combined 
I
1) 1 Tala or Western Samoan dollar = ECU 0.35 
(June 91). 
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Coconuts, like most other crops except taro, are facing low productivity 
efforts put Western Samoa in the com­
fortable position of having enough for­
eign reserves (WSS161 million) to cover 
over nine months of imports of goods and 
services. 
Though some outside observers fear 
remittances may drop as links with 
overseas Samoans risk becoming weaker. 
Finance Minister Tuilaepa Sailele re­
mains confident : 'Our cultural ties will 
always be strongly maintained through 
both family ties and church communities. 
Wherever our people go, they will never 
forget those who stayed behind. There 
have been recessions before in New 
Zealand, Australia and the USA, but 
remittances will for a very long time 
continue to remain very strong'. 'Of 
course, what happens out there can only 
be a further incentive for us to try and 
create more jobs over here, for instance in 
small scale manufacturing and tourist 
facilities even if that may be a tall order', 
he felt. Yet it can be feasible, as is 
illustrated by the pending opening of a 
plant for the production of car wiring 
systems, which will create some 300 jobs. 
Also the success of neighbouring coun­
tries such as Fiji with the development of 
a garment industry have further pushed 
government to renew as a positive 
measure, investment laws and incentives. 
Trying to boost agriculture 
The new Agriculture Minister Jack 
Netzler is really an 'old hand', not only in 
the sense that he held the portfolio in the 
early 1980s, but also because he, together 
with Tuilaepa Sailele (the financial 'Wiz­
ard') are the only two Ministers who were 
also in the PM's previous eight-man 
team. Jack Netzler is also one of the two 
MPs elected by the 2097 individual voters 
of non-indigenous origin He has the 
reputation of a 'doer' and has a no-
nonsense approach to his new job 
(before, he was in charge of Public 
Works) based on experience drawn from 
Jack Netzler. 
Minister of Agriculture 
'There has been too much talk about 
diversification and not enough doing' 
his own farm. His mind seems set this 
time on one target: To get agriculture 
really on the move'. 
There have been a number of structural 
changes already, for instance with the 
privatisation of the Marketing Board 
which, for lack of proper management 
ran into a lot of problems. Of course, 
private operators who took over the job 
still have to establish and consolidate 
their contacts with overseas buyers. The 
huge WSTEC operation is also in the 
process of being privatised with the 
exception of one farm on each main 
island. The government-owned Western 
Samoa Trust Estates Corporation old 
German plantations seized after WWI 
previously controlled some 30 000 acres 
and used to be the main commercial farm 
supplier in the export sector, but its 
performance never lived up to expec­
tation. 'The Lands Corporation is now 
subdividing former WSTEC land for 
leasing it out to farmers, but we will have 
to monitor this operation closely so that 
the level of future leases still make it 
worth the farmer's while', says Minister 
Netzler. In fact he feels that most of this 
sector should be deregulated and priv­
atised, including his own Department : 
'We should really only stick to extension 
services and our very strong research 
branch'. 
Most of the traditional crops have 
suffered major setbacks for a variety of 
reasons, and Ofa is not just to blame. 
Bananas have virtually disappeared from 
the market as they no longer measure up 
to New Zealand import standards. Cocoa 
has ceased to offer a reasonable income to 
planters and rehabilitation of old plants 
has been too slow. Coconut oil not only 
faced a sharp drop in world prices but 
also the effects of a campaign against 
'tropical oil' given — according to some 
its high cholesterol content. 
'There has been too much talk of 
agricultural diversification but not 
enough doing' feels the Minister newly in 
charge. Besides attempting to rejuvenate 
certain crops like cocoa or modernising 
the coconut oil mill, both in terms of 
processing and putting out new end 
products, the Minister is looking for 
crops which would rapidly turn into good 
foreign exchange earners. Apart from 
vanilla — which would take longer to 
establish and be more labour intensive — 
the Minister is thinking of spices, in 
particular ginger, which could quickly 
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produce good export results, as is already 
proven by Fiji's success in this area. 
Forestry and fisheries too have potential 
for development ; some local timber types 
could fetch high value but resources have 
to be monitored carefully. The same goes 
for fishing where, because of the lack of 
the old village controls, fishing in the 
lagoons increasingly depletes resources. 
Further out, species like red snapper 
could be profitably exploited. The Minis­
ter also feels that there will be a need for 
'some changes in the social way of life". 
'What good is it for instance to look 
theoretically at livestock development, 
when resources are often severely de­
pleted to provide ceremonial and social 
functions in the villages?' he wonders. 
Tourism: a more clear-cut 
approach 
Some used to feel government had a 
somewhat half-hearted approach to tour­
ism development, thinking it refrained 
from pushing ahead with it for fear of 
exposing the faa-Samoa to too much 
foreign influence, yet Finance Minister 
Sailele does not agree: 'We just had a lot 
of constraints to overcome. Look for 
instance at the upgrading of the airport 
we had to carry out, in order to make long 
distance flights land here instead of just 
overflying us. It was quite a struggle 
convincing major airlines to come here, 
but you are always in a chicken and egg 
situation. If the potential hotel investor 
holds off for lack of air capacity, the 
carriers can hold off for lack of hotel 
infrastructure'. Jack Netzler who has a 
particular interest in civil aviation and 
therefore combines it with his farming 
portfolio, could not agree more: 'Red 
tape makes flying in this particular region 
of the world a difficult business and it is 
very hard to talk about anything regional 
in this area for everybody has his own 
way of doing things'. Not surprisingly 
therefore Air Pacific, once a regional 
carrier, lost its regional shareholders and 
became only Fiji's national carrier. 
Vensel Margraff, Director of the 
Western Samoa Visitors' Bureau keeps a 
worried eye on current downward econ­
omic trends in his major tourism markets, 
mainly New Zealand, Australia and the 
USA, as they may adversely affect his 
sector. Besides the classic tourist assets, 
he feels additional attractions can be 
provided to improve his product: more 
sightseeing, archeological and historical 
sites, tracks for wanderers from all over 
The Vava'u regional tourism project, still under construction, could become 'a 
stepping stone to village participation in tourism projects' 
the world, nature reserves. Some conser­
vationist societies from Sweden and the 
USA are already active in this field, but 
more are welcome. 
Mr Margraff is 'thankful to the EEC's 
longstanding record of assistance to this 
sector and in particular to the varied and 
all-encompassing help supplied by the 
EEC-backed Tourism Council of the 
South Pacific, which is now in the process 
of elaborating a Tourism Development 
Master Plan'. 
Vensel Margraff, Director of the 
Western Samoa Visitors' Bureau 
'Tourism should not interfere with day-
to-day life in the villages' 
Although the faa-Samoa and culture 
are major assets, he strongly feels that 
'tourism should not interfere with the 
day-to-day life in the villages', though it 
clearly can have an impact on the village 
dominated land tenure system. He con­
tinues, 'applications of investors should 
be processed in a more proper way, as it is 
frankly often the cause of many prob­
lems'. Such was the case for instance with 
the Vava'u tourism project, a TCSP 
regional project still under construction 
which suffered a lot of setbacks originally 
due to the land tenure system. Yet the 
originality ofthe concept — the promoter 
being the local village council -- will 
make this in his view 'a stepping stone to 
village participation in tourism projects'. 
Challenges ahead 
The land tenure system may in some 
cases be a hindrance to quick economic 
development. In the view of Education 
and Labour Minister Fiame Naomi, 'it 
still constitutes a basic security, which is 
not guaranteed in many other places". 
Fiame Naomi, a daughter of Western 
Samoa's first Prime Minister, and 
member ofthe World Executive Commit­
tee of the Young Women's Christian 
Association, is one of two women MPs 
and the first woman ever to join the 
Cabinet. '1 stood for the third time in 
these last elections, and must be con-
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Youth are Samoa's future : how will they be affected in the long term by the transition to a universal franchise-based democracy ? 
sidered by now to have been long enough 
in politics, which does not mean women 
could not handle this job before'. 
Apart from furthering the debate on 
the introduction of compulsory edu­
cation, she will obviously stick to her 
party's manifesto as far as her objectives 
are concerned. This would involve bring­
ing about a number of projects such as, 
for instance, the upgrading of the Tech­
nical Institute to full Polytechnic level, 
the relocation of Samoa's National Un­
iversity, and increased attention to the 
training of and infrastructures for tea­
chers. She certainly faces a number of 
bottlenecks which form a challenge of 
their own: 'I am in the difficult situation 
of having to match overcrowded classes 
in the cities, due to urban migration, with 
a shortage of teachers'. The urban drift is 
indeed on the rise and leaves many rural 
schools empty or under-utilised while 
making city classrooms overflow with 
pupils. 'We will have to prioritise our 
education capital investment accord­
ingly", she feels. 
When asked about possible changes to 
the faa-Samoa due to the pressures of 
modern life, she gives a very well-
balanced answer: 'In the long term, our 
resources, limited as they are, will always 
have an impact on our culture : our model 
is based on the sharing and equitable 
redistribution of common resources 
within the extended family. Of course, 
part of this is typically Samoan but we do 
share a good deal of our culture with 
other more universal values, so really I 
don't see the need for a sort of cultural 
struggle to fight off influences from the 
palangi's (whites). Let us not be hypo­
critical about the advantages it has 
broimht to us and not forget there are 
Fiame Naomi. 
Minister of Education 
'... as long as there are Samoans, there 
will be a Samoan culture with its own 
community-based social fabric ' 
deeper issues to culture than just per­
forming arts. As long as there are 
Samoans, there will be a Samoan culture 
with its own community-based social 
fabric. Yet the more I travel, the more I 
see that people are really the same 
everywhere, and workable social units 
exist everywhere, though in different 
forms and in different degrees of in­
tensity". 
The biggest change so far, the introduc­
tion of universal suffrage, has not really 
altered much in her view, at least not yet : 
'The irony of it all is probably that most 
new voters, mainly women and young 
people — of the previously 20 000 matai, 
only 300 to 500 are women - - still 
followed the old matai criteria of family 
allegiances, kinship ties or church affili­
ations. The real change will come about 
in the minds of the politicians and 
decision-makers. They will have to start 
wondering what those new groups of 
voters, women and young people, will 
think of certain issues, as people in power 
must always read what lives among their 
electorate'. The real transition from the 
former matai-on\y village consensus 
model to modern universal franchise-
based democracy will indeed only start 
now, after the 'historic' elections.o 
Roger DE BACKER 
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The country has reached 
political maturity' 
declares Prime Minister 
Tofilau Efi Alesana 
On Tuesday 7 May, Tofilau Efi Alesana, now 67, became 
Prime Minister of Western Samoa for the fourth time. As 
leader ofthe Human Rights Protection Party, he had won 
30 ofthe 47 seats in Western Samoa's Fono or Par Ha/nen t 
in what are now already referred to as the 'historic ' elections 
of 5 April 199 J. They were indeed the first ever to be held 
under universal franchise in the country. A week later he 
presented his new Cabinet to the Fono, surprising more than 
one observer as he kept only two of the previous eight 
Ministers on his new team. Though planning to increase the 
number of Cabinet Ministers — which would need a change 
to the Constitution, and a 2/3 majority— this move may not 
be without political risk: after his 1985 election win, he 
made the same move — keeping in fact only the same two 
Ministers on his team as today — but within a few months 
the snubbed Ministers defected and made his government 
collapse. Yet in Western Samoa's ever so lively politics, 
Prime Minister Tofilau seemed more confident than ever 
when he met with The Courier magazine, highlighting above 
all, the long and difficult path to universal suffrage and the 
importance it has for the faa-Samoa or Samoan way of life. 
► Prime Minister, you have just won 
another electoral victory, somewhat dif-
ferent from the previous ones because it 
was the first on the basis of universal 
suffrage. What in your view were the 
reasons of your success this time? 
- First of all, I do not regard this 
victory as a direct result of my political 
management. It was rather the result of 
the fact that the country has reached 
political maturity. Political maturity was 
the key this time, because I feel that if 
Western Samoa had still been under its 
former traditional way of philosophy, we 
could not have won the election. It is only 
because of the modern trend of political 
thinking in the country that support came 
to my party. 
As you know my party is the Human 
Rights Protection Party and the people 
know that I am desirous — as are my 
party's supporters and parliamentarians 
- that the rights of the people are not 
only protected but exercised as well. This 
was illustrated by the Introduction ofthe 
Bill for universal suffrage. 
This notion of adopting the modern 
trend of democracy through universal 
franchise and the right of all people to 
cast their votes, had been on our books 
for quite some time. It was already 
mentioned in our first Constitutional 
Convention in 1954 by one of our great 
leaders, Mataafa, who also became our 
first Prime Minister. He strongly pre­
sented his case in the House, which was 
based on granting the right to non-titled 
persons to have a vote and have a say in 
their government. 
► Why did it take so long before the 
idea came to fruition? 
- As I said, it took time for the 
country to become politically mature. 
Remember, it was mentioned again in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1960 ; there 
was a motion in the House moved by one 
of the well-known matai, Paitomaleifi, to 
grant universal suffrage for the election of 
members of the Parliament. It was re­
jected then by the majority but there were 
some matai who voted for the motion. 
Again, in 1968, an MP moved another 
motion to grant to those who have 
attained the age of 21 the right to vote. 
That motion was also lost, but six 
members of Parliament voted for the 
motion, including the current leader of 
the opposition. 
When Tupua Tamasese Efi came into 
power — the former leader of the oppo­
sition, who fell from power as a result of 
the recent elections - he appointed a 
commission to investigate the importance 
of electoral franchise and whether the 
country still favoured the system of matai 
franchise, dually with the individual 
voters' roll which concerned only about 
half a percent of the population. That 
commission was chaired by our former 
Prime Minister Tupua Tamasese 
Lealofiaana IV. His recommendation to 
the House was to change to universal 
suffrage and that was again rejected by 
the House. 
In 1984, a further motion was submit­
ted by a Parliamentarian in the House but 
with a wording different from the pre­
vious ones. She wanted the voting right to 
be given to those who had attained the 
age of 25 upward, not 21 upward. That 
motion was seconded by Tupua Ta­
masese Efi who was then leader of the 
opposition and I was the Prime Minister 
at the time. So I appealed to the proposer 
ofthe motion saying I didn't think it was 
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the right time — motions of this sort had 
been put to the House before and were 
heavily defeated, because the majority of 
the members were matai. I suggested that 
she withdrew her motion until after the 
general elections in 1985, pledging that if 
my party, the HRPP, was returned to 
power, I would introduce a general 
referendum on universal suffrage so that 
the people might express their views. The 
then leader of the opposition, Tupua 
Tamasese Efi also pledged that should his 
party be returned to power, he would 
introduce a plebiscite, which he did not 
do when we were ousted from power 
shortly thereafter. 
I won that election, obtaining 31 seats, 
but after only three months, a motion of 
no-confidence, engineered by some mem­
bers of my own HRPP party, was moved 
against me. Some of them were not 
reappointed to Cabinet by myself, so they 
turned around and formed a faction and 
that faction moved the motion, which 
ousted us from power. So that is the 
history of this key issue. 
My honest reply to the question is that 
I think our victory was very much due to 
political maturity within the country. If 
people had wished to express themselves 
this time on such issues as the improve­
ment of infrastructure, we would not 
have had a chance to come back to power, 
because you have seen the state of the 
roads and of the water and electricity 
supply. They are all in a pretty bad shape. 
People did not consider that. That is 
why I am sure it is the political maturity 
that accounted for our breakthrouah. 
They felt they had a unique chance to 
express themselves for the first time under 
universal suffrage. Maybe, if after the 
current term we can't prove to them that 
we can do some work on infrastructure, 
then they can decide otherwise because 
the majority of them are now non-matai 
of the age of 21 or over. 
► To what extent could this change the 
Samoan way of life, because it is quite a 
change by Samoan standards? 
— My personal feeling, and it has been 
proven during the course of the last 
election campaign, is that the last election 
was the smoothest ever experienced in 
this country because people were happy 
with the opportunity. So I anticipate no 
marked change to our cultural system. 
Take the case of American Samoa where 
they have adopted and practised this 
system of universal suffrage for some 20 
years now, yet their matai system is still 
well under control and is still the best 
showpiece of the Samoan way of life. 
► Much more so than here? 
— Much more than here, because they 
still stick to one matai, to one title per 
family. Here, there was a multiplication 
of matai, I think, so that one family 
reached the number of 70 or 80 titled 
people and this meant a ruination of our 
matai system. 
That was exactly one of the reasons 
why I strongly advocated the change in 
our voting system, because matai who 
were candidates in an election could 
easily turn around and establish matai 
and have them registered. If I registered 
about 100 matai, that means I had 
The current Head of State, Malietoa Tammia fili II, holds the office for life; 
his successor will be elected for a 5-year term 
already 100 strong voters supporting me. 
That happened, I think for the first time 
in 1967. Such undue multiplication of 
matai titles started the ruination of the 
matai system. So I no longer worry about 
any future diminishing of the dignity of 
our system or of our culture, as augment­
ing the number of matai no longer has 
electoral consequences. 
► You have just constituted a new 
government - - taking a political risk 
because you drastically changed its com-
position. What do you want to achieve with 
this new government? 
— Firstly, there is the continuation of 
programmes that we have already star­
ted. As I mentioned earlier, our road 
system is still in bad shape, as a result of 
cyclone Ofa. Now we have financing 
facilities lined up for those road works 
from a number of donors. These will 
assure the continuity of ongoing pro­
grammes. 
Then there are some new programmes 
that I have in mind and these are aimed at 
further opening-up Western Samoa to the 
outside world. Number one is a deep sea 
harbour that will go along with a small 
airstrip to cope with the inter-island air 
traffic. Those are really uppermost in my 
mind. Any additional amount of boats 
that can be brought into the harbour 
you still see a lot of boats waiting outside 
the reef because of shortage of berthing 
capacity — will, I believe, help to open up 
the country even more. 
The other important novelty we want 
to introduce shortly, is the setting up ofa 
commission or a committee to enhance 
and encourage investment to the country. 
You know, we have some assets here. A 
major one is political stability and I can 
vouch for that asset. That will attract 
those with investment ability and funding 
because they know this is a safe place for 
them to be and our matai system con-. 
tributes to the protection ofthat stability. 
In this matter, I really would like to work 
hand in hand with the authority of the 
Alii ma faipule, that is, the Council of 
Chiefs in each village and district. Re­
member that historically, both the New 
Zealand regime and the German regime 
tried to overstep the authority of these 
Councils of Chiefs, but we learnt from 
their mistakes. 
► Confronting the slump of the early 
1980s, you proved not to be afraid of taking 
very drastic austerity measures. Now 
again, in the aftermath of cyclone Ofa, the 
country still needs to be restored to its 
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previous levels. How optimistic are you 
that you can enhance further sustained 
growth ? 
- The last part of of your question is 
very hard to reply to. I am not too 
optimistic. I believe that if I do not have 
support. I can think of anything, but 
those philosophies of mine have to be 
convincing to others. For example, some 
might think my economic and develop­
ment philosophy is too ambitious. But 
anyway, you are quite right to say that 
with my party I managed to have our 
economy recovering from its woes which 
lasted until 1983. 
When I came into power in 1983, our 
economic situation was in a real shambles 
so we had to introduce very austere 
measures. I appealed to Parliament: 
'Please, this is a time for us to make 
sacrifices. We can't expect foreign people 
to come and assist us if they find our 
people just lying back and doing nothing, 
so please stand up'. We devalued the 
currency by almost 33% and we boosted 
industry. The amount of our foreign 
exchange reserves at one time covered 
only three weeks of imports. 
Oil supply ships, when they came, first 
cabled to see whether the banks had 
sufficient money to pay for their oil, or 
else they would go back. The locked-in oil 
payments yet to be made at that time were 
about USS6 million and the total amount 
of locked-in funds for foreign payments 
was about USS13.9 million. We managed 
to pay that back within 9 months and 
now we are maintaining and ensuring the 
stability of our foreign reserve funds at 
about USS150-160 million. 
► One ofthe priorities you had in those 
days and which is still valid, was to increase 
agricultural productivity, but this has not 
really come about. 
— There have been big efforts to 
increase agricultural products but you 
should understand that we have been set 
back not only by Ofa, but also by 
hurricane Cina at the beginning of 1989 
and although its velocity did not reach the 
same speed as Ofa, it was still very strong 
and it damaged a lot of our plantations 
under our incentives system. 
The other reasons behind the declining 
figures for agricultural exports are, on the 
one hand, the drop in world prices and on 
the other, the adverse publicity in the 
United States against the consumption of 
what they call 'tropical oil', which is really 
coconut oil. You should ao to the outer 
The whole village gathers for the funeral of a matai, the head of an extended 
family or aiga 
villages and see the amount of copra just 
dropping down and lying there... We are 
still trying to find a way out of this 
situation and yet our oil mill could not get 
the volume of copra they wanted in order 
for them to have a viable milling oper­
ation, as peopie are reluctant to cut the 
copra. The reason, of course is the low 
price. 
We have made a major change in this 
field to the extent that we introduced a 
Bill which cuts off all subsidies för copra 
and coca. This may rebound on us. 
because the opposition did not take the 
same stand and made very bad publicity 
for the government. They said : 'now that 
you are taking away this money, what 
about the poor people?'. So the people's 
response was not to cut any more copra. 
Also, the opposition promised to re­
introduce incentives if they came back to 
power. Now, as they are not coming 
back, I think we will be alright because we 
will not introduce any copra incentive 
prices anymore. How could we be ex­
pected to do that as we get Stabex funds 
from overseas to compensate for our 
losses in export earnings? 
► To what extent are you concerned by 
the recession in Australia and New 
Zealand? Do you fear the effects of 
adverse economic trends there? 
- They have certain policies that I 
really do not support and I did not have 
much to say before the elections but I 
think I will have some negotiations with 
them. They put, for instance, certain 
restrictions on our exports of agricultural 
commodities to them. Some measures are 
very stringent especially those on our 
bananas, yet bugs in bananas can be there 
because no one can detect everything. Of 
course we fumigate them before they are 
exported but they always seem to find 
something. 
I do not think things should continue 
this way. We, the leaders of the smaller 
nations of the South Pacific, should put 
pressure on these two major governments 
within the region. After all, they are our 
main trading partners — far more so than 
the United States and Europe, so if they 
want to help stabilise our balance of 
trade, I think they should take heed far 
more of our desires. 1 will talk to them 
strongly. 
► What about the labour market : on 
the one hand there is still a high rate of 
emigration which has a positive effect given 
the high level of remittances of Samoans 
abroad, yet those labour markets are 
slowing down and perhaps, the cultural ties 
of generations of Samoans abroad will 
weaken and so will remittances : on the 
other hand, locally there may be a labour 
shortage ? 
- That is exactly one of the points I 
have in mind when 1 say we need to 
encourage investment in Samoa. In New 
Zealand, they have a surplus now of 
factory hands who are out of jobs. Should 
there be investors in manufacturing here 
in Samoa, the Samoans there could 
return home. I really would like to see my 
people return home because people are 
very important. 
Don't forget, in the beginning, the 
reason why they were enticed to go over 
there was not because of the wish of the 
Samoans to leave their country. No, they 
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were asked to. The first were even offered 
the fares to come to work in New Zealand 
in the period after the Second World 
War. A lot of them are now out of a job, 
so remittances from there to here will be 
declining substantially. 
As a matter of fact, I was speaking this 
morning with some returnees from New 
Zealand and I said : 'Are you here to 
stay?' 'Yes' was the answer so I said: 
'Well why don't you try to convince all 
your family to come back? We have a 
potential here'. Indeed there is a land 
mass that is yet to be developed and 
markets to be tapped, such as for taro. 
Incidentally, the booming taro market is 
one ofthe reasons why a lot of people are 
not going into cutting copra because it 
requires a lot of labour but fetches a bad 
price, whereas for taro the price is very 
good and the amount of consumers 
around the world is growing all the time. 
So quite a number of Samoans are now 
thinking of returning. Those who are out 
of a job over there, still have to pay their 
rent, their fees for electricity and water, 
etc. And than there is also the reduction 
of unemployment benefits they used to 
receive, but which are now nearly halved. 
► What is your view on the benefits of 
regional cooperation ? 
- Within the region, I don't think we 
have experienced any immediate increase 
in benefit. I don't mean to say that there 
will be no benefit ; there will be, but it 
might take a long time, so the various 
countries — I can of course only speak for 
Samoa itself — must look seriously to 
their own future. 
Of course, we appreciate very much the 
regional programmes that are also of 
benefit to Western Samoa; programmes 
covering such areas as telecommuni­
cations and perhaps eventually satellite 
television. You may remember that I 
included in my manifesto that we will 
encourage private television companies 
to come here and invest, so maybe 
régionalisation of television programmes 
is another issue we can look into. 
► Looking at tourism, is there still that 
somewhat half-hearted approach to it. On 
the one handit is a foreign exchange earner 
while on the other, there is a certain 
reticence, in view of what it could do to the 
attitude the youngsters will develop about 
their future and what it could do to the 
Samoan way of life and culture, ¡s there a 
more clear-cut approach now? 
— I usually reply to overseas cor­
respondents, when they ask this question, 
that I think the reason why some cultures 
are being spoiled by the tourist industry is 
very much due to the governments of the 
countries concerned. It all goes back to 
their response and motivations, and to 
them passing legislation to cope with it. 
For example, I have pledged that we will 
introduce legislation for compulsory 
education and that will automatically 
prevent children from trying to sell things 
Prime Minister Tofilou Eli Alesana 
'I no longer worry about any future 
diminishing ofthe dignity of our matai-
system or of our culture, as augmenting 
the number of matai no longer has 
electoral consequences' 
to tourists during daytime. That is the 
role of government : preventing unneces­
sary commercialisation via the indigen­
ous people, which would not only spoil 
the country but also the tourists. Some 
tourists will come here with a notion in 
mind 'this is paradise'. So they expect to 
get that because of the books they have 
read, for example. Margaret Mead's 
book that she wrote about 'The coming of 
age in Western Samoa'. 
► What do you think of that ? 
- It's wrong! It is totally wrong. She 
probably had an affair with a Samoan 
man so she wrote that way, but she was 
totally wrong. Maybe if a tourist has read 
that book and comes over here, he will try 
to experience the same as she did. So who 
is to blame? Is it the country or the 
writer? It is an amazing situation and it 
has to be looked into, not only within the 
country but alsg in those places where the 
tourists come from and in the travel 
offices overseas. We should say: 'When 
you go to Samoa this is what you should 
look into. You can go to a Samoan family 
and establish a good relationship. They 
will care for you, look after you and even 
feed you. with no money asked for. At the 
end of his stay, the palangi (') might 
present them with a gift or not, but that is 
not the essence of it all. 
► After so many years experience of 
cooperation with the EEC, how do you 
regard the EEC as a partner? 
I highly regard the relationship 
between my country and the EEC. First 
of all it reflects to the Samoan people an 
understanding that they never had 
before. There are discussions with visitors 
from overseas, the grants of aid to 
projects assisted by the EEC, they all 
contribute to people starting to open their 
minds. Remember those days when the 
Germans were here, they used to take 
Samoans as dancing groups to Germany. 
and don't forget we still have people here 
who are named Europa, as they were 
born during that period, but that era is 
finished. Yet, now this connection ofthe 
European Community with Western 
Samoa is very important again. 
1 think however that the current 
evolution of Europe and whatever out­
come it may have for the social way of life 
ofthe people over there, will not have the 
same effects here. The reason is because 
you based your social system at some 
point, and in some way or another, on 
your economic system. They go hand in 
hand, whereas here they are two different 
things: economic development does not 
spring naturally from our culture. Here 
culture thrives all the same and our social 
system is entrenched in it. That is why I 
make mention of the Alii ma faipule. 
because their influence is very strong. If 
the government introduces new ways and 
means and new programmes to be im­
plemented and spares no effort in ex­
plaining the programme to them, then the 
Council of Chiefs can sell the idea to 
others and people will move accordingly. 
Even if they have no money they can do 
the work on the strength of this cultural 
ability and influence of the Alii ma 
faipule; so our approach is different/ 
Interview by R.D.B. 
(') 'While man'. 
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EEC — Western Samoa 
cooperation 
by Hubert MARTINETZ (*) 
Western Samoa, the most populous 
Polynesian island state in the Pacific and 
independent since 1962, has been as­
sociated with the European Community 
since Lomé I. 
The contribution of the Community to 
the socio-economic development of the 
country has risen consistently with each 
successive Lomé Convention : 
— ECU 4.6 million under Lomé I -
National Indicative Programme 
- ECU 6.2 million under Lomé II - NIP 
- ECU 9 million under Lomé III - NIP 
In addition. Western Samoa has re­
ceived Stabex transfers totalling 
ECU 20.4m. emergency aid of 
ECU 360 900, and loans from the Euro­
pean Investment Bank of ECU 8.4m. At 
the end ofthe Lomé III Convention, the 
European Community had allocated to 
Western Samoa a total of ECU 48.3m. 
Under Lomé IV, the National Indicative 
Programme amounts to ECU 9m in the 
form of grant aid and ECU 1.5m as the 
minimum contribution foreseen in the 
form of loans managed by the EIB. 
Lomé I and Lomé II 
Agriculture is the most important 
sector ofthe economy of Western Samoa. 
(*) EC Resident adviser in Apia. Western Samoa. 
Close to 90% of exports are either 
directly or indirectly based on agricul­
ture. The economy therefore depends 
almost entirely on outside factors such as 
world market prices, over which tbe 
country itself has no control. But the 
prices of Samoa's main export com­
modities, i.e. coconut oil. copra and 
cocoa beans have fallen drastically, while 
at the same time, the prices of imports, 
notably oil, have increased. 
The development plans of Western 
Samoa reflect these problems, in putting 
emphasis on: 
— increased agricultural production; 
— a rural development programme; 
— industrial development ; 
— efforts to reduce dependence on im­
ported fuel. 
The National Indicative Programmes 
under Lomé I and II reflected these 
objectives. The bulk of financing from the 
EDF and from the EIB. has been used to 
develop the substantial hydro-electric 
potential and to reduce dependence on 
imported oil for electricity generation. 
For geological reasons, water storage 
capabilities are limited in Western 
Samoa. Consequently, full use cannot be 
made of hydro-power during the dry 
season. Therefore, all three hydro-power 
plants constructed during this period 
were so-called river schemes. These are : 
Community aid for Western Samoa from Lomé I to Lomé IV 
(in '000 ECU) programmable ά non-programmable aid 
without regional cooperation 
Convention 
Lomé I 
Lomé II 
Lomé III 
Lomé IV 
Lomé I - IV 
NIP 
3817 
6 153 
9 000 
9 000 
27 970 
STABEX* 
2 837 
6 489 
11 122 
— 
20 448 
Emergency 
Aid 
— 
146 
215 
— 
361 
EIB 
LOANS 
890 
3 321 
4 200 
1 500 
9911 
TOTAL 
7 544 
16 109 
24 537 
10 500 
58 690 
* Western Samoa is exempt from the reconstitution of STABEX funds. 
— Samasoni (installed capacity of 
1.8 MW) 
-Fale-ole-Fe'e(1.6MW) 
— Sauniatu (3.5 MW). 
Under Lomé I and II, 60% and 85% of 
the respective National Indicative Pro­
grammes and an additional ECU 3m 
loan from the EIB were allocated to the 
development of hydro-power potential. 
The proportion of total electricity gener­
ation reliant on imported diesel fuel fell 
from 80% in 1980 to 20% in 1985. 
Lomé III 
Lomé III saw continuity in the de­
velopment of hydro-power potential, but, 
also an important step forward in the 
technology which had been adopted. The 
Afulilo hydro-power project, under con­
struction since September 1990, will be 
the first storage "hydro-electric power 
scheme in Western Samoa. At the first 
stage, the plant will be equipped with two 
turbines of a total capacity of 4 MW. 
Further extension by a third turbine is 
foreseen as well as the possibility of 
integrating the neighbouring Vaipu 
basin. The link between the two re­
servoirs will increase the potential by 
using the surplus electricity during the 
night to pump the water from the Vaipu 
basin to the higher Afulilo basin. 
Although the project had already been 
identified in the early 1980s, technical 
design and feasibility studies took several 
years until finally the financial package of 
ECU 21m came together and the finan­
cing was decided in July 1990. The 
breakdown is as follows: 
— European Community (EDF and 
EIB) 51.69% 
— Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
20.9 % 
— International Development Agency 
(IDA) 11.33% 
— Western Samoa Government and the 
Electric Power Corporation (EPC) 
15.31% 
— Australian International Develop­
ment Assistance Bureau 0.77% 
With support for the Afulilo hydro­
electric project of ECU 8.85m from the 
EDF. the Lomé III National Indicative 
Programme was fully committed. The 
EIB committed itself to a minimum of 
ECU lm but by the end of the Lomé III 
Convention, their commitment had risen 
significantly with a further ECU 2.6m for 
the Afulilo project and a further ECU 
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The Afulilo hydro-power project — under construction (above) since September 1990 — will be 
the first storage hydro-electric power scheme in Western Samoa 
1.6m for the Development Bank of 
Western Samoa. 
Lomé IV 
At the beginning ofthe 1990s. Western 
Samoa once again faces considerable 
uncertainty in the light of the recent 
slowdown in the growth of output in 
industrial countries and doubtful pro-
spects for the future. 
In addition, cyclone Ofa caused serious 
damage on the islands of Savaii and 
Upolu in February 1990. Despite in-
creased inflows of private remittances 
and foreign aid, the national economy is 
only slowly recovering from the devas-
tation. Furthermore, the trade deficit will 
worsen as a result of declining export 
receipts and of increased imports follow-
ing the cyclone. 
Having completed the temporary rep-
airs to allow basic access to the country's 
infrastructure. Western Samoa has now 
focused its efforts on urgent medium-
term reconstruction. The Government 
appealed for foreign aid in order to begin 
a large-scale rehabilitation programme in 
infrastructure, especially road construc-
tion, telecommunications, energy and 
water supply. Given the substantial 
capital investments in this sector, the 
Government will ensure that mainten-
ance costs will be recovered from user 
fees. 
The European Community took into 
account the reorientation of the national 
development plan during its program-
ming mission for Lomé IV. Following 
this dialogue between the Government 
and the Commission, the National In-
dicative Programme for Western Samoa 
was signed on 11 March 1991. 
The 'economic and social infrastruc-
ture in the rural areas" has been identified 
as the sector of concentration for the 
Community support. Approximately 
85% of resources will be allocated here. 
The European Investment Bank also 
considers the provision of finance in this 
focal sector to be in accordance with 
Article 236 of the Fourth Lomé Conven-
tion. 
The identification of an integrated 
programme of action for water manage-
ment on both inhabited islands is cur-
rently under way. The viability and 
feasibility of the programme has to be 
confirmed by a water development plan 
study and a corresponding national water 
policy. The study will begin as soon as the 
required number of states have ratified 
the Convention, allowing it to enter into 
force. 
The remaining 15% of the financial 
resources managed by the Commission 
allows a flexible approach for activities 
which do not necessarily fall within the 
focal area, but emphasis may be given to 
the development of human resources and 
follow-up measures for projects financed 
under previous Lomé Conventions. The 
follow-up measures include technical 
assistance and training and institutional 
strengthening, in order to improve run-
ning and maintenance ofthe facilities and 
to measure the long-term viability ofthe 
projects. 
Regional cooperation 
Western Samoa has drawn consider-
able benefit from the allocation of re-
gional cooperation funds. This trend 
should continue under Lomé IV, where 
ECU 35m is allocated to the eight as-
sociated Pacific States. Western Samoa 
suffers from isolation as much as any 
other island country in the South Pacific. 
The accent has therefore been, and will 
continue to be, placed on telecommuni-
cations, regional transport and tourism, 
as well as on research on resources in the 
agricultural sector and in fisheries. 
The multiannual Pacific Regional Ag-
ricultural Programme financed by 
Lomé III funds is currently under way. 
The Western Samoa component is im-
plemented by researchers of IRETA, an 
institute of the University of the South 
Pacific. In addition, the infrastructure of 
the campus will be improved by the 
construction of housing for the students. 
In the sector of communications, the 
13-year-old earth satellite station will be 
replaced in 1990/91 by a modern digital 
station with additional capacity, placing 
communications between Western 
Samoa and overseas on a more modern 
and efficient level. H.M. 
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Remote sensing and rural development 
a better grasp of the phenomena of desertification 
by Robert GREGOIRE (*) 
On 27 and 28 November, Oua­
gadougou, capital of Burkina Faso, 
hosted a meeting marking the end of 
phase one ofa number of studies in which 
remote sensing was used to highlight the 
dynamics of desertification on the 
southern periphery of the Sahara. These 
studies were part of the Community 
drought and desertification control pro­
gramme and, as such, were paid for by the 
Commission budget. More specifically, 
the idea is to help the governments in this 
part ofthe world to combat the decline in 
the natural factors of production by 
giving them a better grasp of the dy­
namics of the principal phenomena of 
desertification. 
The aim of the work, run on behalf of 
the Commission's Directorate-General 
for Development (this time with the 
scientific backing of the Joint Research 
Centre at Ispra) by seven European 
research bodies in Ireland, the UK, 
Denmark, Germany, Belgium, France 
and Italy, was to perfect methods 
of remote sensing that would give a 
clearer idea of the dynamics of 
desertification. It began in 1984 
and involved: 
— estimation of rainfall from sat­
ellite data; 
— continuous monitoring of wind 
erosion ; 
— quantitative and qualitative es­
timation of the ligneous biomass 
used mainly for firewood; 
— continuous monitoring of the 
Sahel grazing land; 
— prospecting for underground 
water near the surface in the 
Sahara and Sahel; 
— production of a hydrologica 
model of the upper Senegal basin ; 
— studies of energy and water in 
various plants grown in the 
Sudano-Sahel area; 
— development of a cheap satellite ¡y 
data processing system suitable for 
West Africa. 
A meeting to summarise these 
data at the Joint Research Centre 
in Ispra in June 1990 revealed that a 
number of the subjects of research could, 
on certain conditions, be transferred to 
potential regional and national users as 
they stood. One or two years' further 
investigation and experimentation were 
called for to validate methods in other 
cases, however, but this was something 
which could be done by mixed African 
and European research teams, with the 
existing local structures leading the way 
and European teams providing any back­
up. 
A proper transfer of technology would 
thus be possible in both cases. 
The idea ofthe Ouagadougou meeting, 
on the threshold of phase two, was to 
provide an interface between part of the 
study strongly dominated by European 
money and men and a further, African-
dominated stage with financing partly 
from Lomé IV regional funds and 
possibly national sources too. 
.· · ' ·-' -Jgja ^^ t 
- \ t 
(*) Principiti administrator DG VIII. 
The underground water resources revealed by remote 
sensing can help transform dry regions 
At the meeting were 13 nations from 
West Africa (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Maurit­
ania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal), two 
from the Maghreb (Algeria and Tunisia), 
five regional organisations (the CILSS, 
the CRTO, AGHRYMET, the IGAAD 
and UNPE/UNSO), the Sahara-Sahel 
Observatory, the seven European co-
investigators and a large delegation of 
staff from the Commission, DG VIII and 
the Ispra Joint Research Centre and 
Delegation advisers. 
Discussions about the transfer of 
technology, which focused on what to 
transfer, how to transfer it and to whom, 
were along two main lines. 
1. Telling national and regional leaders 
how remote sensing can help make a 
better job of managing the natural factors 
of production (water, soil, vegetation and 
the West African microclimate), but 
pointing out the limitations too. 
The basis for this was : 
a) the seven European research 
centres' results, which representat­
ives put over in such a way as to be 
understandable to non-specialists; 
b) the programme monitoring 
team's (French and English) report 
on remote sensing in the Sahel 
environment, summarising the re­
sults of the seven co-investigators, 
together with similar work carried 
out elsewhere in the world and 
some thoughts on the ways of 
transferring technology, which has 
since been very widely distributed 
by our Delegations in West Africa 
and by the CTA. 
2. Discussing the design ofa trans­
fer system for study activity — the 
bulk of which has so far been run 
by European research units — with 
the African partners. 
The wide ranging origins of the 
Ouagadougou participants (25 
people from Ministries of Plan­
ning, Finance, Agriculture, the 
i 
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Environment etc. 25 remote sensing 
experts and 10 Commission staff) show 
that the aim of informing rural develop­
ment decision-makers was partly 
achieved. 
The following recommendations on 
transferring research activities to African 
partners were made and participants 
passed them on to the governments and 
decision-makers. 
Recommendations 
1. Subject of activity 
Diagnosis of the environmental con­
ditions required for better management 
of the natural factors of production 
(water, soil, vegetation and the micro­
climate). 
2. Practical proposals for partnership in 
transfer activities (North-South, South-
North and South-South) 
A protocol enshrining data exchange 
and the joint running of activities. 
— This would mean that the countries of 
the South could help devise technology 
and thus make a bigger contribution to 
decision making. 
Running activities means adapting the 
results of existing but as yet not fully 
operational methods and diagnoses to 
local conditions and developing a new 
methodology. It does, of course, involve 
training technical cadres locally and 
elsewhere. The meeting stressed the 
importance of training — to be provided, 
in particular, by existing national and 
regional organisations here. 
The arrangements for all this are to be 
laid down in partnership agreements. 
Proposals can be made at both regional 
and national levels. 
3. Gradual adjustment of the transfer to 
local conditions 
This means implementing projects over 
a four- or five-year period. 
The adjustments will be made gradu­
ally, with regular evaluations geared to 
inserting the results of applied develop­
ment research into the programmes of 
activities. 
4. Priority applications 
The West African geographical area 
has to be described as a whole. Teams of 
partners and a steering group have to be 
set up downstream to: 
— foster contact between the partners ; 
— make the partnership activity dy­
namic : 
— ensure cohesion between activities and 
programmes. 
5. Lomé IV financing 
It is highly desirable for these program­
mes to be financed under Lomé IV 
regional financing agreements — and 
over a period of four or five years if they 
are to be effective. They will be assessed in 
the usual Lomé way. 
The recommendations show that the 
participants are anxious to: 
1) carry on with the study programme, 
but this time through partnerships in­
volving both African and European 
study teams, with the African teams 
taking the lead. These partnerships, 
grouped into a network in the sub-region 
covered by the invitation to tender, will 
be run and coordinated by a permanent 
European expert living in Africa. Where 
need be. he will be backed up in particular 
areas by ad hoc working parties compris­
ing people from the partnership teams 
and one or two highly qualified experts: 
2) strengthen the weak link in the remote 
sensing utilisation chain i.e. the 
national remote sensing unit in each 
country concerned, which is connected to 
the other units in the West African sub-
region. 
Each of these units, as interface for the 
final user, will: 
— pass on questions and requests from 
the grass roots; 
— disseminate information from outside 
and adapt it to the local situation ; 
— coordinate remote sensing program­
mes at national level ; 
— capitalise on the knowledge of special­
ists trained elsewhere by fitting them into 
a system where their technical skills can 
be used and perhaps improved. 
The infrastructure, equipment, staff 
training and operating costs will have to 
be underwritten by external aid for years 
to come, as is the case with the Las 
Palomas satellite receiver station in the 
Canaries and regional units such as 
Aghrymet in Niamey. 
The bulk ofthe Community financing 
will come from the Lomé IV regional 
programme for West Africa, with an 
additional amount from the Commission 
budget. 
Examples of partnership studies in­
volving getting a national remote sensing 
unit off the eround are: 
Cape Verde 
Inclusion of relief in the evaluation of 
natural ground resources by remote 
sensing. 
Spatial distribution of water resources 
in relation to vegetation and soil runoff 
potential. 
Quantitative diagnosis of agricultural 
output. 
All spatial data (on rainfall, runoff 
potential and vegetation) to be integrated 
into a geographically and administrat­
ively defined geographical information 
system. Duration — three years. 
Partnership - Cape Verde: IN IA 
-Europe: IRAT/CIRAD. 
Guinea 
(with possible extension to Guinea 
Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana) 
Monitoring of brush fires by remote 
sensing. 
Three aspects to be studied : 
— the fire calendar; 
— the geographical area affected by fires 
at any given time; 
— the effect ofa fire season on the plant 
cover (various types of environment and 
cover). 
All data to be integrated into a geog­
raphically and administratively limited 
geographical information system to make 
it easier for users to work in the field. 
Duration — four years. 
Partnership Guinea : Map study unit of 
the Directorate-General for 
Forestry 
Europe: University of 
Geography of Copenhagen 
(CHIPS software) and the 
Joint Research Centre at 
Ispra. 
A partner, as yet to be located, to 
prepare pictures in the early stages. 
In conclusion, it is worth pointing out 
that the new phase of study and action 
discussed at the Ouagadougou meeting 
has substituted 'management of the 
natural factors of production' for the 
more restrictive 'desertification' and thai 
the programme impact zone is now the 
whole of West Africa rather than just the 
Sahel. 
The realities of the terrain thus con­
firm, if indeed any confirmation were 
needed, the Lomé IV authors' desire to 
make the management of the natural 
factors of production in all countries and 
all climates one of the essential aims of 
the Convention. R.G. 
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Community — NGO cooperation 
by Laure DE CENIVAL (*) 
ANNUAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Of DEVELOPMENT NGOs 
BWISSUS 911 APR«. 1931 
ASSEMBLEE GENERALE ANNUELLE 
DES ONG DE DEVELOPPEMENT 
BRUXELLES 9 H AVRIL 1991 
17th General Assembly in Brussels in April 
The 17th General Assembly of Euro­
pe's development NGOs (non-govern­
mental organisations -- DNGOs) was 
held in Brussels on 9-11 April when 
representatives from the 700 organis­
ations in the Liaison Committee of 
Development NGOs of the European 
Community and their partners in the 
Commission took stock of their cooper­
ation and discussed prospects for NGO 
action in the coming years. 
(*) The author is a trainee legal expert in DG VIII 
al the Commission of the European Communities. 
Since 1976, cooperation between the 
NGOs and the EEC has been practical 
proof that the Community shares the 
solidarity of the people of Europe with 
the poorest populations of the Third 
World. The focus has been on cofinan-
cing development schemes (micropro-
jects) in the developing countries, on 
campaigns to put public opinion in 
Europe in the picture, on food aid and 
emergency aid and on helping the NGOs 
coordinate to make them more effective. 
The NGOs and their local partners are 
highly motivated and committed and 
their independence, relatively small size 
and autonomy and attendant flexible 
management all contribute to their suc­
cess. These positive factors tend to 
combine to bring greater efficiency, speed 
and flexibility to the design and im­
plementation of projects in the develop­
ing world, making NGO action a vital 
complement to intergovernmental and 
Community cooperation programmes. 
Manuel Marin, Commission Vice-
President, Nicole Péry, Vice-President of 
the European Parliament and member of 
its Development Committee as well as of 
the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, and 
Devaki Jain, the Head of the New Delhi 
Institute of Social Studies, spoke at the 
opening session of the meeting to a large 
number of representatives of Community 
institutions, ACP nations and NGOs. 
Manuel Marin's subject was human 
rights and development, an area in which 
he has taken the initiative of suggesting a 
new, innovatory Community policy tying 
development cooperation to the pro­
motion of human rights and democracy. 
The Commission indeed intends going in 
for positive encouragement measures in 
the shape of large amounts of aid for 
countries - - such as Haïti and Benin 
which are making a special effort. Al­
though negative measures (sanctions) 
have not been ruled out, there is no 
question of imposing conditionality or, 
even less, a model for democracy. Proper 
development means respect for human 
rights and authentic democratic particip­
ation, and the development NGOs there­
fore see these areas as vitally important. 
The opening session also saw the 
official prize-giving of the DNGO 2001, 
the annual award set up by Europe's 
development NGOs in 1988 and given to 
a group or individual involved in an 
outstanding initiative to do with North-
South relations. This year it went to the 
International Collective in Support of 
Fish Workers (ICSFW), the North-South 
network of basic groups, NGOs, trade 
unions and fishermen from all over the 
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Anne-Marie Beulink, Chairman of the NGO-EC Liaison Committee, presents the 
NGO 2001 award to Aliou Sali, the President of ICSFW 
world, which was founded in 1986 to 
improve the situation of people who 
depend on fishing and on the processing 
and distribution offish and fish products 
for their livelihood. The original idea was 
to help artisanal fishermen in the Third 
World, but the organisation now takes 
care of fisheries workers everywhere and 
is a fine example of an NGO in which 
North and South are in partnership and 
adapting to the NGOs' new role in a 
changing world — the central theme of 
the 1991 meeting. 
The world in which the NGOs work 
has changed over the past few years. 
There have been major upheavals on the 
international scene, bringing progress for 
democracy and an end to confrontation 
between East and West and taking 
Europe's attention away from the prob­
lems of the developing world. The new 
international economic order currently 
emerging puts less emphasis on the poor 
and focuses development on mankind. 
But the advance of democracy in many 
Third World countries is leading the 
populations ofthe South to want greater 
involvement and greater control over 
their own lives — which is why one of the 
essential aims of the General Assembly 
was to see how development agencies in 
the North and NGOs and grass roots 
groups in the South can cooperate more 
efficiently and achieve a democratic 
development model based on what the 
people need. Four workshops therefore 
looked at specific aspects of the main 
topic — NGOs from the South and their 
external relations, European develop­
ment NGOs and their external relations, 
the influence of DNGOs and the challen­
ges of a changing world and the tech­
niques of lobbying and coordination. 
So the DNGOs devoted most of the 
three days to themselves and the world 
they work in. The meeting was an 
opportunity to look at the various con­
texts in which development NGOs from 
North and South operate and to discuss 
the initiatives they hope to promote and 
how to implement them. It also gave the 
European organisations a chance to 
redefine their relations with their partners 
in the South and, most important, when it 
comes to achieving greater solidarity in 
the world, their strategies vis-à-vis the 
authorities in North and South.O 
L.D.C. 
46 ~WA EUROSTAT 
ACP country reports 
by Jenny BEMBELLO (*) 
Länderberichte, the Statistical mon­
ographs in the German Statistical 
Office's foreign series, cover some­
thing like 150 countries at the rate of 
30 per year, clearly setting out recent 
figures from all available national 
and international sources and pro­
viding concise comments, graphs and 
subject maps in addition. 
Lay-out and content are designed 
to show the State structure, govern­
ment, geography and population of 
the country in question and, most 
important, to give a close analysis of 
the different sectors of the economy. 
So there are details of agriculture, 
industry (mining and energy in­
cluded) and external trade, plus more 
specific economic information on 
such things as employment, price and 
wage trends and finance as well. 
Figures on the national economy and 
the balance of payments highlight 
general economic trends and social 
aspects are covered in special chap­
ters on health and education. 
Since relations between the ACP 
and EEC countries are intensifying 
and improving all the time - - the 
Lomé Conventions have something 
to do with this — but that the general 
public in the EEC is ill-informed 
about it. the European Community 
Statistical Office in Luxembourg 
(Eurostat) and the Federal German 
Statistical Office in Wiesbaden 
(StBA) signed a statistical agreement, 
in October 1988, whereby Eurostat 
undertook to bring out French and 
English versions (with one or two 
(*) CESD-Communautaire (European training 
Centre for statisticians, economists of developing 
countries). 
amendments) ofthe original German 
reports on the ACP countries. Four 
of the 22 chapters containing details 
of bilateral and international aspects 
are in fact changed to suit the 
international readership, with the 
analyses (of external trade, official 
development assistance, external in­
vestments and debt) seen from a 
Community rather than a bilateral 
angle. 
Zimbabwe was the test country 
selected to start the Community 
series, a choice dictated by the im­
portance the EEC attaches to this 
country and its potential role in the 
Southern African development pro­
cess and by Zimbabwe's own drive to 
improve its socio-economic perform­
ance with a structural adjustment 
programme. The Zimbabwe report 
was published in June 1990 and 
presented to the press in Harare in 
July. 
With the signing of Lomé IV (due 
to be ratified in 1991), Eurostat and 
the StBA naturally went for Togo for 
the first regular report in the Com­
munity series which is to involve two 
120-page issues every year. 
Togo found development difficult 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, when 
unfavourable international economic 
conditions and breakneck indus­
trialisation triggered a profound 
structural crisis in the nation's 
economy. Things began to pick up 
gradually in the mid-1980s, although 
this country, like many others in 
Africa, is the victim of recurrent 
variations in the price of its main 
export products (phosphates, coffee, 
cocoa and cotton) on the inter­
national market. But its importance 
as a European Community trading 
partner and a goods transit point for 
the neighbouring countries is increas­
ing. 
A functional banking organis­
ation, a highly developed transport 
infrastructure and a liberal trading 
system presage further economic 
improvements, particularly in agri­
culture, where about 70% of the 
population earn their living. 
The structural adjustment pro­
gramme in operation since 1983 has 
brought vast reforms in its wake and 
been of particular importance in 
recent economic developments, while 
the privatisation of unprofitable 
public and semi-public firms, a gen­
eral farm price reform, a new invest­
ment law and the setting up ofa free 
trade zone have, created the con­
ditions for lasting economic growth. 
All this could make Togo more 
attractive as both an investment 
proposition and a trading partner for 
the Community countries. 
As well as setting out general 
economic and socio-economic 
trends, the report gives details ofthe 
volume and destination of trade 
flows and of economic cooperation 
between the European Community 
and Togo. 
The main sectors covered - - ex­
ternal trade, the external debt, for­
eign investments and official de­
velopment assistance — will be dealt 
with in chapters focusing on relations 
with the European Community. The 
German Development Institute 
(DIE, Berlin) was asked to produce 
these four chapters and the general 
economic table and the chapters on 
sectoral economic trends, employ­
ment, trends in prices and wages and 
the social situation are the work of 
the foreign statistics department at 
the Federal Statistical Office in 
Berlin. 
The Togo 1991 report is not just a 
reliable source of information for 
investors in the European Com­
munity and elsewhere. It is a work of 
reference for students looking for 
sound resource material and tourists 
interested in having a better idea of 
the importance and specific nature of 
the country they are visiting. 
The next reports will be on Na­
mibia and Cameroon.o J.B. 
The Courier no. 128 July-August 1991  47 DOSSIER 
Human rights, 
democracy and 
development 
48 In this dossier, The Courier tackles a political issue -
human rights and the transition to democracy — and its 
relationship with development, the economic impli­
cations of which are being widely discussed today. 
We print the opinions of European and ACP authors, 
as usual, with a view to respecting contradictions without 
hiding disagreement and to criticising without facile 
intolerance or easy sectarianism or taking refuge in 
dogma. Far be it from us to be didactic; we are merely 
thinking aloud and taking a critical approach to the 
matter. Far be it from us to explain ; we are merely trying 
to understand and to look less to the causes than to the 
meaning of events. 
Aware, as we are, that there are no ready-made 
solutions in politics, we have aimed as far as possible to 
avoid any form of ethnocentrism — hence the point of 
going beyond official state policy and looking at local 
ways of going about things. Hence also the need to take 
account not just of political power, but also of symbolic 
power, that which, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, 'is 
only wielded when misinterpreted as arbitrary'. 
The human rights debate long turned on the primacy of 
economic and social rights over civil and political rights, 
but there now seems to be a consensus on the idea of 
human rights as more or less universal and a democratic 
minimum everywhere. As Albert Camus said at the 
Labour Exchange in Saint-Etienne on 10 May 1953,'they 
said we ought to have justice first and see about freedom 
later, as if slaves could ever get justice'. 
In this issue, Manuel Marin outlines the Commission's 
view as recently presented to the Council of Community 
Development Ministers. 
Dr Simmonds gives an ACP point of view and Henri 
Saby says where the European Parliament stands, while 
human rights in both ACP and EC countries are covered 
in the Amnesty International report. Germain N'Gom, 
President of the African Lawyers, and a British NGO 
describe operations run by Africans in Africa. 
Democracy is currently attractive because of its 
economic implications — which is both its strength and its 
weakness — but it would be as well to wonder whether it 
should not be sought for its own sake rather than just for 
what it means in terms of development. 
In any case, it would be wise to avoid any preconceived 
ideas about democracy being alien to Africa and to shun 
the tendency to impose existing models from outside. 
Democracy may be universal, but it is contingent on 
many other things at the same time. The situations in the 
(particularly African) ACPs are very different from those 
in the EC. The only obvious similarity is that many 
regimes are now seriously short on legitimacy, although 
local conditions tend to lead to specific differences from 
then on. Most Africans, for example, think and talk 
politics in the vernacular and symbols usually win the day 
over instrumentality (Dominique Darbon). The patri­
monial nature of the African State turns a political 
struggle into a struggle for access to state resources as well 
as for political position (J.F. Médard) and, lastly, nations 
were built before democracy in Western Europe. 
It would also be wrong to overestimate the new call for 
democracy. The first aim is to contest the authority of 
power, so the first thing at stake is power and the fight to 
control it (in some cases) or consolidate it (in others). In 
some cases one may ask, perhaps if the real issue is not 
political change for its own sake. Hence some govern­
ments react merely by trying to limit the damage by being 
'democrats for convenience' as contrasted with 'de­
mocrats by conviction'. Defending legality has also 
sometimes been used as an alibi for safeguarding vested 
interests previously established without benefit ofthe law. 
Looking beyond its institutions, democracy is a 
political system in which the people have formal and/or 
informal ways of keeping tabs on the governments which 
they have chosen (Comi M. Toulabor). 
So a democratic society is one in which there is a public 
arena in which to discuss the ways and means of 
organising society and where no power is aimed at 
ideological hegemony (Alain Ricard). 
Seen from this angle, the link between democracy and 
development is an obvious one and the sort of democracy 
which has a range of targets is a political choice which 
must be exercised democratically. 
In this context The Courier opens its columns to a 
personal opinion on the relationship between tribalism, 
democracy and party, and also to an analysis of the 
democratic tradition in most countries of the Caribbean 
and the Pacific as well to a reflection on the tie-up between 
democracy and development. A member of the EIB staff 
has contributed his thoughts on the relationship between 
development and the African political heritage; lastly, 
there is an analysis of recent outstanding switches to 
democracy and a point of view about the terms of proper 
governance. 
Whether the aim be merely to smooth over political 
contestation or genuinely to convert to democracy, the 
important thing is to provide a response to the many 
expectations of the overwhelming majority of the people 
of Africa and elsewhere...o 
Dominique DAVID 
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'Democracy 
cannot be imposed 
from the outside' 
by Manuel Marin 
Vice-President of the European Commission 
The human rights debate has broadened considerably of late. 
Growth models can no longer be designed along purely 
economic lines but must be linked to models of society too. 
Although in the past, human rights infringements were quite 
often raised as issues of principle (in Lomé II and III, for 
example) or when particularly serious breaches had occurred, 
the international community always preferred (whether from 
self-interest or hypocrisy) to avoid placing matters such as 
regimes and political structures on the agenda. Nowadays, as I 
have stated before, even the most neutral of international 
organisations openly discuss these issues, under pressure from 
two sources : 
— First and most obviously, people are gradually waking up to 
the fact that economic reforms are heavily dependent for their 
success on certain social structures, democratic ones especially, 
existing at the same time. Individuals cannot be expected to be 
productive unless they actually have the possibility of guiding 
and controlling the way the benefits of their work are used ; that 
much is obvious, and the collapse of the regimes of Eastern 
Europe is there to prove it. 
— Second, and to my mind much more importantly, the 
demand for democracy did not just emerge from the hallowed 
precincts where the funders hold their technocratic meetings. It 
came in fact from the developing countries themselves, from the 
peoples who are now, with greater or lesser degrees of urgency, 
calling for a complete reform of their political structures. 
The movements may be violent, they may be confused and 
they may be hesitant, but their demands are much the same 
everywhere - - representation of the people, freedom of 
expression, more efficient management and the rule of law. 
Failing to understand and provide support for this wave, 
which is a clear sign of our partners' increasing political 
maturity, would be to ignore the very foundations of our 
commitment to development linked not only to growth but also 
inspired by a concept which focuses on man as operator and 
principal beneficiary, in which human rights are recognised as 
one of the basics of genuine development — as Article 5 of 
Lomé IV makes clear. 
These new considerations were behind the communication on 
human rights, democracy and development cooperation policy 
which the Commission made to the Council and the European 
Parliament in March this year. 
The idea was to trigger thinking and come up with coherent, 
general lines of conduct for the relationships to be established 
between development cooperation policies, respecting and 
promoting human rights and supporting the démocratisation 
process in the developing countries. 
This is why the two main aims for development cooperation 
in the Commission's political union proposals are to: 
— ensure economic and social development and meet the basic 
needs ofthe populations of the developing countries; 
— ensure development and consolidation of democracy and the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights. 
The processes for taking decisions on human rights and 
democracy in relation to development cooperation can be 
designed, with a view to greater effectiveness and consistency, in 
the light of whatever guidelines are laid down at the 
intergovernmental conference on political union. 
So it is as well to ask how the human rights-democracy issue 
can be reflected more clearly in the cooperation policy 
guidelines. 
If the Community's initiatives are to be politically credible, 
they must be seen to be free of particular politico-economic 
interests or preferences. Equally important is for the attitudes of 
the Community and the Member States to be more consistent. 
The Commission's thinking on this is based on the 
indissoluble links between human rights and democracy on the 
one hand and the right to development on the other. 
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Artide 5 ofthe Lomé IV Convention 
1. Cooperation shall be directed towards development centred 
on man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development, 
which thus entails respect for and promotion of all human rights. 
Cooperation operations shall thus be conceived in accordance 
with the positive approach, where respect for human rights is 
recognised as a basic factor of real development and where 
cooperation is conceived as a contribution to the promotion of 
these rights. 
In this context development policy and cooperation are closely 
linked with the respect for and enjoyment of fundamental hitman 
rights. The role and potential of initiatives taken by individuals 
and groups shall also be recognised and fostered in order to 
achieve in practice real participation of the population in the 
development process in accordance with Article ¡3. 
Hence the Parties reiterate their deep attachment to human 
dignity and human rights, which are legitimate aspirations of 
individuals and peoples. The rights in question are all human 
rights, the various categories thereof being indivisible and inter-
related, each having its own legitimacy: non-discriminatory 
treatment ; fundamental human rights ; civil and political rights; 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
Every individual shall have the right, in his own country or in a 
host country, to respect for his dignity and protection by the law. 
ACP-EEC cooperation shall help abolish the obstacles 
preventing individuals and peoples from actually enjoying to the 
full their economic, social and cultural rights and this must be 
achieved through the development which is essential to their 
dignity, their well-being and their self-fulfilment. To this end, the 
Parties shall strive, jointly or each in its own sphere of 
responsibility, to help eliminate the causes of situations of misery 
unworthy of the human condition and of deep-rooted economic 
and social inequalities. 
The Contracting Parties hereby reaffirm their existing 
obligations and commitment in international law to strive to 
eliminate all forms of discrimination based on ethnic group, 
origin, race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion or any 
other situation. This commitment applies more particularly to 
any situation in the A C Ρ States or in the Community that may 
adversely affect the pursuit ofthe objectives ofthe Convention, 
and to the system of apartheid, having regard also to its 
destabilising effects on the outside. The Member States (and/or, 
where appropriate, the Community itself) and the ACP States 
will continue to ensure, through the legal or administrative 
measures which they have or will have adopted, that migrant 
workers, students and other foreign nationals legally within their 
territory are not subjected to discrimination on the basis of 
racial, religious, cultural or social differences, notably in respect 
of housing, education, health care, other social services and 
employment. 
3. At the request ofthe ACP S tales, financial resources may 
be allocated, in accordance with the rules governing development 
finance cooperation, to the promotion of human rights in the 
ACP States through specific schemes, public or private, that 
would be decided, particularly in the legal sphere, in consultation 
with bodies of internationally recognised competence in the field. 
Resources may also be given to support the establishment of 
structures to promote human rights. Priority shall be given to 
schemes of'regional scope. 
Human rights and democratic principles are not just an aim in 
themselves. To my way of thinking, they are a sine qua non ofthe 
balanced, effective development which is designed to meet the 
basic needs of the people. 
There can be no question of imposing institutional models on 
our partners in development. What we have to do is emphasise 
the fact that the battle for human rights is a universal battle and 
that human rights are entirely independent of whatever the form 
of society may be. Now that South Africa is on its way to 
becoming a multi-party, multi-racial democracy, I do not see 
how the rest of Africa can dissociate itself from what has become 
a universal phenomenon. 
Switching to democracy means respecting fundamental 
rights, opening a political dialogue and running free elections to 
guarantee a pluralist society. And if democratic systems are to 
be set up in the developing countries, it must be primarily as a 
result of internal initiatives, for democracy cannot be imposed 
from the outside. 
So the Community must go along with the move to 
democracy and freedom at the pace which the history of each 
country dictates and in the light of the historical and cultural 
characteristics of each — provided that progress actually 
occurs. 
The essential thing, to my mind, is to lay the foundations for 
profound and lasting democracy. Our immediate priority must 
be to promote what might be called economic democracy in 
which every section of the population has fair access to 
economic resources and a larger part to play in development. 
The Community's cooperation policy should help establish 
genuine democracy in the developing world and make these 
countries work more transparently, more openly and more 
efficiently. This pursuit of the principle of good governance 
demands proper domestic control ofthe way development funds 
are used. 
In the context I have just outlined, the Commission feels that 
Community action should concentrate on positive support and 
promotion as far as possible. A frank and open dialogue has to 
be established with the developing countries if this sort of 
approach is to work. The need for negative reaction measures 
may be to some extent a sign of failure, but they may be 
necessary in extreme cases of violation of human rights. If this 
happens, reaction has to be graded according to the degree of 
seriousness and due care must be taken to avoid harming the 
interests ofthe most underprivileged sections ofthe population. 
The debate on the link between human rights, democracy and 
development is extremely important, for it could, I am 
convinced, shape North-South relations in the 1990s. 
I hope that a frank and open exchange of views by all the 
parties concerned will clarify the various viewpoints and make 
for a consistent, global approach.o M.M. 
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Early dialogue 
necessary with violators 
of human rights 
An interview with Dr Erskine 
Sinimonds, Vice-President of the 
ACP-EEC Joint Assembly 
Dr Erskine Simmonds is Vice-President in-office ofthe 
ACP-EEC Joint Assembly. A member of the Barbados 
Lower House of Parliament from 1986 to 1991 and now a 
senator, he was a member ofa Joint Assembly team sent 
to investigate the human rights situation in Sudan and 
Suriname. The EEC Delegate in Barbados, Philippe 
Darmuzey, met him in Bridgetown on behalf of 'the 
Courier' and had the following interview with him. 
-
► You are a national ofa country ojien 
described as a true democracy, a fact not 
very common in the developing world. How 
do you account for this enviable situation ? 
- I think that Barbados takes its 
democracy from the system bequeathed 
to us by the British. You are quite aware, 
of course, that our parliament is 350 years 
old and with a tradition like that, the 
people themselves are the keepers of 
democracy. They set the standards and 
any politician in Barbados who tries to 
step out of line with that tradition would 
sooner or later be dealt with very severely 
by the people. So, I think it is a matter of 
the long educational process ofthe people 
to the merits of democracy. 
► As a member ofthe Joint A CP-EEC 
Assembly, you have taken part in a number 
of missions to Africa, and also in this 
region, to Suriname. What lessons have 
you drawn from these missions with regard 
to human rights? 
— I would like to say that human rights 
violations are not unique to any one 
country. Human rights violations occur 
in all countries in the world. It is a matter 
of degree, and I say to people in third 
world countries that I visit that there is a 
certain point beyond which one cannot 
go. We view it as a kind of spectrum 
moving, say, from green to red. When 
you have passed the green mark, moving 
towards the red, you begin to border on 
the dangerous and what we would say to 
you is that you should bring those 
violations to an end. 
Now, you asked about my visits to 
Africa. You have to understand that 
there are some countries not only in 
Africa but also all over the world where 
the system of government is quite dif­
ferent from the systems we might be 
familiar with and their norms are dif­
ferent. We have to understand that we 
are, at times, judging them by our own 
standards, using our value judgments to 
evaluate their human rights violations. I 
say that because there are several coun­
tries where civil wars have been going on 
for years. It is difficult to expect in a 
country which has got a civil war not to 
have people in prison, people who oppose 
governments. I think what happens in a 
lot of countries is that after a length of 
time, the authorities seem to forget the 
people they have incarcerated and one 
needs to remind them that there are 
channels through which charges should 
be brought against them. Very often, I 
have found that when you sit down and 
discuss with those responsible for the 
incarceration, they have overlooked the 
fact that some of the people they have in 
jail no longer constitute threats to the 
community. I say that because, if you 
incarcerate someone for ten years, the 
political climate invariably changes 
during that period: ten years after, the 
kind of people who supported the im­
prisoned would have left the scene. So, 
you see, at times when you are in the 
forest you cannot see the trees and it takes 
someone else to come in with a new eye to 
remind you and have you reappraise the 
situation. We were able during our 
missions to get some of the political 
prisoners released. I think this was 
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because we were able to point out to 
officials that it was detrimental to the 
image of the presiding government to 
hold political prisoners. 
► On this issue of human rights, are 
there norms that have to to be accepted by 
everyone ? 
— Yes, I think we have to have norms. 
In this world we must have laws. If we do 
not have laws then the world becomes a 
jungle. We have to say to people that if 
you arrest someone; if you take him into 
custody, then it is accepted practice to let 
that individual know why you have taken 
him into custody. Secondly, once you 
have informed him, there is a limited 
length of time within which you must 
have brought charges against him. No 
individual should be held indefinitely 
without charges. I think this is a basic 
human courtesy that must be extended in 
all countries. You cannot take away any 
individual's right to live in freedom. If 
you think that someone has violated the 
laws of a country, he or she must be told 
of the violations and he or she must be 
given the mechanisms to defend himself 
or herself. I think this is a fundamental 
right on which we cannot compromise 
and to which every country should 
adhere. 
► Are there any mechanisms whereby 
outside pressure can be exerted on any 
country to make sure that it respects these 
fundamental rules on human rights? 
- This is a very interesting question. I 
am one who believes that dialogue can do 
a lot and my belief has been reinforced by 
the missons that I have made. I went with 
a team to Sudan in December, and 
following our misson, some 55 political 
prisoners were released. When we got 
there initially we felt a certain resistance 
from the Government. We did have a few 
problems but after dialogue we noticed a 
general mellowing ofthe authorities. Let 
me say here, I think one ofthe things that 
disturbs me is the lack of a follow-up. 
When a country frees some prisoners, we 
should not rest on our laurels. Once it has 
been possible to establish dialogue with 
the country and get them to move, we 
should have a follow-up. It is very, very 
important. In my short time in the Joint 
Assembly (and I am not accusing the 
Joint Assembly) I have not seen enough 
ofthe follow-ups. You see. the freeing of 
political prisoners, the triumph of human 
rights, is a credit to the country involved 
and, indeed, to the entire ACP family and 
the Lomé concept. We should not wait 
for a situation to get out of hand and talk 
about intervention, which causes a lot of 
dislocation and human suffering. If and 
when we recognise that problems are 
incipient, as part of a body that works 
together, we should initiate dialogue as 
quickly as possible. This dialogue should 
not be a one-off dialogue because in the 
long run, it would cost the individual 
country, the region and the Joint As­
sembly much more effort and money to 
correct a problem that could have been 
solved by simple persuasion. So, I think 
that what we need to do, once we 
recognise infringements of human rights 
in any particular country, is to start 
dialogue early. We need to maintain that 
dialogue and as soon as we realise that 
they are responding positively, to make 
sure they stay on the right path, with the 
right mechanisms, in the interest not only 
of the country or region but also of the 
ACP-EEC Joint Assembly. 
► Dialogue is also a key word in 
development cooperation. It is even an 
important aspect ofthe Lomé Convention. 
Can external aid, particularly that pro-
vided by the European Community, play a 
role in the promotion of democracy ? 
- There is no doubt in my mind, 
looking at the philosophy that is shaping 
our world today, that we are moving 
towards two things: privatisation and 
démocratisation. This is quite evident 
looking at the changes that are taking 
place in Eastern Europe and in other 
parts of the world. It is therefore in­
cumbent upon third world countries, 
looking for aid, to understand that the 
world is no longer one of confrontation 
with nuclear bombs. The confrontation 
now is about the rights of human beings 
to live in peace and to express themselves 
fully within a society. It is a fact that aid is 
being linked more and more to dé­
mocratisation. I think this is a reality 
which we have to face. My point is that 
those countries which have no proper 
democratic systems have to recognise 
that financial aid for development will be 
difficult to attract if the whole issue of 
démocratisation is not addressed and 
addressed urgently. I see nothing basi­
cally wrong with this philosophy. I feel 
that in many countries where there are 
human rights violations, where there are 
standing armies and where there are civil 
wars, these are impediments to progress. 
So, if any country wants seriously to 
make progress then they must avoid civil 
wars. I know this is not easy but I think 
we need to enter into dialogue. Let me 
add though that many of the conflicts 
within countries are fuelled by outside 
interests. Historical, economic and social 
factors, at times, fuel civil wars within 
some countries and so in addressing the 
whole area of human rights and dé­
mocratisation, one also has to take into 
consideration external factors that con­
tribute to these problems. So, although I 
have said that we need to talk to the 
political leaders within the country, 
sometimes it will be necessary to talk to 
agents beyond the boundaries of the 
countries who may in· some way be 
fuelling turmoil. At times, we may have to 
say to those external forces that we think 
that certain interests should not be 
pursued at the expense of tranquillity 
within a given country. 
What I am saying is not new. It is a fact 
that we have to face. One may argue 
theoretically that it is in the interest of 
people who produce arms to see civil wars 
all over the world so that they can sell 
their arms. This is a very simplistic way of 
looking at it, but we are talking also ofthe 
financial dimension to a problem that we 
have to address. 
► //; general terms how is the connec-
tion between democracy and development 
reflected at the moment within the ACP 
Group ? 
— The only isolated case I know of is 
Sudan where the European Community 
has cut off aid because of its human rights 
records. I know that this has caused a lot 
of concern within the ACP Group, 
especially among countries which have 
been accused of serious human rights 
violations. This is understandable be­
cause in the countries in question, viable 
and far-reaching projects are funded by 
the European Community. A cut-off of 
aid puts any country at a disadvantage. I 
would like, however, to comment on this. 
We have to understand that when we cut 
off aid to a developing country because of 
human rights violations, it is not the 
political leaders that suffer most, it is the 
masses ofthe people who suffer. So, what 
happens, in effect, is that in trying to 
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ACP/EEC JOINT ASSEMBLY MEETING 
AMPALA. UGANDA. 25 FEB.-2 MARCH 1991 
CONFERENCE CONJOINTE DES ACP/CEE 
KAMPALA-OUGANDA 
25 FEVRIER-2 MARS 1991 
ACP-EEC Joint Assembly in session in Kampala, 
Uganda last February 
'The freeing of foliei t al prisoners, the triumph of human rights, is a credit to the 
country involved and, indeed, to the entire ACP family and the Lomé concept' 
penalise the people who violate human 
rights, it is the very people whose human 
rights are being violated who are pena­
lised. So, we need to have a more holistic 
view of the situation before acting or 
before donors cut off aid. 
► Is there a general consensus in the 
ACP Group on this holistic approach you 
mentioned and on how to make progress on 
this issue ? 
- The ACP is made up of 69 countries 
from different parts of the world (the 
Pacific, the Caribbean and Africa). It is 
difficult to expect 69 countries; people 
from varying backgrounds, to come to a 
specific agreement on any issue. How­
ever, even the countries that are accused 
of human rights violations will agree (as 
members ofthe United Nations, and the 
Lomé Convention, which have their own 
provisions on human rights) that vio­
lations are an infringement of law. So, in 
a sense, yes, there is that agreement. But, 
some would say that what the outsider 
may see as a human rights violation at 
times is not a violation at all. Human 
rights violation is a matter of degree. An 
individual, because he is the leader of his 
political party, may think and act in the 
interest, first, of his political party and 
then of his country. His vision may be 
blurred, seeing his political party as the 
country : anything that is in the interest of 
his political party is also automatically in 
the interest of the country. We, as 
politicians, are, at times, guilty of that, 
because we think that our political party 
is the only one that has the total interest 
of the country at heart. Sometimes it 
takes someone from the outside to say to 
you that you are not representing the 
country but only your political party. 
You know when our vision is impaired it 
is only the eye specialist who can fit us 
with a pair of appropriate glasses to see 
properly. The Joint Assembly should be 
like the eye specialist when our vision is 
blurred as regards respect for human 
rights. 
► Dr Simmonds, beyond democracy, 
are there, in your opinion, minimal con-
ditions for pluralism ? 
- That is a very interesting question. 
My observation ofthe African continent 
is that it cannot be compared to the 
Caribbean where you have almost homo-
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genous societies and where it is very easy 
to have a democratic system with oppo­
sition parties existing. However, in some 
African countries, you have the ethnic 
problem. History has shown, with the 
first multi-party systems they had, that 
these systems have accentuated ethnic 
problems. One has to ask the question 
whether other systems should not be 
tried. I am told, for example, that in 
Uganda the leader of the opposition is 
also the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a 
member of the Cabinet (')· Now, that 
would be unthinkable in our system. 
Using the simple democratic process, it is 
inconceivable that an opposition member 
can sit in the Cabinet and make decisions 
for our country and, what is more, he is 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is a 
very key Ministry. I think one needs to 
look at that kind of system and see what 
advantages it has, because what that 
system does is bring together differing 
groups of people, whether they are along 
ethnic lines or not, and they can make 
meaningful contributions to the develop­
ment of the country. What I am saying is, 
that in most developing countries we have 
to understand that poverty is the enemy, 
not necessarily the other political party. 
How do you fight poverty? You fight 
poverty by avoiding civil wars. You fight 
poverty by bringing the masses together, 
whether or not they are from different 
ethnic groups or political backgrounds. 
We must recognise what the common 
enemy is. Civil war is an enemy. Poverty 
is an enemy. Desertification is an enemy. 
The creation of refugees is an enemy. If 
we can get people to see that these are 
common enemies and if they can develop 
a political system — call it democracy, 
pluralism, or whatever you will — to fight 
those common enemies then I think we 
would have achieved our objective. So 
what needs to be done in special circum­
stances like these is for people to sit down 
and rationally analyse which political 
system can benefit their country. I do not 
think that there is any one political 
system that can work for the whole world 
because people come from different social 
backgrounds, different cultures, and have 
different experiences. Once we recognise 
(') Reference to the government of the National 
Resistance Movement, a grand coalition of all the 
political parties in Uganda aimed at providing a 
united and effective government after several years of 
political instability. Although it is provisional and 
experimental, it is not unlikely that this new political 
system would be incorporated into the new Consti­
tution currently being drafted. 
the causes of failure, there is nothing 
wrong in looking at them and experimen­
ting with systems that will solve those 
problems, including all the problems of 
human rights. 
»> Now let us look at the question ofthe 
economic cost of the transition to de-
mocracy, ¡s it possible to pursue a policy of 
democratic adjustment at the same time as 
an economic structural adjustment? Given 
the support to structural adjustment fore-
seen under Lomé IV, is there any potential 
to use this support to advance the de-
mocratic process ? 
- This is a very important question 
because when we talk about structural 
adjustments, for us in the ACP, it means 
the ones presented by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions and our experience here has 
been very bad. The results, if I look at the 
Caribbean, for example, in places like 
Guyana and Jamaica where the IMF 
have gone in, there has been great social 
dislocation. You find people from those 
potentially rich countries (compared to 
Barbados) actually fleeing, migrating to 
other countries because the standard of 
living in their countries has fallen tremen­
dously. I therefore would like to' see the 
Lomé Convention looking at ways of 
helping ACP countries reconstruct their 
economies. Now, I know there will have 
to be some social consequences, but while 
the economy is being reconstructed, these 
consequences should be made less pain­
ful. And, let me say that in the countries 
that are democratic, such structural 
adjustment can pose a serious threat to 
the democratic institutions with the 
threat of military dictatorship around the 
corner. It would give ammunition to 
those opposed to the government; an 
opportunity to mobilise frustrated people 
to create political and social turmoil. I 
think this is an aspect that escapes the 
Bretton Woods Institutions when they 
consider structural adjustment program­
mes. I understand that in a way because I 
think they deal primarily with the econ­
omic factors of countries but economic 
factors are not the only ones which 
determine, the peace, stability, progress 
or success ofa country. You have to have 
people who are content. You must have 
people who are prepared to work within 
that country to uplift it. One of the 
problems with structural adjustment is 
that when the pill becomes too bitter to 
swallow, it is the intellectuals who leave 
the country first, so that even when 
structural adjustment begins to be effect­
ive, the people needed for the implemen­
tation ofthe programme are gone. Skilled 
people do not stay around. The other 
factor is that when structural adjustments 
are implemented in a particular country, 
within that region, it causes dislocations 
in neighbouring countries. This is be­
cause that country's commodities are 
cheaper as a result of devaluation and 
businessmen in neighbouring countries, 
not involved in structural adjustment, 
find it more profitable to buy their 
products from the country where the 
adjustment is taking place rather than 
produce at home. All of these factors 
have to be taken into account when we 
are talking of structural adjustment and 
démocratisation. Structural adjustment 
administered in a vacuum can at times be 
a disincentive and an enemy to the 
process of démocratisation. 
► So then, do you see any way there can 
be perhaps a transitional period for a 
country involved in reconstructing its 
democracy, for example, a kind of external 
support ? 
— I personally think that any insti­
tution; any international institution that 
is seriously interested in the démocratis­
ation process of any country has to look 
not only at the economic factors, but also 
at the social and political factors. These 
are linked, because in the final analysis 
the politician in a democracy has to go to 
the people to ask for a vote. Now, people 
are not going to vote for a party in a 
democracy when they perceive that party 
as having made their fathers and mothers 
lose jobs and as having been engaged in 
closing schools so their children cannot 
be educated and have a brighter future. 
After all, the world has become a small 
place where you can turn on the television 
and see people in all parts of the world 
and how they live. People all over the 
world aspire to higher standards of living. 
That is normal in any society. So, once 
the standard of living drops with struc­
tural adjustment, it would have negative 
effects on the political system, especially 
if that political system is democratic. So, 
structural adjustment programmes have 
to include social measures and, at times, 
an initial, substantial injection of funds, o 
Interview by 
Philippe DARMUZEY 
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'Human dignity 
is a universal value' 
A talk with Henri Saby, 
Chairman of the Development 
Committee of the 
European Parliament 
Henri Saby'spersonal conviction is that human dignity is 
a universal value. There is an international consensus on the 
links between human rights, democracy and development, 
although it is wise to be wary of systems that look like 
democracies but mask unbearable dictatorships. The 
criteria for and arbiters of human rights can be defined and 
the job of external aid is to back up measures which make a 
positive contribution to developing political democracy and 
population involvement and encouraging opportunities for 
democratic adjustment. 
World consensus on the links 
between human rights, 
democracy and development 
► Mr Saby, you are Chairman of the 
European Parliament's Committee on 
Development, ¡s there a common position 
on the relationship between human rights, 
democracy and development ? 
— I cannot say that there is officially a 
common position because we are in the 
middle of discussing Manuel Marin's 
report. But over the past few years, I have 
noticed a large majority on the concept of 
the close and indissociable link between 
human rights, democracy and develop­
ment — an urgent and vital subject which 
has been discussed at world level, in the 
UN and in various other places. 
So the European Parliament does not 
have an official position, but we will have 
one and we are going to be discussing it in 
the Development Committee and in the 
plenary session. I have noticed that the 
subject has been cause for considerable 
concern over the past two or three years 
— on the agenda in the UN and in think-
tanks elsewhere. Only the day before 
yesterday, we ourselves on the bureau of 
the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly put it on 
the agenda of the Amsterdam meeting in 
September, for example. It really is a very 
topical issue. 
'Canada Dry' democracies 
p- When people talk about democracy 
at the moment, they are thinking mainly of 
Africa — which is not to say that other 
ACPs are unaffected. I know that you, in 
your capacity as President ofthe Develop-
ment Committee, have been on a number of 
field missions on the delicate subject of 
human rights. What have you learnt from 
them ? 
- A number of things. First of all. 
when we began tackling these problems 
seven or eight years ago, it was a dialogue 
of the deaf. It was not opposition per­
haps, but a psychological block, a poli­
tical block. The missions we have had to 
Africa. I have to say, have been real 
successes. We got results first with Mr 
Bersani with this human rights approach 
and now we are getting them with Mr 
Tindemans. The results are extraordi­
nary. I cannot tell you exactly how many 
people have been released from or had 
their lives changed thanks to our joint 
ACP-EEC action, but it must be tens of 
thousands. 
It's not just the ACP-EEC Joint As­
sembly; it's the whole Community ma­
chine, the Council of Ministers — we put 
the matter before them - and the 
Ambassadors, the Governments and the 
joint action ofthe Joint Assembly. Now if 
you like I shall explain the criteria and the 
various stages of action. 
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There is something else I should like to 
say. The Committee on Development 
covers 130 countries. I have been to South 
East Asia and Latin America in my 
capacity as President and I have come to a 
conclusion which is both interesting and 
worrying. It is interesting because 1 am 
delighted to see that there are no more 
dictatorships in the world today. The last 
ones, be they ideological or economic or 
monetary or military, have fallen. 
But what we are seeing emerge now are 
just as big a cause for concern, because 
they are far more subtle. I call them 
'Canada Dry' democracies — they have 
the name of democracy and the flavour of 
democracy, but nothing to do with 
democracy at all. 
A typical example is Guatemala, where 
to all intents and purposes we have 
republican institutions and elections, 
although no people has in fact ever 
suffered so many assassinations and so 
much victimisation. I have been on 
missions to El Salvador, where it was 
awful, and I went on missions to Chile a 
few years ago, before the new institutions 
were set up, but I have never seen 
anything like what I saw in Guatemala. 
So we are seeing the emergence of a 
number of so-called democracies which in 
fact mask unbearable dictatorships and 
systematic killings. Yet — and this seems 
to me to be fundamental — there can be 
no development or economic take-off in 
these countries unless there is democracy 
and there can be no democracy without 
respect for human rights. So when we 
tackle these problems, reactions differ. 
There is another way, I think, beyond 
the right to interference, as some people 
so disagreeably call it. The idea is that no-
one forces a sovereign state to sign an 
international treaty (the UN Declaration 
of Human Rights, for example, or the 
OAU Charter, the Charter against the 
torture of children and so on), so. once it 
has signed it, it is reasonable for the 
international community, the conscience 
of the nations, to question the govern­
ment in cases of clear violation. That is 
the principle we arc recommending. 
We have no model to help. We believe 
there is a universal scale of values about 
human dignity and that it therefore has 
nothing todo with culture or religion. It is 
the sum of reasoning and a political will 
for dignity which has emerged from all 
civilisations and all cultures. But today, a 
universal conscience of the people is 
emerging through the UN. It must be 
expressed much more strongly through 
this principle of recognition of inter­
national law and a universal scale of 
values belonging to no-one but being part 
of the collective memory of mankind. 
This means we have both the right and 
the duty to question and collect inform­
ation from the authorities in countries 
which have signed these international 
contracts. Infringements, and sometimes 
cases of serious violation, are common. 
Criteria and arbiters 
► Suppose there is a consensus now on 
human rights being more or less universal 
can we have criteria and universally 
recognised arbiters to exercise what you 
don't like calling the right to interference 
— the right to check, let us say? 
- 1 should answer that by saying that 
the basic criteria need adding to. I have 
already mentioned the universal scale of 
values and there is a second term de­
mocracy. What is a democracy? ín other 
words, what is a State of law? We well 
know that human rights are usually 
violated when the State of law disappears 
and State terrorism starts. It's the eternal 
link between a State of terrorism and the 
terrorism ofthe State. We have seen State 
terrorism in Chile, we have it in 
Guatemala and El Salvador, we have it in 
our countries and we have seen it else­
where. So what means does a State of law 
have, what is democracy actually foun­
ded on? Some criteria crop up often, 
regardless of religion and culture. 
A democracy is a State of law where 
political parties alternate in elections by 
secret ballot. Political pluralism is the 
first criterion. The second, a fundamental 
one to my mind, is that justice must be 
independent of the executive power and 
the military. A third criterion is that a 
legal environment must be created in the 
State of law whereby each individual can 
flourish and his freedom thrive in a 
concept of responsibility with rights and 
duties. Those are the three terms which 
give the best idea of what a State of law 
needs for its democratic development. 
That is the second concept of the un­
iversal conscience which is beginning to 
emerge. 
The third is equally important. Clearly, 
although we recognise the people's right 
to self-determination and independence, 
decades of experience have shown us that 
a nation which does this will still fail if it is 
economically and monetarily strapped. 
So the third concept is the economic right 
of peoples and that is the crux of the 
matter. The economic right of the people 
is the right to produce and trade in the 
world on fair terms and it is a right which 
brings basic contradictions in practice. 
Is it, for example, compatible with 
GATT, that veritable world market 
racket, the biggest cloak of hypocrisy I 
have ever seen, which has ultimately 
cornered the world market for one or two 
ofthe wealthiest and virtually banned all 
the others from joining the club? GATT 
too, paradoxically, blocks free econ­
omies, for the system is founded on the 
law of supply and demand with a regu­
lator called the market and, once there 
are dominant positions, the market — the 
regulator — silts up. 
So, here we are in a system which to all 
appearances is liberal, but which is in fact 
an economic dictatorship of the worst 
kind. The last parameter of this third 
point is an unstable international mo­
netary system and international insti­
tutions which no longer reflect this 
concept of human rights, democracy and 
development. 
As soon as the Bretton Woods insti­
tutions inveigle a country which is strap­
ped by debt into accepting a 'Chicago 
School' programme, the situation gets 
even worse. The World Bank and the 
IMF have constantly strangled the 
economy — and thus democracy and 
human rights — in most countries. 
The last is the most difficult one, for 
although states and international bodies 
are willing to accept the idea of the first 
and the second, they are reluctant to have 
anything to do with the third. 
That is the fundamental thing that has 
to change at international level. Let me 
give you a practical example. The Com­
munity is making a big effort for the least 
developed nations. Over the past 10 years 
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it has almost kept to the international 
agreement to channel 0.7 % of GDP into 
them. And look at what our richest 
partners have done during this time — the 
USA has given 0.15% and Japan 0.32%. 
We have been consistent. 
But how can we get the European 
Community, the Council of Ministers 
and the 12 Member States to make a big 
effort with the budget? Twelve and three 
make fifteen, and we could get to 20 bil­
lion easily if we added bilateral aid to 
Community aid in making use of Lomé 
IV to promote the human dimension of 
development cooperation issues. But at 
the same time, the Twelve's representat­
ives at the World Bank only see the 
Chicago School criteria. But it can't go 
on. 
This is a key issue, a point of friction 
which calls for the strongest international 
pressure, including a reform or a change 
of GATT, which is no longer in line with 
the realities of today or tomorrow. It is an 
increasing brake and it is blocking up the 
system itself. So, there you have two or 
three basic criteria which define the 
approach at international level. Who 
then should step in if stepping in has to be 
done? I am with those who believe that 
the countries and peoples of the world 
will never accept just one policeman, be it 
the USA, France, England, the USSR or 
anyone else. And that they will be less and 
less inclined to accept just one banker 
laying down the rules. 
So this call to planetary conscience has 
to be made in an institution like the UN 
and in institutions like the European 
Community or in the international bodies 
which are there to guarantee these rights 
and the implicit involvement ofthe States 
when they sign these agreements. 
An arbitration body? 
► If I may interrupt you here... do you 
think that one of the various joint ACP-
EEC institutions might turn into an 
arbitration body one day? 
— We must be pragmatic about this. 
An arbitration body means universally 
accepted criteria. The first criterion, the 
concept of individual dignity, is not a 
problem. Respecting oneself and re­
specting other people is something which 
will get across. The second, the means ofa 
real State of law, is something which is 
going to happen in accordance with the 
will of the peoples. There is no imposed 
model. But I should say that there are 
references and universal values which are 
undeniable and less and less under 
discussion. 
It is the third criterion which will be the 
problem, for which is the body which will 
tell GATT to be careful ? Which body will 
say 'it's all over, you are ruining or 
strangling a country or making it go 
hungry?' Which body will tell Bretton 
Woods that it's all over and we have to 
have structural adjustments that take 
notice of the human dimension and stop 
going in for short-term management with 
the plain lucrative aim of making more?' 
I think there is the UN. I think the UN 
has an important part to play here. It can 
give its opinions on appeals, not as of 
right, but assessing values. And there are 
other ways. In the contractual relations 
between the 12 and the 69 ACPs, for 
example, we are fully able to say, publicly 
— and we have a graduated scale for this 
- that a particular State has violated 
human rights. 
Diplomatic pressures heavily applied 
give results. We have, for example, asked 
the Commission to block aid to Sudan, 
Israel, Syria, Turkey and so on. So things 
have developed, because a Community 
which involved inter-governmental 
cooperation and a commercial side with­
out conscience has, over the years, given 
birth to a political conscience of the 
people of Europe. There are means of 
applying pressure there. 
Strictly speaking, one can have courts 
at various levels, according to the points 
at issue — 'a world court', the court at the 
Hague, the European Court of Justice, 
why not? There is a whole approach here, 
but if we can get a written process 
recognising the unbreakable link between 
human rights, democracy and develop­
ment, we shall have made an extraordi­
nary step forward. 
The role of external aid 
► Is there a role for external aid in 
promoting democracy, not just preventing 
abuse but actually promoting it to en-
courage development ? 
— I had to ask the Commission about 
this and I think we agreed on positive, 
practical measures. I went to represent 
Parliament at the elections in Benin, for 
example. I went to represent it at the 
elections in Haïti and at the proceedings 
at Windhoek in Namibia. Sometimes we 
are dealing with states which have done 
nothing, which have no experience and 
sometimes not even the money to build 
polling booths or print voting slips. 
So I asked the Commission for aid in 
the democratic process as we had for Asia 
and Latin America, but it cannot be done 
because there is nothing in the Lomé 
agreements. So we are convinced that the 
1992 budget should contain a line on 
backing up the democratic process. We 
should, if necessary, be able to send a 
delegation to ask the Commission to help 
train the officers who will be checking on 
the voting, printing the slips, ensuring 
that the count is properly done and so on. 
That, I think, is a positive contribution 
which is absolutely vital today. 
When it comes to Mr Marin's docu­
ment, I believe that all positive aid 
arrangements should be backed up here. 
Lastly, we see people making a con­
siderable effort in extraordinarily dif­
ficult conditions and helping them is just 
as important as building a motorway. I 
am also candid enough to say that the 
community of peoples, in their fiscal 
solidarity, can no longer accept the idea 
of development funds being misapprop­
riated. Excuse me for saying so, but the 
days of building gold mosques and gold 
cathedrals in countries where most peo­
ple die of hunger are over. It must be 
advertised. 
A country whose head of state has 
transferred development funds to a Swiss 
bank account or anywhere else is no 
longer acceptable. I cannot see me and 
my colleagues telling the voters, 320 
million Europeans, that they are being 
asked for an extra bit of solidarity and 
partnership with the people in the de­
veloping world and then find that 40% of 
the funds have been misappropriated, 
that the system is corrupt. It can no 
longer be accepted. 
And there, the Commission has a very 
important job to do on the spot, in 
conjunction with the diplomatic rep­
resentations. We must state clearly that 
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we are willing to do more to ensure that 
nations flourish and not increase the 
burdens which crush and imprison them'. 
Democracy from the bottom up 
► //; all the positive work the Commis-
sion does in the field, there are the 
problems of democracy from the bottom — 
i.e. people participation. I should like to 
know what you think about what can be 
done to get the (often emergent) civil 
society to be aware of itself before project-
ing it, possibly too fast, into the somewhat 
sophisticated machinery of formal de-
mocracy. 
- There is a popular saying which goes 
'empty stomachs have no ears'. In con­
ditions of this sort, it is obvious that it is 
pretty much ofa Utopia to talk about the 
concepts we have just discussed. So a 
fundamental part of the cooperation, 
development and international solidarity 
process is giving people the means of 
existence. Some extremely interesting 
things have been done here. People dying 
of hunger in the country must be pre­
vented from coming to die of hunger in 
the town and learning the most danger­
ous things our civilisation has ever 
produced, be it drugs or the exploitation 
of women and children. 
I should like to mention an IFAD 
scheme here in which five women work­
ing in a village were given the opportunity 
to take turns at getting loans to buy seed 
and a few basic tools and get organised. 
The rate of coverage of these loans is 
98%, while the figure for the rich is 46%. 
which is something for the bankers of this 
world to think about. Obviously there is 
no question of democracy unless women 
can play a decisive role in these countries. 
Not only do they have to provide the 
daily bread. They are also responsible for 
bringing up the children and organising 
the micro-society. So there will be no 
proper democratic process and no real 
respect for human values unless practical 
action is taken, speedily and as a matter 
of urgency, on the weakest link in the 
chain. 
It is clear that the NGOs have a 
fundamental part to play in this process, 
although it must be clear that the Com­
munity's or the world's development 
policy cannot be entrusted to them. We 
are boosting their means and we want to 
'... once a sovereign state has signed an international treaty, it is reasonable for the 
international community, the conscience ofthe nations, to question the government in 
cases of clear violation' 
go on doing so more and more, but we 
maintain that we have to have coordi­
nation, at all costs, at the same time, 
including with bilateral aid. And al­
though it may well shock some Govern­
ments, I am clear in saying that bilateral 
cooperation will disappear in time if we 
are serious. 
The Community's development 
cooperation policy has logically to steal a 
march on this process from the recent 
The Courier no. 12S July-August 1991  59 DOSSIER 
past of former colonies, on whatever is 
negative and positive. At the moment, 
efficiency dictates that the general de­
velopment policy has to come from the 
Community. There has to be complemen­
tarity and at least concertation upstream 
- which is not always the case today. 
There is a new approach that a special 
session of the European Parliament is 
going to attempt to define through the 
concept of a new world partnership. 
Towards democratic adjustment 
► Returning to more macro-economic 
problems, do you think that it is a good idea 
to promote structural adjustment ? What is 
your position on the need for such struc-
tural adjustment and what forms it might 
take ? 
That touches on the intellectual 
aberration of the 'mondiocrats'. Going 
on with a structural adjustment policy 
along Bretton Woods lines is a monu­
mental heresy featuring technical and 
scientific incompetence or patent bad 
faith. Who can define the contrary of 
reality? Take stock of structural adjust­
ment over the past 10 years and the 
consequences are dramatic in most cases. 
It hasn't been a success anywhere — at 
least as far as the people are concerned. 
There are cases where the temperature 
was prevented from mounting any fur­
ther, but there are none where it was an 
actual success. Why? The statistics show 
that the past 10 years have been a time of 
constant transfer of capital from poor to 
rich countries. 
I don't want to be difficult with my 
economist colleagues and friends, but it 
has to be admitted that economics is not a 
science. It is a technique. And like any 
technique, it is not the user but the 
inventor who defines the programme. It is 
reasonable to support the idea that 
structural adjustment has to continue 
along the present stringent lines. 
I think the Bretton Woods structural 
adjustment criteria are perfect for 
Sweden but a dead loss for places like 
Zambia or Mozambique and I said so in 
public at the Joint Assembly in Kampala. 
'Stop the massacre'. I said. Today's 
structural adjustment criteria fail to take 
account of the human dimension in the 
medium term. It is for all the world as 
though they were pointing a jet of water 
at a fire and putting jerrycans of petrol 
ready to burst into flames all round it. It's 
a blunder. 
They are always saying; 'It's not true. 
It will work. Look at South East Asia', 
but I've spent four or five years getting to 
grips with this issue and let me tell you 
that if a tenth of the billions of dollars 
invested in that part of the world had 
gone to Africa, things would be quite 
different. So let us be serious about it. Let 
us be like the Community and turn on the 
pressure. With Lomé IV, the Community 
is bringing pressure to bear to get Bretton 
Woods criteria altered along the struc­
tural adjustment lines we have laid down 
to revive the human realities and ensure 
proper chances of rationalisation and 
development for the people in these 
countries. 
I love intellectual formulae. I have a lot 
of fun with the civilisation technicians, as 
the economists are sometimes called. 
They aren't serious. Reality proves them 
wrong. You find the same analysis in 
every sector, in every country and in the 
international bodies. Even the World 
Bank and IMFstaffareclearaboutit, but 
as long as there is no chance of changing 
the rules of these institutions and there 
are many more blockages, nothing will be 
achieved — hence the major consequence 
of a new world economic order, a new 
and more stable international monetary 
system and another currency alongside 
the dollar. If the dollar is unwilling to 
cater for the human dimension, the Ecu 
can guarantee a different development 
policy from that of the Chicago School, 
ultimately backed up by a European 
Development Bank. Why not? 
Migrants' rights 
► Our A C Ρ partners are worried about 
what effect the Single Market of ¡992 will 
have on human rights how it will affect the 
particular problem of the status of migrant 
workers and students and particularly the 
new procedures the Community is bringing 
in for refugees and the right of asylum. 
Where do you. as a Euro-MP, stand on 
this'' 
— This is very important and it is 
something we dealt with in the Commit-
tee — especially during a very successful 
seminar. I think we have to open our eyes 
and take our heads out ofthe sand. Most 
Community countries have immigration 
problems and 1 think there are two sides 
to them. I have always maintained that 
the answer to immigration is to boost 
income, because, if someone can earn a 
decent living at home, no one would feel 
he has to uproot himself or herself and go 
abroad. 
However, there is another side to 
reality and that is the people from all over 
the world who have already settled in our 
countries, which is something for the 
European Community. There are two 
approaches to this. First of all, a common 
legal basis for the whole definition of 
refugees and migrant workers — we need 
a minimum of legal coordination in the 
Community on this one if political theory 
is to be consistent with political will and 
reality. 
That perhaps means defining what an 
immigrant is. You have political inmigr-
ants and you have economic immigrants 
and you have people who want to flee the 
law in their countries. What the Com-
munity has to do. I think, is harmonise its 
legislation. An immigrant who is pro-
perly registered and has completed the 
universally accepted formalities has to 
have the same rights and duties whether 
he is in Patras or Amsterdam or Ham-
burg or Toulouse or anywhere else. 
This last point has to do with the rights 
and duties of immigration. I, as a Com-
munity national, am willing for immigr-
ants to have the fullest rights the Com-
munity can endow, but on one condition 
— the countries of origin must re-
ciprocate. The immigration side of the 
rights of peoples must recognise the 
individual's right to thrive in a consensus 
of reciprocity. If that demand had always 
been there, we would have far fewer 
problems today. So that is roughly what I 
personally think about this issue and I 
believe a majority in Parliament agrees 
with me. O 
Interview by 
Dominique DAVID 
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AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL« 
The international conscience 
for 30 years 
fr 0 L f r* 
You cannot get away with killing or 
torturing prisoners of conscience so easily 
any more, says Peter Dufy, the young 
lawyer who now heads the international 
organisation, because Amnesty Inter-
national is everywhere. 
Thirty years ago, another lawyer, Peter 
Benenson, heard that President Salazar 
had given two Portuguese students seven-
year jail sentences for toasting freedom in a 
restaurant and decided to launch an 
international campaign for political priso-
ners. 
Amnesty International, the humani-
tarian association, was born, with the 
helping hand of Sean McBride, the Irish 
lawyer and diplomat, on 28 May 1961. It 
has saved 42 000 prisoners and now has a 
million members in 150 countries. 
How it works 
Amnesty International handles vio­
lations of the basic human rights defined 
in its mandate with a view to: 
— freeing all prisoners of conscience who 
are detained for their beliefs, colour, sex, 
ethnic origin, language or religion and 
who have not used or advocated violence ; 
— getting fair and prompt trials for all 
political prisoners; 
(*) Taken from official Amnesty International 
publications. 
— opposing the torture and execution of 
all prisoners. 
It starts with a thorough investigation, 
drawing on a variety of sources of 
information and missions in the field. The 
only objective boundary is that 'the 
information (still) has to be plausible in 
the light of all we know', says Malcolm 
Smart, the Head of Research at the 
International Secretariat. Amnesty rece­
ives more than 1100 papers, periodicals, 
government bulletins and transcriptions 
of radio broadcasts for this purpose. 
Amnesty's work was originally based 
on Articles 18 and 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
In 1975, it started a movement to get 
the death penalty abolished. The first 
approach employed was lobbying by 
sending letters direct to government 
authorities. It then focused on bringing 
abuses to the notice not only of govern­
ment authorities but also ofthe public at 
large. 
The death penalty is the only subject on 
which Amnesty International's members 
may make direct approaches to their 
Governments. They have to remain 
impartial and therefore never campaign 
against other human rights abuses in their 
own countries. 
Amnesty both campaigns for human 
rights and provides material assistance 
for victims. It helps pay lawyers who 
defend prisoners of conscience and con­
tributes to the costs of habeas corpus or 
other legal procedures aimed at contest­
ing detention or restrictions. It also 
assists prisoners on release. 
Is Amnesty impartial? 
As Malcolm Smart says, Td be de­
lighted if governments could prove all our 
reports wrong, if that meant human 
rights aren't being violated...' 
Although Amnesty works in highly 
political fields, it is a strictly non­
partisan, independent and impartial or­
ganisation, which never takes sides in 
conflicts between governments or oppos­
ing groups and favours no political or 
religious ideology. It is financed by 
donations from members and receives 
nothing from any government. 
One criticism noted by Richard Reoch, 
head of press and publications, is that in 
some parts ofthe world people think that 
Amnesty International does nothing in 
Western Europe or North America. This 
is wrong, for there are plenty of cam­
paigns in the West, particularly against 
the detention of conscientious objectors 
and police action against some of the 
nationalist movements. 
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Amnesty International in Africa 
The human rights movement in sub-
Saharan Africa has developed fast. 
Governments have been known to say 
that the protection of civil and political 
rights is a luxury and that priority has to 
go to the economy and social matters, but 
Amnesty International has always main­
tained that this is no justification for 
abuse such as torture or illegal exe­
cutions. Human rights are indivisible. 
The organisation now has national 
branches in six countries of Africa and 
groups in four more, most of them set up 
over the past decade. 
There were AI national branches in just 
Ghana and Nigeria in 1978, but branches 
opened in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire in 
1979 and the first African meeting of AI 
members was held in 1980. Regional 
meetings of this sort, now annual events 
run in a different country each time, are 
an opportunity for members to discuss a 
regional view ofthe policy put forward by 
the International Council. They also 
mean that African members have more to 
do with decision-making at every level of 
the international movement. 
In 1982, Amnesty International was 
extended to East Africa and notably, to 
Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania. 
In 1984, the Tanzanian groups hosted a 
regional conference during the world 
campaign for the abolition of torture. At 
the time of this meeting, attended by 
70 people from 26 countries, including 
17 African ones, there were 41 local 
groups on the continent. 
Tyranny exists regardless of colour. 
It is no less reprehensible for 
being perpetrated by one of us. (') 
Recruitment of Zimbabwe members 
began in 1989. 
The difficulties are objective ones -
poor transport, rudimentary communi­
cations and general poverty, posing a real 
challenge to the development of an 
independent human rights movement in 
Africa. In some countries a stamp on a 
letter for a prisoner is the same price as a 
meal. 
African prisoners of conscience ad­
opted by Amnesty International include 
Agostinho Neto, the first President of 
independent Angola, Robert Mugabe 
and Joshua Nkomo, President and Min­
ister in Zimbabwe, and Diallo Telli. 
former Secretary-General of the OAU, 
who was starved to death. 
Human rights violation in Africa 
Religious groups and lawyers in the 
front line of the struggle are particularly 
subject to abuse. Journalists too have an 
important part to play in spreading news 
of abuse and drawing attention to re­
pression. 
Individual rights in Africa often used 
to be seen in terms of economic develop­
ment rather than civil and political 
freedom. 
In the 1960s, AI made appeals for 
Africans jailed for opposition to the 
colonial regime or to systems imposed by 
the whites in general. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
Amnesty faced an emergency situation 
with the killing of thousands of prisoners 
by various states. 
One of the atrocities revealed by the 
organisation was the massacre of dozens 
of schoolchildren in the Central African 
Republic in 1979. Subsequently, Bokassa 
was condemned to death... and an Al 
observer at the court appealed against his 
execution. Human rights are indivisible 
no matter who is involved! 
The military regimes and single-party 
systems gradually set up summary pro­
cedures, particularly for political cases. 
Then came lightning, unfair court cases 
and forced confessions, often broadcast 
on the radio. People accused in a case in 
1986, for example, never appeared in 
court and never knew they had been 
f,i fi pi i'r Ì
,}-
pi fr 'i''
r 
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(') A reference to a speech by Yoweri Museveni, 
the President of Ueanda. at the OAU Summit in 
1986. 
'I'd be delighted if governments could prove all our reports wrong, if that meant 
human rights aren't being violated' 
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AI describes the present situation 
Africa in 1990 
Human rights abuse continues despite signs of reform in one or 
two countries. Among the most tragic cases in the ¡990 report is 
that of a 38-year old university teacher who died after torture 
during a week's 'unofficial' imprisonment for his political 
opinions. 
But positive changes are occurring with political reform 
allowing for opposition parties in former single-party states, the 
abolition of the death penalty iti three countries and better 
human rights protection in others. 
Benin, for example, has freed political prisoners and made 
important changes on the human rights front since it brought in 
its political reforms. 
The death penalty has been abolished in Sao Tome & Principe 
where new political parties have also been authorised and 39 
political prisoners have been released. 
Zambia has freed 10 political prisoners serving long-term 
sentences and has legalised the opposition parties. 
South Africa has raised the ban on opposition movements, 
Nelson Mandela is free and the state of emergency is over — 
although opponents to the regime are still in prison awaiting 
charges and trial. 
Seven other countries now allow new political parties to set up, 
but are still arresting people on political grounds, if not 
massacring students and political prisoners during power 
switches. Torture continues in about 18 African countries at 
least, illegal executions in 10 and irregular procedures in two. 
Mozambique, Namibia and Sao Tome & Principe have 
abolished the death penalty and Rwanda has commuted many of 
its death sentences. Recourse to capital punishment has declined 
in South Africa, but is on the increase in five other countries. 
Europe in 1990 (·) 
The political upheavals in Eastern Europe in 1989 are still 
making themselves felt in reforms aimed at greater freedom of 
expression, movement and association, in the freeing of political 
detainees and prisoners of conscience and in the election of two 
former prisoners of conscience as President, in Czechoslovakia 
and Poland. 
Bui human rights are stillbeing flouted in Europe .particularly 
in the context of ethnic conflict or nationalist troubles. 
Bad police treatment persists in 12 countries of Europe and 
seven of them are in the EC. Conscientious objectors stiliget sent 
to prison in nine countries of Europe, three of which are in the 
EC. 
Czechoslovakia and Ireland have abolished the death penalty, 
the Belgian Government has produced a bill to do away with it in 
peace time, Bulgaria has decided to place a moratorium on it and 
Albania is using it less. 
European external policy and human rights 
— Amnesty International's view· — 
AI believes that the protection and promotion of human rights 
are essential to the Community's external policy (development 
aid policy included) and must be an integral part of any overall 
structural approach to human rights. 
Such an approach should involve positive measures and 
systematic, practical steps whenever human rights are violated, 
in accordance with Article 5 of Lome IV (ACP States). 
AI hopes that the idea of human rights clauses as adopted in 
the recent cooperation agreements with countries in Central and 
Latin America and Eastern Europe will be extended systemati-
cally to all the Community's future agreements with third 
countries. This will show the care the Community takes over 
human rights, objectively and not subjectively, without limiting 
itself to the developing countries or those moving over to 
democracy. 
The organisation also feels that the Community could usefully 
support national human rights protection-promotion schemes in 
the developing countries. 
The Community could also help national NGOs defend the 
rights of local communities and interest groups and help victims 
of abuse and their families. 
Free elections and multi-party systems, Amnesty Inter-
national maintains, cannot guarantee human rights on their 
own.O D.D. 
(') The geographical region of Europe, including Eastern Europe. 
judged. Some of them were not in a 
position to know as they had already been 
executed. 
Serious human rights abuses occurred 
in the 1980s in countries long at war, 
where there was respect for neither 
human rights nor the laws of war -
massacre, torture and arbitrary detention 
were common currency. AI both cam­
paigned against abuse by Governments 
and drew attention to abuse by the armed 
forces of the opposition in these places. 
Over the past five years, AI has been to 
all but 12 ofthe countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. It has been forced to suspend its 
appeals for individual prisoners of con­
science in some places because of the 
potential threat to their lives. 
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Towards the universal abolition 
of the death penalty 
Amnesty International began this cam-
paign in 1975. It has had international 
backing from UN Economic and Social 
Committee decisions (1984), the sixth 
Protocol ofthe European Human Rights 
Convention (1985), the African Human 
Rights Charter (1986), the optional 
protocols to the International Covenant 
of Civil and Political Rights (December 
1989) and the American Human Rights 
Convention (1990). 
There have been no executions in the 
EEC since 1977 and the trend in Africa is 
encouraging too. Cape Verde has been 
abolitionist since independence in 1975. 
No-one has been condemned to death in 
Comoros since 1975 or Djibouti since 
1972 and Madagascar, Seychelles, Sen-
egal and Côte d'Ivoire have commuted all 
the death penalties imposed over the past 
decade at least — which could be seen as 
de facto abolition. Comoros, Djibouti. 
Niger and Togo can reasonably be 
considered as abolitionist in practice. 
However, some countries on the con-
tinent are still resolutely in favour of 
capital punishment and one of them 
executed more than 120 people in 1990. a 
sad record, even bearing in mind the size 
of the population. 
In the Caribbean, the Dominican 
Republic abolished the death penalty for 
all crimes in 1966 and Haïti did likewise in 
1987. A commission of enquiry is looking 
into abolition in Trinidad & Tobago, 
while Barbados brought in legislation in 
1989 to prevent the death penalty being 
pronounced on under-18s. 
The Pacific States have a long ab-
olitionist tradition. Kiribati, the Solomon 
Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu no longer 
have the death penalty for any crime, Fiji 
and PNG have abolished it for ordinary 
crimes and Western Samoa is abolitionist 
in practice. 
The European Parliament called the 
death penality a violation of human 
rights and appealed to the 'common 
civilisation' ofthe Member States to get it 
abolished. It has made many appeals for 
clemency, as have the EEC Foreign 
Ministers as part of European political 
cooperation, and the Co-Presidents ofthe 
ACP-EEC Joint Assembly have also 
intervened in a large number of cases. 
The death penalty continues to be used in 92 countries 
Late 1990 — the trend is 
towards abolition 
Half the countries on the planet have 
done away with capital punishment on 
either a de jure or defacto basis. The death 
penalty has been abolished for all crimes 
in 44 countries, for common law crimes in 
17 and there has been no capital punish-
ment for at least 10 years in 25. However, 
92 still have the death penalty — and use 
it. 
AI particularly concerned with 
harmonising policy on the right 
to asylum in Europe 
One of the things the Member States 
are doing as part of the 1992 single 
market programme is to provide for 
systematic cooperation whereby 
nationals of many non-Community 
countries have to have visas and sanc-
tions can be taken against carriers who 
transport asylum-seekers without the 
relevant visas and travel documents. 
Amnesty International is concerned 
that such measures might deny potential 
prisoners of conscience and people who 
might face torture, 'disappearance' or 
execution, access to the status of refugee. 
The Member States are also working 
on cooperation provisions for the policies 
and practices governing the entry of 
asylum-seekers to their territories and 
these people's access to the refugee status 
determination procedure. The new provi-
sions suggest that people fleeing human 
rights abuse and seeking protection in a 
Community country will only be able to 
apply for asylum in one Member Slate. 
Amnesty International has found that 
the criteria used to determine the status of 
refugee vary from one Member State to 
the next and that an asylum-seeker may 
well be recognised as a refugee in one 
country and have his application refused 
in another.ι ' D.D. 
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The African Charter on Human and People's Rights 
by Nuala MOLE (*) and Hezekiah LAITAGO AWASEB (**) 
The wind of change is once again 
sweeping across Africa. Only this time, it 
is with a difference. The call is no longer 
for national independence, but the pro­
tection of fundamental human rights. 
The link between human rights and 
development has now been expressly 
recognised in Article 5 of Lomé IV. Since 
1981, Africa has had its own regional 
human rights treaty - - the African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights 
which has been ratified by 40 countries 
(see box). An independent Human Rights 
Commission based in the Gambian capit­
al, Banjul, has been set up under the 
Charter to oversee its implementation. 
The Charter, the Commission and the 
national courts all need support in their 
work of protecting human rights. 
The provisions of the Charter draw on 
the philosophy and wording of the other 
international instruments which pre­
ceded it — the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Coven­
ants and the European and American 
Conventions. But it has adapted their 
provisions to meet some ofthe situations 
which are of particular importance to 
Africa. The Charter not only protects the 
rights of both individuals and groups, but 
also lays down corresponding duties, 
including duties of the state towards the 
individuals and groups whose lives it 
governs. 
The Charter protects the rights of 
individuals to equal treatment before the 
law, a fair trial and freedom from both 
torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment. It protects the rights of groups 
as well as individuals, to freedom of 
speech, association, movement and as­
sembly. Individuals have duties towards 
their families, society, the state and the 
international community. States have a 
duty to assist the family, to eliminate 
discrimination against women and to 
protect the disabled. The Charter con­
tains some provisions not always found in 
The headquarters in Banjul, ofthe African Commission on Human Rights 
(*) Executive Director, Interights. 
(**) PhD student. University College, London. 
other regional treaties -- the right to 
social and economic development, to self-
determination and to assistance in liber­
ation from foreign domination. 
The Commission 
The functions and powers of the 
African Commission on Human and 
People's Rights relate to the protection of 
the rights laid down in the Charter. The 
Commission can undertake research 
studies, organise meetings to discuss 
issues and problems, disseminate inform­
ation, encourage other human rights 
institutions and give its views or make 
recommendations to the governments. 
More importantly, under Article 45 of 
the Charter, the state parties have en­
trusted the Commission with the task of 
interpreting it. The Commission has 
11 members under the current Presidency 
of Professor Umozurike of Nigeria. Each 
member is elected for a six-year period 
and there may only be one national of any 
particular state serving on the Commis­
sion at a given time. The Commission 
members are chosen for their high repu­
tation for integrity and their relevant 
expertise in the field of law. 
It has always been stressed that in 
carrying out its functions, the Com­
mission's primary objective is the amic­
able settlement of disputes. Its role is 
conciliatory, striving to mediate between 
the parties to secure a friendly resolution. 
The Commission can examine alleg­
ations made by one state about another. 
Where one state has good reason to 
believe that another has violated the 
provisions ofthe Charter, it may refer the 
matter to the Commission by communi­
cation to its Chairman, to the Secretary-
General of the OAU and to the state 
concerned. There then follows a three 
month period during which the issue can 
be resolved through bilateral negotiation 
or by any other peaceful procedure. If this 
fails, either state may submit the matter 
to the Commission through the Chair­
man, notifying the other state or states 
involved to that effect. 
The individual 
Anyone who feels that a violation of 
the Charter has occurred can com-
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municate this to the Commission, which 
will examine the complaint if a simple 
majority ofthe members agrees to do so. 
The communication must, however, 
meet a stringent series of criteria which 
are clearly stipulated in Article 56 of the 
Charter and which include the following : 
— communications must be compatible 
with the Charter of the OAU and the 
African Charter on Human and People's 
Rights; 
— they must not be written in disparag­
ing or insulting language directed against 
the state concerned or its institutions, or 
against the OAU ; 
— they must not be based exclusively on 
reports disseminated through the news 
media ; 
— every effort must first have been made 
to resolve the problem through the 
national courts and the complaint must 
be made within a reasonable time of this 
having been done. 
The Commission cannot deal with 
cases already settled by states in accord­
ance with various international instru­
ments, ie the principles of the UN 
Charter, the OAU Charter or the African 
Human Rights Charter itself. 
While the Commission mandate has 
been established since 1986, its pro­
cedures are not yet fully operative. At the 
Eighth Ordinary session in Banjul in 
October 1990, two submissions were 
communicated by non-governmental or­
ganisations under Articles 55 and 56, and 
their outcome is awaited with interest. 
The African Centre for 
Democracy and Human 
Rights Studies 
Access by individuals, lawyers and 
national governments to the facilities ofa 
regional commission of this kind is a new 
experience for Africa. It inevitably re­
quires the development of specialist 
expertise and resources. 
The work ofthe African Commission is 
complemented by the African Centre for 
Democracy and Human Rights Studies 
which is based in the Gambia. Under its 
director, Raymond Sock, the Centre 
strives to advance greater respect for 
human and people's rights in Africa. It 
collaborates closely with African and 
international organisations working in 
the field. The Centre has six interrelated 
programmes for the 1991-92 period. 
These are: 
— Human Rights Procedures; to in­
crease awareness in Africa of inter­
national human rights procedures, with 
the aim of increasing the flow of inform­
ation between African human rights 
groups and the international machinery; 
— Research: to conduct, commission 
and publish reliable and objective re­
search about human rights in Africa; 
— Documentation: to build a human 
rights library and documentation re­
source, available to anyone interested in 
human rights in Africa; 
— Publication: to publish a regular 
newsletter and series of occasional papers 
on African human rights issues; 
— Training and education : to organise 
two training seminars, conduct a review 
of human rights education in Africa and 
prepare for an annual human rights 
course starting in 1992-93; 
— African Human Rights Internship 
Programme: to enable African and other 
interns to learn from and contribute to 
the work of the African Centre. 
The Banjul judges meeting 
To deepen the understanding of inter­
national human rights law by the African 
judiciary, a judges meeting or 'Judicial 
Colloquium' was held in Banjul from 7-
9 November 1990 on the theme of the 
'Domestic Application of International 
Human Rights Norms'. The importance 
attached to the national application of 
international human rights norms is 
evident in the fact that this was the third 
such meeting. The first was in Bangalore, 
India in 1988 and the second in Harare, 
Zimbabwe in 1989. 
Out of the first meeting came the so-
called 'Bangalore Principles'. They refer­
red, inter alia, to the growing tendency for 
national courts to look to international 
law for the purpose of deciding cases 
where the domestic law, be it consti­
tutional, statute or common law, is 
uncertain or incomplete. The Bangalore 
Principles concluded by stating: 
'These views are expressed in recog­
nition of the fact that judges and 
lawyers have a special contribution to 
Interights 
Interights, the International Centre for 
the Legal Protection of Human Rights 
has observer status at the African Com-
mission and is currently actively involved 
in the advisory, promotional and edu-
cational process pertaining to inter-
national human rights norms in Africa. 
Among the members of its Advisory 
Council are two notable African experts, 
Justice Enoch Dumbutshena, former 
Chief Justice of Zimbabwe and Adama < 
D ¡eng from Senegal. The organisation's g 
base is in London and it works in Europe, g 
Africa and the Caribbean. 
Interights' activities include the provision of the following : 
—free specialist advice and information in international human rights law (it is 
currently assisting lawyers in several countries in Africa and the Caribbean) ; 
— direct legal representation in selected cases before tribunals such as the European 
Commission of Human Rights, the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the 
Inter-American Commission ; 
— assistance to lawyers and non-governmental organisations in the preparation of 
cases before international and regional tribunals ; 
— practical assistance and advice to local civil liberties organisations and lawyers on 
international and comparative human rights law; 
— amicus curiae briefs in cases raising important issues concerning the interpretation 
of fundamental rights (an amicus curiae brief is a document which is put before a 
commission or court by someone who is not a party to the dispute but who has specialist 
knowledge ofthe law or facts which may assist the tribunal to reach a more informed 
conclusion). 
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make in the administration of justice in 
fostering universal respect for funda­
mental human rights and freedoms'. 
The follow-up to the Bangalore meet­
ing was convened in Harare in April 1989 
by Chief Justice Enoch Dumbutshena of 
Zimbabwe and was opened by President 
Mugabe. The 'Harare Declaration' re­
iterated the Bangalore principles and 
added : 
'But fine statements in domestic laws 
or international and regional instru­
ments are not enough. Rather, it is 
essential to develop a culture of respect 
for internationally stated human rights 
norms which see these norms applied in 
the domestic laws of all nations and 
given full effect...'. 
It is against this significant backdrop of 
both Bangalore and Harare that the 
Banjul meeting took shape. It was well-
attended by senior judges from the West 
African region, by visiting judges from 
Zimbabwe, India, Australia and the 
United Kingdom and by Mr Adama 
Dieng, the new Secretary-General of the 
International Commission of Jurists. 
The meeting was hosted by the Chief 
Justice of the Gambia, in conjunction 
with the Commonwealth Secretariat and 
Interights, with assistance from the Ford 
Foundation, the Danish International 
Development Agency and the British 
Overseas Development Agency. 
The discussion centred on papers 
presented by the participants which 
covered a wide range of subjects. The 
concluding statement ofthe proceedings, 
known as the 'Banjul Affirmation' called 
for human rights to be included in legal 
education, in formal professional teach­
ing and in other activities. It also called 
for wide and popular dissemination of 
information about human rights and 
freedoms. To this effect, judges, lawyers, 
litigants and others should be made 
familiar with applicable human rights 
norms as stated in international instru­
ments and national constitutions and 
laws. 
The 'Banjul Affirmation' also called on 
the African Commission on Human and 
People's Rights to consider establishing 
local associations in each member state 
for the purpose of facilitating the process 
of education and training, and the dis-
semination of human rights information. 
Participants at the Banjul Judges meeting 
It proposed the establishment of closer 
links and cooperation across national 
frontiers by the judiciary on the interpre­
tation and application of human rights 
law, and the making of effective arrange­
ments for the publication and exchange 
of judgements, articles and other inform­
ation and, where appropriate, the use of 
special expertise. 
It also suggested that adequate re­
sources by way of library stocks and other 
materials be urgently made available for 
all judges for their information and 
assistance and to disseminate and teach 
international human rights law. Further­
more, it stressed the importance of 
complete judicial independence as well as 
complete independence of the judicial 
profession. Underlining the importance 
of real and effective access to the ordinary 
courts for the determination of criminal 
charges and civil rights and obligations 
by due process of law, it stated that these 
safeguards were necessary if the rule of 
law was to be meaningful and if the law 
was to be of practical value to ordinary 
men and women. It also recognised the 
need for a generous approach to the 
matter of legal standing in public law 
cases, suggesting that courts be assisted 
by well-focused amicus curiae submis­
sions from independent, non-govern­
mental organisations such as Interights in 
cases where international and comparat­
ive law and practice might be relevant. 
The Banjul Affirmation also suggested 
that national courts enable non-govern­
mental organisations and expert ad­
vocates to provide specialist legal advice, 
assistance and representation in import­
ant cases of public interest. 
It called for the exceptions and derog­
ations contained in the African Charter 
to be construed strictly and for the law to 
be interpreted in such a manner as to 
reject arbitrary or unreasonable laws. 
Otherwise, these exceptions and derog­
ations would destroy the very principles 
guaranteeing fundamental human rights 
and freedoms'. 
Call for an African Court of 
Human Rights 
However, the single most significant 
and constructive development of the 
Banjul Colloquium is the recognition by 
the participants of the pressing need for 
an independent African Court of Human 
Rights similar to the European Court, 
whose decisions would be binding. Cur­
rently, the only enforcement organ is the 
Commission whose decisions cannot 
bind the states. 
As a result of the Banjul meeting, a 
further judges meeting in Nigeria is set for 
December 1991 which will again be 
attended by the senior West African 
judiciary. A judge from the European 
Court of Human Rights has also been 
invited to share the experiences of that 
institution with the meeting, o 
N.M. & H.L.A. 
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Human Rights in Africa: the decisive steps 
by Benoît NGOM (*) 
Africa, 'the continent human rights have forgotten', was soon 
to surprise many observers with its protection of human rights 
and freedoms when, during the second decade of independences. 
the idea of non-interference was held up to question in no 
uncertain manner. 
Paradoxically, African political leaders were among the first 
in the world to claim the right to criticise a state if it violated 
human rights and thus the idea became part of the continent's 
human rights practices. 
The first public manifestation of this was in 1975, when 
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere severely criticised the 
President of Uganda, where that year's OAU Summit was due 
to be held. 
Dr Nyerere, with the backing of the Heads of State of 
Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, objected to the host 
country being one where human rights were flouted so openly. 
They thought it was wrong to criticise South Africa for violating 
human rights and yet not speak out when other African 
countries were guilty of the same thing and, although the 
recommendation to move the summit came to nothing, it was a 
precedent and it left its mark. 
This was the background against which the process culminat­
ing in the removal of Bokassa was set in motion. The Emperor, 
accused of allowing the massacre of primary and high school 
children, agreed to the commission of enquiry suggested by the 
heads of French-speaking states. They met in Kigali in May 
1979 and decided to set up an African legal commission — it 
comprised lawyers from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Togo 
and Liberia - - and this ultimately pronounced Bokassa 
responsible for atrocities committed on the children of Bangui. 
At the Monrovia Summit in June 1979, Godfrey Binaisa, 
ignoring diplomatic niceties, launched into a violent attack on 
dictators such as Nguéma and Bokassa. 
So it was the crimes of African Heads of State — Idi Amin, 
Macias Nguéma and Jean Bedel Bokassa — which triggered the 
first indignant reactions of the continent's leaders. The 
denunciation ofthe conspiracy of silence around the violation of 
the rights and freedoms of the citizen heralded the subsequent 
adoption ofthe African Charter of Human and People's Rights. 
Thus it was that, with one voice, the states of the continent 
agreed to the principle of setting up an African Charter of 
Human, and People's Rights. The Monrovia resolution 
ultimately took practical shape when the Heads of State and 
Government unanimously adopted it at the 18th OAU 
(Organisation of African Unity) Summit in June 1981. 
A year after Monrovia, in June 1980, Banjul (Gambia) hosted 
a first meeting, an interministerial conference which adopted the 
draft African Charter of Human and People's Rights on the 
basis of a text which experts had come up with at an earlier 
session in Dakar. 
( ) President of the African Jurists' Association. Author of 'Les droits de 
l'homme et l'Afrique' (Silex - Paris - 1984). 'La cour suprême du Sénégal' 
(Présence africaine - Paris - 1990). 
The Charter is a fundamental contribution to the develop­
ment of regional law in Africa and, as such, fills one ofthe many 
gaps in the protection of individual and collective rights and 
freedoms. It seems to embody a median line of conduct 
involving two concepts of human rights — the concept of civil 
and political rights found in the West and the concept of social 
and cultural rights found in the socialist countries, which both 
are applicable to and can be demanded ofthe states of Africa. 
So, clearly, there was more to it than just signing a human 
rights charter without reference to the vague notion of people. 
A Commission of Human and People's Rights was set up to 
ensure that the Charter was applied. The members were elected 
by secret ballot by the Conference of Heads of State and 
Government. 
In carrying out their duties, the Charter says, the members of 
the Commission enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities 
provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Organisation of African Unity. Their 
prerogatives are broad, since they may use whatever method of 
investigation seems appropriate and. in particular, hear the 
Secretary-General of the OAU and indeed anyone likely to 
enlighten them. 
The wind of freedom is blowing across Africa, bearing hope 
with it. and people are surprised to find themselves dreaming of 
new democratic constitutions involving several parties taking 
their turn at governing. 
In only a few months, countries such as Namibia, Benin. ( ape 
Verde and Sao Tome & Principe have tried out multiparty 
systems and tasted the delights of alternance. 
But is this really the end of dictatorship and the coming of 
democratic political regimes'.' Time alone will tell but the 
democrats are still getting ready for a society of equality and 
justice. 
The African Jurists' Association brought its expertise and 
reputation to bear on the consolidation ofthe primacy of law in 
Africa, attending seminars with UNESCO and many NGOs to 
get the African Charter of Human and People's Rights adopted 
and ratified. 
We have also been involved in the démocratisation of Africa's 
political system, having contributed to the process in Namibia, 
at the OAU's request, and attended the Benin National 
Conference and joined the OAU in supervising the first 
democratic elections in Cape Verde, at the invitation of the 
parties concerned.o B.N. 
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A personal view 
Building democracy with tribalism 
Although corruption is often cited, tribalism is probably the commonest 
motivation of most military coups in Africa-those violent reactions of resentment 
by one or several groups against domination by others. Note that, invariably, no 
sooner are the accusers in office than they are themselves accused of the same 
misdeed. If they are not, in turn, overthrown a state of permanent tribal tension 
would reign. More tragic, of course, are the civil wars with ethnic overtones — 
led by war-lords in search of political power — which have been and are being 
savagely waged with tremendous loss of lives and property, immense human 
suffering and famine. The picture Africa projects is, accordingly, one of absolute 
chaos, of barbarism and economic decay. 
Perceived inevitably as a factor of instability, an evil which would distort and 
ultimately destroy any political system no matter what its merits, tribalism is 
justifiably in the forefront of the debate on democracy in Africa as one regime 
after another bows to popular pressure for political pluralism. But is tribalism 
really evil? Is it truly inimical to democracy and party politics? 
For over three decades, advocates of 
the one-party state or military rule have 
advanced the need to overcome tribalism 
and promote national unity to justify the 
monopoly of power by a restricted group 
of people. This has led, in some cases, to 
the installation of dictatorship and a 
reign of terror. These one-party or 
military-rule enthusiasts erroneously as­
sumed that, either by persuasion or 
coercion, tribalism could be smothered 
and a nation of subservient peoples 
moulded. They failed miserably. 
Surprisingly, proponents of a multi­
party system of government appear to 
make a similar assumption in claiming 
that party ideals, freedom and justice, 
respect for human rights, and other 
principles embodied in democracy are so 
cherishable and attractive that tribalism 
can easily be traded for them. They often 
cite examples in Western Europe where 
pluralism has flourished amid ethnic 
tensions and nationalism. Africa, they 
point out, has not the monopoly of 
tribalism. Its leaders should create the 
conditions favourable for its defeat. 
These 'democrats' aspire to the creation 
of homogeneous African societies, with­
out which, they claim, multi-party de­
mocracy would be in jeopardy, as if 
homogeneity can be achieved within a 
time frame of twenty or thirty or fifty 
years, and as if it does not require as a 
minimum condition a common language. 
Such reasoning betrays a lack of 
understanding of the psychology, indeed 
of the true nature, of African tribalism. 
We are not dealing here with minorities 
resentful of decades or centuries of 
oppression seeking redress or secession 
(such agitations are, as already pointed 
out, also taking place in Africa), but with 
what is, in essence, the primitive impulse 
of the African's heart, his being. 
Defined as the sentiment of belonging 
to a group of clans which claim a 
common ancestry, tribalism is, as we 
know from the works of Sigmund Freud, 
linked to totemism, a necessary and 
universal phase of human development. 
This definition differs considerably from 
the popular negative understanding of it 
as meaning 'hatred of, or discrimination 
against, people of other tribes' - - a 
notion reinforced by the political situ­
ation in Africa just described, which is 
repulsive to many people around the 
world. Tribalism that involves hatred and 
domination of others is a sentiment with 
which many Africans are ashamed to be 
associated, even if by nature they are 
tribalists. 
The African tribalist 
Let us then undertake briefly a psy­
choanalysis of the African tribalist. We 
must start by recognising as valid the 
freudian assertion that in this our twen­
tieth century, there are societies which 
have retained, more than others, that 
sense of oneness with nature with which 
humanity in primitive times was imbued 
and that that sense exercises tremendous 
influence in the organisation of life, 
manifesting more often in animism, and 
in the worship ofthe ancestors. Such are 
African societies, still overwhelmingly 
rural, which are characterised mostly by 
the worship ofthe ancestors, a traditional 
religion of which absolute loyalty not 
only to the family but also to the clan or 
the tribe is the basic tenet. In Western 
societies, that primaeval sense has been 
forced back deep into the subconscious, 
although traces can be found in certain 
gestures, superstitions and rituals. Al­
though there is a certain re-awakening of 
the sense ofthe 'tribe' among minorities, 
spurred by political and economic re­
asons, the family as a unit in the West, 
generally, has given way to the individual 
and society has become a collection of 
individuals in contrast to Africa where 
society is made up of families and of 
tribes. The African attachment to his 
family or his adherence to the extended 
family system is too well-known to 
warrant emphasis. 
Loyalty to the clan, as demanded by 
the traditional religion, together with fear 
and mistrust of other tribes acquired 
through ages of inter-tribal wars, raids 
and slavery, have created in the African 
psyche a sense of 'insecurity outside the 
group'. Evidence of this can be found in 
schools, universities and cities across the 
continent where different tribal associ­
ations come into being for the purpose of 
providing their own tribes-men and 
-women with the support they need in 
unfamiliar surroundings, keep them in 
touch with their own culture and promote 
tribal interests. It is not uncommon to 
find such associations in places as far 
away as London and New York. 
We should note, looking back at 
history, that almost all the tribes brought 
under one 'nation' for the administrative 
and economic convenience ofthe colonial 
master resented the unnatural union. It 
should therefore not come as a surprise to 
realise that the African, accordingly, 
owes greater allegiance to his tribe than to 
his so-called country. Indeed his order of 
priorities are instinctively his family, his 
tribe and his country, caring much less 
about the latter, except in the context of 
international relationships. 
These then were the people to whom 
the colonial masters granted indepen­
dence. Not long exposed to democratic 
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A Nigerian newspaper vendor in the 1960s bearing news ofthe political strife that was to lead to a chain of catastrophic events. 
At the root of it all was tribal tension 
practices, and amid poverty, is it any 
wonder that the democratic models be­
queathed to Africa collapsed almost 
everywhere in the first decade of indepen­
dence, as many regimes were overthrown 
in military coups and many others con­
fiscated power by means of one-party 
states? 
The case of Nigeria 
It is perhaps in order at this juncture to 
undertake a case-study of Nigeria where 
the tribal problem posed to democracy is 
more acute and more complex than in any 
other African country. Nigeria, ac­
cording to some estimates, has well over 
70 ethnic groups. It was created in 1914 
through the amalgamation of the British 
Protectorates of Northern and Southern 
Nigeria. 
A glance at the records ofthe three-day 
debate on the 'Motion for Independence' 
in the Nigerian Federal House of Rep­
resentatives in January 1980 reveals 
certain incontrovertible facts: 1) The 
House was a caricature of the House of 
Commons, Members knew very little 
about parliamentary ethics and pro­
cedures; 2) Debates lacked substance, 
being dominated by ethnic squabblings. 
For example: Soon after the Prime 
Minister had introduced the motion 
and the leader of the opposition had 
replied, the first Member to speak 
expressed fears about exchanging what 
he called 'white imperialism for black 
imperialism'. 'I love independence', he 
said, 'I fought for it and its attainment is 
a credit to us, but nevertheless there are 
some doubts and sad experiences aris­
ing from the insincere, undemocratic, 
oppressive, vindictive and tribalism 
attitude of some of our leaders I have 
to mention that I come from a tribe 
which is deemed to be the fourth largest 
and the oldest in the country. Now we 
are attaining independence we want to 
be independent in that tribe, to rebuild 
and reopen in such an administrative 
way that all the Ijaw-speaking elements 
are united to form their own Province or 
State in an independent Nigeria'. He did 
not want his people to be under the 
Government of the Western Region. 
Another Member did not want his 
either to be under the Government of 
the Eastern Region. 'I feel Mr Speaker 
Sir' he said, 'that we are not safe in the 
hands of 'Ajingba' Government of the 
Eastern Region. Certainly you know 
that with Dr Okpara presiding we 
people in the Calabar Province are in 
hell.' 
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It should be noted that the colonial 
administration had created three regions, 
based on the three main tribes, in 1947 in 
response to tension between the three 
groups. The political parties which emer­
ged during this period, though sup­
posedly national, were each dominated 
by one tribe. They were: the Northern 
Peoples Congress (NPC)-Hausa-domi-
nated; the National Council of Nigeria 
and Cameroon(NCNC)-Ibo-dominated ; 
and the Action Group(AG)-Yoruba-
dominated. Politicians from the minority 
tribes allied themselves with one or the 
other party in accordance with whichever 
they felt would serve their best interest. 
They were often disappointed, and be­
cause they usually felt uncomfortable 
within the formations, were more often 
inclined to agitate for the creation of their 
own region or province. 
In the House ofthe Representatives we 
referred to, the NPC and NCNC were in 
coalition. They were opposed by the AG. 
It was thought that the alliance between 
the Hausas and Ibos augured well for 
peace and democracy in the country in 
terms of promoting tribal understanding 
and harmony. It increased, on the con­
trary, the suspicion ofthe Yorubas of an 
Hausa/Ibo conspiracy to dominate. Equ­
ally it was thought that the realignment of 
the political landscape which occurred in 
1963 was a step in the right direction: a 
split had occurred in the AG with a 
faction forming the Nigerian National 
Democratic Party (NNDP) and going 
into an alliance with the NPC. The 
NCNC and AG, on the other hand, came 
together. Unfortunately, the bitterness 
caused among the Yorubas by the split in 
the AG was to precipitate serious poli­
tical disturbances in the Western Region 
and lead to a chain of catastrophic 
events : the first military coup in 1966, the 
massacre of the Ibos in the Northern 
Region, the secession of the Eastern 
Region ('Biafra') and the Nigerian civil 
war. 
Mindful of these experiences, the 1979 
Constitution of the Second Republic, 
which saw the return to democratic 
government that year, required political 
parties to be truly national, ie present on 
the ground in the then 19 States of the 
Federation, and the President of the 
Republic to win election in at least two-
thirds of the number of states. That 
Constitution failed. The political form­
ations which emerged were a virtual 
resurrection of the three post-indepen­
dence parties, still as ethnically domi­
nated as ever, and with the same per­
sonalities. With another return to de­
mocratic rule planned for 1992, a number 
of measures have already been taken 
aimed at avoiding a repetition. Will they 
succeed? It should be noted that, in order 
to reduce tribal tension, the tradition of 
devolution of power begun in 1947 by the 
colonial regime has been maintained with 
exercises in the creation of states. Each 
exercise has always succeeded in reducing 
ethnic tension in the country. 
Admittedly not all the African coun­
tries have had the same experience as 
Nigeria, but we can draw a number of 
general conclusions, valid for all, from 
our psychoanalysis of the African tribal­
ist and our case-study of Nigeria : the first 
is that tribalism is a natural sentiment 
that cannot be stifled. It relates to the 
personality, indeed to the true identity of 
the African; the second is that African 
countries had at independence little or no 
experience in the operation of democracy 
based on western models, and still have 
considerable difficulties grappling with 
their mechanics; and the third is that 
politics in Africa cannot avoid being 
affected by tribal sentiments. Consider 
the results ofthe March 1991 election in 
Benin Republic where, despite the general 
feeling of a widespread desire for change 
after more than two decades of govern­
ment by Mr Kerekou, the latter's share of 
the votes was almost exclusively based on 
the support of his northern tribesmen. 
The winner, President Soglo, failed to win 
substantial votes among them. This, on 
the threshold of what is supposed to be a 
new era for democracy in Africa. 
Let it be said outright that democracy 
has, since the days of the Greek city-
states, proved its superiority over all 
other political systems. It is a system that 
has triumphed over totalitarianism in 
Eastern Europe and which is increasingly 
being adopted in the Third World in 
general. Poverty is not a constraint. After 
all, the biggest democracy in the world, 
India, is a poor country. The future peace 
and prosperity of Africa, no doubt, 
depends on democracy taking root on the 
continent. 
The trouble is that Africans have never 
realistically attempted to build democ­
racy with the institutions available to 
them. They have indulged and are con­
tinuing to indulge in mimicry. None of 
the great democracies of today copied 
wholesale the political system of the 
other. Whatever system they have is both 
a reflection of their national character 
and of their history: the United King­
dom, a constitutional monarchy since 
William and Mary in 1689; France, a 
unitary presidential system since 1958 
after a long period of government insta­
bility and search for a more durable 
system — since the 1789 revolution in 
fact!; the United States, a federal pre­
sidential system since 1789 when the 
Constitution of the United States came 
into effect. The founding fathers of that 
Constitution had examined all the poli­
tical systems known to mankind — 
monarchy, oligarchy and democracy and 
rejected each as dangerous, preferring 
instead to infuse all three into a system of 
checks and balances, refined it is true by 
various Amendments. A· great document 
which suits the American temperament 
and which has stood the test of time. 
Condemned to living together in mod­
ern states, Africans ought to find a 
formula for peace. Tribalism, as defined 
in this article, should not be seen as a 
factor of division but as a natural 
institution (in-built pluralism or natural 
constituencies if you will) with which 
democracy ought to be constructed. 
Language, they say, is a vision of life. 
Tribes which speak different languages 
see the world in different manners, and 
such visions should find. expression in 
democracy, much more so in societies 
where ideology plays little or no part in 
the formation of political parties. 
Reconciling democracy with 
tribalism: a possibility 
The question inevitably is: how can 
tribalism, in practice, be reconciled with 
democracy? This must, of course, start 
with a Constitution which emphasises the 
basic, entrenched principles of democ­
racy; ie respect of human rights, respect 
for the rights of minorities, freedom of 
speech and of the press, an independent 
legislature, an independent judiciary, fair 
distribution ofthe nation's wealth, social 
services and amenities, education for all 
and an obligation for government to 
govern constitutionally. 
Although situations vary from country 
to country (some have a greater number 
of tribes than others and thus have 
greater ethnic problems as already poin­
ted out), the Constitution should organ-
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ise political life with a guaranteed role for 
every tribe. For those with numerous 
ethnic groups, political life could, for 
example, be organised thus: Each com­
ponent part of society, ie tribe, should 
have at least a guaranteed representation 
in the Legislature, the number of rep­
resentations, of course, reflecting its 
numerical strength. Each tribe should 
elect its representative on the basis of a 
contest, initially at least, exclusively 
between tribally-based political parties. 
The virtue of such a system is that it 
would reduce thuggery, ballot rigging, 
resentment often felt by many at the sight 
ofa member of one tribe campaigning in 
another or the thought of being rep­
resented by him, increase popular par­
ticipation in political life, and give a 
double mandate to the elected person: ie 
representative not only of his local party's 
interests but also those of his tribe. 
Let us not forget that in the Athenian 
city-state where democracy was first 
practised in the ancient world, the Coun­
cil of the Five Hundred, which con­
stituted the steering committee of the 
Assembly, was composed of 50 members 
drawn from each ofthe 10 tribes and that 
the board of magistrates comprising 10 
members was also chosen on a tribal 
basis. Although women, slaves and fore­
ign residents were excluded from par­
ticipation in politics, the city-state system 
functioned for its citizens very well, 
ensuring peace and stability from 508 BC 
to 338 BC when Athens was conquered 
by the Macedonians. 
Readers may well ask how under such a 
system a national government can be 
formed with the multiplicity of tribally-
based political parties. The answer is 
simple. The system will induce the emer­
gence at national level of political parties 
formed through the coalition of the 
tribally-based parties. This inevitably 
implies not only a process of negotiation 
but also a bottom-up approach to the 
establishment of national parties rather 
than what currently obtains which is of 
parties formed at the national level (but 
dominated in most cases by a single tribe 
as has been the case in Nigeria) and 
imposed on the rest ofthe country. It will 
be the local parties willingly going into 
alliances whose structure, policies and 
constitutions they will help shape rather 
than individuals without voice and with­
out influence joining parties whose po­
licies and structures had been determined 
elsewhere. It will give the tribe, however 
minor, a sense of importance and of 
participation in national affairs, espe­
cially if the Constitution demands a high 
level of support in the Legislature for the 
formation of a government and the 
enactment of certain kinds of legislation, 
support high enough to preclude domi­
nation by one or a small group of tribes 
however populous. 
Let us note here that, in contrast to 
most European parties which are based 
A system as suggested in this article 
necessarily means reduced powers for 
whoever is chosen by whatever means as 
Head of State. It means greater powers 
for the Government and the Legislature. 
It will induce the establishment of local 
government more on the tribal level 
(which, in any case, will be a return to one 
akin to what Africa had before colonia­
lism), than on the level of district or 
province, the boundary of which was 
often arbitrarily drawn. The establish-
A Kenyan politician in suit and in traditional regalia during an election rally in his 
constituency. The message is clear: tribal sentiment is a powerful factor. Better 
marry it with democracy rather than fight against it 
on mass membership of branches, the two 
main parties in the United States, the 
Democratic and Republican parties, had 
their roots in a variety of militant groups 
across the country supporting one or the 
other of the two strands of political 
opinions which emerged between 1789 
and 1801. The Democrats were mainly 
adherents of the federalist principles 
enunciated by Alexander Hamilton while 
the Republicans were mainly followers of 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 
opponents of federalism and supporters 
of greater powers to the states. The 
American party system thus came into 
existence as a bottom-up movement, the 
national parties serving as umbrella 
organisations for different interest 
groups which happened to have common 
interests at the national level. 
ment of local government on the tribal 
level will not only contribute towards the 
channelling of those energies presently 
expended at the national level on dispute 
back into tribal cultural and social 
welfare; it will also facilitate rural de­
velopment. 
This system can only function effect­
ively if there is a commitment to respect 
those entrenched democratic principles 
which we have already outlined here, 
particularly those regarding the respect of 
the rights of minorities and the obligation 
to govern constitutionally. To ignore, 
deplore or attempt to smoulder tribalism 
in order to build a strong democracy is, in 
the opinion of this writer, day-dream­
ing, o 
Augustine OYOWE 
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Democracy in 
the English speaking Caribbean 
The upsurge in democratic sentiment which has transformed the world's 
political landscape over the last five years has certainly been dramatic. Some 
political scientists are tempted to characterise this as a sea-change which 
represents the final triumph of democracy and its attendant liberal economic 
philosophy, over authoritarianism and central planning. While such a conclusion 
may be premature — with many infant democracies facing formidable challenges 
which could threaten the whole process — the prevailing wind continues to favour 
political pluralism. Within the A CPs, the main impact of this sudden democratic 
renaissance is being seen in Africa. Elsewhere, and notably in the Caribbean, 
democracy has followed a more evolutionary course and, at the beginning ofthe 
1990s, the pluralistic tradition is already well established. 
In this article, we focus on the democratic systems in the English-speaking 
Caribbean, with a view to identifying their principal characteristics and to 
assessing their effectiveness. As more and more developing states experiment 
with the democratic alternative, in the hope of finding solutions to their current 
political and economic difficulties, the experiences of existing democracies in the 
developing world may offer some useful lessons. 
Similarities 
In general terms, the 12 anglophone 
ACP countries of the Caribbean region 
display a considerable degree of homo­
geneity. Ten of them are island states (the 
exceptions being Guyana and Belize). 
Their populations range from small to 
very small (Jamaica is the largest with 2.4 
million inhabitants). There are notable 
economic similarities, with heavy reliance 
on a limited range of cash crops and a 
particular emphasis on tourism. In most 
of the countries, the general level of 
education is good, and a high proportion 
of the population is literate. On the 
negative side, they are all vulnerable to 
the tropical cyclones which strike with 
such devastating force in the region. 
From a constitutional standpoint, the 
common heritage ofthe English-speaking 
Caribbean is largely reflected in the 
systems of Government which have 
emerged. In the decolonisation period, 
following the Second World War, it was 
generally believed that statehood was not 
a viable option for territories below a 
certain population and size. The British 
solution to this problem in the Caribbean 
was to set up a West Indies Federation 
which, it was intended, would proceed to 
independence in due course, as a single 
sovereign entity. The scheme foundered 
as a result of inter-island rivalries and 
because the British simultaneously pur­
sued a policy of internal self-government 
on an island by island basis. The latter 
approach effectively undermined the 
efforts to forge a West Indian identity 
(although this exists on the cricket field) 
under the umbrella of the Federation. 
At the same time, international percep­
tions about the minimum requirements 
for statehood in terms of both population 
and territory were rapidly changing. 
Economic advances in a number of the 
larger Caribbean territories contributed 
to the view that these, at least, could 'go it 
alone' and this led to the independence, 
between 1962 and 1966 of Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and 
Guyana. Despite a further attempt by 
Britain to draw together most of its 
remaining Caribbean islands — princip­
ally in the Lesser Antilles — under the ill-
fated 'Associated States', the majority of 
these moved to independence during the 
1970s. 
Westminster model 
In stark contrast to the position in 
Africa, the basic constitutional frame­
works bequeathed by the colonial power 
have survived largely unscathed in the 
English-speaking Caribbean. Accord­
ingly, government structures continue to 
resemble in many ways the Westminster 
system upon which they were modelled. 
Guyana is the only real exception to this, 
having inaugurated a new constitution in 
1980 which replaced the system es­
tablished at the time of independence and 
which incorporated socialist principles 
into the basic law. 
One clear distinction between the 
countries under discussion and the 
erstwhile metropolitan power is the fact 
that the former have written consti­
tutions. It is perhaps ironic that Britain, 
whose antipathy towards enshrining its 
own basic norms and conventions in a 
single constitutional document is well 
known, should have played such a prom­
inent part in the writing of other peoples' 
constitutions, but it is difficult to imagine 
how the independence process could have 
proceeded otherwise. 
In all of the states concerned except 
Guyana, the legal form of the Consti­
tution is still the original 'Order in 
Council' signed by the monarch at the 
time independence was granted. Each 
contains a series of human rights provi­
sions as well as the basic rules governing 
the exercise of executive, legislative and 
judicial authority. 
Human rights guaranteed 
Broadly speaking, the provisions relat­
ing to fundamental rights guarantee the 
following to the citizen (taken from the 
Antigua and Barbuda Constitution 
Order, 1981): 
— life, liberty, security ofthe person, the 
enjoyment of property and the protection 
of the law ; 
— freedom of conscience, of expression 
(including freedom of the press), and of 
peaceful assembly and association; 
— protection of family life, of personal 
privacy, of the privacy of the home and 
other property, and from deprivation of 
property without fair compensation. 
It is perhaps significant that these 
entrenched rights usually precede the 
clauses relating to the structure of 
government. 
A set of similar rights is also en­
umerated in the Guyana Constitution, 
although this document cites as 'the 
principal objective of the political sys­
tem', the extension of 'socialist de­
mocracy by providing increasing oppor­
tunities for the participation of citizens in 
the management and decision-making 
processes ofthe state'. Article 18 goes on 
to lay down, in almost biblical fashion, 
the precept that 'land is for social use and 
must go to the tiller', while the existence 
of privately owned economic enterprises 
is also recognised (Article 17). 
The Courier no. 128 July-August 1991  73 DOSSIER 
On the institutional side, in the other 11 
states, the British parliamentary system 
of government has been reproduced with 
variations which are more of form than 
substance. This is true even of the two 
countries which decided against consti­
tutional monarchy with the Queen as 
head of state (Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Dominica). In both of these, the Pre­
sident performs a role which is analogous 
to that of the Crown, and real political 
power is in the hands of the directly 
elected politicians. In the others, the 
Queen remains head of state, and is 
represented by a Governor-General who 
assents to bills which have been passed by 
the Parliament. In the normal course of 
affairs, the Governor-General has a 
formal and ceremonial role but, as events 
in Grenada in the early 1980s revealed, he 
assumes a position of considerable im­
portance when the system itself is under 
threat. 
The bicameralism of the British 
system, with an unelected upper house, is 
also reflected to a large extent in the 
Caribbean democracies. In most cases, 
the Parliament consists of two chambers 
- the elected House of Assembly (or 
House of Representatives) and the ap­
pointed Senate, although in a few of the 
smaller jurisdictions, representatives and 
senators sit together in a single chamber. 
The standard pattern is for representat­
ives to be elected by single member 
constituencies using the simple majority 
voting system while Senators are ap­
pointed by the Head of State 'on the 
advice of...' the Prime Minister or the 
Leader ofthe Opposition. Students ofthe 
British constitution will recognise the 
formulation as a euphemism which ac­
cording to convention, effectively binds 
the monarch. 
Two-party emphasis 
From the democratic standpoint, it is 
interesting to note the extent to which 
two-party as opposed to multi-party 
politics are protected by the various 
constitutions. There is no rule against 
third parties standing, but the use of 'first 
past the post' in single member con­
stituencies — an arrangement which is 
constitutionally entrenched in several of 
the jurisdictions — clearly tends to favour 
two-party politics. More significant in 
this regard is the method of appointment 
of senators. In most cases, the Prime 
Minister chooses the majority of senate 
members while the opposition is guaran­
teed a minority bloc by virtue of their 
leader's right of nomination. Thus for 
example, in Trinidad and Tobago. 18 of 
the 31 Senators are chosen by the govern­
ment and six by the opposition. 
The extent to which Guyana departed 
from the 'British' model is particularly 
reflected in its voting arrangements. It is 
the only English-speaking Caribbean 
nation whose constitution requires pro­
portional voting, with 53 of the 65 
National Assembly members elected 
under a list system. 
Clearly, the health or effectiveness of 
democratic structures cannot be judged 
solely by reference to the systems which 
exist on paper. There are numerous 
examples of countries with ostensibly 
democratic constitutions where the essen­
tial characteristics of democracy such as 
free speech or fair election processes are 
manifestly absent. The importance of 
having the right system should not be 
underestimated but arguably, the ex­
istence ofa genuinely democratic atmos­
phere is even more vital. 
Importance of education 
In this respect, most of the Caribbean 
islands have been fortunate. There is a 
well-established tradition of democratic 
debate and of tolerance of opposing 
views. The relationship between these 
circumstances and the generally high 
level of education — which includes wide 
understanding about the principles and 
mechanics of democracy — is one which 
should not be overlooked. It should also 
be underlined that the practice of rep­
resentative government in the area has a 
longer pedigree than the relatively recent 
independence dates would seem to sug­
gest. Many ofthe islands enjoyed extens­
ive internal self-government prior to the 
final cutting of constitutional ties with the 
UK, and in fact the Parliament of 
Barbados, which was established in 1639, 
is one of the oldest in the Common­
wealth. 
The process of democratic evolution in 
the Caribbean, which contrasts sharply 
with the more rapid transition experien­
ced by other states in the decolonisation 
process may also help to explain the 
relative stability of political systems in the 
region. Although a number of countries 
have, at different times, experienced 
turmoil which appeared to threaten 
established political structures — for 
example in Jamaica in 1980 — the system 
has normally been able to absorb this and 
to act as a vehicle for peaceful political 
change. Grenada in 1983 was, of course, a 
notable exception in experiencing the 
kind of revolutionary upheaval more 
commonly associated with the African 
continent. The fact that speedy interven­
tion from outside resulted in the restor­
ation ofthe status quo ante means that we 
can only speculate about whether this 
would have occurred in other circum­
stances, but it certainly is not incon­
ceivable. 
The tradition of democracy may be an 
important foundation, but there is some 
debate as to whether the Westminster 
model is the most suitable basis for the 
genuine and democratic expression ofthe 
will of the various English-speaking 
Caribbean peoples. While acknowledg­
ing that the existing systems have pro­
vided West Indian societies 'with regular, 
usually honest and basically reliable 
mechanisms for elite recruitment and 
circulation', the author Anthony Main-
got clearly has some doubts. (') 
Doubts over voting method 
He accepts that the intrinsic legitimacy 
of the current government structures in 
the West Indies 'has allowed them to 
survive some dramatic challenges', which 
is clearly a testament in their favour, but 
he also suggests that the electoral method 
may have a corrosive effect in the longer 
term. In particular, he is critical of the 
'winner takes all' voting system which 
tends to translate modest movements of 
votes into much larger swings of seats, to 
the detriment of minority groupings. He 
also believes that the system encourages 
polarisation of opinions and induces 
partisanship which might tend to under­
mine fundamental national unity. There 
is some evidence to suggest that simple 
plurality voting is less suitable for coun­
tries which do not have homogenous 
electorates, and where fair representation 
of different ethnic, religious or other 
groups is desirable. In the Caribbean 
(') Author of the chapter entitled 'Citizenship and 
Parliamentary Politics in the English-Speaking 
Caribbean', which appears in 'Dual Legacies in the 
Contemporary Caribbean: Continuing Aspects of 
British and French Dominion', edited by Paul 
Sutton. 
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., London. 1986. 
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context, Maingofs critique may, there­
fore, have greater relevance to a country 
such as Trinidad and Tobago while being 
less pertinent, for example, to the Ba­
hamas or St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
However, the essential fact remains 
that governments in the English-speaking 
Caribbean can be, and regularly arc 
replaced by a peaceful electoral process in 
which everyone is free to participate. To 
an adherent of democracy in a country 
where no such freedom exists, the exact 
form of the system would certainly be a 
secondary consideration. 
The issue of minority representation, 
indirectly referred to above, also arises in 
the somewhat different context of the 
rivalries which exist between various 
Caribbean islands brought together in a 
single sovereign entity. The territorial 
instincts and loyalties of island inhab­
itants are a well-established sociological 
phenomenon. These instincts tend to be 
expressed in nationalistic or 'quasi-
nationalistic' sentiments, the concom­
itant of which is likely to be a suspicion of 
larger neighbours. Europe has a number 
of well-known examples of this, and in 
the Caribbean it has affected the consti­
tutional situation of a number of coun­
tries. 
The problem arose because, not­
withstanding the much reduced popu­
lation criteria which came to be accepted 
in assessing the viability of statehood, 
there are numerous Caribbean islands 
which are almost certainly still too small 
to operate meaningfully on the inter­
national stage. Geographical logic would 
suggest that where possible, these should 
have been joined with larger neighbour­
ing islands, and this was done in a number 
of cases, by a UK government which 
appeared anxious finally to cast off its 
colonial mantle. Thus Tobago was 'part­
nered' with Trinidad, Barbuda with 
Antigua and the islands of Anguilla and 
Nevis with St Kitts. The trouble is that 
geographical logic and political reality do 
not always coincide. Early disturbances 
in Anguilla, where local people were 
vehemently opposed to the proposed link 
with St Kitts, resulted in its reversion to 
the status of a' UK dependency. The 
remaining partnerships have survived 
although not always without difficulties. 
From a constitutional standpoint, it is 
interesting to note that each ofthe smaller 
islands enjoys some form of internal self-
Is the Westminster model the most suitable basis for Caribbean democracy 
This is the Parliament building in Grenada 
government. The aim here has been to 
satisfy concerns about the possible domi­
nation of larger neighbours by allowing 
some diversity in the governmental 
system, without undermining the wider 
unity of the state. Thus, for example, the 
constitution of 'The Federation of St 
Christopher and Nevis' specifically guar­
antees the rights of the smaller island. 
This kind of solution has not been 
possible throughout the Caribbean, how­
ever, and as a result, the region now 
contains most of the world's remaining 
dependent territories — small islands 
where the leeway which comes from being 
a 'remnant of empire', thousands of miles 
distant from a largely disinterested met­
ropolitan power, is preferred to any ofthe 
alternatives. 
Personality politics 
A further aspect of politics in the 
Caribbean area which deserves a brief 
mention is the importance of individual 
political personalities. Although, as in the 
UK, party systems are well-entrenched, 
the political dynamics of small jurisdic­
tions are such that much greater weight 
tends to be attached to the leading 
personalities. Clearly, in the smallest 
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The Pacific - distinctive cultures and traditions 
At first sight, one might expect the governmental systems of 
the eight Pacific states in the ACP group to have quite a lot in 
common with those of the English-speaking Caribbean. The 
countries, after all, have certain important similarities — small 
populations, economies founded largely on primary com­
modities and a history of strong links with the British Crown. 
However, despite the similarities, an examination of the 
political structures of the Pacific countries reveals important 
differences which are rooted in the distinctive cultures and 
traditions ofthe region. Each ofthe island nations has its own 
characteristics and these are reflected in the way their societies 
are currently organised. It is evident, for example, that Papua-
New Guinea, with its four million inhabitants and its 
multitude of different tribes and languages, mainly of 
Melanesian origin, will be organised along different lines from 
Polynesian Tuvalu, which has fewer than 10 000 people living 
on eight tiny islands just to the west of the international date 
line. The unique pre-independence status of Vanuatu as a 
Franco-British 'condominium', had a particular effect on the 
way government evolved in that archipelago while the fact that 
Tonga was never a colony (it was a British protectorate) clearly 
influenced the system more in favour of local norms and 
institutions. Fiji, with its two main ethnic groups, is something 
ofa special case. Problems over the relationship between, and 
role of the Fijian and Indian communities respectively, have 
influenced the country's constitutional development in a very 
specific way in recent years. 
Despite the divergences within the region, the essential 
factor which differentiates it from the anglophone Caribbean 
is the strength of the pre-existing indigenous societies. The 
local populations (Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian) 
had their own institutions based on tribal or family groupings 
long before the European powers became involved in the 
Pacific and the current political systems, therefore, represent a 
synthesis of these traditions with imported political concepts 
which are mainly of British origin. 
The most obvious manifestation of western-style democracy 
is the fact that all ofthe states concerned now have universal 
adult franchise. However, the relationship between this and 
the actual wielding of political power varies from country to 
country depending on the role played by traditional insti­
tutions, hierarchies and ethnic groups in the process. In 
Tonga, for example, only nine of the 31 members of 
Parliament are elected and the role of traditional chiefs and of 
course, the King as head of state, is still very significant. In 
PNG and the Solomon Islands, the fact that the village 
(wontok) is the basic unit of society, is seen as an important 
buttress of the democratic system. In Tuvalu, all twelve 
members of the Parliament are elected by their local (island) 
communities and the Prime Minister is chosen from among 
them. In Fiji, voters are registered on four separate rolls 
(Fijians, Indians, Rotumans and others) and 37 of the 70 
members ofthe House of Representatives are elected by those 
registered on the first of these. 
In some of the Pacific states, parliamentary bodies are, 
themselves, somewhat alien transplants, representing as they 
do, the unity and expression of the modern nation state in a 
region where the family, the village or the island is likely to 
prove a far more important focus. What is interesting is that 
parliamentary politics, complete with local adaptations, have 
endured in most of the states concerned. Transfers of power 
are generally peaceful and opposition groupings can normally 
function freely. Unlike Africa, where the marriage between 
local political concepts and the Westminster model, proved an 
unhappy one, the fusion of two different political cultures in 
the Pacific has met with much less difficulty. 
states such as Dominica and St Kitts/ 
Nevis, with populations of less than 
100 000, the relationship between a poli­
tician and his or her voters is likely to be 
particularly strong, but even in the larger 
Caribbean countries, an elected rep­
resentative would find it difficult (and 
would be ill-advised) to distance himself 
too much from the voters. The con­
stituency system further reinforces the 
link between the local member and the 
particular group of voters upon whom he 
depends for his political career. 
From a democratic standpoint, this is 
obviously a good thing. The continuing 
legitimacy of representative democratic 
systems requires that they should remain 
accountable and accessible. There is a 
tendency on occasion, for politicians 
operating in larger jurisdictions to lose 
sight of these imperatives. On the other 
hand, there is the risk that too much 
emphasis on personalities and on main­
taining the support of one's own power 
base could affect the coherence of 
national political and economic object­
ives. Additionally, the apparatus which is 
designed to provide checks and balances 
against excessive or corrupt behaviour 
may function less effectively in a small 
state where a charismatic political leader 
plays a dominant role. 
In the final analysis, the success or 
failure of any country's political system 
can be gauged by its results in terms of 
economic performance and social well-
being. The results from the English-
speaking Caribbean are not uniform and 
it must be recognised that a number of 
them continue to face problems of de­
velopment and poverty. However, the 
conclusion must be that the record of 
recent decades is largely positive. 
In most ofthe countries which arc the 
subject of this article, democracy has 
worked, and in a world with an ever­
growing number of new democracies 
whose systems are currently 'on trial', this 
fact alone should be a source of en­
couragement. O 
Simon HORNER 
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Democracy and development 
Is democracy the culmination of the 
development process? If so, is it earned? 
Does it hold back development? If so, is it 
a luxury? Is it mixed with a particular 
cultural heritage? If so, is it racialist? 
A start is made on answering these 
questions below. It emerges that, if no 
analyses arc run or conditions laid down 
prior to democracy, then the appearance 
of a democratic environment generally. 
but not always, makes economic develop­
ment easier. However, different sorts of 
state systems (constitutional monarchies, 
parliamentary systems etc) have usually 
achieved this sort of development and 
dirigism (not to be confused with author­
itarianism) has helped speed up economic 
progress. And the later the economic 
take-off, the stronger the degree of state 
intervention (as in Germany, the Latin 
countries of Europe and South America, 
in contrast with Northern Europe, 
Britain etc, where the state hand was 
much lighter). 
Lastly, and especially, there is no need 
to be rich to be democratic. An aptitude 
for democracy is not a cultural privilege. 
Democratic but 
not necessarily rich 
The emergence ofa democratic system 
is not the ultimate prize of societies whose 
development has flourished. Although 
extremely poor societies have priorities 
and preferences other than democracy or 
the defence ofthe right to live, the formal 
and quantified systématisation of de­
mocratic conditionality is contestable, as 
is the democratic income threshold put at 
$ 1000 per capita just recently. The 
finding that there are more democracies 
amongst the rich is simply an image ofthe 
existing situation and an analysis ofthe 
dynamics, and causes of it in no way 
includes any economic considerations. 
Democracy in Europe also emerged at 
a time of underdevelopment. 
Britain was under-developed in this 
sense then, because people were hungry, 
child mortality was high, farm workers 
were virtual slaves to the big landowners, 
corruption was rife and so on. 
(*) Mr Gazzo is a principal administrator with the 
Directorate-General for Development at the Com­
mission of the European Communities. 
by Yves GAZZO (*) 
Prosperous Argentina, on the other 
hand, failed to ensure democracy until 
very recently, while Colombia is sticking 
to constitutional civil arrangements in 
spite of outbreaks of violence. Lastly, 
India's democracy seems to be the fruit of 
a happy marriage of complex tradition 
and relatively successful decolonisation. 
Democracy and cultural privilege 
Democracy is born of an awareness of 
the limits of dictatorship. Authoritarian­
ism (in South America, for example) 
indeed now seems to mean inevitable 
uncertainty and democracy moderate 
certainty. 
Such awareness always occurs in peri­
ods of sudden change, when social 
balance ceases to appear as the zero-sum 
game which gets the despots accepted. 
And the discovery is, in fact, that ofthe 
idea of development and the 'citizen' is 
born with it. 
However, although people are not 
fated to authoritarianism, they are not 
fated to democracy either. 
Democracy does not have to be a 
carbon copy of the European model, 
furthermore, and not because the Third 
World is more community-spirited than 
the First, or that it is totalitarian either. In 
African societies, be they Moslem or 
oriental, the concept of the individual is 
different, usually involving greater reli­
gious subjugation and powerful com­
munity constraints whereby the indi­
vidual only exists as one of the group of 
very similar members to which he or she 
happens to belong. In Europe. 16th 
century Protestantism produced Calvin's 
stifiingly totalitarian Geneva, yet 17th 
and 18th century Calvinism became one 
ofthe main springboards for our modern 
western society. 
Questions 
Is democracy earned? 
Authoritarianism may well look like an 
extremely good way of getting through 
the brutal stage of economic take-off and 
there are many examples which seem to 
back up the idea, including: 
• the Second Empire in 19th century 
France ; 
• the Franco regime in Spain, which 
changed into a speedy development 
promoter in its last stages, but still 
contained negation in the shape of the 
unsuitable dictatorship it had created ; 
• the Brazilian military and its galloping 
inflation. 
However, there are just as many 
examples ofthe opposite, including: 
• the decline of democracy in Japan, 
South America, Germany etc in the 
1930s; 
• the development" hold-up (in Salazar's 
Portugal and Vargas' Brazil in 1932-54 
and in Ethiopia, Cuba, Tanzania, Ma­
dagascar etc today). 
Is democracy a luxury? 
It may certainly seem so, since the 
world map is still dominated by author­
itarian regimes of many kinds, ranging 
from the wretchedly poor Bangladesh 
and Somalia to the industrialised nations 
of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore etc. 
It is also true that authoritarianism is 
sometimes seen as an accessory to de­
velopment. 
Some people say that the societies of 
the South need a sound dose of author­
itarianism to overcome their inertia and 
bad habits — and to withstand perverse 
seduction from us. 
Although political stability is vital, it 
would be wrong to confuse author­
itarianism and political dirigism. 
The institutional nature of regimes 
seems to have had little influence over 
development in the past. 
However (as already mentioned), the 
later the economic take-off, the greater 
the state intervention. The early indus­
trial revolutions of northern Europe took 
place outside the state, while those 
(re)launched later on in Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, Spain and Brazil 
took place with it. In cases of this kind, 
the state is still very much in evidence as 
overseer, regardless of how far the coun­
tries may be from the democratic ideal, as 
in the Third World, for example, Côte 
d'Ivoire and Mali show. 
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The form a government takes is no 
indication of its ability to succeed econ-
omically. Brazil planned its development 
without regard for the country's (more 
authoritarian or more democratic) poli-
tical phases and democratic India has 
ensured the progress of its farming and 
industry with far more determination 
than the military governments of Pakis-
tan and Indonesia. 
In Europe and other places, democracy 
has often, but by no means exclusively, 
been a forerunner of development. Al-
though Britain's economic upheaval hap-
pened in the predemocratic framework of 
a stable parliamentary system in the 18th 
century, Germany's industrialisation oc-
curred mainly under the authoritarian 
hand of the Bismarck regime. 
Trends in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland (and the USA and Canada) 
were along the same lines as those in 
Britain, although somewhat later. 
After the revolution, economic expan-
sion in France took off again with the 
same élan under the monarchical, pro-
perty-dominated, authoritarian Second 
Empire and the parliamentary Third 
Republic and the same went for Italy, 
with a corrupt parliamentary system, the 
Mussolini dictatorship and the Republic 
after 1946. Japan modernised during the 
first 30 years of the century under the 
aegis of a regime that was parliamentary 
in appearance and then under successive 
authoritarian governments until 1945. 
Is democracy racialist? 
When the Peruvian novelist Maria 
Vargas Llosa says 'we should stop despis-
ing ourselves', he is referring to our 
lamentations about the purported de-
mocratic inability of the countries of the 
South. Our political modernisation has 
often been the outcome of some fairly 
unlovely comings and goings sandwiched 
between both more democratic and more 
dictatorial episodes. 
If we accept the idea of non-democracy 
in the developing world easily, it is by 
legitimating it in the name of tolerance. 
What we used to call primitive (dif-
ferent traditions and cultures and poor 
material conditions) is now respect for 
other people's identity. The process of 
démocratisation which recently got under 
way in various countries in fact calls for 
all our care and understanding. 
Africa, or the difficulty 
of building 
a nation-state 
There are fairly few possibilities for an 
African State. As G. Hyden put it, it is 
'hanging in the air' and for several 
reasons : 
• the relatively new concept of the 
nation-state in Africa; 
• the limitations of the unanimist idea ; 
• the fact that the real economy develops 
independently of the state. 
The nation-state — a new-
concept 
African states are very heterogeneous 
and the frontiers fail to follow either 
major geographical features or rivers. 
Contrary to what is usually thought, the 
African borders were not drawn at the 
Berlin Conference in 1886. They are the 
result of a series of negotiations in the 
field, as exploration happened, military 
expeditions went out and commercial 
interests were secured. 
However, states organised in the pre-
colonial era were genuine multi-ethnic 
federations. 
Yet when they left, the colonial powers 
declined to play the federation card to the 
benefit of these territories, aided by one 
or two countries such as Côte d'Ivoire 
and Gabon. This militated in favour of 
the dismantling of FWA and FEA, the 
collapse of the East African Federation 
and so on. 
What changed in comparison with the 
pre-colonial period was the way the states 
were administered. The functions of 
multi-ethnic states were limited to the 
central power, ensuring security and 
collecting taxes, without interfering in the 
social relations of the groups, which kept 
their own languages, laws and customs. 
The modern states, on the other hand. 
were designed along European lines and 
tried to define and impose legislation that 
was supposed to represent what the whole 
community wanted. 
The limitations of 
the unanimist approach 
The drive to build national unity where 
none existed and develop the countries 
contrived to avoid the scattered effects of 
western-style democracy, so efforts could 
be focused better — hence the unanimist 
approach in most countries, with single 
parties etc. And when the military rep-
laced politicians who were deemed to be 
unacceptable, they kept the same lan-
guage in the interests of 'national sal-
vation'. 
With embryonic trade unionism and 
the traditional aristocrats in many cases 
broken by colonisation, most African 
governments applied policies that tended 
to favour people in the towns. 
The modern African states are the fruit 
ofa foreign tradition, not the interplay of 
the various social groups, and they are to 
a very large extent foreign bodies in their 
societies. 
Despite this, some countries have made 
real progress with national unity (al-
though other countries, Chad and Sudan 
for example, are still on the brink of 
explosion) and with building a modern 
economy (exports), although, with 
famine and unsuitable policies, things are 
less encouraging on the food production 
front. 
Lastly, an increasingly large section of 
the African economies is developing free 
of state action, which illustrates the way 
African societies are responding to chan-
ging values and economic conditions. So 
the nation-state should Africanise and be 
less 'hanging in the air'. 
Although it is difficult to draw conclu-
sions on a subject which has been under 
discussion for two thousand years, the 
ideas outlined above should add to our 
thinking and the way we react to the 
questions we get from, inter alia, the 
ACPs. 
There is no doubt that their develop-
ment drive will not succeed without an 
improvement in their mastery ofthe art of 
governance — which does not necessarily 
mean western-style democracy. 
Responsible leaders, transparent use of 
public funds, the involvement of the 
people at every stage of economic, social 
and political activity and the possibility 
of them organising their own mutual 
assistance and voicing their opinions on 
development decisions which concern 
them are among the principles of the 
development charter which has still to be 
established.O Y.G. 
78 DOSSIER 
Development and the 
African political heritage 
by Stephen McCARTHY (*) 
Since the end of the Second World War, most peoples of the world have 
experienced an improvement in hitman well being. Economic and social progress 
has come to be taken for granted. Until ten years ago, the 450 million people of 
sub-Saharan Africa could have been comfortably accommodated in this 
generalisation. Africa was regarded as the least developed of all the continents, if 
not necessarily as poor as the Indian sub-continent. But with its plentiful 
resources, its unexploited geography, and supported by financial and technical 
assistance from wealthier countries, it was certainly moving in the right 
direction. 
These hopes have all been dashed. Observers now view Africa with deeper and 
deeper pessimism, socially, economically and politically. The rest of the world 
appears to be pulling away leaving that vast continent standing at the starting 
gate and increasingly handicapped by the growing weight of its own problems. 
Explanations for sub-Saharan Africa's 
performance being so much worse than 
that of other parts of the world fall into 
two groups. Some have blamed external 
circumstances, including the colonial past 
and the structure of international trade 
relations; others emphasise internal fac­
tors. 
African apologists have tended to opt 
for the external causes. The notion of 
nation states with precisely fixed geog­
raphical boundaries, each theoretically 
being in equal relationship with all the 
others, is, they would say, not part of 
African cultural and historical tradition, 
with its more organic structures of groups 
and tribes. The colonial powers" division 
of Africa completely ignored such tradi­
tions. They used geographical features, 
rivers and hills and lines of latitude and 
longitude, to divide a continent. In so 
doing they disregarded the lessons from 
their own European history, which 
showed that what makes a nation is a 
complex web of common cultural, social 
and economic interests among people 
leading to a sense that what they share in 
common is greater than their regional, 
tribal or other differences. Without such 
commonality of interests, genuine rep­
resentational government would be very 
hard to achieve. 
The costs of nation-building 
As a result, although independent 
Africa adopted the European notion of 
(*) Head of Division, European Investment Bank. 
These are edited extracts from a longer and more 
wide-ranging paper published in the ΕΙ Β paper n° 15, 
December 1990 entitled "Development stalled, the 
crisis in Africa: A personal view". They reflect solely 
the views ofthe author, and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the EIB. 
the nation state and of fixed geographical 
boundaries, an enormous and economi­
cally costly nation-building effort has 
been required to hold these nations 
together. These costs initially included 
the essential trappings of a modern 
sovereign state -- legislatures, govern­
ment machinery, foreign representation, 
independent currencies, armies — which 
the national economies, often no bigger 
than a European municipality, could ill 
afford. Later they included the abandon­
ment of political pluralism and the 
emergence of powerful over-centralised 
systems of government. 
Outsiders are more inclined to argue 
that the roots of Africa's problems are 
largely internal. Many Africans themsel­
ves would accept this but without accept­
ing that this is a simple explanation 
amenable to simple solutions. Poor 
government is both a cause of under­
development and a symptom of it. It is 
partly caused by the lack of human 
capital, the weak sense of nationhood 
discussed above, fluctuating foreign earn­
ings, inappropriate political philosophies 
and so on. In reality there is a whole web 
of interrelated factors which combine 
into inter-locking vicious circles (see 
Figure 1). 
But there are a number of patterns and 
policies which are found throughout the 
continent. These have their origins in the 
historical circumstances leading up to 
independence, in the prevailing rather 
socialist and dirigiste ideologies at the 
time, and in a general opinion, shared by 
both African governments and their 
advisers, as to what was necessary to 
cause and sustain 'development'. 
At the time that most African nations 
were being created, theorists generally 
believed that industrialisation was the 
key to economic development. This was 
partly based on the view that raw material 
prices were in long term decline. This 
implied that the situation of developing 
countries was getting steadily worse. 
They were dependent on a limited range 
of export commodities, which were sold 
at fluctuating prices on world markets 
open to distortion by the actions of richer 
countries. 
National planning of capital invest­
ment was also essential. In poor coun­
tries, capital was self evidently in short 
supply. And African countries needed a 
great deal of basic infrastructure. There 
was no choice but to coordinate such 
decisions and to plan the allocation of 
capital at a national level. Much of the 
resources for investment would have to 
come from outside the country often 
through external aid programmes. This 
again required coordination. Finally, 
since skilled manpower was short it 
seemed better to concentrate it in small 
efficient units operating at the national 
level. 
The highly centralised institutions and 
structures which were created acquired a 
momentum and political power of their 
own which has survived ever since. They 
were essentially urban, modern sector 
institutions and were favoured at the 
expense of the rural agricultural sector 
where, typically, three quarters or more 
of the population were still to be found. 
The urban population insisted on 'mod­
ern standards' and was able, by virtue of 
its geographical concentration, to exert 
far more political pressure on the govern­
ment than the more dispersed rural 
dwellers. So urban wages and salary 
levels rose, prompting in turn an ac­
celerated drift of people to the towns. 
This happened throughout the continent. 
Opportunities for corruption 
In fact the urban modern sector turned 
out to be inefficient and corrupt. With 
few market constraints on the para­
statals, and governments increasingly 
unrepresentative of the people, the cen­
tralised structures became bloated and 
rich sources of patronage. Centralised 
regulation of so many aspects of econ­
omic life offered many opportunities for 
corruption. 
Higher urban living standards were 
effectively paid for by greater taxation of 
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Checks and balances art 
the rural sector, often achieved by the 
monopsonistic marketing boards not 
paying agricultural smallholders a fair 
price for their products. Real exchange 
rates were also allowed to appreciate, 
thereby shifting the internal terms of 
trade between the rural sector which 
provided most of the export earnings, 
except in the few mineral economies, and 
the urban sector which consumed most of 
the imports. Smallholders had little 
choice but to accept this situation. They 
could sometimes smuggle exports into a 
neighbouring country, if the economic 
environment there was more favourable, 
and such informal inter-country trade 
continues on an enormous scale. They 
could also opt out of the monetary 
economy and revert to subsistence pro-
duction. Many rural people appear to 
have done so especially when national 
foreign exchange shortages became so 
acute that basic commodities were simply 
unavailable in the rural areas. 
The political system offered rural 
dwellers no countervailing political con-
trol. Although the majority of African 
states had been set up with democratic 
constitutions on European lines, in feu 
cases did the democratic element survive 
more than a few years. 
A number of forces contributed to this 
constitutional disintegration. Traditional 
structures had not necessarily been un-
democratic. But the idea, which is im-
portant in a western democracy, of a 
'loyal opposition", loyal to the state and 
the constitution but not to the govern-
ment in power, was not easily grafted 
onto this tradition. Further, as noted 
earlier, the new African nations were 
usually artificial creations bearing little 
relation to previous African geo-political 
structures, with their intermingling and 
sometimes interdependent tribal groups. 
As a result, in most countries government 
and opposition parties quickly divided 
along tribal or regional lines. Those who 
genuinely wanted to promote the new 
nation state, and no doubt many did, did 
not see how this could be achieved when 
the political parties merely seemed to 
legitimise old traditional and tribal dif-
ferences. Thus the one party state emer-
ged, attempting to internalise and bal-
ance these ancient political forces within 
a single structure. With a few exceptions, 
pluralist democracy was discarded on the 
continent. 
Checks and balances undermined 
In most countries the process rapidly 
went further. Either the single political 
party became the personal fief of a 
dictatorial President who then changed 
or corrupted the constitution to ensure 
his own survival, or the military took 
over. Moreover, once the basic checks 
and balances of the original constitution 
were undermined other safeguards 
quickly fell away. Human rights were 
eroded, freedom of speech was ab-
andoned and political dissenters were 
imprisoned. Legislative assemblies 
became rubber-stamping bodies. Ju-
diciaries lost their independence and 
stopped dispensing justice - - at least 
where affairs of slate were concerned. 
Meanwhile the traditional rural leaders 
had either been emasculated in the new 
national order or had been absorbed into 
its elite. The generally low standards of 
rural literacy and education combined 
with poor internal communications made 
it difficult for new rural leaders to 
emerge. The exclusion of the rural poor 
from the political and economic main-
stream — except in so far as they can 
continue to be induced to grow export 
crops — has meant that few resources 
have been allocated to human develop-
ment ofa basic kind — literacy, primary 
education, preventive and basic medical 
care, and nutrition. In the long term this 
perpetuates the low skill level in the 
population and more indirectly the high 
population growth rate. 
In short, the human dimension affects 
the economic outlook for Africa in a 
number of ways. First, the population 
explosion makes it necessary, like Alice, 
to run in order just to stay in the same 
place. Second, the low level of skill and 
relatively poor health of African people 
limits their productivity, their income and 
thus the rate of growth ofthe economy as 
a whole. This in turn means that fewer 
resources are available for improving 
health or educational standards. Finally, 
an ill educated population has been more 
easily manipulated by small groups seek-
ing power for themselves and effectively 
further denying resources for the rural 
poor. 
'Rural poor excluded from political and economic mainstream' 
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The African political establishment has 
been traumatised by recent calls for 
political change. Throughout the con­
tinent there has been an upswell of 
popular discontent, with demands for the 
abandonment of the one party state, the 
holding of free elections and the restor­
ation of basic human rights and free­
doms. 
Politicians have responded in different 
ways. Those with least to fear appear to 
have acquiesced and agreed to consti-
imprisonment without trial, restore free­
dom of speech and so on. 
A pattern for peaceful political change, 
albeit perhaps utopian, might be on the 
following lines. The centre, whose im­
portance has often been reinforced by 
inflows of external aid, would weaken. 
Power would flow more to small groups 
and intra-country regions whose natural 
influence and historical importance has 
been suppressed for a long time. Such 
groups and localities are likely to draw 
incomplete African statistics would sug­
gest. People may not yet have found 
technical, social or economic solutions to 
the problems which confront them each 
day, but they are undoubtedly more 
aware of the outside world and more 
open to external influences than they 
would have been even a generation ago. 
These then are reasons for optimism, 
even though political paralysis may, in 
the short term, slow the pace of economic 
reform. 
Figure 1: Vicious circles — the political, historical and human factors 
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high population 
growth 
few resources for 
human development 
tutional reform and free elections. Others 
have set themselves against change, 
making as few concessions as they can. 
They may succeed in digging in for a 
while without making any political ad­
justment. But they will be more politically 
isolated, both domestically and inter­
nationally, than hitherto. 
Raised expectations 
Although one cannot see the outcome 
of these events, something fundamental 
has clearly changed. Expectations have 
suddenly been raised, or expressed, and it 
will not be easy to put the genie back in 
the bottle. The calls for reform certainly 
go beyond just multi-party elections, 
indeed it may prove inappropriate simply 
to go back to Westminster style de­
mocracy. There will also be demands to 
reform the judicial system, abandon 
strength from their own traditions. The 
overlay of western institutions and values 
might begin to be discarded and replaced 
by increasingly confident African sol­
utions for African problems, not neces­
sarily less representative than what went 
before. 
The earlier analysis suggested that 
decentralisation of power and democratic 
advancement in some form or another 
can be expected to encourage economic 
and social progress over the medium 
term. A return to a more organic local 
and tribal political structure should 
encourage local economic decision 
making, more likely to reflect the needs 
and interests of rural people. 
There are indeed signs and hints that 
rural communities and economies are 
much more alive than unreliable and 
The alternative to peaceful political 
change and economic reform is much 
more sombre. Civil war, such as has now 
been continuing in the Horn of Africa for 
many years, but can also be found on a 
smaller scale throughout the continent, 
may lead to national disintegration in a 
number of countries followed by econ­
omic and political anarchy. 
So far as the rest of the world is 
concerned, the failure of aid to raise living 
standards is widely, if still quietly, ac­
knowledged. Western countries, par­
ticularly European ones, will view present 
developments in Africa with some trepid­
ation. The continent, having once been 
brought into the ambit of the global 
economy and polity, initially through 
colonisation, cannot now simply be 
ignored.o S.M. 
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Some thoughts on governance 
and démocratisation 
by F.J. van HOEK (*) 
'Governance' is now widely recog­
nised, by all concerned with achieving 
sustainable development, as an import­
ant issue that can no longer be neglected. 
Recent shifts within the international 
political arena, notably, the changes in 
Eastern Europe, as well as political 
changes in various ACP countries (the 
cold war finally receding from Africa, the 
movement towards, and demands for, 
multi-party systems in various ACP 
States), have reinforced discussion on this 
topic. However, it is not only the political 
context which has contributed to the 
emergence of this debate on governance. 
The recognition that sustainable develop­
ment and a more equitable distribution of 
income have not occurred in most ACP 
States has also played a part. The crisis in 
governance is, therefore, now considered 
to have been one of the main impedi­
ments to sustainable development and as 
a result figures high on the development 
agenda. 
The debate on governance has been 
characterised at first by a political conno­
tation. It is now generally recognised that 
in many developing countries, particul­
arly — but not exclusively — in Africa, 
factors such as extensive personalisation 
of power and widespread corruption 
resulted in a situation where government 
and its organs have only served the 
interests of a few, while fundamental 
freedoms and human rights were denied 
to many. Hence, the crisis can, in part at 
least, be attributed to the lack of a 
countervailing power and the pervasive 
lack of institutions of democracy. Discus­
sions about political reform have stressed 
the need to bridge the gap between state 
and civil society; to create the necessary 
social and political space for popular 
participation in the development process ; 
to nurture 'institutional pluralism' in 
government and civil society. This in turn 
(*) Director General. European Centre for De­
velopment Policy Management (Maastricht. Nether­
lands). The opinions he expresses in this paper are 
entireh his own and not those oí the Centre. 
explains the recent internal and external 
pressures for the introduction of the 
processes of démocratisation. 
Beyond the political context within 
which the crisis of governance can be 
explained, lie the very fragile systems of 
governance. Historically, alien models of 
governance were introduced during and 
after independence and these resulted in 
institutions managing the development 
process which were more often not 
originally designed for this function and 
thus were ill-adapted to local political, 
social and cultural conditions. Moreover, 
external factors such as donor interven­
tions, have also had their effects on the 
performance of these institutions e.g. 
through the setting-up of project-related 
parallel administrations, the introduction 
of new institutions and organisations that 
operate either within or outside the realm 
of government, and the traditional ap­
proach to technical assistance favouring, 
as it did, full-time long term assignment 
of expatriate personnel in executive 
positions. 
The issue of governance is complex; 
definitions vary widely and one cannot 
easily disaggregate the various notions. 
Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to 
distinguish between what could be called 
'politico-administrative' aspects of 
governance and the economic aspects 
although in practice they are interwined. 
As Richard Joseph indicates in his article 
on 'African Governance in the 1990s', 
economic governance embraces the prac­
tices of decision-making and implemen­
tation in the economic realm, i.e. matters 
that affect directly public investment and 
expenditure as well as the use of available 
resources in both the private and the 
public sectors. Hence, economic govern­
ance embraces such issues as price, fiscal 
and exchange rate policies, protection­
ism, subsidies, market liberalisation, the 
role ofthe state as an economic agent and 
as facilitator for the blossoming of an 
efficient and competitive private sector 
etc. The political dimension of govern­
ance refers to the prevailing political 
system, the structure of government, 
general constitutional provisions (includ­
ing those referring to an independent 
judiciary), the nature of the electoral 
system, the relation between state and 
civil society (including the question of 
human rights as well as what is now 
commonly called 'participatory govern­
ment'). 
The seminar on Governance and Insti­
tutional Development in sub-Saharan 
Africa ('). organised by the European 
Centre for Development Policy Manage­
ment (ECDPM) in March 1990, identi­
fied several issues as being of critical 
importance to governance, such as: the 
level of political stability; the role ofthe 
state in development and how this role 
can be operationalised; the endogenous 
institutional capacity for policy formu­
lation and implementation and the 
'checks and balances' necessary to ensure 
transparency of policy formulation and 
implementation as well as accountability 
at both political and administrative 
levels. 
For the purpose of achieving its man­
date, ECDPM has formulated the follow­
ing outline of what governance connotes : 
Governance is taken to refer to political 
and institutional aspects of the capacity 
ofa government to ensure law and order, 
formulate and implement policy, and 
create an enabling environment for de­
velopment. This capacity comprises the 
organisational structures, human re­
sources and management systems, which 
constitute the machinery of government, 
and is influenced by societal norms. 
Governance is associated with trans­
parency and accountability of public 
management and embraces the totality of 
institutions related to governing a mod­
ern state. 
The greater part of ECDPM's present 
work-programme is of direct relevance to 
the enhancement of governance capacity 
as described above. This holds true for 
programmes like the Sous-Espace 
Céréalier in the Sahel, which aims at 
improved cereals marketing systems at 
national level and policy harmonisation 
at regional level; the issue of how to 
ensure more efficient policy formulation 
and implementation through improved 
mechanisms dealing with sectoral inter-
(') Ref. 'Governance and Institutional Develop­
ment', J. Corkerey and J. Bossuyt, (Eds.), European 
Centre for Development Policy Management. Occa­
sional paper, Maastricht 1990. 
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linkages in the OECS region; and the 
various issues dealt with under the 
programmes 'Public Sector Manage­
ment/Private Sector Development' and 
'New Avenues for Technical Cooper­
ation'. Thus, ECDPM is clearly involved 
in a range of aspects of governance. 
Because of its mandate, its primary focus 
is on the institutional aspects of adminis­
trative and politico-administrative 
governance. 
In this period where démocratisation 
forms a major subject of discussion in 
many ACP countries, a new area that 
could be explored in the area of govern­
ance could be that of ways and means to 
improve the process of interaction be­
tween the several organisations that 
might be regarded as stakeholders in the 
policy process. In this context it would be 
useful to explore the interplay between 
the state and representative professional 
and other occupational organisations; 
the institutional arrangements needed for 
effective interplay in policy-making, im­
plementation and monitoring. 
An analysis of this kind could focus on 
the kinds of institutions and processes 
that can lead to a genuine policy dialogue. 
It may help identify a framework within 
which organisations such as universities, 
trade unions, women's organisations, 
chambers of commerce and cooperatives, 
an independent judiciary, the press and 
other media would actively participate in 
improving development policy formu­
lation and implementation. Such a dia­
logue would be part ofa systematic effort 
to build a pluralistic institutional infra­
structure. This, in turn, would contribute 
to improved governance, by encouraging 
greater transparency and accountability 
through more intensive popular particip­
ation. Transparency in the policy process 
and accountability within a government 
system can be the result ofthe checks and 
balances that stem from a participatory 
system. A central issue in development 
and governance, this synergy can only be 
achieved if both are supported by the 
appropriate institutions which, in turn, 
require the political will to make them 
work. 
The analysis would have to take stock 
of the existing relevant organisations in 
order to know how they operate, what 
their institutional and human capacity is 
and how they exercise their influence vis-
à-vis the central government. 
What is central in this analysis is the 
channels through which these organis-
Market women in the Republic of Benin 
'Discussions about political reform have stressed the need to bridge the gap between 
state and civil society ; to create the necessary social and political space for popular 
participation in the development process'. 
ations interact, and the ways in which 
they can improve the process of policy­
making and implementation. The power-
base of these organisations and the way in 
which they can operate and contribute to 
an effective management of the economy 
evidently constitute parameters for 
'governance'. 
As has been said, démocratisation is 
one of the main topics of discussion in 
relation to developing countries. It fea­
tures in discussions within these countries 
as well as between them and the donor 
community. Its advancement is often an 
element of conditionality. Most, if not all, 
of the discussion centres on the political 
aspects of systems of government. These 
can be both sensitive issues for the 
countries concerned and difficult areas in 
which to effect real change in the short 
term. 
Any system to foster and give effect to 
popular participation in the process of 
government will need to take account of 
the characteristics of the local socio-
cultural environment. Many developing 
countries need to be able to accom­
modate within their boundaries ethnic, 
religious and other groups which may 
differ widely and deeply from each other. 
Today, however, most of the developing 
countries have models of government 
that have their origin in the industrialised 
world. There the environment, with its 
generally more educated populations and 
greater and more widespread systems of 
checks and balances, is so different as to 
raise questions concerning the relevance 
ofthe models. In addition, the continued 
effectiveness of some of these models is, 
today, under scrutiny in some indus­
trialised countries. Consideration of the 
question of démocratisation from the 
perspective of the right and power of the 
governed to participate in and influence 
the formulation of policy would be less 
sensitive. A focus on the institutional 
rather than the political dimensions of 
démocratisation could lead to the pro­
duction of more effective mechanisms for 
consultation and communication be­
tween the central government and the 
several sectors and interest groups in the 
population. It would thus facilitate the 
achievement of a policy articulation and 
formulation process which would be 
perceived to be more equitable whatever 
the political system. 
Understanding of what the elements of 
a system to achieve popular participation 
in this context are, would be a contri­
bution to the evolution of a genuinely 
indigenous structure of government and a 
governance system to complement it. O 
F.J. van H. 
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Transition to democracy 
is there a model? 
A few years ago, Milton Friedman, the 
well-known American economist, used to 
justify his contact with General Pino­
chet's Chile by saying he still hoped to see 
a right-wing dictatorship veer towards 
democracy - - something his critics, 
regular visitors to the Eastern bloc, could 
not, he maintained, legitimately enter­
tain, such was the entrenched nature of 
the Communist regimes. But since Gor­
bachev and the dismantling of the Berlin 
Wall, things have changed and no author­
itarian regime is likely to survive the fever 
of democracy that has taken hold of the 
people. 
Black Africa, long deprived of de­
mocratic debate, is no exception. Coun­
tries from one end of the continent to the 
other are following each other down the 
path to change — and, curiously enough, 
the French-speaking and Portuguese-
speaking nations seem more affected than 
the English-speakers. (Could it be be­
cause the hitter's freedom was less con­
strained?) 
But how does a switch from a military 
or single-party system to a democratic, 
multi-party system based on freedom of 
the press and economic liberalism 
happen ? Political events in recent months 
suggest that there are two main scenarios, 
with variations — a gentle move Benin-
style with a national conference or Côte 
d'ivoire-style without one, or violent 
change, with a bloodbath, as in Mali. 
But there is an exception to every rule 
and, in this case, it is the Cape Verdean 
model which does not really fit into either 
category. This really is a peaceful dé­
mocratisation process and, in contrast 
with almost all others, not the result of 
pressure from the street. In February 
1990, with neither strike nor demonst­
ration to prompt it. the Cape Verdean 
Government looked at Eastern Europe 
and decided to go for political pluralism. 
It intended this to take the opposition by 
storm, it is true. but. contrary to all 
predictions, the newly created People's 
Democratic Movement (MPD) got twice 
as many seats in the January 1991 
elections as the former single party, the 
African Independence Party of Cape 
Verde (PAICV). 
A month later, it was the turn of 
outgoing President Aristide Pereira, 
former leader of the PAICV, who was 
beaten by pro-change Antonio Mascar­
enhas Monteiro. The nation, deprived of 
free elections since independence in 1975, 
calmly demonstrated that there was 
nothing incongruous about democracy in 
Africa. And it was soon to be followed by 
another Portuguese-speaking nation -
Sao Tome & Principe, where things were 
even more conducive to change since the 
outgoing President decided not to stand 
again. 
A national conference 
These two Portuguese-speaking 
nations are not typical, however, for 
democracy in their case came about when 
the 'prince' was suddenly converted, 
unprompted and certainly without any 
economic triggering, to the virtues of 
pluralism. The Cape Verdean economy, 
which had developed consistently since 
independence, was far from being a 
disaster. 
Benin, on the other hand, is more 
typical of what happened in Africa -
which is no doubt why its particular 
model so quickly became the one to copy 
at any price. With the economy in ruins 
after 17 years of a 'Laxist-Beninisf 
system (a reference to the official Marx­
ist-Leninist doctrine) and the country 
paralysed by a civil service strike. Pre­
sident Kérékou decided to find a solution 
by calling representatives from across the 
political spectrum to a meeting — the 
famous national conference, which Af­
rican oppositions across the continent 
were to call for in their own countries and 
which laid down the various stages of, 
and guidelines, for the démocratisation 
process and appointed people to run the 
country during the transitional period 
(see report on Benin elsewhere in this 
issue). 
After Benin. Gabon and Congo ran 
national conferences. Niger, Togo, Mali 
and Zaire are preparing theirs and more 
and more people in Cameroon, Chad and 
Madagascar are calling for one in their 
countries too. 
Côte d'Ivoire managed to move over 
from a single party to complete pluralism 
without one. After months of student-
worker agitation against a background of 
economic crisis. President Houphouet-
Boigny decided to disregard his much-
advertised antipathy for multi-party sys­
tems, authorise all parties which wanted 
to become legal and hold free elections — 
without any change to the constitution, 
which had in fact always catered for such 
an eventuality. 
Democracy and development 
However, his opposite number in Mali, 
Moussa Traoré, could not bring himself 
to free the country's political life from the 
monopoly of his own party, the De­
mocratic Union of the Malian People, 
and turned a deaf ear to the opposition's 
oft-repeated requests. He had no com­
punction about opening fire on unarmed 
demonstrators, killing hundreds and 
wounding nearly a thousand more, until a 
group of soldiers joined the civil oppo­
sition, removed him and immediately 
started the move to democracy. 
This is the only example of bloodshed 
in the démocratisation process so far if 
you do not take into account countries 
such as Ethiopia where there was an 
armed struggle. There has been loss of life 
during demonstrations in some places 
(Cameroon and Togo spring to mind), 
but Mali is the only country where so 
many victims have fallen to democracy -
but is it really democracy yet? 
It is early days. What is clear is that 
there are promising beginnings all over 
the continent. The void has been replaced 
by a surfeit of political parties, with the 
international press reporting new titles 
every day, and the trade unions, long-
muzzled, are able to function as they 
should. But the economic crisis is there, 
cramping the style ofthe new regimes in 
their drive to meet the aspirations of an 
increasingly impatient people. 
Ultimately, the future of the democ­
ratic process depends on the success of 
economic recovery programmes. For, as 
former French Cooperation Minister 
Jacques Pelletier used to say: 'there may 
be no development without democracy, 
but there is no democracy without de­
velopment either'. : A.T. 
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Travellers' rights 
by Gilles FONTAINE (*) 
There are overloaded lorries all along 
the roads and tracks, of course, but I 
remember being truly amazed one day at 
a wood truck with only one shock 
absorber, if that, and its rear end practi­
cally scraping along the ground. 
My travelling companion felt that a 
short lecture on micro-economics was in 
order: Overloaded? But, my good man, 
that's the African profit margin' more 
pith than truth, perhaps, but a snappy 
little formula which I have heard trotted 
out many times since. 
Sorry. Is anything the matter? Yes, I 
did know this edition of The Courier was 
supposed to be on human rights and not 
road transport... which is why we are 
going to replace the wood with people. 
And with people, the overloading-
equals-operator's-profit is still there, but 
instead of dead wood, we now have lack 
of comfort, loss of time and, most 
important, loss of life. Anyone who has 
witnessed a bush taxi accident knows just 
what I mean and that snappy little 
formula we used just now soon has a 
bitter taste to it. 
Are we really all that way from Article 
3 ofthe Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights? (**) 
Let us briefly return to the shock 
absorbers. 
There are those sensitive souls and 
they easily come to terms with rudimen­
tary bush taxis because they never have to 
go in one — who can be moved to tears by 
ageing suspension and worn out motors 
kept going by amazing little craftsmen. 
But infinitely rarer are those who arc 
moved (to tears or not) by the roads, 
although roads are the main victims of all 
this overloading. 
When you ask the uninitiated why nice 
tarred roads (often financed by the EDF) 
which are supposed to last 20 years have 
to be redone at least every 10, they tend to 
think it is poor maintenance — which is 
where they are wrong. Overloading is the 
biggest cause of speedy deterioration of 
tarred roads and this way of making a 
profit has put half the roads in sub-
Saharan Africa out of commission and 
meant a quarter need urgent maintenance 
to head off rapid decline. 
A quick look at the figures shows that 
this would take enormous investments... 
but who will find the money if there is 
every likelihood of it going up in smoke 
again? And what sort of future is there 
for the whole road network anyway when 
there are hardly any funds for upkeep? 
This transport non-policy is leading 
straight up a blind alley. Everyone knows 
how important roads are — as a local 
chief once told me so elegantly, without 
roads, the wilds will return to the wilds. 
So it is economically and technically 
vital to stop operators overloading their 
vehicles, otherwise towns will not get 
their supplies, imports will go up and 
exports will be further penalised. The 
immediate question, of course, is how. 
And the immediate answer is by control­
ling axle weight. 
At this stage in the proceedings, it 
would be as well to take a break for some 
exercise, just long enough for lots of 
(*) Principal Administrator, Directorate General 
for Development. EEC, 200, rue de la Loi, B-1049 
Brussels. 
(**) Every individual has the right to life, liberty 
and safety. 
Bush taxi in Madagascar 
The effects of overloading always occur 
to road-users and drivers later on. Many 
people see checks on it as police 
harassment rather than a useful 
precaution 
people to raise their arms to the skies, 
drop them with long, fatalistic sighs and 
say: 'Don't you realise that's never 
worked in Africa?' -- meaning that it 
never will work either. 
But let us leave the perpetual cry of 
'that's Africa' to those who despair of 
everything and listen instead to those who 
believe that protecting the roads, that 
dying species, is a major challenge that 
has to be picked up. 
Dream a bit, of course, and you soon 
come to the idea that turning the roads 
into a controlled area, one of law and 
therefore of freedom, could be an even 
more exciting challenge than might be 
imagined. 
Just think. Given all the necessary 
financing there could be a body of 
properly paid officials running proper 
controls instead of today's systematically 
illegal levies on the way in and out ofthe 
villages. And just suppose that overload­
ing declined as a result. Where would the 
profit margin be if fares were not put up? 
Therein lies the big risk of failure. So 
we have to create this area of law and do 
away with all the predators holding 
operators and passengers to ransom 
along the way. What a saving in time and 
money that would be! Perhaps fares 
would not need to go up after all. 
Am I dreaming? Of course I am and so 
is everyone else interested in human 
rights. 
I should like to end with something I 
saw during the great drought of 1985 
when there was a terrible shortage of 
trucks to unblock the ports where food 
aid was being unloaded. 
The first reflex was to ask for inter­
national aid to provide a fleet of extra 
trucks, a request it would obviously have 
taken months to meet. But a miracle 
happened, because the number of trucks 
available to shift goods out ofthe port of 
Lomé doubled in just a few days. All it 
took was a cut in the transport time to the 
coast by doing away with all the pointless 
pseudo-controls and speeding up the 
customs formalities. It was no dream and 
it really could not have been called 
expensive. 
So what is wrong with high-speed bush 
taxis — HSBT — and, say, Air-Ziguin-
chor or Air-Bonkoukou doing direct 
flights with none of those pointless 
stopovers?o G.F. 
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Children in the Sahel learn to 
protect the environment 
We know why the desert is advancing 
in the Sahel. We have known for years. 
One of the reasons is the hazards of 
climate or, to put it more simply, the 
successive periods of drought over the 
past 15 years. But it is not the only one. 
The main reason, perhaps, is the destruc­
tion of the natural environment by man 
himself, for whenever a tree is burned as 
firewood, 90% of the heat generated is 
lost and whenever the edge of a well is 
neglected and whenever a bucket of water 
is wasted, the desert takes over a few more 
square metres of land. 
The problem is that it takes time for 
cause to have effect and there is no 
obvious link at all between man's act of 
prédation and the damage which this 
actually wreaks on the environment. So 
environmental protection is very much a 
matter of awareness and education and, 
some say, of creating a proper ecological 
reflex in man, something which has to be 
done in childhood, before bad and 
environmentally harmful habits become 
ingrained. 
This finally brings one to the school­
children of the Sahel, who are both to 
benefit from and be involved in an 
environmental training and information 
programme which the European Com­
munity is running in the nine member 
states of the CILSS (the Permanent Inter-
State Committee on Drought Control in 
the Sahel), i.e. in Senegal. Mauritania, 
Gambia, Cape Verde, Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Niger. Guinea Bissau and Chad. 
Sixty schools in these countries have 
been chosen to teach their pupils a new 
way of living in their natural environment 
and a new way of life that is in harmony 
with the world around them. 
In the following interview, Bartolomé 
Amai, head of the training schemes 
technical group at the European Com­
mission, explains the background to the 
scheme and how it will work. 
► Mr Amat, can you tell us first what is 
behind the project ? 
- The nine members of CILSS first 
called for an environmental training and 
information programme at the Lomé III 
regional fund programming meeting in 
Cape Verde, when they made combatting 
'... a new way of living in their natural environment and a new way of life that is in 
harmony with the world around them' 
of desertification their main aim. It was to 
be achieved in three ways — by providing 
training in environmental matters and 
environmental protection, by using gas 
instead of firewood and by bringing in 
solar water pumps. It was our job to 
investigate the first of these and come up 
with a training programme and, after 
discussion and reflexion, we began defin­
ing targets and subjects. We decided to 
start with an in-depth scheme for schools, 
although we knew that many youngsters 
did not attend and that we could not 
reach the population as a whole through 
the children alone. Target number one 
was to change the children's outlook, 
attitudes and behaviour towards the 
environment and the surroundings in 
which they lived. 
► But is understanding the environ-
ment really something you can teach from 
books like other subjects in the classroom ? 
- We are going to concentrate on just a 
few schools and ask the children and the 
teachers there to go out and look at what 
is around them. We are going to get them 
to look at the changes that have taken 
place and get them to use their observ­
ations to think about why the natural 
environment is deteriorating. Inductive 
teaching, we call it. It goes from the 
particular to the general. The Freinct 
method which has spread over France 
and produced excellent results there, is 
the inspiration behind it. but it is not very 
well known in Africa. Teachers haven't 
been trained to use it and it takes a lot of 
effort to put into practice. 
► So the first thing is to train the 
teachers, is it ? 
- That's right. Train the teachers, 
change their outlook as well and ask them 
to do more, because there is more to it 
than dishing out work in class. They have 
to go outside the classroom and cope with 
children asking questions they can't 
answer. They will have to do research of 
their own to give pupils answers to any 
questions which they haven't studied 
themselves and which aren't covered by 
the ordinary textbooks. 
► So you are going to run seminars and 
courses for teachers... ? 
- That's right. In each of the countries, 
we have set up an institutional apparatus 
around a project leader, who is assisted 
by national teaching teams and people 
from universities and institutions who 
can also help with the teaching. Then 
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there is a national steering committee of 
representatives from the various minis­
tries — of Education and Agriculture and 
the Environment, if there is one — to 
guide the training programmes, while the 
project leader runs teacher training semi­
nars, with the help of local teaching 
teams. 
► The programme only gets to the 
children, doesn 't it ? But it is usually adults, 
the parents, who are responsible for the 
deterioration of the environment. Do the 
designers of the project expect the children 
to tell people around them, especially their 
families, what they have learnt? 
- This is indeed what we hope will 
happen, because, in Africa, teaching 
schoolchildren cannot be dissociated 
from informing parents. Parents associ­
ations in these countries of the Sahel are 
very active. They are very involved in the 
life of the school and you cannot bring in 
a new subject or an extra-curricular 
activity without the parents being told 
about it. So they are bound to keep tabs 
on what their children learn. The idea of 
African children teaching their parents 
obviously does not come into it. 
► Your programme will only reach 
children who go to school, something which 
by no means all African youngsters do. The 
project has been given ECU 10 million, 
CFAF 3.5 billion that is to say, for nine 
countries to share over a number of years, 
which is really very little, bearing in mind 
the targets, and only a few thousand 
children at most will be able to benefit. Will 
that be more than a drop of water in the 
Sahara ? 
— We could go for a national inform­
ation campaign, but we would lose out on 
intensity. The other option was an in-
depth scheme for a restricted number of 
schools and that is what we decided on. 
We think that, afterwards, the idea can be 
spread by osmosis and that it will catch 
on. Above all, we set a lot of store by 
exchanges between schools and by visits 
lo demonstrate what particular schools 
have done and others can be persuaded to 
do. 
► So it will start with a few schools and 
then these schools will teach others, is that 
right ? 
- That is correct. Don't forget that by 
starting small, with 20 schools in each 
country, we shall have reached at least 
65 000 children by the end of three years. 
That really isn't bad. It's quite a large 
number, in fact, and it is bound to have an 
influence on the social environment in 
which they live. 
► How far are you with the actual 
implementation of the project ? 
-The project began in 1990 with the 
installation of the project leader and the 
whole institutional set-up. Now, a year 
on, we have the first teacher training 
sessions and we hope to start practical 
activities in the schools during 1991. This 
means for the moment discovery, analysis 
and reflexion for the children. Practical 
soil protection and nursery creating 
activities will come later. This year, we 
will be showing the children that the 
environment has changed, but that the 
important thing to change is man's 
behaviour. 
► But active teaching methods mean 
using knowledge and putting what you have 
learnt into practice... 
— That's right! So we are asking each 
school to devise small schemes and they 
will have small, autonomous budgets of 
their own to run so they can buy 
equipment or spend what they need to 
carry out the activities they themselves 
have devised. 
► The project is a three year one, isn 't 
it ? Is that enough ? 
— By no means. Educationally speaking, 
three years is a very short time. The 
project set-up year was time lost as far as 
teaching is concerned. We opted for three 
years because the funds available under 
Lomé III were limited, but we are already 
preparing an application for the meeting 
of ministers in Bamako soon for new 
schemes to be programmed under Lomé 
IV so that we can extend the programme 
to five years. O 
Interview by Jean TANGUY 
free lance journalist 
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Freedom and the film industry 
in Africa 
by William N'DIAYE (*) 
The idea of freedom in African 
societies differs with the tribal group and 
its socio-economic activity, the various 
phases in the group's history and the 
degree of intercultural relations experien­
ced with the French, English or Por­
tuguese colonials. 
One thing is constant in this com­
partmentalised world, however, and that 
is that the individual does not exist 
outside the group. The life of the com­
munity is organised in such a way as to 
create social cohesion and respecting 
custom and usage means bowing to a 
whole series of obligations with the 
abiding principle that the group must 
adhere to the general consensus. So the 
view of freedom is a common one and in 
no way an evil for the group. The ability 
to know and be able to do things are 
linked and in the hands of the holders of 
knowledge. 
The influence of Islam and Christianity 
created a new system of constraints 
alongside the traditional one still thriving 
in the area between savannah and forest. 
Colonisation brought Africa a network 
of towns and the towns, a new pheno­
menon, drew in the rural populations, 
cutting them off from their villages, their 
traditions and their culture. This exodus, 
a favourite subject with the African 
cinema, was already a kind of journey of 
initiation in search of greater indepen­
dence and liberty, for there was no 
demanding village patriarch in the town 
and it had an air of freedom as a result. 
But it was pseudo-freedom and, when 
other constraints ofa modern kind, ofthe 
consumer society where everything had 
to be paid for, made themselves felt, it 
very soon emerged as relative. Financial 
alienation was a leitmotif of African films 
and economic freedom was seen as 
synonymous with freedom itself. 
Independence brought upheavals, with 
the new states managing their freedom in 
such a way as to create social, cultural, 
economic and political upheaval. 
(*) Senegalese in-service trainee with the unit 
'Europe in the world: development* DG X (Inform­
ation) of the European Commission. 
The psychological shock of traditional 
culture meeting modern culture reflected 
a series of criteria which are hard to 
identify with the notion of freedom, 
varying as they do from one period to the 
next, and this conflict was reflected by the 
African cinema, which saw itself as a 
means of political awareness and socio-
cultural liberation. 
Africa-sur-Seine film-makers 
In the collective imagination of young 
Africans, the West in general and Paris in 
particular stand for freedom in all its 
forms — a Mecca where life is full. 
African filmmakers were among the first 
to fall victim to this dream and there is 
nothing surprising about the fact that the 
first Africa-sur-Seine film — the title says 
it all — was made in Paris by a group of 
young Senegalese under the direction of 
Paulin Vieyra. It was the beginning of a 
fantastic adventure for the African film 
trade... 
Instead of the freedom they so much 
desired, they found incomprehension. 
lack of communication and rejection. 
The extent ofthe ensuing disappointment 
is reflected in the many films on the 
subject -- J.P. Ngassa's 'Aventure en 
France' in 1962, T.M.Manga's 'Mon 
stage à Paris' in 1968 and D. Ecaré's 'A 
nous deux France' in 1970, to name but a 
few. 
The problem of first choosing between 
and then balancing tradition and mod­
ernity troubled most film-makers and 
was a constant feature of their works 
from then on. 
Back to 'the roots' 
Most of them went home to Africa and 
threw themselves into the cinema of truth 
and discovery (Bachy), aware ofthe role 
which film could play in societies of oral 
tradition seeking freedom in their lives. 
Helped by what they had lived 
through, they looked around and gained 
inspiration from experience of the com­
plexities ofthe conflict between tradition, 
with its strength and its (often highly 
repressive) archaism, and modernity, 
with its extraversion and its progressive-
ness. Where freedom stood in the conflict 
between neocolonialism and autonom­
ous development was also to be a concern 
of these African film-makers, who were 
inspired by Jean Rouch and went for the 
cinema of truth from the outset. 
The establishment of military or single-
party regimes in the new states led to the 
emergence of an elite company of rich, 
intellectual leaders who were quick to 
dissociate themselves from the poor and 
mostly illiterate masses who knew no­
thing about either modern legislation or 
their rights - - clear social inequality 
which left its mark on the cinema. 
The African cinema saw its aim as 
primarily social. Film-makers, like folk-
singers, had to be the people's conscience. 
In a changing world, films were a means 
of building a picture of African culture 
and identity and a mirror constantly 
reflecting the society of which they were 
an expression. They were also a way of 
making people aware of things through 
illustration and by freeing men, women 
and children from alienating or repressive 
forces of an endogenous or exogenous, 
traditional or modern kind. 
The African film-maker 
as medium 
Ferid Boughédir, the Tunisian critic 
and film-maker, who created the out­
standing 'Halfaouine', sees live great 
trends reflecting the different motivations 
of film-makers in the Negro-African 
cinema. These trends are political, cul­
tural, moralistic, navel-contemplating 
and commercial and they sometimes 
intermingle. 
Every film-maker has an innate sense 
of vision and sees reality with greater 
depth and acuity because of it. He is free 
to choose how to transmit his perception 
of African realities to the public — or his 
people, as he prefers to call his audience 
- and say where he stands vis-à-vis the 
movements of his society. His main aim is 
to make the spectator aware of his socio-
cultural environment and to sharpen his 
emergent political maturity so he can 
reclaim the freedom taken from him and 
better his condition. 
The prime aim ofthe film-maker here is 
to decondition the audience whose free­
dom has been taken away by a flood of 
images from elsewhere. African films, 
long neglected by the countries of their 
continent and, thanks to the big Euro­
pean and American multinationals, 
absent from African screens, have long 
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Scenes from the film 'Finye' by Souleymane Cissé 
been in the trough of the wave, tossed 
about amidst jetsam from the West— all 
those American 'B' films and Indian 
melodramas and karate films. And, often 
unable to take the vital step backwards 
from this screened reality, they live at 
second-hand the imaginary reality in-
spired by the hero, who thereby becomes 
a symbol, a link of projection and 
identification for the audience in the 
reality of the story which is foreign to 
him. This absence of freedom of choice is 
full of import when it comes to shaping 
the spectators' taste and reactions. So the 
viewer of African films must get used to 
this through quality pictures which are 
both instructive and based on an African 
language and African aesthetics which 
are accessible to the masses and yet offer 
them the pleasure of viewing. This is vital 
if viewers are to be won over and 
educated and their loyalty ensured. 
So the viewer has to be culturally freed 
and held up to question in a new social 
and economic context. 
English-speaking and Portuguese-
speaking African films are different. In 
Nigeria, the cinema is more or less bound 
to the Yoruba tradition and is therefore 
entertainment for the unthinking who 
want an easy time of it (V. Bachy). Ola 
Balogun alone makes committed pic-
tures. And, given the civil war, all films in 
Mozambique and Angola are nationalis-
tic broadsheets of a sort. 
A kind of awakening 
The first wave of western films de-
scribed above - - navel-contemplating, 
perhaps, in that they are the work of 
people who are anxious to free themselves 
from existential anguish related to their 
sense of being uprooted and who, most 
importantly, have an account to settle 
with the West — was followed by rapid 
denunciation of colonial and neo-col-
onial oppression, economic poverty, 
social inequality and cultural alienation. 
This kind of — in a way — subversion 
launched by some film-makers hit home 
with the African masses and certainly had 
something to do with the general wave of 
contestation throughout Africa today 
aimed at obtaining greater freedom and 
democracy. 
The first important film made in 
Africa. Ousmane Sembène's 'Borom 
Saret' ( 1962), denounces social inequality 
in African towns where the centre is 
reserved for the local bourgeoisie and the 
In his film 'Finye', Souleymane Cissé 
opposes the political establishment and 
traditional values 
masses are relegated to the suburbs, uses 
the folk-singer to speak out against social 
parasitism and invites the viewer to a 
revision of this alienating custom. The 
antagonism between different social 
classes with diverging interests is a feature 
of almost all Sembène's films. In 'Xoala', 
for example, he plainly criticises the 'class 
of politico-businessmen and their under-
hand dealings with the people in power', 
to use his own words, and screenings of 
the picture in Senegal have involved 
cutting all the sequences deemed com-
promising for the authorities. 
Madagascar's Benoît Ramampy used 
'Accident' as a way of speaking out 
against his country's marked social in-
equality and the alienating role of money. 
'Baara', the work of Malian 
Souleymane Cissé, was the first African 
film to show the condition ofthe worker, 
his exploitation by the bourgeoisie and 
the perverse effect of money. 
The wind of change 
Some film-makers encourage the spec-
tator to be aware ofthe struggle required 
to change the existing powers and insti-
tutions. 
Souleymane Cissé's 'Finyè' was in 
some way a premonition here. Designed 
in complete freedom, the picture is a 
profound reflexion on temporal and 
spiritual power, in which Cissé contrasts 
political power and traditional values. In 
it, an old man. the incarnation of Africa's 
spiritual heritage, fights the military 
government's repression of the students. 
When his spiritual power fails, he burns 
his sacred garment, thereby symbolically 
freeing himself from tradition, and joins 
the student demonstration shouting: 
'You are the future'. This picture does not 
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have the didactic quality of so many films 
dealing with the contrast between old and 
new and the viewer is free to draw his own 
conclusions from what he sees. 
Less than 10 years after 'Finyè' (it 
means 'the wind') came out, a student 
demonstration which claimed freedom so 
far ungranted won the support of both a 
people aspiring to democracy and the 
regular army, which led to the overthrow 
of Moussa Traoré's dictatorial régime. So 
perhaps the picture helped speed up the 
people's awakening. 
Okioh's 'Ironu', is a virulent denunci­
ation of the corruption and misbehaviour 
of the political regime in his country 
(Benin), although the picture is set in an 
imaginary country, where the hero pre­
fers torture and death to compromise and 
loss of dignity. 
'Lettre paysanne', the work of Sen­
egal's Safi Faye, an ethnologist by train­
ing and the only African to film fiction, is 
in the same vein. This is a peasant/ 
government controversy over a single 
groundnut crop which is grown for 
export (without any economic benefit to 
the peasants) and hampers the develop­
ment of the millet crop which is of more 
benefit to the grower. The subversive 
nature ofthe shots and the story-line have 
resulted in this film being banned in 
Senegal. Films and freedom are not 
always compatible in Africa. 
The cinema not only complained about 
the absence of political freedom. It also 
denounced attacks on human rights by 
stigmatising the bad treatment meted out 
to 'rebels' who fight for their rights and 
glorify anti-colonial resistance. 
Sembène's 'Camp de Thiaroye' is a 
denunciation of French troops' massacre 
of Senegalese soldiers claiming the same 
rights as their French counterparts and it 
was banned in France, as was Barabé of 
Niger's 'Si les cavaliers...'. 'Un ano de 
independencia', the work ofthe Mozam-
bican pioneer Fernando Silva, points an 
accusing finger at the deeds and misdeeds 
of Portugal in its former colonies of 
Africa. Ruy Guerra's 'Mueda. souvenir 
et massacre' (1979) is a similar denunci­
ation of the Portuguese army's massacre 
of 600 freedom-seeking peasants. 
Sembène's 'Ceddo' hits out at the 
cultural traumatism ofthe people and the 
political implications ofthe sudden intro­
duction of Islam to Senegal, praises the 
resistance ofthe ceddo. who are free men. 
and suggests revolt through the heroine. 
who kills the Great Imam, the Head of 
State, at the end of the picture. 
'Sarraounia', the work of Med Hondo 
(Mauritius), along similar lines, invites 
the audience to identify and project onto 
the queen, the symbol of anti-colonial 
resistance and reunification of the peo­
ples of Africa. 
In Ola Balogun's 'Cry Freedom', it is 
the British colonials who are at logger­
heads with the guerillas (led by men keen 
on freedom and independence). 
Evolutive freedom 
The evolutive aspect of freedom and 
tradition is apparent in a number of 
pictures whose producers have decided to 
bring the audience a debate on civilis­
ation. They seem concerned with lo­
cation-conflict and how to handle it and 
the audience is invited to reflect on this. 
Far be it from them to recommend a 
blind return to source, for theirs is an 
objective view of tradition, which capital­
ises on the positive aspects and complains 
about the retrograde and oppressive 
sides. 
'Tilai' deals with the problem of 
freedom in traditional society. In it, a 
young man goes back to his village, after 
several years away, in the hope of finding 
and marrying his fiancée, but, to his great 
surprise, he finds that his father has 
married her instead, against her will, as 
traditionally he was entitled to do. 
Should the young couple resign themsel­
ves to this as tradition demands? 
Possibly, but they free themselves from 
their shackles and go against the op­
pressive custom and the audience is left to 
draw its own conclusions. 
'Muna moto', by Dikongue Pipa (Ca­
meroon) is an original script looking at 
how to reconcile freedom and respect for 
tradition. 
Both 'Kodou' by A.Samb (Senegal) 
and 'Médecin de Gafiré' by M. Diop 
(Niger) discuss the meeting between 
traditional and western medicine, empha­
sising the limitations of each, but without 
suggesting any answers, so the audience is 
free to draw its own conclusions. The 
freedom of the film-maker and the 
audience also means mutual respect for 
free will. 
Keeping a promise made according to 
tradition is the subject of the last film of 
O. Ganda, the pioneer from Niger, who 
suggested that today's politicians might 
get inspiration from 'L'exilé' (1980). 
The ban on marriages between high-
caste nobles and lowcast folksingers is 
presented as an aberration by a number 
of film-makers, especially Ivorian K.L. 
Fadika in his 'Djelli'. In 'Julu'. King-
Ampaw, the Ghanaian, sets a young 
technician against his father, a traditional 
dignitary, who refuses to allow a well to 
be sunk although it would have been 
beneficial to the whole village and, most 
important, would have removed the need 
for women to walk several kilometers a 
day to fetch water. 
D. Diop Mambetty, the Senegalese 
film-maker, portrays the distress and 
anguish of young Africans caught be­
tween two cultures in 'Tsuki Bouki', in 
which various levels clash violently to 
reflect the mental image ofthe protagon­
ists. Theirs is an existentialist dilemma. 
They hesitate between staying in the 
town, that place of both freedom and 
perversion, going back to their villages, 
where they can revive their cultural 
resources but be deprived of freedom, 
and going to France, that symbol of total 
freedom where everything is good. They 
opt for the middle way — staying in town. 
Women's lib 
Polygamy, emancipation, culture 
shock and a clash of values are at the very 
heart of the women's liberation issue in 
the African cinema and there are plenty 
of films to illustrate the aberrations of 
marriage and the dowry system. D. 
Kamea (Cameroon) uses farcical and 
comic techniques, those genuinely Af­
rican approaches, to get across this 
message in the manner of the traditional 
folksinger in 'Pousse Pousse" and 'Notre 
fille'. Sarah Maldow gives a vehement 
glorification of the Angolan liberation 
movement through the heroine of 'Sam-
bizanga' and Safi Faye has a vitriolic 
portrait of the harsh conditions in which 
women are forced to live in traditional 
society in the 'Lettre paysanne - Fadjal -
Moi, ta mère' trilogy. 
Souleymane Cissé complains about lhe 
alienation of women in 'Den Muso', in 
which he has his heroine in very eloquent 
non-communication about the social 
isolation of women in Africa in general. 
Many Malian women deprived of free­
dom by tradition and religion identified 
with the heroine — hence the picture's 
great success. 
Bigamy and sexual freedom are also 
dealt with, very dramatically, in D. 
Malga's 'L'étoile noire' and D. Ecaré's 
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Scene from the film 'Yeelen' by Souleymane Cissé 
'Visages de femmes' mixes extrovert 
eroticism, incest and adultery in an over-
long love scene in its overturning of 
traditional sexual taboos, thereby posing 
the problem of the limits of freedom of 
expression. 
However, other 'city' films - V. 
N'Dabian's 'Le cri du Muezzin' and H. 
Duparc's 'Bal poussière' — have women 
portraying perverse and ill-assimilated 
westernism. 
'Visages de femmes', again, gives us a 
new social category which has emerged in 
Abidjan — businesswomen, who run 
their own affairs and have nothing to 
envy men. 
The rights of the child 
It was not until 1990 that the Charter of 
the Rights of the Child was signed and 
brought in line with the UN's 40 funda­
mental freedoms. Children are in fact as 
badly off as women in Africa, where they 
suffer from ills as varied as illiteracy, 
juvenile delinquency and being forced to 
work at too young an age, to name but a 
few. 
Yet many African films, particularly 
short and medium-length ones (80% of 
output), denounce the deprivations and 
injustice meted out to children. CO. 
Cissoko (Mali) takes a lively approach to 
children's right to education in 'Nyaman-
thon', a short film which has won many 
awards while in 'Njangaan', M. Traoré 
(Senegal) in turn decries the idea of 
children being exploited in the name of 
religion and points up the usefulness of 
modern education. 
Senegalese Moussa Bathily's 'Tiyabu 
biru' (circumcision) rejects children's 
western education, which it sees as a loss 
of identity and dignity. 
'Falato' (the orphan), the work of 
Mali's Mohamadou Cissé, takes an op­
timistic approach to childhood. In this 
picture, an African child who has lost his 
father is not allowed to be brought up by 
his mother and has to go to his uncle 
instead. But his uncle treats him very 
badly and he ultimately runs away, finds 
his fortune in the city and ends up 
governor. 
All these films are rooted in the mental 
and imaginary universe of tradition, 
which fails to become myth in spite of it, 
and they help shape a new culture in 
which the city dimension is of increasing 
importance. 
Yet the African cinema is changing. It 
is seeking a wider public by creating its 
own language and aesthetics based on 
living language, gesture and visual ex­
pression, thereby expanding the possibi­
lities of understanding and freeing itself 
from worn-out international clichés. 
Conclusion 
The intellectual adventure couched in 
terms of a discussion of civilisation and 
culture which African films bring to their 
audiences is a window on man himself 
and on to a better understanding of self 
and the other. The importance of the 
individual's image of himself and his own 
identity makes for greater freedom of 
thought and control over the future. 
The recent wave of debate which has 
swept across Africa in the quest for 
greater freedom, justice and democracy is 
eloquent proof that socio-political ma­
turity, that prerogative ofthe intellectual 
élite which has been in power for so long, 
is now the prerogative of the masses in 
Africa too. And films of course have 
something to do with it. The espousal of 
the idea of a multi-party system in so 
many African states is a step towards 
democracy and points the way to a 
further area of freedom for the people, 
something of which the cinema is aware 
— and responsible for. 
Film-makers who wish to be involved 
must, in turn, respect the freedom of the 
spectators, ie they must take their re­
spective expectations into account, know 
how they appreciate different kinds of 
films, evaluate their new aspirations and 
understand any reluctance. 
The cinema itself has to get rid of a 
number of obstacles, such things as poor 
production and distribution policies for 
local films, narrow national markets, the 
shortage of decent regulations and all the 
political and linguistic barriers. Burkina 
Faso alone seems to have grasped the 
importance of all this. As well as running 
the two-yearly Pan-African Film Festival 
in Ougadougou (FESPACO), where 
there are more and more entries, the 
country helps its film industry and even 
coproduces foreign pictures (such as 
'Sarraounia' by Mauritian Med Hondo), 
for, as President Sankara said, 'the 
cinema is a battlefield'. Gaston Kaboré, 
the creator of 'Wend Kuuni') and Sec­
retary-General of the Pan-African Film 
Federation, deplores this and is working 
for closer collaboration between televi­
sion and the cinema. 
However, young African film-makers 
presented four films at Cannes in May 
this year, a sign that the industry's 
horizons are broadening. And in May 
again, professionals at RECIDAK 91, 
Dakar's film meeting, tabled a motion to 
ensure that freedom of expression is 
actually ensured and never held up to 
question again. 
What the Africans have to do now is go 
deep into the immense store of adven­
tures, epics, myths and legends (G. 
Hennebelle) and say what they think in 
another way, untrammelled, so they can 
play a full part in Africa's economic, 
social and cultural development — in its 
freedom, that is to say.O N. N'D. 
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Animal health and production 
in the developing world 
by Micheline NIELSEN and Jacques HARDOUIN (*) 
More and more thought is being given to closing the gap between progress in 
the developing countries' livestock sector and the means actually invested in it. 
Animal production and health researchers realise that they need inter-regional 
and international collaboration and must design strategies and mult ¡disciplinary 
research. They must also ensure that the right sort of training is available for 
young research applicants from the developing countries, but, despite frequent 
statements and suggestions to this effect, institutional brakes have largely held 
back any practical change. 
The networks 
Research networks have been set up to 
foster inter-regional and international 
collaboration, in order to forge and 
facilitate closer links between researchers 
in given fields so as to make for better use 
of infrastructure, disseminate inform­
ation and possibly train research workers 
and devise joint research strategies. More 
efficient data distribution should mean 
that duplication of effort in time and 
space can be avoided and research better 
geared to requirements. Although there is 
no point in discussing the relative merits 
of theoretical versus applied research, in 
the developing world, where there are 
vital needs to be met (Hardouin, 1989), 
actually identifying those needs is still a 
problem, and for several reasons. 
Multidisciplinarity 
This, a fairly common feature of 
development projects but much more ofa 
rarity in research projects, is absolutely 
vital when it comes to identifying needs 
and analysing the feasibility of using the 
results of research in the field. 
Multidisciplinary identification of 
needs is sometimes carried out by teams 
working on development schemes, but 
rarely by the researchers themselves. 
However, experience shows that develop­
ment and research tend to be separate, 
leading to the ludicrous and all-too-often 
passively accepted situation in which the 
(*) Dr Nielsen and Professor Hardouin are with 
the Department of Tropical Animal Production at 
the Prince Leopold Institute of Tropical Medicine. 
Antwerp. Belgium. 
needs are known only by people who have 
no access to research. It would be wiser to 
admit that development teams do applied 
research and that all too often the 
research workers do pure research. -
which is why the idea of multidiscipli­
narity absolutely has to include the skills 
of both developer and researcher if 
research is not to be purely academic. 
Research networks have their part to play 
here by combining researchers and de­
velopers and making the researchers 
shoulder their responsibilities and answer 
the developers' questions rather than 
embark upon further research into what 
may well be of only secondary interest. 
Strategies and training 
Research topics which never yield the 
ultimate answer (crossing, for example) 
and over-specific, over-repetitive subjects 
should no longer make up the majority of 
proposals (Fielding, 1987). By altering 
species, type, place, proportions in the 
ration etc, the food value of any given 
agricultural by-product can be tested ad 
infinitum and this is an example ofthe sort 
of research which involves major invest­
ments in terms of skill and equipment and 
should, in all but exceptional cases, be 
stopped. Technicians in the field should 
use existing data to find the best answer, 
calling on the advice of research staff if 
need be. Indeed, it is often better to come 
to terms with some imprecision (as to 
rates, yield and so on) but have workable 
answers to the real (sociological, econ­
omic etc) constraints. 
In the case of trypanosomiasis, genuine 
progress in combating the vector will 
probably not solve the problem in the 
short or medium term; vaccination is 
probably a dream and chemical control is 
often difficult to manage (Demey, 1987). 
A product may be tested over and over 
again and shown to be effective, but these 
results will not be of any use if the product 
is in short supply in the field or the user 
cannot afford it. The main criterion for 
selection and crossing in the indus­
trialised world is productivity and the 
developing countries have tended to 
follow suit here, all too often overlooking 
factors such as trypanosomiasis tolerance 
or the advantage of small size for high 
yield. Research comes into its own in 
investigations of the trypanosomiasis 
tolerance type, which meets a need (10 
million km
2 and 200-220 million people in 
Africa are affected), and the point of the 
work done on laboratory animals is 
proven in the actual herds. The desired 
results, i.e. the selection of trypano-
somiasis-tolerant animals in the light of 
genuinely objective criteria, should have 
a rapid, long-term effect in the field. 
There are more examples — spontaneous 
resistance to ticks thus reducing the use of 
acaricides and slowing down the appear­
ance of resistance on the part ofthe ticks 
(de Castro, 1990) and resistance to worms 
rather than worm resistance to anthel­
mintics etc. Results obtained in Australia 
show the well-foundedness of research of 
this kind. The crossing of bulls and zebus 
has produced animals with stronger 
resistance to ticks and satisfactory pro­
ductivity and selection has led to a sheep 
population 80% more worm resistant 
than the original population -- some­
thing which meant accepting new selec­
tion criteria. 
However, even with what seems like 
the right research topic, the techniques 
and general approach are often mis­
guided and generate results that are 
unacceptable outside the research sta­
tions — which if they are in the develop­
ing countries, tend to be a very long way 
from the realities of the terrain. So 
feasibility controls of the results in the 
ecological, sociological and economic 
conditions of the field should be an 
integral part of the research when full-
scale application is out of the question. 
Training is fundamental here and it is 
reasonable to ask about the point of 
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training future researchers in the indus-
trialised world when they are going to 
have to cope with conditions in the 
developing countries. What is the point of 
a Visna-Maedi specialist who knows 
nothing about contagious ecthyma? 
What is the point of a specialist who 
studies productivity in the light of rations 
of concentrate, that are anyway un-
obtainable on the market, but knows 
nothing about molasses and urea? What 
is the point of a specialist who goes for 
double and treble lambs at all costs 
without realising that they will often have 
little chance of survival in a traditional 
village environment? Triangular cooper-
ation is obviously useful to research 
training (Hardouin, 1989), with, say, 
institute A in the developing world 
sending a research trainee to be super-
vised at institute Β in the industrialised 
world and the student then continuing his 
or her training with a research project at 
institute C in the developing world, free 
from the routine and constraints of the 
original institute A. 
Researchers should think more in 
terms of development and remember 
some of the questions raised (and men-
tioned by Fielding, 1987) in the context of 
the work on small ruminants. Would 
there be any consequences, for example, 
if research into small ruminants stopped? 
Would the owners of sheep and goats see 
a difference? Research integrated into the 
environment which is supposed to benefit 
from it should be part of the training of 
future researchers. When designing ex-
perimental protocols in national and 
regional strategics, students should learn 
to put priority on the objective outcome 
of their work in the field and on real 
future needs. Indeed, developers faced 
with problems do not have time to wait 
for answers and they have to cope with a 
degree of imprecision which increases 
when they look at the future. But re-
searchers rarely have the 'futuristic' 
vision which would enable them to look 
at the long and the medium term. Very 
few of them were working on sheep and 
goats in the late 1970s, when research into 
this particular category of animals was 
deemed to be pointless, and the same was 
true of research into the farming of game 
animals, long considered utopie, while 
the use of draft animals was thought to be 
outmoded. This failure to look ahead 
should be handled by proper training in 
institutes with real science policies that 
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Fences on a research station. Practical 
innovation tends to be the work of 
developers rather than researchers 
are open both to the future and to 
practical realities in the field. Practical 
innovations are usually the work of 
developers, not researchers, as resear-
chers are rarely under pressure to solve 
problems immediately. They, alas, have 
other pressures, as they have to publish 
when they start their careers, with pro-
motion depending on the number of 
articles they produce, and the point of 
research becomes publication rather than 
results, research topics being chosen in 
haste and not for their pertinence. The 
potential number- of publications and, 
therefore, the speed with which 'results' 
i.e. column inches in research journals, 
can be obtained are major criteria when it 
comes to choosing topics and the quality 
of the results is now only of secondary 
importance. So the responsibility of the 
authorities in charge of promoting re-
search staff in the industrialised and 
developing world alike is enormous, 
because an assessment of scientific worth 
must be more than a mere page count. 
Conclusions 
Research should no longer be allowed 
to continue if similar work has already 
been done elsewhere, if the results are ofa 
predictable order or if there is no clear 
idea of the effect in the field. 
Priority must be given to topics which 
combine economic, sociological and ecol-
ogical factors and aim to produce global, 
long-term solutions. 
The results of applications in the field 
should be an integral part of any publi-
cation. Research stations should be an 
additional tool of research in the field and 
no longer just institutions geared ulti-
mately to nothing more than self-per-
petuation. 
None of this can be achieved unless 
research is seen as a service for developers 
and breeders — which means that de-
velopers and researchers have to col-
laborate closely at every level, identifying 
problems. organising experimental 
protocols, analysing results in the field 
and identifying strategies together. It 
would also be wise to envisage the 
possibility of research staff sharing their 
time between the research stations and 
the producers, as this would keep them 
close to the grass roots and enable them 
to do extension work, run full-scale 
applications of results obtained on sta-
tion and make observation a part of 
everyday practice (Nielsen, 1982).O 
Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA). "de Rietkampen'. Galvanistraat 9, 6716 AE Ede 
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I have just received No 125 of The Courier (January-
February 1991 ) and was very interested in what it had to 
say. I am writing to you about two of the articles in 
particular— Scientific publishing in Africa (page 48) and 
The European integration process : lessons for Africa (page 
50). 
On the first of these, scientific publishing, it is worth 
pointing out that although Africa has sound intellectual 
potential after 30 years of socio-political independence, 
there are various impediments to its scientific and technical 
development. They include the passiveness and inability of 
African scientists, who all too often forget science once they 
embark on politics, a lack of will and, most important, 
governments' tendency to stifle initiative with dictatorial 
policies, so, even where scientific publications exist, they 
represent practically nothing. Scientists and students 
therefore have to wake up to the part they have to play in the 
intellectual development of Africa... and they have to start 
by triggering the Africans' scientific initiative. 
On the second subject, African integration, I should like 
to say that Africa is the continent where national economies 
develop in the greatest isolation. There are many reasons 
for this, both inside and outside the continent. For example, 
governments have not yet realised — or indeed refuse to 
realise — that it will take EEC-style economic integration 
to secure for Africa a sound economic future. Official sub-
regional bodies (such as Ό DE AC and ECO WAS) are not 
as effective as they might be. Yet unofficial trading takes 
place between people living along all the frontiers of Africa, 
and if governments wanted to make a start on integration, 
all they need to do is make this official. Economic 
integration should ultimately also have political aims, 
because free political movement and the unification of legal 
systems must go hand in hand with the free movement of 
capital, goods and individuals. All this seems out of reach in 
Africa, where everyone who takes power justifies it for his 
tribe or family. 
Isidore Ondoki, Kiev, USSR 
Demography and development 
In issue No 123, I read an article on demography 
containing one or two alarming statistics. This has 
prompted me to write to you with some observations about 
this science. 
Two indicators are always quoted for economic and social 
development - rate of economic growth and rate of 
population growth — but the most important measure of 
economic and social development to my mind is per capita 
GDP. The majority of the developing countries have had 
negative economic growth rates over the past few years, 
while their populations have gone on expanding and this 
does not add up to proper economic and social development. 
The two rates need at least to match each other if the well-
being of the people is to be assured. 
More striking is the fact that all the financing is focused 
on maintaining economic growth — but without tackling 
the population explosion alongside. This is a big mistake for 
developing nations and donors alike, because all the 
material and financial means channelled into economic 
growth will bring nothing but failure unless some of them go 
into slowing down demographic growth. 
Here are one or two examples. 
1. Where can the developing countries find the means of 
creating 38 million jobs by the year 2025 when some of them 
have the threat of famine to cope with ? 
2. Can the developing countries provide housing for an 
urban population expanding at the rate of 3.6% p.a. —four 
times faster than in the developed world and 60% faster 
than in the rural areas ? 
3. Can Africa feed a population which will expand from 
the present 648 million to 1581 million without also trying 
to stop it going that far, because grain production has 
declined in 25 of the 43 countries of Africa for which the 
FAO has figures for the period ¡979-81 and 1986-87? 
4. How can sub-Saharan Africa reduce poverty with C DP 
growing at a projected rate of 3.7% annually in the 1990s, 
while its demographic growth is 3-4% p.a.? 
If the donors want to help the developing countries 
achieve sound economic and social development, they have 
to see that these countries can improve their economic and 
social growth rates and bring down their rate of population 
expansion. 
Djibo Bahoba, Niamey, Niger 
94 Sight Savers 
The interesting article by Chris Mclvor in your November-
December issue entitled 'A new approach to the disabled in Africa' 
describes what is not such a new approach, asfar as Sight Savers 
(The Royal Commonwealth Society for the Blind) is concerned. 
For many years, this organisation has supported projects which 
take treatment to where it is needed, particularly in rural areas. 
Mobile eye units, of which there are several in Zimbabwe, 
undertake primary eye care and refer more complex cases to 
clinics. A programme supporting itinerant teachers in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Malawi —jointly funded by the EEC — enables 
blind children to be taught in their local schools instead of being 
segregated in an institution. Permanently blind people are trained 
to redevelop their ski/Is or acquire new ones so that they can live 
fuller, more productive lives within their own communities. This 
includes 'rehabilitation assistants' as described by Mr Mclvor. 
This is not to criticise what he wrote. Indeed, Sight Savers fully 
support the opinion he quotes : 'Our final aim throughout the globe 
is to allow the disabled and handicapped to become a part ofthe 
community rather than a section outside it '. It is just that this has 
been this organisation's philosophy for quite a long time. 
Andrew Walker, Haywards Heath, West Sussex, UK 
Environmental issues neglected 
It is with great interest and high regard that I usually read 'The 
Courier'. I find il indispensable for anybody who is involved in 
official development assistance, and have recommended it to many 
offices here in the Philippines. 
I was, however, disappointed with your latest Dossier on Roads 
(Issue no. 125j. I found the topic to have been treated in a rather 
old-fashioned way. I am missing, specifically, the following 
points: 
— Could it be that the EC is unaware of the huge amounts of 
taxpayers ' money wasted on useless roads. Your editing simply 
assumes that roads and trade are good (sometimes gods.') in their 
own right. A considerable amount of recent research does not 
prove this positivistic viewpoint. 
— Increasingly, roads and other infrastructure projects have 
resulted in greater rural militarisation. This aspect alone, which 
often limits public acceptance, deserves closer scrutiny. Also 
lacking in the Dossier is the question of public participation in the 
road planning process. 
— As an environmental consultant, I am especially concerned 
about the non-treatment of the environmental effects of road 
construction, ¡n other issues of 'The Courier', and in other 
publications, the EC is highly vocal about environmental 
quest ions. Roads have long been recognised as a major contributor 
to problems in this area. 
Given the large amount of EC assistance flowing into this 
sector, one wonders why the Courier has come up with such a 
shallow treatment ? 
Dr Stefan Cramer, Calbayog City, Philippines 
Cornish now extinct 
77¡e article entitled 'Europe's regional or minority languages' 
( The Courier no. 122) was of great interest, ¡note it mentions that 
'Cornish is spoken in Cornwall'. However, I believe that it is more 
accurate to say that the language is now extinct. Although a few 
words of Cornish origin are still used in local English, Cornish as a 
spoken tongue died out in the eighteenth century. 
Richard Roberts-Miller, Dorking, Surrey 
Why no Nigeria? 
I have been a regular reader of the Courier since I first 
subscribed in February 1988 (Issue no. 108). As a student of 
Educational Management/Economics at the University oflbadan, 
I have found a number of your dossiers particularly useful. Your 
Country Reports are also fascinating and educational enabling us 
to learn about lesser known countries on the globe. Please keep it 
up. 
But why have you failed to cover Nigeria, the giant of Africa, in 
your Country Reports? Since I became a regular reader of the 
magazine, Nigeria has not been featured. 
Olu Adesola Famade, Abeokuta, Nigeria 
Ed. We endeavour to organise our Country Reports so as to 
ensure coverage of as many ACP States as possible, in what may 
be loosely described as a 'rolling programme'. There may of 
course be special circumstances which justify our covering a 
country at a particular time or which prevent us from preparing 
a report which would otherwise be due. 
With six issues of the Courier a year, and 69 ACP States, there 
is normally a gap of some five to six years between our reports 
on a particular country. Nigeria was the subject ofa Country 
Report in issue no. 106 (November-December 1987) and it is 
probable, therefore, that we will be featuring the 'giant of 
Africa' once again in the relatively near future. 
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Thierry de MONTBRIAL ed. 
RAMSES 91 Institut français des re­
lations internationales (IFRI), 6. rue 
Ferrus. 75014 Paris - - Published by 
Dunod — 424 pages Bfrs 1122 — 1990 
The latest RAMSES (the Annual 
World Report on the Economic System 
and Strategies) is, like previous editions, a 
topic-by-topic summary of the main 
international events, although, having 
been written in August of last year, it does 
not of course cover the consequences of 
what has been happening in the Gulf. 
Thierry de Montbrial's introduction 
starts with a maxim which Louis XIV 
included in his memoirs for the enlighten­
ment of the dauphin : 'The whole art of 
politics is making the most of short-term 
situations", and then cites two outstand­
ing personalities whose contribution to 
recent history has been immense and 
whose influence is still to be felt -
Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl. Part one of 
the book, 'Europe again', comments on 
the spectacular and far-reaching changes 
of the past 18 months and part two, 
'European competitiveness — nations 
and companies' develops a particular 
aspect of this. Part three, 'The inter­
national economy - - Europe's turn', 
looks at Europe and its place in the world 
and part four discusses the environment. 
We are given a lucid analysis of the 
economic and political collapse of com­
munism, the reunification of Germany 
and the upheavals in the Soviet empire. 
There is little about the Third World this 
time, other than some emphasis on the 
persistence of regional conflicts, nonethe­
less some of which seem to be calming 
down. 'Both Soviets and Americans are 
pulling out from Angola, Cambodia, 
Ethiopia and Afghanistan and together 
they are recommending negotiated an­
swers to fighting which they have them­
selves often kindled in the past'. The 
handling of trends in southern Africa and 
ofthe Gulf crisis of August 1990 is useful 
and there are some pertinent remarks on 
other Third World issues, in particular in 
a section on development and inter­
national cooperation in part three — the 
developing countries' total debt by the 
end of 1990. for example, was expected to 
reach $1 320 billion, in spite of improve­
ments in its financial management. The 
author quite rightly points out that the 
common term 'Third World" is less and 
less suitable for a very varied reality, 
where there are Asian nations, for ex­
ample, especially the 'four dragons', with 
quite remarkable development alongside 
African nations 'which have gone on 
declining and are in a genuinely tragic 
situation'. 
Lastly, the reader aware of the 1990s 
being a 'green' decade will be fascinated 
by part four, which deals with the 
environment, the fruits of industrialis­
ation, urbanisation, the negligence of 
mankind and demography — 'There were 
a billion people on earth in 1800. There 
were 2 billion by 1925. 5 billion by 1987 
and there will probably be more than 10 
billion by 2010'. And the reader seeking a 
synthesis of current international events 
will be drawn to the statistical annexe. 
Indeed, for anyone interested in develop­
ments on the international scene, 
RAMSES, as usual, is a must. 
Alain LACROIX 
ooo 
Edited by Jan JOOST TEUNISSEN -
Europe and Third World Debt Reduction : 
the role of the Netherlands — FON DAD 
Policy Research Centre, Noordeinde 
107a, 2514 GE The Hague. Netherlands 
- 58 pages —$5 — 1991 
This publication is the outcome of a 
Seminar organised in collaboration with 
the Interchurch Action for Latin America 
'Solidaridad' and the Catholic Organis­
ation for Joint Financing of Develop­
ment Programmes (Cebemo). 
The participants whose contributions 
are presented here are Jan P. Pronk, 
H. Johannes Witteveen. Percy S. Mistry, 
Stephany Griffith-Jones and Javier Ig-
uiniz. 
'After eight years of debt crisis man­
agement, what results have actually been 
achieved?' This is one of the critical 
questions raised by Percy S. Mistry, a 
former high official of the World Bank. 
In his contribution. Mistn discusses the 
escalating burden of official debt, i.e. 
debt owed to governments and multi­
lateral institutions like the World Bank. 
Jan P. Pronk, Minister for Develop­
ment Cooperation of the Netherlands 
expresses grave concern about the 'poli­
tical inertia' that has prevented solutions 
to the debt problem. 'Despite the Brady 
Plan, despite recent proposals to adopt an 
international strategy combining debt 
relief with investment and trade policies, 
international policy making in this field is 
paralysed'. 
H. Johannes Witteveen, former Man­
aging Director ofthe International Mo­
netary Fund, argues that current debt 
reductions under the so-called Brady 
Plan are not sufficient to restore growth 
and the creditworthiness of developing 
countries. He finds it 'a somewhat anom­
alous situation" that most European 
banks now have loan-loss provisions 
worth over 50% of their Third World 
loans, 'while in the Brady Plan, debt 
reductions of much smaller percentages 
are being proposed'. 
If developing countries cannot obtain 
adequate levels of debt reduction, inter­
national financial institutions (IFIs) like 
the World Bank should accept 'that the 
debtor unilaterally imposes a maximum 
level of debt service, jointly defined by the 
IFIs and the debtor government', says 
international financial expert Stephany 
Griffith-Jones. 
'The apparent unsustainability of cur­
rent development models promoted by 
the IMF and the World Bank gives 
reason to evaluate and seriously rethink 
development philosophies and stra­
tegies', states Javier Iguiniz, Professor of 
Economics at the Catholic University of 
Lima. 
In the concluding debate, a banker 
says: 'Banks, certainly those in Europe, 
have provisioned sufficiently large 
amounts to allow a very sizeable debt 
reduction. The question is how we can get 
things moving, I think that pressure on 
the banks will be much more effective if it 
is complemented by initiatives of govern­
ments to do something more substantial 
on the side of official debt reduction. It 
would be up to Europe to do some­
thing...'. 
OOO 
Albert SASSON: Feeding tomorrow's 
world, UNESCO/CTA 1990, Sextant 
series no. 3, 805 pp. ISBN 92-3-102083-8. 
Published by the United Nations Edu­
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organis­
ation, 7 Place de Fontenay. 75700 Paris. 
The title 'Sextant' was chosen for the 
UNESCO series of publications which 
includes this book because, by analogy 
with the navigational instrument, the 
essential purpose is 'to enable the reader 
to find his bearings in an ocean of 
sometimes complicated and often confus­
ing information'. 
'Feeding tomorrow's world' should 
help to achieve this purpose. Essentially, 
it is a 'mini-encyclopaedia' which pro­
vides a wealth ofinformation about food-
related issues. It is divided into three 
sections entitled 'Human Nutrition', 
'Production and Trade in Agricultural 
Foodstuffs' and 'Achievements and Pot­
ential International Cooperation and 
Prospects'. There can be little doubt 
about the utility ofthe book as a reference 
volume for people working in the field. 
The 'Human Nutrition' section, for 
Continued on inside huek cover 
96 NEWS ROUND-UP 
President Delors visits Senegal 
In his first official trip to an ACP 
country since assuming office, the Pre­
sident of the Commission, Jacques Delors 
visited Senegal from 30 April to 3 May. 
The purpose of the visit, on which he 
was accompanied by Vice-President and 
Commissioner for Development, Mr 
Manuel Marin, was to affirm European 
solidarity with an African continent 
facing difficult political and economic 
circumstances, in particular at a time 
when many in Africa are worried that the 
Community might be concentrating more 
of its aid effort on countries of Eastern 
Europe. 
President Delors was welcomed at 
Dakar-Yoff by the Senegalese Prime 
Minister, Habib Thiam, senior members 
of the Government and diplomatic rep­
resentatives of the Member States. 
Mr Delors, Mr Marin and a number of 
their officials later had an audience with 
President Abdou Diouf, with a number of 
Senegalese ministers in attendance. The 
discussions were continued at a dinner 
offered by the Head of State. 
The following day, President Delors 
and Vice-President Marin, accompanied 
by the Prime Minister, went to Podor in 
the north ofthe country. This is the site of 
a major rural development programme 
financed by the European Community. 
Atmosphere of warmth 
In an atmosphere of warmth, the 
President met village heads and rep­
resentatives of women who are bene­
ficiaries ofthe programme. This gave him 
the opportunity, not only to learn about 
the situation 'on the ground', but also to 
ascertain the utility of the project and to 
assess the problems still to be tackled in 
order to ensure a regular flow of produc­
tion. 
Presidents Delors and Diouf in conversation 
On 2 May, Mr Delors and Mr Marin 
had a working meeting with the Prime 
Minister and ministers with responsibility 
for issues involving cooperation with the 
Community. The talks focused largely on 
the situation in Senegal, Africa and 
Europe. 
Visit to Gorée 
The President subsequently visited the 
island of Gorée where, in the presence of 
the Mayor of Dakar, members of the 
Government and representatives of the 
Member States, he inaugurated the 'Place 
de l'Europe'. He then went on to the 
Senegalese National Assembly where he 
delivered a keynote speech on the themes 
of interdependence and solidarity (see the 
editorial at the beginning of this issue). 
On 3 May, President Delors was 
received at the 'Hôtel de Ville' of Dakar 
where the mayor presented him with the 
keys to the city. 
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SPECIAL PROGRAMME AGAINST 
FAMINE IN AFRICA 
Recognising the seriousness ofthe food 
crisis which threatens many parts of 
Africa, the Commission has adopted a 
special programme aimed at supplying, 
as speedily as possible, the cereal equi­
valent of 400 000 tonnes of food aid to the 
affected areas. Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, 
Liberia, Malawi, Angola, Mozambique, 
Mauritania and Niger will receive sup­
plies under this programme. The es­
timated overall cost is ECU 140 million. 
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EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND 
The Commission has recently decided to finance the following projects, after a 
favourable opinion from the European Development Fund Committee. 
19 March 1991 
Kenya and Ethiopia (regional project) : 
6th EDF — ECU 1.75 million (grant). 
Isiola-Moyale road study 
Cameroun: 6th EDF — ECU 10.3 
million (grant). Rural development axes : 
Saa — Ntui — Sangmelima — Bafut. 
27 March ¡99! 
Uganda: 6th EDF — ECU 685 000 
(grant). Energy supply project for the 
Hima cement works. 
Cameroun: 6th EDF — ECU 12 
million (grant). Construction of the 
Yaoundé-Ayos road. 
23 April 1991 
Trinidad and Tobago: 6th EDF — 
ECU 1 million (grant). Phase II of the 
tourism development programme. 
Solomon Islands: 6th EDF — ECU 2 
million (special loan). Honiara urban 
development project. 
Member States of the Preferential 
Trade Area (PTA) : 5th and 6th EDF — 
ECU 6.7 million [5th EDF — ECU 2.2 
million (grant), 6th EDF -- ECU 4.5 
million (grant)]. Computerisation of PTA 
customs and trade statistics. 
Tanzania and Malawi (regional pro­
ject): 6th EDF — ECU 9.1 million 
[Tanzania National Indicative Prog­
ramme — ECU 3.5 million (grant), 
Regional Cooperation — ECU 5.6 mil­
lion (grant)]. Ibanda-Uyole Road. 
Malawi: 6th EDF — ECU 3.262 
million (grant). Aid to refugees. 
2 May 1991 
Papua-New Guinea : 5th and 6th EDF 
- ECU 21.52 million [6th EDF (Sysmin) 
— ECU 18 million (special loan), 5th 
EDF — ECU 1.043 million (special loan), 
5th EDF — ECU 2.477 million (grant)]. 
Programme of road and bridge repairs. 
Sierra Leone: 6th EDF — ECU 16.8 
million (grant). Reconstruction of the 
Waterloo-Masiaka Road and repair of 
the Makeni-Fadugu section. 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger (re­
gional project): 6th EDF — ECU 18.5 
million (special loan). Rehabilitation of 
the Godomey-Bohicon road (119 km). 
Rwanda : 6th EDF — ECU 8 million 
(grant). The Kigali-Butari and Butari-
Burundi roads. 
30 May ¡991 
Ghana: 6th EDF — ECU 20 million 
(grant). Phase II of port rehabilitation. 
Kiribati: 6th EDF - - 5.7 million 
(grant). Telecommunications prog­
ramme. 
EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK 
Madagascar: ECU 180 000. The Euro­
pean Investment Bank has acquired a 
minority holding, on behalf of the Euro­
pean Community, in Financière d'Inves­
tissement ARO (FIARO), a Madagascan 
venture capital company established in 
1988. The operation, involving ECU 
180 000, has been funded from risk 
capital resources provided for under 
Lome HI. The purpose of FIARO, which 
is majority-owned by the State insurance 
company (ARO), is to take up minority 
equity participations in private com­
panies. 
Senegal: ECU 1.5 million. The Euro­
pean Investment Bank is providing a loan 
of ECU 1.5 million for improving cargo 
handling at the port of Dakar, Senegal. 
The investments comprise a forklift, 
trailers, data processing equipment, 
office space modernisation and local 
transport facilities. 
The funds from risk capital resources 
provided for under the Third Lomé 
Convention and managed by the EIB, are 
advanced in the form of a conditional 
loan for 10 years at 5% to Credit 
Lyonnais Sénégal which will on-lend the 
proceeds of the loan to Delmas Sénégal 
SA, a limited company incorporated in 
Senegal. 
ACP EMBASSIES 
Three new ACP Ambassadors, 
representing Gabon, Guinea-Bissau 
and Mauritania, have presented their 
credentials to the President of the 
Commission of the European Com­
munities. 
GABON 
Marcel Eugene Ibinga Magwangu 
(47), who is the new Ambassador of 
Gabon, has a degree in economics from 
the University of Caen (France). In his 
early career, he worked at UNESCO 
before returning to Gabon where he held 
a number of posts of responsibility in 
educational and government circles. 
During the 1980s he served a term of 
office as Director General of the Agency 
for the Safety of Aerial Navigation in 
Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA) 
based in Dakar (Senegal). On his return 
to Gabon, he was appointed Personal 
Representative ofthe Prime Minister and 
in May, 1990, he became adviser to the 
Prime Minister with responsibility for 
missions. 
Mr Marcel Eugene Ibinga Magwangu, 
the new Ambassador of Gabon 
GUINEA-BISSAU 
Mr Fali Embalo (35), who is the new 
ambassador of Guinea-Bissau is a law 
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graduate of the University of Reims 
(France). He also holds a master's degree 
in public law from the same institution. 
Prior to undertaking his tertiary studies, 
Mr Embalo was a school teacher, first in 
his own country and then in Vietnam. 
In 1983, he was appointed Head ofthe 
Secretariat of the Guinea-Bissau Min­
istry of Foreign Affairs. The following 
year, he became Head of Cabinet to the 
Foreign Minister and Permanent Sec­
retary with responsibility for cooperation 
with the five Portuguese-speaking coun­
tries of Africa. 
He has worked at the Guinea-Bissau 
Embassy in Brussels since 1986, initially 
as First Secretary and subsequently as 
Legal Affairs Adviser. 
MAURITANIA 
Mr Taki Ould Sidi (46), who is the new 
Mauritanian Ambassador, went to 
school in his native country before 
studying at the Institut des Hautes Etudes 
d'Outre-Mer in Paris. He has long ex­
perience of diplomatic posts in both 
Europe and Africa. His first ambassa­
dorial position was in Bonn (Germany) in 
1976, where he was also accredited to 
Denmark and Sweden. He subsequently 
served as his country's ambassador in 
Dakar, Madrid and Beijing as well as in 
Brussels for a short time. 
During the 1980s, Mr Sidi held minis­
terial office in the Mauritanian Govern­
ment, first as Minister of Economic and 
Physical Planning and subsequently as 
Minister for Fisheries and Marine Re­
sources. 
Mr Fali Embalo, the new Ambassador 
of Guinea-Bissau 
Mr Taki Ould Sidi, the new 
Ambassador of Mauritania 
VISITS 
Prime Minister Sacko of Mali in Brussels 
Mr Soumana Sacko, Prime Minister and Head of Government of the Republic of 
Mali, visited the Commission on 25 June 1991. He was accompanied by Squadron-
leader Souleymane Sidibe, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by Mr Amadou Mody 
Diali, Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister and Head of Mission, and also by Mr 
Mamadou Ouattara, Minister of Justice. He was received by Mr Jacques Delors, 
President of the Commission, and by Mr Manuel Marin, Vice-President of the 
Commission responsible for development cooperation and for fisheries. 
During discussions, the evolution of 
the political situation in Mali following 
the events in March was mentioned. 
President Delors and Vice-President 
Marin welcomed the progress already 
made by Mali on the way to democracy. 
Both the President and the Vice-
President of the Commission underlined 
that the European Community, which is 
one of the principal partners of that 
country as regards external aid and trade 
flows, is ready to help Mali during this 
delicate period in its history. At the 
beginning of the events in March, the 
EEC rapidly supplied emergency aid 
intended to improve medical care for the 
wounded. More recently it has financed, 
using counterpart funds, a study to 
identify the damage sustained by the 
administration and public enterprises. It 
is in the same positive spirit, they said, 
that the Commission intended to par­
ticipate in the meeting of the Friends of 
Mali scheduled to take place in Paris on 
3 July. 
King Mswati III of 
Swaziland at the Commission 
His Majesty, King Mswati III of 
Swaziland visited the Commission on 30 
May and was received by Vice-President 
Marin. The King, who is currently the 
Chairman ofthe Preferential Trade Area 
for Eastern and Southern African States 
(PTA) was accompanied by the Minister 
of Finance and the Minister of Com­
merce, Industry and Tourism of Swazi­
land, and by the Secretary General of the 
PTA. 
The objective ofthe visit was to discuss 
cooperation between the EC and the PTA 
and to take a general look at regional 
cooperation between the EC and the 
Southern African Development Coordi­
nation Conference (SADCC) member 
states and the prospects for the im­
plementation of Lomé IV. The talks also 
provided an opportunity to discuss the 
bilateral relations between the EC and the 
Kingdom of Swaziland in the framework 
of the Lomé Convention. 
During the King's visit, Swaziland's 
national dance troupe was also in Bel­
gium. In the framework of cultural 
cooperation, the troupe gave demonst­
rations in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, of Sibhaca dancing, a 
colourful mixture of powerful rythmic 
movement and humour. 
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Commission Vice-President Manuel Marin greeting His Majesty, King Mswati III 
of Swaziland during his visit to the Commission in Brussels 
Mr Marin visits 
Madagascar, Mauritius 
and the Seychelles 
Mr Manuel Marin, Commission Vice-
President with special responsibility for 
development and fisheries paid official 
visits to the three island ACP States of the 
Indian Ocean, at the end of April. The 
purpose of Mr Marin's trip was to join 
with the authorities of Madagascar, 
Mauritius and the Seychelles respectively 
in reviewing progress in cooperation 
between these countries and the EC, and 
in assessing future prospects. 
Mr Marin had talks with, among 
others. President Ratsiraka and Prime 
Minister Ramahatra of Madagascar, 
Prime Minister Jugnauth of Mauritius 
and President René of the Seychelles. 
The Commissioner was able to sign, in 
each of the countries concerned, the 
indicative programmes which had been 
drawn up covering the first five years of 
the Lomé IV Convention, the ceremonies 
having been timed to coincide with his 
visit. 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
EMERGENCY AID 
The Commission has recently 
taken the following emergency aid 
decisions. These include a number 
involving EDF funding for ACP 
States : 
AH ACPs: ECU 650 000 (27 
March 1991 — grant). 
Immediate emergency aid for prompt 
action in ACP countries. 
Malawi: ECU 650 000 (27 March 
1991 — grant). 
Immediate emergency aid for the vic­
tims of floods and landslides. 
Liberia : ECU 630 000 (25 April 
1991, 6th EDF —grant). 
The aid is intended for the 500 000 
people who are still suffering the con­
sequences of the conflict. It will be 
implemented by the International Com­
mittee ofthe Red Cross and International 
Action Against Hunger and will finance 
health and medical programmes. 
Somalia : ECU 3 million (24 April 
1991, 6th EDF —grant). 
According to available information, 
millions of victims are suffering the 
effects of the civil war which has resulted 
in the destruction of a large part of the 
country's infrastructure, the abandon­
ment of health services, a serious shortage 
of food and drinking water and the 
migration of a large number of people 
from the major towns and cities. The aid 
will be deployed by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the 
NGO, 'Hermann Gmeiner Fonds De­
utschland' in the form of medical assist­
ance programmes as well as the organis­
ation of transport for emergency and 
food aid in the areas affected. The 
Commission had already decided on 
similar emergency aid and food aid to the 
tune of ECU 5.8 million, which is being 
channelled through various NGOs. With 
this latest decision, the total aid commit­
ted to date, by the Community and its 
Member States in favour ofthe victims of 
the conflict in Somalia, has risen to 
approximately ECU 11 million. 
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Ethiopia: ECU 650 000. 
The aid, which will be deployed by 
'Médecins Sans Frontières' (Belgium) 
will consist of medical assistance pro­
grammes and emergency supplies. 
Sudanese refugees in Zaire : ECU 
300 000. 
The aid is designed to help the 15 000 
Sudanese refugees who have arrived, in 
particularly difficult conditions, in Zaire 
since March. The influx is continuing at 
between 300 and 500 a day. The aid will 
be deployed by the French and Belgian 
organisations of 'Médecines sans Fron­
tières' in the form of a medical and 
sanitation programme and temporary 
shelter facilities. 
Somalian refugees in Kenya : ECU 
435 000 (22 May 1991, grant). 
The aid will be undertaken by the Red 
Cross League, the UN High Com­
missioner for Refugees and the NGO 
'CARE', and will provide basic needs. 
Bangladesh: ECU 10 million. 
This emergency humanitarian aid has 
been provided for the victims of the 
cyclone and floods in Bangladesh. Com­
munity aid will be allocated as follows: 
— ECU 2 million in emergency aid to 
cover the cost of distributing tents, 
blankets and other emergency equipment 
through the Red Crescent Society of 
Bangladesh, a number of non-govern­
mental organisations and the Commis­
sion Delegation in Dacca; 
— ECU 8 million in food aid for the 
distribution of 45 000 tonnes of wheat 
and 1500 tonnes of vegetable oil. These 
products will be mobilised largely on the 
spot, so that they can be made available 
quickly to the sectors of the population 
most seriously affected. 
Myanmar (formerly Burma) : 
ECU 70 000. 
The aid will cover a League of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies relief 
programme for 25 000 people left home­
less and destitute by a fire in the town of 
Mektila. 
Cambodia: ECU 500 000. 
The aid, which will be undertaken by 
the French and Belgian organisations of 
Médecins sans Frontières, is directed 
towards those people in Cambodia who 
are particularly affected by the intensifi­
cation of the conflict. It is aimed at 
financing medical/sanitary programmes. 
FISHERIES 
Namibia: The European Commission 
decided in April temporarily to suspend 
negotiations for the conclusion of a 
fisheries agreement between the Com­
munity and Namibia, notably in order to 
bring about the ending of illegal fishing in 
Namibian waters, and to encourage the 
EC Member State concerned to take the 
measures required to attain this objective. 
The Commission considers that the 
situation is, at present, clarified, and thus 
proposes to reopen negotiations with the 
Namibian authorities. The Commission 
has received assurances from the associ­
ation of shipowners concerned that its 
members will henceforth respect Na­
mibia's sovereignty over its territorial 
waters, and avoid all action that might 
endanger this sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the Member State con­
cerned has informed the Commission 
that it has adopted the necessary meas­
ures to discourage any further illegal 
fishing. 
The Commission hopes that the negoti­
ations will continue henceforth in a 
harmonious atmosphere, and that a 
fisheries agreement between the EC and 
Namibia will be concluded taking into 
account the interests of both parties. 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
European Political Cooperation 
The following public statements have been made recently in the framework of European 
Political Cooperation 
Somalia 
The Community and its Member 
States are following with concern, the 
development of the situation in Somalia. 
In view of the separatist tendencies of 
recent days, they reiterate their urgent 
appeal to all the parties concerned to 
maintain the territorial integrity and 
unity of the country and underline the 
urgent necessity ofa peaceful solution to 
the internal conflict, which is the only 
guarantee for cohesion and national 
stability. 
The Community and its Member 
States urge all the parties concerned to 
participate as rapidly as possible in talks 
which should deal in particular with 
political reconciliation, institutional re­
organisation and the reconstruction of 
the country. They note with interest all 
regional and international efforts to this 
end and reaffirm their willingness actively 
to support the search for a negotiated 
settlement acceptable to all the parties 
concerned. 
The Community and its Member 
States also reaffirm their commitment to 
pursue efforts to provide humanitarian 
relief to the populations affected by 
famine. They call upon all the parties 
concerned to do everything in their power 
to guarantee the efficient delivery of aid 
directed to the civilian populations. 
Ethiopia 
The Community and its Member 
States welcome the joint communiqué 
issued in London on 28 May and the 
commitments subscribed to on this occa­
sion. They reiterate their conviction that 
only a negotiated, political solution 
acceptable to all the parties will guarantee 
peace, stability, and the economic and 
social development of Ethiopia. 
The Community and its Member 
States appeal to all the parties to exercise 
restraint so as to allow a smooth trans­
ition to a democratic system. They 
support the convening of a Conference 
open to all political groups, with the 
participation of international observers, 
with a view to establishing a national 
government of transition. They hope that 
an undertaking will be given on this 
occasion to hold free elections, duly 
scrutinised, on the future organisation of 
the country and its institutions. 
The Community and its Member 
States recall the commitments to which 
they have subscribed in the framework of 
the Lomé Convention and consider that 
the economic aid to Ethiopia would be all 
the more effective if democratic insti­
tutions were rapidly established. To this 
end, they look to the provisional adminis­
tration to respect its commitments re­
garding human rights and the progressive 
démocratisation of the country. 
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The Community and its Member 
States recall their readiness to support 
any appropriate process of political 
negotiation and electoral consultation 
which will be organised. They also 
confirm their commitments to meet the 
humanitarian needs while stressing again 
the necessity to ensure free access to the 
populations benefiting from assistance. 
Western Sahara 
The Community and its Member 
States welcome the adoption by the UN 
Security Council of Resolution 690 ap­
proving the report of the UN Secretary 
General on the referendum to be held 
concerning the self-determination of the 
Saharan people. They believe this rep­
resents an important step towards a just 
and lasting settlement of the conflict in 
Western Sahara. 
They also confirm their firm support 
for the Secretary General's efforts to 
implement the final stages of his plan. 
Code of conduct for Community 
companies with subsidiaries in 
South Africa 
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
approved the tenth synthesis report on 
the application of the Code of Conduct 
for companies from the EC with sub­
sidiaries, branches or representation in 
South Africa. They decided to forward it 
to the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee of the 
European Community. 
The report covers the period from 1 
July 1988 to 30 June 1989 and analyses 
reports on the activities of 244 companies 
with more than 91 000 black employees. 
It also takes into account the annual 
report by representatives of the Twelve in 
Pretoria on the implementation of the 
Code. 
The Community and its Member 
States noted with satisfaction: 
— that a very large majority of European 
companies have resolutely adopted a 
policy of allowing their workforces to 
choose freely their representatives; 
— that objective, non-racial criteria are 
employed by all companies in determin­
ing wages and filling vacancies; 
— that the majority of companies have 
achieved total desegregation; 
— that in line with the objective of 
encouraging black businesses, an increas­
ing number of companies are members 
of, or support, local organisations es­
tablished to promote black entrep­
reneurs. 
The Community and its Member 
States are convinced that the measures 
taken by European companies to abolish 
segregation at the working place have 
substantially contributed to furthering 
their policy aimed at achieving the 
elimination of apartheid by peaceful 
means. In the expectation of the fore­
shadowed profound changes ofthe South 
African society, they reaffirm their com­
mitment to promote the full implemen­
tation of the Code of Conduct. 
COMMUNITY CITIZENS SUPPORT 
DEEPER AND WIDER UNION 
Eurobarometer poll 
In the opinion of the majority of EC 
citizens, Europe in the year 2000 will have 
a single currency, more member states 
and a common military force. These are 
some of the results of the latest EURO-
BAROMETER poll, which was carried 
out in March 1991. 
A variety of issues currently being 
debated at the Intergovernmental Con­
ferences on Political Union and Econ­
omic and Monetary Union receive a 
favourable reception from the general 
public. 
The establishment of a European 
citizenship, proposed by Spain, is con­
sidered 'a good thing' by 60% of EC 
citizens, with a particularly warm wel­
come from Spaniards (78%), Greeks and 
Italians (73%). Denmark is the only 
country with a majority not in favour of 
the idea. 
A majority of Europeans (62%) 
favours the Community being respon­
sible for a common policy in matters of 
security and defence. 
60% of EC citizens (and 54% of 
British) are supporters of a single cur­
rency replacing the different currencies of 
the Member States in five or six years' 
time. 64% think that this will be a reality 
by the year 2000. 
57% think that the Community should 
be responsible for a common foreign 
policy — a seven point increase since the 
last poll. 
The idea of creating a common Euro­
pean Central Bank, with the heads of 
national central banks on its Board of 
Directors, is accepted by 56%. 
STUDENT MOBILITY 
IN THE EC 
In 1991/92, the Commission is to 
finance 1645 Interuniversity Cooperation 
Programmes involving around 1200 
higher education institutions and 59 000 
students. Thus, the continuity of Com­
munity assistance to an increasingly 
strong network of institutions will be 
maintained and, with significant support 
at Member State level, nearly 4% of all 
EC students will be eligible for a period of 
study in another Member State under the 
ERASMUS programme. 
SINGLE CURRENCY 
On 27 June, Commission Vice-Pre­
sident Christopherson presided at the 
prize-giving ceremony of the first Euro­
pean Ecu Essay contest, organised by the 
Ecu Banking Association. 
In his speech the Vice-President de­
clared that it would be vital for Europe in 
the future world, to have a single cur­
rency. Only this, could bring the full 
benefits of the Single Market and of 
Economic and Monetary Union. A single 
currency, he averred, would be essential 
for the identity of Europe vis-à-vis the 
rest ofthe world, and only the Ecu could 
fulfil this role. 
Mr Christopherson emphasised that 
the Ecu was now a strong and stable 
currency. Its attractiveness was such that 
Norway, Sweden and Finland had de­
cided to peg their currencies to it. He 
argued that it must be reinforced, not by a 
new definition but by the reinforcement 
of convergence. The Commission there­
fore favours a freezing of the basket 
definition so that there will be no further 
modification of the currency amounts 
defining the Ecu. This will allow the Ecu 
to strengthen naturally as the appreciat­
ing currencies within it account for an 
ever-increasing share. 
The Vice-President stressed, however, 
that the strengthening of the Ecu required 
clear political commitment to its status as 
the future single currency within a reas­
onable timespan. He added that progress 
made so far in the Intergovernmental 
Conference on European Monetary 
Union was encouraging and expressed 
confidence that the Treaty amendments 
would be in place before the end of the 
year, paving the way for the Ecu as 
Europe's single currency before the end 
ofthe millenium. 
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GUYANESE MILL NEARLY TREBLES 
SHINGLE PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT 
r^TI agasar Sawh Ltd., has been pro-
I k' I ducing shingles since 1978 and is 
■■■ the only Guyanese sawmill to do 
so. By 1989 production had risen to 
2,700 bundles of shingles per month, 
mainly absorbed by the domestic mar-
ket. (A bundle is equivalent to approxi-
mately 2.3 square metres of shingles.) 
The company, which employs 200 peo-
ple, then decided to expand their shingle 
production by 5,000 bundles a month 
and to exploit export opportunities to 
the Caribbean Region and to North 
America. 
In 1990 they purchased four second-
hand mills from Canada, financed by 
Gaibank and the International Develop-
ment Bank. They requested technical 
assistance from CDI in the areas of shin-
gles plant layout and production system 
planning. CDI paid fora Canadian expert 
to make three visits of three weeks to 
Guyana. 
The construction of the new plant 
went smoothly. During the expert's first 
visit, which took place in June 1990, 
drawings were produced to make as-
sembly easier and reduce possible errors. 
The interior layout of the mill was estab-
lished with the goal of eliminating slow 
spots in the production line. Production 
flow problems in the old mill were iden-
tified. 
During the second visit in September 
adjustments were made to the speed of 
the conveyors to create an optimal flow 
for productivity before final start-up took 
place. In December all remaining ma-
chinery was put in place, shingle ma-
chines were given a test run and a main-
tenance programme was sug-
gested by the expert. He also sug-
gested the creation of a middle 
tier of management in ordei to 
free senior management to lead 
the growing company and rec-
ommended the appointment of a 
mill foreman to ensure smooth 
running of the machinery and 
systematic maintenance to mini-
mize downtime. 
Annual production at Nagasar 
Sawh Ltd., is estimated to rise 
from its present value of Ecu 0.65 
million to a value of approximately 
Ecu 1.5 million in the second year 
and approximately Ecu 1.8 mil-
lion in the third year after expan-
sion. 90% of the additional pro-
duction will be easily absorbed by 
the Caribbean Region and North 
American markets. 70 new jobs 
should be created.♦ 
The infeed conveyor and the splitter at the 
new plant. 
Cooperation with CDI 
extremely useful, 
say Portuguese. 
S
ince the Portuguese Institute of 
Foreign Trade (ICEP) signed a co-
operation agreement with CDI in 
June 1987 no less than 70 projects have 
been jointly assisted by the two organi-
zations. More than 90% of the projects 
are in Africa, with the emphasis on Portu-
guese-speaking countries, while the re-
mainder are divided equally between the 
Caribbean and Pacific ACP regions. 
The industrial sectors with the largest 
numberof assisted projects have been, in 
order of magnitude, agro-industry, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, metal 
fabrication, footwear and clothing. Many 
other industries are represented with 
fewer projects. The main types of assist-
ance have been feasibility studies 31 %, 
training 22% and technical assistance 
21 %. Assistance has also been provided 
in the areas of company evaluation, re-
habilitation, diagnostic missions, start-
up assistance and licensing agreements. 
THE BENEFITS 
The cooperation agreement hasshown 
itself to be an extremely useful instru-
ment for Portuguese companies, ac-
cording to a status report prepared in 
January 1991 by Cristina de Almeida, 
who is CDI's liaison person in ICEP. In 
listing the benefits the report cites eleven 
actual project case histories as evidence. 
By encouraging investment in the ACP 
countries the agreement enables Portu-
guese companies to regard industrial 
cooperation as a new way of transferring 
labour-intensive production to the ACP 
countries and making their products 
competitive. It permits them to promote 
their technology which, generally speak-
ing, is not ultra-sophisticated and is ex-
tremely well-adapted to the state of de-
velopment of ACP countries. 
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CDI-lNDUSTRI AL OPPORTUNITIES · JULY-AUGUST '91 · P. 1 Continued from page 1 
Equipment which needsto be replaced 
due to its low productivity by European 
market standards can be transferred as a 
form of participation in joint ventures in 
ACP countries, where it can still be used 
to manufacture competitive products. 
Portuguese companies can benefit 
from fiscal and financial incentives, spe-
cifically tax exemptions when products 
manufactured in ACP countries are ex-
ported. In some cases they are able to 
gain access to new sources of raw mate-
rials. In other cases they are able to enter 
protected markets from which they have 
previously been excluded or which have 
been uneconomical as export destinations 
due to transportation costs over great 
distances. 
Increased exports can also be a benefit 
through the expansion of existing busi-
ness or through contacts with their new 
trading partners. Taking seven concrete 
examples, ICEPshowsthatan investment 
on their part of approximately Ecu 83,000 
produced estimated exports of about 
Ecu 6 million in the form of equipment, 
raw materials, components or end 
products. From its point of view ICEP 
finds such figures encouraging. 
A final benefit for Portuguese com-
panies is the assistance provided by ICEP 
and CDI in seeking finance. The rela-
tionship between CDI and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), becoming closer 
under the fourth Lomé Convention, 
should also facilitate Portuguese firms in 
obtaining the financing they seek, says 
ICEP. And they are mindful that CDI also 
has cooperation agreements with other 
financial institutions: the Danish Invest-
ment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), 
the French Promotion and Equity Com-
pany for Economic Development 
(PROPARCO), the Geneva-based Inter-
national Finance Company for Invest-
mentsand Development in Africa (SIFIDA) 
and the German Finance Company for 
Investment in Developing Countries 
(DEG). 
CONTINUING INVESTMENT 
IN AFRICA 
In view of the benefits accruing to 
Portuguese companies from the assist-
ance given to industrial cooperation under 
the agreement, ICEP believes in con-
tinuing activity in Africa. The Institute has 
plans in Africa and believes it should be 
left to competing countries to take their 
chances in the recently opened up mar-
kets of Eastern Europe. 
At a time when there is so much talk 
of foreign investment in Portugal, ICEP 
believes it is important to realize the 
Cristina de Almeida, CDI's liaison person at ICEP. 
capacity of Portuguese firms for dynamic 
expansion in foreign countries. It also 
believes that the assistance that it pro-
vides jointly with CDI is essential to small 
and medium-sized companies and may 
well have a still greater multiplier effect 
on Portuguese exports of goods and 
services, thus achieving the Institute's 
ultimate objective. 
FUTURE STRATEGY 
Astudy ofthe "death rate" of projects 
co-financed with CDI leads ICEP to con-
clude that difficulties in obtaining fi-
nancing have been the chief obstacle to 
their coming to fruition. Without any 
doubt, the most constructive form of 
cooperation is the establishment of joint 
ventures. The Institute believes that results 
so far achieved could be considerably 
imp'oved upon with the development of 
an appropriate strategy, particularly now 
that CDI's role has been slightly modified 
under Lomé IV. 
To develop its strategy ICEP sees a 
need clearly to define its priorities. Prior-
ity markets will be: 
1) Africa, primarily the Portuguese-
speaking countries plus ECOWAS (Eco-
nomic Community of West African States) 
and the member States of SADCC 
(Southern Africa Development Coordi-
nation Conference); 
2) the Caribbean and the Pacific Re-
gions on a case by case basis. 
The priority sectors of industry, based 
on the results to date and the demand 
from Portuguese firms, will be agro-in-
dustry, metal fabrication, leather goods 
and footwear. In addition, priority will be 
given to strategic industries for priority 
countriesandindustriesforwhich equip-
ment is available for transfer to ACP 
countries as equity participation. 
Regarding the priority activities, fea-
sibility and financing studies are to be 
reinforced, technical assistance will be 
provided when export expansion and/or 
an advantageous use of technology is 
involved. Less emphasis will be placed on 
professional training which can be carried 
out by other agencies. 
Priority will be given to larger projects 
of optimum feasibility. ICEP's level of co-
financing will be maintained. It will make 
full use of CDI's assistance for smaller 
projects. It will also seek out other sources 
of financing and develop close, pains-
taking collaboration with other agencies 
involved in cooperation, banks, venture 
capital companies, et cetera.♦ 
PROMOTING COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL 
SEMINARS ON LOMÉ IV 
More than 50 industrialists attended 
each of two seminars organized by the 
Portuguese Association for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (ELO) in 
Oporto on the 4th of April and in Lisbon 
on the 5th of May. The subject of the 
seminars was financing possibilities un-
der Lomé IV. This attracted a great deal of 
attention, given the high level of interest 
displayed by Portuguese industry in in-
vestment in ACP States. (See article 
above.) 
Participants from Brussels were J-M 
Anacoreta Correia, Head of Division for 
Industrial Cooperation, Investment and 
Enterprise in the Directorate General for 
Development at the EC Commission, 
Martin Curwen, Head of Coordination 
Division, atthe European Investment Bank 
(EIB) and Fernando Matos Rosa, respon-
sible for liaison with CDI's partner or-
ganizations in the EC. 
COOPERATION WEEK IN LISBON 
Cooperation Week was organized by 
the Technical University of Lisbon during 
the second week of May. The event 
focussed on the PALOP group of 
lusophone African States which use Por-
tuguese as an official language. Portu-
guese universities work together with 
industry on technologies adapted to co-
operation. 
The event was attended by a number 
of government ministers from Portugal 
and the African lusophone States. CDI's 
Fernando Matos Rosa, together with chief 
executives and directors of several com-
panies, took part in a panel to discuss the 
experiences of Portuguese firms involved 
in ventures in African lusophone States.♦ 
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EAST AFRICA ANTENNAE HELP 
PLAN AND PROGRESS INTERVENTIONS 
"Involving antennae in project promotion in Europe adds another dimen-
sion to their knowledge of projects and the requirements of European 
investors. It gives them greater expertise in selecting well-prepared projects 
that have better prospects of implementation. " 
Ashenafi Shifferaw, CDI Antenna in Ethiopia 
B
DI's antennae in Ethiopia and Su-
dan visited Brussels in April to re-
view and select projects in their 
countries with CDI staff and to promote 
and progress them with EC firms and 
institutions in collaboration with CDI's 
industrial sector experts. 
17 ETHIOPIAN PROJECTS 
PROGRAMMED 
Seventeen out of a total of twenty-
four projects reviewed were selected for 
inclusion in the 1991 programme of in-
terventions in Ethiopia. Of these, five are 
in the food sector, ten in the manufactur-
ing and processing, one in the construc-
tion and one in the agricultural indus-
tries. Ten projects involve joint ventures, 
three training, three diagnostic and other 
studies and one travel assistance. CDI 
antenna Ashenafi Shifferaw was able to 
contribute to progressing 13 of the 
projects during his visit. 
The unique climate of Ethiopia makes 
it very suitable for the cultivation of vari-
ous plants for essential oils. In furthering 
a joint venture essential oil mill project, 
Ashenafi Shifferaw visited a French pilot 
plant operated by the National Polytech-
nic Institute of Toulouse. He also investi-
gated a low-tech straw board manufac-
turing process in the United Kingdom. 
SUDANESE PROGRAMME 
PUTS EMPHASIS ON FOOD 
AND EXPORT INDUSTRIES 
Salah H. A/Mageed, in charge of CDI 
affairs at the Sudan Development Cor-
poration, our antenna organization, re-
porting at the end of his visit, writes: 
"Five of the twelve proposed interven-
tions fall within the food sector, a top 
priority in the government programme. 
Four projects are in the mining and build-
ing materials sector. The input to GDP of 
the long-neglected mining sector could 
be very great indeed. Mining projects, 
though demanding very big investments, 
have a great added value, are export 
oriented and could be very attractive to 
EC partners. 
" Sudan is rich in animal resources and 
a leather-board tannery joint venture 
project also has good export potential. 
"The proposed programme includes 
rehabilitation of an asbestos factory, 
important since it could be the main 
supplier of asbestos pressure pipes and 
sheets for the local market. Another 
import-substitution project is a plastic 
moulding company forfridges and water 
coolers. " 
Types of assistance requested include 
three searches f or joint-venture partners, 
a search for financing and six evaluation 
and market studies. Tech-
nical assistance is pro-
grammed forthree projects 
and installation and start-
up assistance for one 
other* 
Sudanese marble being processed 
in Belgium, a joint venture between 
* Sudanese and Belgian firms. From 
left to right: Victor Brancaleoni, the 
Belgian joint venture partner: Omer 
Mohamed Abdelsalam, Economic 
Counsellor, Sudan Embassy, Brussels; 
Ashenafi Shifferaw, CDI Antenna in 
Ethiopia: Salah H. A/Mageed, CDI 
Antenna in Sudan; J-M. Delchambre, 
Head of Interventions and EC Re-
sources Division, CDI; Imad Eldin 
Hassan of the Sudanese Imtco Min-
ing & Trading Co. 
New act encourages 
investment in Sudan 
Government of Sudan policy is to use 
the resources ofthe country, especially 
in agriculture, to obtain self-reliance in 
food production, to free prices, solve 
the problems of existing industries and 
encourage investment. In June 1990 it 
approved a new investment act which 
is meant to achieve greater harmony 
and to be more effective and practical 
in the treatment of the problems facing 
new investments in Sudan. 
The act's salient features are: 
1. Equitable treatment for investors ir-
. respective of whether they are na-
tionals or expatriates or whether the 
project is private or public. 
2. Greater encouragement is, however, 
given to those investments that tend 
to utilize domestic materials, raise 
export capabilities, achieve food se-
curity, promote rural development 
and support equitable distribution of 
income. 
3. Arbitrary nationalization or confisca-
tion is forbidden. 
4. Projects shall have the following 
privileges: 
- exemption from business profits tax 
for a period, not less than five years; 
- partial or total exemption from duty 
on machinery, equipment, land, ap-
paratus, prefabricated buildings, 
generators, means of transport, spare 
parts, initial and intermediate pro-
duction inputs; 
- allocation of land necessary for 
projects; 
- duty concessions; 
- granting ofa higher credit ceiling for 
project financing; 
5. Projects shall be granted the follow-
ing facilities: 
- transfer of profits and the cost of 
financing resulting from foreign 
capital or loans, in the currency in 
which the capital or loan was im-
ported; 
- setting aside of the necessary per-
centage of export returns to meet 
the cost of foreign production Inputs 
and other financial obligations; 
- repatriation of the savings of foreign 
investors in accordance with the pre-
vailing regulations. 
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H
imbabwe possesses copper which 
is mined and locally processed into 
semi-finished products. A Zimba-
bwean company producing galvanized 
steel wire products since 1972 with an 
annual turnover of Ecu 900,000 decided 
to diversify into copper wire for the do-
mestic market and subsequently for ex-
port to the region. In order to give the 
project a solid basis, the promoter ar-
ranged supply agreements with local 
customers. 
CDI provided technical assistance in 
the following areas: selection of equip-
ment, advice on the design of a strander 
to be built by the promoter and factory 
layout. The promoter paid for the local 
costs of the visiting expert while CDI 
covered the foreign exchange costs. 
Based on the expert's advice the pro-
moter ordered equipment. Further CDI 
assistance for start-up and training is 
envisaged. 
This diversification project requires an 
additional investment of Ecu 250,000 
and will produce an additional annual 
turnover of Ecu 350,000> 
Milling local maize in Madagascar 
Q 
lour mills are normally large scale 
operations. Local African cereal 
growers are rarely able to supply 
grain in sufficient quantity to supply such 
millsand accordingly imported grain tends 
to be used, consuming scarce foreign 
currency and providing no benefit to 
local agriculture. 
Probo is a Malagasy company involved 
in cassava and coffee processing and 
other food-oriented products. It was set 
up and is run by a private entrepreneur 
and is situated in a maize-growing area. 
With the help of the African Project 
Development Facility (ADPF), a subsidi-
ary, of the World Bank, the entrepreneur 
developed a project for milling the local 
maize, of which there is an adequate 
supply. To mill the relatively small planned 
capacity of 20 tons per 24 hours he 
planned to use well-adapted equipment 
which is simple to operate and maintain. 
It also consumes little energy. 
The Agricultural Development Bank 
of Madagascar agreed to finance the 
project in principle but required that vari-
ous elements of the feasibility study be 
confirmed or elaborated. Cooperating 
with ADPF, CDI identified an appropriate 
expert and and co-financed the addi-
tional study. The study confirmed that a 
sufficient quantity of maize was available 
of acceptablequalityand price, thatthere 
was an adequate market for the mill's 
products among bakers and brewers and 
thatthechoiceof equipmentwas indeed 
suitable. 
The study enabled BTM to grant the 
financing and the project is now 
underway. 26 people will be employed at 
the mill and the project will stimulate 
maize production and benefit the local 
farming community. Adding value to lo-
cal cereals falls into the area of CDI's 
priorities and we are now assisting the 
training of a Malagasy technician in Eu-
rope. CDI will also assist start-up of the 
mill over a period of two months.♦ 
The mill under construction. 
Developing scarce tropical 
fruit products for export in 
Suriname 
B
urinarne produces large quantities 
of tropical fruit but at relatively 
high cost, so that adding value by 
producing fruit pulp and juices is not 
economically feasible. 
Since 1987 Consolidated Industries 
Corporation (CIC), a Surinamese deter-
gent manufacturer, has been developing 
a project to diversify into dried and can-
died fruits for export as a means of 
earning foreign currency. The company 
set up a fruit farming subsidiary and a 
small experimental processing facility and 
test-marketed the resulting products 
successfully in local shops. 
CDI financed a pre-feasibility study to 
investigate European marketing oppor-
tunities and the development of a can-
died and desiccated fruits production 
unit. The study confirmed that opportu-
nities existed, especially for the scarcer 
tropical fruits such as star fruit and 
Malaysian apples, which could be mar-
keted at a premium and had already 
been grown and processed successfully 
by the promoter. The study also defined 
the technical and quality control re-
quirements for a pilot plant. 
Following the pre-feasibility study the 
promoter has decided to set up the pilot 
plant, which can produce enough dried 
and candied fruit for test marketing in 
Europe. Further assistance has been ap-
proved by CDI to investigate distribution, 
packaging, price structures and profit-
ability and, according to the results, a 
bankable project for a full scale 
operation.♦ 
Adapted technology 
and technical partnership 
for fruit processor in 
Cameroon. 
0
problem of fruit processing in 
many parts of Africa is that fruit is 
not farmed in sufficiently large 
quantities to ensure an adequate con-
tinuous supply. Often the only supply is 
simply the surplus produce of kitchen 
gardens which exist primarily to feed 
their owners' families. 
Conserves M'Banga is a small 
Cameroonian enterprise which supplies 
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THE NEED TO CHANGE ATTITUDES 
TO INDUSTRY 
by Jean-Pierre Zounon 
Jean-Pierre Zounon is responsible for CDI affairs at the Central Projects 
Bureau of'the Ministry ofPlanning andStatistics, our antenna organization 
in Benin. In this article he describes some obstacles to industrial growth that 
the governments of developing countries should take into account. The 
obstacles essentially relate to the concept that governments have of 
development, of the educational system and of the nature of industry itself. 
D 
t is hard to understand today how 
governments of developing coun-
tries used to believe that agricul-
ture alone would suffice to ensure the 
economic take-off of their countries. 
Often campaigns were organized on a 
large scale to inculcate the idea among 
the people that the only solution to their 
problems was to be found in agriculture. 
Certain administrations even went so far 
as to take anti-economic and anti-social 
measures to apply their programmes 
based on this nutritional concept of de-
velopment. 
Today the international crisis, from 
which the developing countries are the 
heaviest losers, should make us think. 
Our ideas and actions have got to evolve 
not only towards democracy but towards 
the whole area of development. 
No economic model constitutes a 
panacea but the history of the evolution 
of the rich countries shows that the pace 
of development of a country depends to 
a large extent on the rate of industrializa-
tion of its economy. It is imperative for 
the poor cou ntries to begin by encourag-
ing initiative and creativity in the indus-
trial field if they really want to develop. 
The educational system in developing 
countries also constitutes a bottleneck 
to industrialization. Many criticisms have 
been voiced against a system inherited 
from the colonial period which is de-
voted to training administrators, that is 
to say employees and not employers. 
Private promoters come to create their 
own businesses more by accident than 
by vocation. The educational system in 
the countries of the third world should 
be rethought and reoriented towards the 
training of men and women capable of 
creating jobs, not only forthemselves but 
also for others. 
Some obstacles to industrialization 
have to do with the nature of industry 
itself. The activity is often thought of as 
difficult, and for good reason. Industrial 
projects demand more resources and 
dedication from the promoter. If he wants 
to succeed, an entrepreneur is obliged to 
invest all that he possesses, all his time, 
his whole body and soul. And most en-
terprises do not produce real profits until 
after years of operation. The entrepre-
neur has tö arm himself with with forti-
artisanally produced, high quality, pas-
teurized fruit juices to hotels, restau-
rants, supermarkets and other outlets. 
The entrepreneur planned to expand and 
to produce about a million litres a year of 
passion fruit, guava and pineapple juices 
with equipment specially developed in 
collaboration with the French Citrus 
Fruit Research Institute (IRFA). 
The simple, low capacity equipment 
can process different types of fruit and is 
therefore well-adapted for local condi-
tions of supply where no single fruit may 
be continuously available. 
CDI assisted in the drawing up of a 
contract in which the equipment sup-
plier became the technical partner of the 
entrepreneur. This involves short-term 
sta rt-u ρ assista nee f ol lowed by two yea rs 
of production assistance, during which 
there will be continuous communication 
between the partners and four visits of 
inspection by the equipment supplier. 
This two year programme has the full 
financial support of CDI and the French 
Caisse Centrale de Coopération 
Economique. Longer term production 
assistance is also planned. 
It is CDI's policy to encourage this type 
of partnership, which ensures the on-
going commitment of a European sup-
plier in the satisfactory performance of 
his equipment without necessarily in-
volving him ina financial joint venture.* 
tude and patience. Whateverthe reliabil-
ity of studies carried out beforehand, the 
success of a project finally depends on 
the character and the determination of 
the entrepreneur. 
All this means that people seeking to 
earn a living often prefer occupations 
such as, for example, trading or operat-
ing taxis. They do not create added value 
butthey can bring substantial short-term 
profits to the operators. It is necessary, 
therefore, to convince such entrepre-
neurs that industry may also be profitable 
as well as a more satisfying, creative and 
challenging activity for them personally 
in the longer term. 
It is undeniable that the lack of material 
and financial means annihilates the spirit 
of enterprise. But sometimes the refusal 
to undertake something is the result of 
underestimating the means at one's 
disposal. This is proved by the fact that 
those who have accumulated money by 
so called "parallel" activities, often do 
not think of investing the money in an 
industrial enterprise. 
This situation challenges the con-
science of developing country govern-
ments, which must begin to create the 
genuine bases for developing private ini-
tiative in the industrial field. People must 
be helped materially and psychologically 
to understand that industry contains no 
more risk than other kinds of activity. 
Today's educational system is inad-
equate to train people to meet the 
challenge facing countries and it must be 
improved. To do this, the planners and 
decision makers must reappraise their 
nutritional concept of development. CDI 
can play a useful role in this process of 
changing attitudes and behaviour. 
CDI welcomes contributions on themes 
relevan t to industrial development in A CP 
countries. Views expressed in such con-
tributions belong to their authors and do 
not necessarily reflect the views ofCDI. ♦ 
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goes right to the factory floor 
Industrial Opportunities is mainly devoted to providing a bi-monthly chronicle of CDI's activities. This descriptive 
article on CDI, its mission, and how it works summarizes the framework for these activities and the way it is 
adapting to the priorities set by the Fourth Lomé Convention. 
Q
een to encourage the growth of 
small and medium-sized enter-
prises, the European Community 
and the ACP States set up the Centre for 
the Development of Industry (CDI) in 
1977 under Lomé I, the first ACP-EC 
Convention. 
Although CDI isan international insti-
tution is is also a practical operational 
instrument for creating new industries in 
ACP States and improving the opera-
tions of existing ones. It subsidizes tech-
nical assistance and facilitates contacts 
between ACP and EC companies wish-
ing to form long-term partnerships. 
CDI'scontributions reducethe burden 
of pre-investment and implementation 
costs for ACP industrial projects and may 
significantly reduce risk and enhance the 
early profitability of the more marginal 
ones. 
FACILITATING 
AND LOCATING 
PROJECT FINANCE 
CDI is a facilitator. It does not itself 
provide equity or loan finance, but assists 
ACP enterprises in choosing appropriate 
EC partners and in locating sources of 
finance. It has received Ecu 60 million for 
the first five years of Lomé IV to carry out 
a wide range of free services aimed at the 
identification, promotion and imple-
mentation of projects, with a special 
emphasis on SMEs. It puts together ACP 
entrepreneurs and European suppliers of 
technology, know-how and finance. It 
helps to render feasibility studies bank-
able and to identify sources of project 
finance. 
CDI taps additional funds through 
agreements with its partner organiza-
tions in EC countries and its 
complementarity with the two main in-
stitutions of the Lomé Convention, 
namely the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) and the European Commission. 
CDI is increasingly positioning itself as 
a service organization which can speedily 
and flexibly complement the assistance 
given to industrial enterprises at local, 
regional or international level. It is also 
ready :o act as an executive agency for 
funds earmarked for industry (as techni-
cal assistance) under the bilateral aid 
programmes of EC countries. 
CDI sees itself as a dynamic link be-
tween two decentralized complemen-
tary networks. The European network 
consists of industrial firms that have 
registered with CDI and regional, national 
or private institutions that collaborate 
with it. It also incorporates financial in-
stitutions, including the European In-
vestment Bank and national development 
banks. 
The ACP network consists of CDI's 
antennae and correspondents in all ACP 
countries. Typically these are development 
banks, chambers of commerce and in-
dustry, government ministries, industrial 
promotion agencies or private consult-
ants. 
EMPHASIS ON SMEs 
The Lomé IV Convention stresses the 
need to create and develop small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) because 
of "the essential role that these enter-
prises play in the modern and informal 
sectors in building up a diversified eco-
nomic fabric and in the general devel-
opment of the ACP countries". 
Attention is drawn to the advantages 
SMEs offer for the acquisition of skills by 
ACPcountries.theuseof local manpower 
as well as other local resources and the 
transfer of appropriate technology. 
This is why the Convention requires 
CDI to give priority to SMEs. 
INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIPS 
CDI is especially committed to pro-
moting long-term cooperation between 
ACP and EC enterprises through various 
types of partnership, notably joint ven-
tures, management contracts.-marketing 
agreements, licensing, franchising and 
sub-contracting. The EC partner also 
contributes to all pre-investment studies 
and accompanying measures. 
For an ACP entrepreneur there can be 
many advantages to such partnerships, 
including the sharing of risk, long-term 
access to know-how and technology, 
possible entry to the EC partner's mar-
kets and his sources of finance. 
EC firms may be able to benefit from 
entry to new markets which might other-
wise be ciosed to them, access to local 
sources of raw materials, and additional 
finance plus fiscal and other incentives, 
through an ACP partner. They may be 
able to sub-assemble in ACP countries 
and export from them at competitive 
cost. They may also be able to make 
profitable use of know-how and equip-
ment appropriate to ACP countries, even 
if possibly obsolescent in Europe by, for 
example, contributing good second-hand 
equipment as their share of the overall 
investment in a joint venture with an ACP 
partner. 
CDI encourages EC firms to come 
forward with their own proposals for 
setting up production in ACPcountries. It 
will promote such proposals to experi-
enced ACP entrepreneurs who might 
make suitable partners. 
PROJECT IDENTIFICATION 
Some projects are identified through 
missions to ACP countries and through 
ACP field representatives or antennae 
which make up CDI's network of contacts 
in each ACP country. Other projects are 
presented to CDI directly by ACP entre-
preneurs, or may be introduced by EC 
firms or by CDI's partner organizations in 
EC or ACP countries. 
Whicheverwaya project is introduced 
to CDI, an actual request for assistance 
must be made by an ACP promoter on 
special application forms. 
If a project does not already have an 
EC partner, CDI will attempt to match it, 
where appropriate, with an EC firm which 
has expressed interest in establishing 
industrial partnerships in ACP countries. 
CDI naturally finds it more cost effi-
cient to assist enterprises in countries 
which have planned adequate technical 
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AND SERVICES 
The following are some of the main 
features of the free assistance avail-
able from CDI: 
• assessment of initial requests (ACP 
projects, EC firms' proposals); 
• searches for EC or ACP partners; 
• sponsorship of business trips to 
allow potential partners to meet; 
• diagnostic studies for the rehabili-
tation, diversification, privatization 
or expansion of existing ACP en-
terprises; 
• assistance with negotiations 
• provision of model legal texts for 
business partnerships; 
• presentation of projects to finan-
cial institutions; 
• technical advice on plant selection 
• provision of technical expertise, 
notably for start-up; 
• assistance with training; 
• evaluation of second-hand equip-
ment; 
• help with the export of ACPmanu-
factures (product upgrading, mar-
ket surveys, trade fairs, publicity 
material and so on); 
• provision of industrial information 
(technology, markets etc.) in re-
sponse to enquiries. 
CDI subsidizes the foreign exchange 
costs of its interventions along with 
enterprises and partner organizations 
in EC countries. 
and financial support for industry under 
the European Development Fund (EDF) 
indicative programmesfor Lomé IV. Plainly 
speaking, CDI will stop spreading its net 
too wide and will focus its limited re-
sources on promising branchesof industry 
and on countries where there is coherent 
support for industrialization and a 
manifest will to succeed.* 
Renewed agreement aimed at intensifying 
Greek cooperation 
□ 
new agreement aimed at increas-
ing and intensifying cooperation 
between ACP and Greek compa-
nies during Lomé IV was signed by Mr. 
N. Anastassakis, President of the Hellenic 
Organization of Small and Medium-sized 
Industries and Handicrafts (EOMMEX), 
and CDI Director Paul Frix on the 7th of 
June. It will build on the cooperation 
already achieved under the previous 
agreement between the two organiza-
tions during Lomé III. 
Together with CDI, EOMMEX will as-
sist pre-investment and implementation 
costs of Greek firms involved in industrial 
projects in ACP countries as well as the 
search for finance for these projects. At 
the signing ceremony, Mr. Anastassakis 
said that the Greek sectors of industry 
which offer most promise for coopera-
tion with ACP countries are agro-food, 
wood, leather tanning and processing, 
solar and wind energy, paper, construc-
tion materials, ceramics and textiles. 
Other meetings were held in Athens 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with 
officers in charge of cooperation matters 
in the Minister's cabinet and at an opera-
tional level, with the Minister of Industry 
and the Secretary General of his ministry, 
with the Greek member of the Committee 
on Industrial Cooperation (ClC)as well as 
with the Federation of Greek Industries, 
the Hellenic Bank for Industrial Devel-
opment, the Athens Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry, the Hellenic Export 
Organization and individual entrepre-
neurs and consultants. 
Accompanying Paul Frixfrom CDI were 
Fernando Matos-Rosa, Manager of the 
EC Cooperation Agreements Unit and 
Vana Catsica-Diamantopoulos of the EC 
Resources Division.♦ 
EOMMEX 
CLOSE ENCOUNTERS IN OUAGADOUGOU 
□ 
s part of a policy of getting closer 
to ACP States on the ground, CDI's 
Executive Board Meeting in April 
took place in Ouagadougou, capital of 
Burkina Faso and home of one of its 
members, Zama Banhoro, who is Direc-
tor of Industrial Development at the Min-
istry of Economic Promotion. 
Meeting in an ACP country gave the 
six Board members a chance to observe 
the realities ofthe develooment situation 
at first hand and to make contacts with 
local institutions. 
Another Board meeting took place in 
June in Luxembourg where the members 
had an opportunity to become acquainted 
with local development cooperation 
bodies and with the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB). An Autumn meeting 
will be held in Kenya at a date coinciding 
with the CDI Antennae Meeting of the 
East Africa Region. 
Antennae meetings are regular bi-
annual events which give Brussels staff 
and antennae the opportunity to im-
prove effectiveness by reviewing and ce-
menting their working relationship and 
resolving problems. At the same time 
antennae are able to pool ideas and 
foster links for regional cooperation 
among themselves. The Board's pres-
ence in Ouagadougou coincided with 
the West Africa Region antennae meet-
ing. 
InOuagadougoutheantennaeagreed 
unanimously on a numberof recommen-
dations for the future. They recom-
mended that the frequency of regional 
meetings be increased to once a year. 
They suggested that more use should be 
made of them as consultants, in addition 
to the preparation work they already 
carry out for the West Africa Industrial 
Forum, held every two years. Some mis-
sions, they said, do not necessarily have 
to be carried out by expatriates. 
As for the West Africa Industrial Fo-
rum, they suggested that its venue should 
rotate among the countries of the Re-
gion so that the economic benefits that 
accrue to the host country be shared. 
Flexibility in applying the minimum 
investment threshold of Ecu 200,000 to 
projects was requested, given the eco-
nomic conditions in some countries of 
the region.♦ 
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VACANCIES 
CDI (see description on pages 6 and 7) invites applications for the following vacancies in two Divisions. 
♦ RESOURCES, INTERVENTIONS 
AND EEC NETWORK DIVISION 
The Resources, Interventionsand EC Network Division plans 
and implements CDI interventions by using resources of know-
how, technology, financial engineering, etc., in the EC, in 
particular among industrial companies. 
CDI is currently looking for specialists for this division, 
capable of fulfilling the following specific tasks: 
Tasks 
Evaluation of industrial projects to be created or rehabili-
tated in ACP countries; implementation and follow-up of 
assistance operations decided by CDI; relations with industrial, 
professional and institutional operators in thefield of industrial 
cooperation and development. 
Assignments 
Successful candidates will be assigned to the following 
departments in accordance with their qualifications: 
- Department of technological resources, industrial interven-
tions, documentation and marketing; 
- Department of feasibility studies and financial engineering; 
- Department of partnership agreements and legal services; 
- Department of cooperation agreements and EC network. 
♦ PROJECTS AND ACP NETWORK DIVISION 
The main task of the Projects and ACP Network Division is 
to develop a thorough knowledge of ACP countries and 
necessary contacts with these countries to ensure that CDI can 
identify viable projects and companies and provide them with 
appropriate assistance. 
For this Division, CDI would welcome applications for the 
posts of country officers from candidates meeting the appro-
priate criteria. 
Country officer job description 
- Build up and manage a network of contacts in a group of 
ACP countries to maintain a good knowledge of the coun-
try's industrial possibilities and requirements; 
- Train and motivate local officers representing CDI within the 
network; 
- Draw up a list of priority industrial sectors in need of CDI's 
assistance and, on the basis of pre-established criteria, 
identify, evaluate and select the companies or projects to 
receive assistance from CDI; 
- Ensure that timely and appropriate assistance is provided by 
using outside resources under CDI's supervision or by using 
CDI's own resources; 
- Monitor the follow-up and overall implementation of as-
sistance provided to thegroup of countries forwhich he/she 
is in charge and draw up the relevant progress reports; 
- Report to the regional Department Head; 
- Although the place of assignment for the above positions is 
Brussels, the successful candidates will have to travel to the 
countries in question. 
• QUALIFICATIONS AND 
CONDITIONS FOR CANDIDATES 
Education and training 
University level or equivalent, with degree in industrial 
economics, engineering, economics, finance, management or 
commerce. 
Professional Experience 
Minimum of 5 years experience in an industrial enterprise, 
consultancyfirm, development bank, development institution, 
professional association, etc., preferably acquired in both EC 
and ACP member States. We refer to experience: 
• either in technical and marketing aspects in an industrial 
sector (preferably agro-industry, building materials or tex-
tiles); 
• or in the preparation, evaluation of studies, financial engi-
neering or the negotiation of partnership agreements; 
• or in relations with organizations for industrial cooperation 
or promotion. 
General terms and conditions 
• Be a national of one of the signatory States of the Lomé 
Convention (ACP-EC); 
• Contracts with possible renewal for the duration of the first 
part of the Lomé IV Convention, ending 28 February 1995. 
Frequent missions to EC and ACP countries; 
• Salaries and other benefits will be comparable to those 
offered by similar international organizations; 
• Place of assignment: Brussels; 
• Desired maximum age: 35; 
• Languages: thorough command of English and French as 
working languages; 
• Application deadline: 2nd September 1991, to be sent to the 
following address: 
The Director of CDI, 
rue de l'Industrie 28, B-1040 Brussels 
Tel.:(32 2)513 41 00 Fax (32 2) 511 75 93 
The application file can be in either English or French and 
should include: 
• A complete curriculum vitae; 
• Names of at least 3 people who can testify to the candidate's 
qualities; 
• A letter from the applicant explaining his/her reasons for 
applying; 
• Copies of degrees and certificates of employment for all 
professional experience indicated in the CV; 
• A recent photograph plus a photocopy of a valid passport or 
identity card. 
Acceptability of applications 
A duly filled in, clearly legible and signed application must 
be submitted within the specified deadline. 
Interviews with preselected candidates will be conducted in 
Brussels over a period of two days at most. CDI will cover the 
relevant travel and accommodation expenses. 
CDI is an equal opportunities employer, and does not 
discriminate on the basis of race, creed or sex. 
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Summary 
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(position as at 28th June 1991) 
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EEC-financed development schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC 
development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows: 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups of 
countries, corresponding to the main aspects of 
Community development policy: 
— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific), which signed the multilateral 
conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), 
Lomé II (31 October 1979) and Lomé III (8 De-
cember 1984), plus the OCT (overseas countries 
and territories) of certain member states of the 
EEC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP 
countries; 
— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and 
Mashraq), which signed cooperation agree-
ments with the EEC in 1976 and 1977; 
— the ALA developing countries of Asia and 
Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of 
annual aid programmes. 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical 
order). 
Note 
As the information provided is subject to 
modification in line with the development 
aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, 
or with the conditions laid down by the 
authorities empowered to take financial 
decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this 
summary, which is for information only. 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
— the title of the project; 
— the administrative body responsible for it; 
— the estimated sum involved (prior to financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided (post 
financing decision); 
— a brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, supplies of equipment, 
technical assistance, etc.); 
— any methods of implementation (international 
invitations to tender, for example); 
— the stage the project has reached (identifi-
cation, appraisal, submission for financing, 
financing decision, ready for implementation). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth. 
Int. tender 
tender 
Ace. tender: Invitation to tender (ac 
celerated procedure) 
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation t< 
tender 
TA: Technical assistance 
EDF: European Development Fund 
mECU: Million European currency units 
Responsible Authority 
International invitation to 
Correspondence about this operational summary can 
be sent directly to:: 
Mr. Franco Cupini 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Communities 
Beri. 6-86 
200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
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Planning and public administration 
Administrative buildings 
Economic planning and policy 
Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
Police and fire protection 
Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
Demography and manpower studies 
Development of public utilities 
Power production and distribution 
Electricity 
Water supply 
Communications 
Transport and navigation 
Meteorology 
Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
Agricultural production 
Service to agriculture 
Forestry 
Fishing and hunting 
Conservation and extension 
Agricultural storage 
Agricultural construction 
Home economics and nutrition 
Land and soil surveys 
Industry, mining and construction 
Extractive industries 
Petroleum and natural gas 
Manufacturing 
Engineering and construction 
Cottage industry and handicraft 
Productivity, including management, auto-
mation, accountancy, business, finance and 
investment 
Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
Research in industrial technology 
Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
Agricultural development banks 
Ν SEC 
A5B 
A5C 
A5D 
A5E 
A5F 
A5G 
A5H 
A5I 
A6 
A6A 
A6B 
A6Bi 
A6C 
A6Ci 
A6D 
A6E 
A6F 
A6G 
A6H 
A6I 
A6J 
A7 
A7A 
A7B 
A7C 
A7D 
A7E 
A7F 
A8 
A8A 
A8B 
A8C 
A8D 
A8E 
A8F 
A8G 
A8H 
A8I 
A9 
A9A 
A9B 
A10 
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Industrial development banks 
Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
Export promotion 
Trade, commerce and distribution 
Co-operatives (except agriculture and hous­
ing) 
Publishing, journalism, cinema, photog­
raphy 
Other insurance and banking 
Archaeological conservation, game reserves 
Education 
Primary and secondary education 
University and higher technical institutes 
Medical 
Teacher training 
Agricultural training 
Vocational and technical training 
Educational administration 
Pure or general research 
Scientific documentation 
Research in the field of education or training 
Subsidiary services 
Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
Health 
Hospitals and clinics 
Maternal and child care 
Family planning and population-related 
research 
Other medical and dental services 
Public health administration 
Medical insurance programmes 
Social infrastructure and social wel­
fare 
Housing, urban and rural 
Community development and facilities 
Environmental sanitation 
Labour 
Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
Environmental protection 
Flood control 
Land settlement 
Cultural activities 
Multisector 
River development 
Regional development projects 
Unspecified 
Δ 
ATTENTION: The PABLI Service is temporarily suspended for technical reasons 
The reactivation of the Pabli Service will be indicated in due course. 
PABLI — Blue page informatics 
Direct access to the blue pages via on-line terminal or telex 
The blue pages are on computer and available 
either directly via a terminal or micro-computer. 
Selected extracts of the blue pages may be 
obtained. 
The cost of these two services has been fixed 
and are applied from 1989. 
To obtain any information concerning PABLI 
please write, specifying the option chosen 
(terminal or telex) to: 
ECHO Customer Service 
177, Route d'Esch 
L-1471 LUXEMBOURG 
Tél.: 352/48.80.41 
Télex: 2181 
ECHO is in charge only for PABLI. For general 
correspondence see page I. 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ACP STATES 
New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left 
Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics 
ANGOLA 
Namibe-Lubango-Makala road re-
habilitation sections 3+4 (Serra da 
Leba-Lubanga, PK 41.1). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministério do Plano. Estimated total cost 
17mECU. EDF 16 mECU, local 1 mECU 
(Counterpart Funds). Rehabilitation and 
strengthening of 74 km. Project on appraisal. 
* Int. tender no 3293 for works (con-
ditional), launched in April'91. Opening 
15.8.91. 6th EDF. 
EDF ANG 6011 A2b 
TA. to the Department of water affairs. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF BT 6023 A2b, A8c 
Wildlife Conservation in Northern 
Botswana. Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Wildlife and National Park. (DWNP). 6.800 
mECU. New tracks, construction of adminis-
trative office quarters and accommodation. 
Supply of equipments (earthmoving — 
tractors — 4 *4pick-ups). T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing July 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF BT 6026 A3e, A5i 
BARBADOS 
Hospitality Studies Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Education and Culture. 
Total estimated cost 2.5 mECU. EDF 1.6 
mECU, local 0.900 mECU. Construction of 
Tourism Training Centre — cum-Hotel. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BAR 6006 A5c 
BELIZE 
Belize City Hospital. Phase I. 8.6 
mECU. Work constructions and supply of 
equipment. 4th, 5th, and 6th EDF. Works: in. 
# tender foreseen 2nd half 91. Project in 
execution. 
EDF BEL 6004 A7a 
Community Development Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social 
Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation 
study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF BEL 6002 A6b 
BENIN 
Mono rural development prog-
ramme. Development of the rural produc-
tion. Cofinancing with BAD. EDF 
16,5 mECU, BAD 14.4 mECU, local 4.9 
mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: 
SCET-AGRI (F) 
EDF BEN 6003 A3a 
Fish breeding. Applied research and 
popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: 
MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project 
on appraisal 6th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6009 A3d 
BOTSWANA 
Support programme to Botswana 
copper-nickel mining industry. Resp. 
Auth.: BCL Ltd (Bamangwato Concessions 
Ltd). 21.650 mECU. Works, exploration 
drillings, supply of mining equipment by int. 
tender. Replacements parts by direct agree-
ment T.A. to prepare int. tender dossier, 
evaluation and follow-up of the tender. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF BT SYS 6019 A4a 
Livestock marketing development 
project. Resp. Auth.: Botswana Cooperat-
ive Union. 2.4 mECU. Provision of infra-
structures, transports, T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF BT 6014 A3a 
Water development programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Department of Water Affairs. 2 
mECU. Serowe waste water sanitation and 
BURKINA FASO 
Rehabilitation of the road Koupéla -
Togo border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Equipement, Supervision: Direction Gén-
éral des Travaux Publics. Estimated total cost 
20.35mECU. 152 km rehabilitation (R.N. 
16). Works by int. tender and supervision. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
* f\nanc\ng2ndhalf91. Int. tender no 3344 
(conditional) launched in March 91. 
Opening 1.8.91. 5th, 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 6019 A2d 
vehicles, crop inputs, rural equipment. Pro-
ject on appraisal. Date foreseen forfinancing 
• 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF CM 6012 A3a 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
Conservation programme for the 
ecosystem in the North. National game 
and natural reserves. Supervision for pro-
tected areas. Monitoring, management. 
Supply of infrastructures. EDF 25 mECU. 
Supplies: first int. tender launched in August 
89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF CA 6002 A3a 
Development programme of the 
Central and Southern region. Resp. 
Auth: Ministère du Dév. Rural. 20.3 mECU. 
To strengthen coffee plantations in the 
villages and the infrastructure, diversifi-
cations in ex cotton zones; rural health and 
human hydraulics, T.A., studies, following 
and evaluation.-Short-lists already drawn 
•k up. Project in execution. Int. tender for 
supplies no 3440 launched in June 91. 
Opening 11.9.91. 6th EDF. 
EDF CA 6005 A3a 
BURUNDI 
Socio-economic development of the 
natural region of Mugamba. Resp. 
Auth.: CVHA project, 0TB, Ministère du 
Dév. Rural, Direction Générale des Routes. 
32 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and evalu-
ation. Project in execution. Int. tender for 
works launched in November 89. Int. tender 
■k for supplies launched in July 90. 2nd int. 
tender no 3379 for vehicles launched in 
June 91. Opening 30.7.91. 6th EDF. 
EDF BU 6018 A3a 
CAMEROON 
Rural development programme in 
the Bénoué basin. Resp. Auth.: Mission 
d'études pour l'aménagement de la vallée 
supérieure de la Bénoué (MEAVSB). Total 
estimated cost 30 mECU, EDF part 
25 mECU. Roads network, schools, health 
centres, rural water supply. Support to crop 
production and fishery. Irrigated agricultural 
areas, fight against soil and surface vege-
tation degradation. Works, supplies, T.A. 
and training Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF CM 6002 A3a 
Rural development programme in 
the Logone and Chari. Resp. Auth.: 
Semry. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Consolid-
ation and extension of existing actions. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF CM 6013 A3a 
Rural development poles: Saa-ntui, 
Sang melima, Bafut. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tères de l'Agriculture et du Plan et de 
l'Aménagement du Territoire. Total es-
timated cost 14.625 mECU. EDF 10.300 
mECU, local 4.325 mECU. Strengthening of 
the monitoring structures, improvement and 
extension of basic socio-economic infra-
structures, training, education, populariz-
ation of rural development, health. Works: 
tracks, buildings; supplies for civil works, 
CHAD 
Rural development priority prog-
ramme in the concentration zone. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de Dév. 
Rural. 15 mECU. Hydro-agricultural works, 
infrastructure, education, health. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF CD 6002 A3e 
Strengthening ofthe health sector in 
the Sahelian prefectures. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de la Santé Publique. 12 mECU. 
Supply of essential medicines, training 
programme and T.A. Int. tender for véhicules 
launched in July 90. Project in execution 
6th EDF. 
EDF CD 6003 A7e 
Rural development programme. 
Phase 2. Resp. Auth. Office National de 
Dév. Rural (ONDR). 28 mECU. Works, 
feeder roads, scholar buildings, agricultural 
equipment, pumps, T.A., follow up and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF CD 6005 A3a 
COMOROS 
Rural integrated development pro-
gramme in the north region of Anjouan 
Island. Resp Auth. : Ministère de la Produc-
tion agricole, 1 1.3 mECU. Improvement of 
crop production, infrastructure, works by int. 
tender (conditional) launched end June 89. 
Supply of equipments, materials and vehic-
les. T.A., training, evaluation, audit. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF COM 6002 A3a 
Artisanal fishery. Second Phase. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production 
Agricole. 2 mECU. Purchase of equipment, 
+ T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF COM 5017 A3d 
The Courier no. 128 — July-August 1 991  III CONGO 
FEDAR (EDF regional action for the 
Pool and Cuvette). Resp. Auth. : Ministère 
du Plan. 36 mECU. Roads, wells, rural 
infrastructure, supervision of works, line of 
credit, monitoring. Road: int. tender launc-
hed in August 89. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF COB 6002 A3a 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Support to the livestock develop-
ment. Continuation and completion of the 
Marahoué Ranch (T.A., investment, train-
ing) and support to 'Centre National d'Ele-
vage Ovin'. 11 mECU. Project in execution. 
First int. tender for supply launched in 
December 89. T.A. : Jules Van Lanker (B) — 
GFA (BRD)-INFORMES Y PROJECTOS 
(E) 6th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6003 A3a 
Centre food crops programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 
40 mECU. Irrigation, agriculture modern-
ization, young settlements. Food crops 
production marketing improvement. Works, 
soil improvement, supplies. T.A. studies, 
follow-up and evaluation. Project on ap-
* praisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 
91. 6th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6009 A3a 
DJIBOUTI 
Training programme. 2.2 mECU. New 
vocational training actions for adults. T.A. 
for training centres. Training, scholar-ships 
and training courses. Works and supplies. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF DI 6101 A6d 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Essential goods import programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Présidence de la République. 
Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import essential goods. Project 
on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 0000 A1c 
Support to the agricultural develop-
ment of the Bata district. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 
1.7 mECU Rehabilitation or buildings exten-
sion. Supply of equipments. T.A. by Associ-
ation Française des Volontaires. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 6004 A3a 
Conservation and rational utilisation 
of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth. : 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, 
Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General 
for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classifi-
cation and Use Master Plan — National 
System of Conservation Units — Forest 
Training and Research Centre. T.A. and 
supply of equipments. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing July 91. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i 
ETHIOPIA 
North Shewa rural reclamation and 
development programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture. Total cost 
28.5 mECU. EDF 24 mECU, local 4.5 mECU. 
Soil and water conservation, reafforestation. 
rural infrastructure development and feeder 
roads. Works, supply of equipment, vehicles, 
T.A. and line of credit. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF ET 6001 A3a 
Central Shewa peasant agriculture 
development programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture. 53.4 mECU. Build-
ings, roads, rural infrastructure, agricultural 
inputs, consumer goods, equipments, T.A., 
studies, credit line. Project in execution. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF ET 6002 A3a 
South Shewa conservation-based 
rural development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Agriculture. 26.2 mECU. Buildings, roads, 
rural infrastructure, agricultural inputs, con-
sumer goods, training, T.A., micro-projects, 
credit line. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ET 6005 A3a 
Coffee improvement programme III. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Coffee and Tea 
Development. 38.1 mECU. Construction 
and civil works, supply of equipments, 
vehicles and agrie, inputs, aerial photo-
graphy, training and T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF 6003 A3a 
Lake fisheries project. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery Dept. 
7.5 mECU. Provision of inputs to fishermen, 
development of cooperatives, establishment 
of marketing organisation and infrastructure, 
training, research and fingerling production 
centers. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ET 6008 A3d 
Aid for refugees. Contribution to the 
UNHCR and to M S F.Transport sector, water 
sector, health sector. Project on appraisal. 
8.1 mECU. 6th EDF. 
EDF ET 6104 A8 
Sectoral import programme. III. 
Resp. Auth.: S.I.P. Steering Committee. 
17 mECU. Supply of fertilizers and raw 
materials. Spare parts. Public sector indus-
trial inputs and private sector. T.A. and 
monitoring and evaluation. Project in exe-
* cution. Int. tender no 3408 launched in 
April 91. Opening 31.7.91. 6th EDF. 
EDF ET 6017 A3a 
Foreign trade development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT). 
1.5 mECU. T.A. : two-years marketing 
expert, a team of marketing specialists 
(short-term consultancy services in Et-
hiopia). Market researches, training on 
international marketing and international 
trade, technical seminars. Equipments and 
supporting services Project in execution. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF ET 6010 A5de 
of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF FU 6009 A6a, 8a 
Electrification of the Lakeba, Grau 
and Koro islands. Estimated cost 2.762 
mECU. Supply and installation of diesel 
power stations, electrical distribution and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF FU 6004 A2ai 
FIJI 
Investment and export development. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Com-
merce (MTC) and Fiji Trade and Investment 
Board. 7.2 mECU. Land purchase for the Tax 
Free Zone, works, supply of equipments, T.A 
and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF FU 6007 A5d 
Social infrastructure, schools and 
bridges. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Infra-
structure and Public Utilities and Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sport 2.626 mECU 
EDF 2.350 mECU, local 0.276 mECU. 
Construction of 11 bridges and 49 new 
classrooms and 45 teachers quarters. Supply 
GAMBIA 
Rural Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omic Affairs. 14.5 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
Water schemes, supply of road equipments 
and materials, T.A. and supervision. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
-k2nd half 91. 6th EDF 
EDF GM 6004-7004 A3a 
Import Programme for Petroleum 
Products. Resp. Auth. Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Affairs. Estimated cost 4 
*mECU. Purchase of fuel products. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GM 6008-7001 A1c 
GHANA 
Accra Plains Livestock Development 
Project (APLDP). Estimated total cost 
4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. 
Provision of veterinary and animal hus-
bandry extension services, including con-
struction of cattle treatment centres, water 
points and other inputs. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF G H 6006 A3a 
Twìfo oil palm development. Main-
tenance aid 1988-1991. Resp. Auth: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(M.F E.P.). Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU 
EDF 5 mECU, local 7.6 mECU. Works, 
supply of equipment and T.A Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF GH 6007 A3a 
Ghana Ports rehabilitation project. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ghana Ports and 
Harbour Authority. Total estimated cost 22.6 
mECU, EDF 20 mECU, Ghana Ports and 
Harbour Authority 2.6 mECU. Further re-
habilitation of Takoradi, dredging of Ta-
koradi and Tema Ports, reconstruction of the 
■k Tema access road 5th EDF. Date finan-
cing May 91. 
EDF GH 5028 A2d 
GRENADA 
Leverà National Park project. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Tourism. 0.925 mECU. 
Works ans services comprising Park intra-
structure. access roads, attractions develop-
ment, management programmes, T.A. Pro-
ject in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF GRD 6005 A5i 
GUINEA 
T.A. and supplementary equipment 
for the 'Ecole Nationale des Arts et 
Métiers'(EIMAM), Conakry. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Education Nationale. 
5.5 mECU. Renovation works by ace. tender. 
Equipements by int. tender. T.A. and train-
ing. Project in execution. Supplies: Int. 
tender launched in April 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF GUI 6006 A6b 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Rural development programme. 
23.8 mECU. Improvement of the food and 
IV  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY fishery production, line of credit, micro-
projects, T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6001 A3a 
General import programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Unité de Gestion de Balance de 
Paiement auprès de la Banque Nationale. 
6 mECU. Hard currencies allowance pro-
gramme. Italy: 2 mECU to supply fuel and 
lubricants to the Bissau Power Plant during 
1 year. Project in execution. 5th and 6th 
EDF. 
EDF GUB 6005 A1c 
Project for the rehabilitation of 
social and economic infrastructures. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
8 mECU. Road rehabilitation, schools, 
health centres urban roads, markets, water 
and sanitation. Construction of secondary 
bridges, access roads, supply of a ferry. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6010 A7, A8 
JAMAICA 
Rural water supplies. Phase I. Resp. 
Auth.: National Water Commission. 
6.7 mECU. Extension, upgrading of five 
existing water supply schemes: South Man-
chester, Elderslie/Niagara, Castleton, South 
Chapelton. Works and supplies. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF J M 6003 A2b 
Montego Bay airport. Charter ter-
minal. Resp. Auth.: Airports Authority of 
Jamaica. 7.1 mECU. Works and supply of 
equipments. Works by ace. tender. Supplies 
by int. tender. Supervision. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF J M 6004 A2d 
Negril and Ocho Rios sewerage 
schemes. Resp. Auth.: National Water 
Commission. 25 mECU. Negril: 17 km of 
trunk sewers, 1 3 pump stations and 2 treat-
ment plants. Ocho Rios: 5 km of sewers, 6 
pump stations, 1 treatment plant and deep 
sea outfall. T.A. for supervision. Works by int. 
tender Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF J M A8bc 
Special debt programme. Resp. 
Auth.:. Director of External Resources with 
representative from Ministry of Finance, 
Commerce, Central Bank of Kenya, the 
Delegate of the Commission. 2nd phase of 
the Agricultural Sector Import Programme 
(ASIP). 7 mECU Supply of agricultural 
inputs by int. tender. T.A. and evaluation. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF KE 6019 A3a 
Strengthening of research resources 
of the national museums of Kenya. 
Resp. Auth.: NMK Directorate 3 mECU. 
Construction, transport, equipment, T.A., 
training and research links with national, 
regional and international organizations. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF KE A6f 
Strathmore post secondary edu-
cational college. Resp Auth.: Strathmore 
college. EDF 3.100 mECU, Italy 
1.310 mECU. Construction of teaching and 
administrative buildings, library, canteen, 
accomodation and catering department. 
Supply of equipment and T.A. Works by ace. 
tender. T.A and supplies by Italy. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF KE 6005 A6b 
KIRIBATI 
Telecommunications programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Telecom-Kiribati. 5.7 mECU. 
Supply and works relating to 2 telephone 
exchanges, a transmitting station and equip-
ment for air and sea rescue services. Works, 
supplies and T.A. 6th EDF. Int. Tender 
(conditional) launched in November 90. 
■k Date financing May 91. 
EDF Kl 6003 A2c 
KENYA 
Agricultural research programme. 
20 mECU. Soil and water management 
research. Soil fertility and plant nutrition. 
Civil works and libraries. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF KE 6003 A3e 
Cereal sector reform programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Agricul-
tureand Supplies and Marketing and NCPB. 
National Cereals and Produce Board. 
65 mECU. T.A., studies, training. Storage 
and rolling stock, sectoral import programme 
purchase of agricultural inputs, short and 
longterm T.A., cooperatives and reserve 
funds. Studies, T.A. and training: short-lists 
already drawn-up. Works by int. tender and 
ace. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF KE 6008 A3a 
ASAL livestock development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Lives-
tock Development. 9 mECU. Works by restr. 
tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF KE 6009 A3a 
LESOTHO 
Manpower development project to 
support Lesotho's natural resources 
sector. Resp. Auth.: National Manpower 
Development Secretariat (NMDS). Ministry 
of Planning Economic and Manpower De-
velopment 7.7 mECU. Construction of 
schools, class-rooms, laboratories, supply of 
T.A., scholar-ships and training. Project in 
■*■ execution. Int. tender no 3428 for sup-
plies launched in June 91. Opening 
12.8.91. 6th EDF. 
EDF LSO 6007 A6b 
Queen Elizabeth II Hospital: impro-
vement and upgrading. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Health and Ministry of Works. 
4.9 mECU. Works by ace. lender. Supply by 
int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 4th and 
6th EDF. 
EDF LSO 6012 A7a 
'Lesotho Highlands Water Project' -
Muela Hydropower Project (MHP). 
Estimated cost 44 mECU. Engineering 
supervision and part of the civil works. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
• financing July 91. 7th EDF. 
EDF LSO 6001-7001 A2ai 
LIBERIA 
Bong Mining Company. Rehabili-
tation project. Resp. Auth.: Government 
and BMC.49.3mECU. Supply of specialized 
equipment, shovels, conveyor belts, dum-
pers, locomotives, spare parts. 2 int. tender 
launched in July 89. Project in execution. 
5th EDF. 
EDF LBR/SYS 0000 A4a 
South-East development prog-
ramme. Estimated cost 27 mECU. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF LBR 6002 A3a 
Rural water supply. Phase II. Resp. 
Auth.. Minister of Planning and Economic 
Affairs. 2.900 mECU. Drilling works by ace. 
tender. Supply of hand pumps and spare 
parts. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF LBR 6011 A2b 
MADAGASCAR 
Maize development programme in 
the Middle West. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de la Production Agricole. 9.5 mECU. Build-
ing of a nursery and farmers training. Works, 
supplies, T.A. evaluation and training. Pro-
ject in execution. 6th EDF. T.A. : CONSULT -
IBERICA (E) 
EDF MAG 6006 A3a 
Bridge Rehabilitation of the Fanam-
bana river. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. 2.3mECU. Works and T.A. 
Date financing June 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 5034 A2d 
Local handicraft, improvement Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de ¡Indus-
trie de l'Energie et des Mines. To improve 
production and marketing. T.A., training and 
line of credit. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing Septembre 91. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF MAG 6022 A5d, e 
MALAWI 
Strategic fuel reserve. Resp. Auth.: 
Office of the President and Cabinet. Con-
tingency Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU, Con-
struction of tanks for diesel, petrol, ethanol. 
Associated infrastructure and equipment. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF MAI 5020 A2a 
Rural health programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Health and Ministry of Com-
munity Services (MOH and MOCS). 
9.3 mECU. Construction of an hospital, two 
health centres supply of equipments, T.A. 
Works by ace. tender. Supplies by int. tender. 
T.A.: short-list drawn up. 2 int. tenders for 
supplies launched in August 90. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAI 6009 A7a, e 
Programme for industrial products 
imports. 12.5 mECU. Supply of industrial 
equipment, raw materials and spare parts. 
Project in execution 6th EDF. 
EDF MAI 6019 A1c 
Aid for Refugees. Contribution to the 
UNHCR and the Malawi Red Cross. 3.262 
mECU. Actions for access roads, health 
* facilities, boreholes-wells. Date financing 
April 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAI 6104 A8 
Limbe - Thyolo - Muloza Road. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministry of Works. Estimated cost 30 
mECU. Asphalting of 104 km. Works by int. 
tender (conditional). Project on appraisal. 
•k Works: int. tender (conditional) 
no 3407 launched in May 91. Opening 
13.9.91. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI A2d 
MALI 
Rice-growing intensification pro-
gramme in the large irrigated areas of 
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Segou'. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. 65 mECU. Improvement 
of the irrigated areas, roads. Supply of 
equipment for maintenance and for 
agriculture, study, T.A., training and 
experimentation. Study: short-list 
done. Project in execution. 5th and 6th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 6004 A3a 
Food security programme in the 5th 
region. Resp. Auth.: Gouverneur de la 
région. 24 mECU. Soil and ground water 
resources, rehabilitation of Bamako. Mopti 
road. Works, supplies, supervision, study, 
T.A. training. Supplies: int. tender launched 
in July 89. Works: int. tender launched in 
March 90. Project in execution. 5th and 6th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 6005 A2b, d 
Support to the Structural Adjuste-
ment Programme. Estimated cost 31 
mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
+ for financing July 91. 7th ADF. 
EDF MLI 7001 A3a 
MAURITANIA 
Aioun El Atrouss hospital. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement. 
1.050 mECU. Renovation and supply of 
equipment for 3 buildings. Works by ace. 
tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF MAU 5012 A7a 
Rehabilitation of Nouakchott 
National Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Equipement. 4 mECU. Renovation and 
upgrading for building, supply of medical-
technical and surgical equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. STUDIES: STUDIO 
BICHARA (I) 
EDF MAU 6003 A7a 
Support programme forthe develop-
ment of the Gorgol region (PDRG). 
Estimated cost 35 mECU. Improvement of 
the irrigated areas, support to the traditional 
crop, regeneration of the natural habitats, 
rural infrastructure, sanitation of Kaedi. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6007 A3a 
General import programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Economie et des 
Finances. Banque Centrale de Mauritanie 
(BCM). 7 mECU. Hard currency allowance 
for essential goods imports. Project in 
execution. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6008 A1c 
MAURITIUS 
Programme to diversify productive 
sectors (2nd part: agriculture). Resp. 
Auth.: to purchase equipments: Ministère 
des Finances. Tender board. 8 mECU. 
Works, rural development, supplies, T.A. and 
training. Project in execution. Int. tender 
launched in November 89. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAS 6006 A3a 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Second import programme. Resp. 
Auth.: UCPI (Unité de Coordination des 
Programmes d'Importation et Délégation de 
la Commission. 30 mECU. Sectors: rural, 
fishery, transports and industry. Supply of 
seeds, equipments, row materials, lorries, 
spare parts, T.A. audit and valuation. 4 int. 
tenders launched from August 89. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 6025 A1c 
Rural telecommunications. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Transports and Communi-
cations. Estimated cost 11 mECU. Supply of 
radio and telephone equipment. Project on 
♦ appraisal. Int. tender (conditional) 
no 3383 launched in May 91. Opening 
20.8.91. Date foreseen for financing 
Septembre 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 6021 A2c 
Integrated development programme 
of Cabodelgado. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of 
Commerce. AGRICOM. 8 mECU. EDF 
5 mECU, local 3 mECU. Support to ± 
50 000 people in the districts of Mocimboa, 
Priaia and Mueda. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 6022 A3a 
NIGER 
Rice-growing in the river valley. 
Resp. Auth. Ministère de l'Agriculture. 
63.6 mECU. Cultivation of 1,800 ha, elec-
trification, feeder roads. T.A. for manage-
ment. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF MR 6001 A3a 
Small irrigation programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 
21.560 mECU. Rehabilitation of the Tarka 
down valley, irrigation, boreholes and wells. 
Feeder roads, environmental protection, T.A. 
Works and supplies. First tender launched in 
July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF NIR 6002 A3a 
Mining research : gold and coal. Resp 
Auth.: Ministère des Mines et de l'Energie. 
12.450 mECU. Gold: photogeological and 
photomorphological study on existing aerial 
photos. Revision of all available data. Stra-
tegic prospecting. Site exploration and pilot 
plant. Coal : study and building of a washing 
plant. Study on the coal field of Anou 
ArarenSolomi. T.A. and training. Drillings by 
int. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in 
execution. First tender launched in July 90. 
6th EDF. 
EDF-SYS-NIR 6011 A4a 
Training programme. Resp. Auth: 
Ministères de l'Education, Commerce, Cul-
ture, Plan, Agriculture. 4,366 mECU. Three 
priority sectors: rural development, business 
development, cultural development. Supply 
of equipments T A. and scholarships. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF NIR 6101 A6b, c,i 
General Import Programme. Support 
to the structural adjustement. Esti-
mated cost 27 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
* Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NIR 7001 A3a 
Niamey Say Road Construction. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement — 
Direction des Travaux Publics. Estimated 
cost 12 mECU. Construction of 56 Km by int. 
tender (conditional) launched in May 91 
with number 3406. Opening 27.8.91. Pro-
ject on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
September 91. 6th or 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 6022- 7001 A2d 
NIGERIA 
Oil Palm Belt Rural Development 
Programme (OPBP). Resp Auth.. Min-
istry of Agriculture, Water Resources and 
Rural Development. 68.840 mECU. Flood 
protection and drainage works in the Niger 
Delta — 20 000 ha. Rural infrastructures, 
micro-projects, T.A, training, research, 
supervision of works, management. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: SOCFIN Con-
Ik· su Ita nt Services (B). Int. tender no 3438 
launched in June 91. Opening 20.8.91. 
EDF UNI 6001 A3a 
North East Arid Zone development 
programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture. 35 mECU. Increase of rural 
production, livestock development, affores-
tation and environment control, rural infra-
structure development (health, education), 
commercial services (inputs, credit and 
marketing system), manpower develop-
ment, training and research. Works: irrig-
ation, drainage, buildings, supply of seeds, 
chemicals, fertilizers, dozers, drilling rigs, 
T.A..training, research. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. T.A.: DANAGRO (DK) 
EDF UNI 6002 A3a 
Research and Training programme. 
Resp. Auth: Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omic Development Training Support Unit 
(TSU). 30 mECU. Scholarships, seminars, 
T.A. Teacher training, cooperation between 
Nigerian Training Institutions and European 
Training Institutions, exchanges between 
nigerian and european research institutions. 
Purchase of equipment. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF UNI 6004 A6a, b, c, d, e, f 
Desertification control and environ-
mental protection programme in 
Sokoto. Resp. Auth.: Sekoto Environ-
mental Programme (SEP). Direct respons-
ibility of the Office of the Governor. 
30.6 mECU. Community awareness, mobili-
sation and development campaign. Affores-
tation actions, improvement of range man-
agement and livestock development. Re-
habilitation of a smallscale irrigation, train-
ing and applied research. Works: buildings, 
nurseries, water points, irrigation netwotks. 
Supply of vehicles, motocycles, generators, 
media equipments, T.A. Works by ace. 
tenders. Supplies by int. tenders. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: SIR MAC 
DONALD & PARTNERS (UK) — I.N.C. — IL 
NUOVO CASTORO (I) 
EDF UNI 6003 A3a 
Sectoral import programme. 
10 mECU. Supply of pumps, agricultural 
inputs, spare parts for tractors and metal 
frame for warehouses. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. T.A.: CROWN AGENTS (UK) 
EDF UNI 6008 A3a 
'Middle belt' programme. Resp. 
Auth.: States of Kwara and Niger, Executive 
Committees. Estimated total cost 
38.662 mECU. EDF 33 mECU, local 5.662 
mECU. Education, health, social infrastruc-
ture. Renovation works, rehabilitation, 
supply of equipments, T.A., training and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
T.A.: B.M.B. (NL) — TRANSCON LTD. 
(UNI) 
EDF UNI 6007 Aabe 
Mambilla Tea Integrated Develop-
ment Project. Resp. auth. : Nig. Beverages 
Production Company Ltd. 28 mECU. Civil 
works: dam, roads, buildings utilities. 
Supply of vehicles, factory and irrigation 
equipment T.A. for management and train-
ing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7001 A3a 
Export Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Export Promotion 
Council. 35 mECU. To transfer export Know 
how to ±250 nigerian firms. Components: 
sectors, market, human resources and insti-
tutional development. Others: T.A. for man-
agement and supervision. Project on ap-
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praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7002 A5d 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Road and Bridge Rehabilitation Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 
Parallel cofinancing with World Bank. EDF, 
part estimated 21.520 mECU. Works and 
* supervision. Date financing May 91. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF PNG 6014 A2d 
RWANDA 
Food strategy support programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 51 mECU. 
Development of the rural activity, monitor-
ing, training, maintaining of natural environ-
ment stability. Infrastructures, supply of 
agricultural inputs, vehicles, T.A. studies and 
training. 2nd int. tender launched in July 90. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF RW 6001 A3a 
Special Import Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Gouvernement du Rwanda and 
Banque Nationale Rwandaise (BNR) 
1 2mECU (6 mECU) for petroleum products 
by int. tender. (6 mECU) hard currencies 
allowance to import essentiel products 
(malt, oil, sugar, salt, gypse, pharmaceutical 
products, fertilizers, pesticides). T.A. (pro-
curement agent) to promote, coordinate and 
follow up of operations. Date financing June 
91. 6th EDF. 
EDF RW 6009 A3a 
SAO TOMÉ 8i PRINCIPE 
Riberia Peixe rural development. 
Resp. auth.: Ministère de la Coopération. 
Development of agricultural output (palm 
oil) and industrial exploitation. 6.79 mECU 
as follows: EDF4,00mECU, EIB2,00mECU 
and local 0.791 mECU. T.A., works, training 
and supplies. T.A.: ULG Consultants (UK). 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF STP 6001 A3a 
SENEGAL 
Consolidation of the livestock de-
velopment programme. Resp. Auth.: 
SODESP. Estimated cost 1.6 mECU. Study 
under way by Bessel Ass. (UK). Project on 
appraisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF SE A3a 
Support programme for repatriation 
from Mauritania. Resp. Auth.: DIRE 
( Délégation à l'Insertion, à la Réinsertion et à 
l'Emploi). EDF2.1 mECU. Line of credits, for 
existing SME and new SME. T.A. and 
training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SE 6104 A8b 
Support programme for the phos-
phate sector. Sysmin. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère du Développement Industriei. 
15 mECU. Research for methods to elim-
inate cadmium from rock and/or from phos-
phoric acid. Investments in 2 processing 
plants. Research actions, studies, new 
humid storage (central conveyor, adjustable 
stocker, rail scraper, longitudinal conveyor), 
mining equipment, 3 dumpers, 1 bull-dozer, 
* 2 loaders, 1 hydraulic shovel. Project in 
execution 6th EDF. 
EDF SYS SE 17 A4af 
SEYCHELLES 
I
Consolidation ofthe development of 
the craft industry. Resp. Auth.: Depart-
ment of Industry and CODEVAR. 1 mECU. 
T.A. on policy in the sector and specialized 
for wood, ceramics, textiles and others (tobe 
decided). Training and evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
July 91. 7th EDF. 
EDF SEY 6003-7001 A5d, e 
Tuna quay rehabilitation. Resp. auth.: 
S.F.A. 1.200 mECU. Supply of equipment 
and works. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF SEY 6008 A2d 
SIERRA LEONE 
North Western artisanal fisheries 
and community development prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Agricul-
ture and Natural Resources (Fisheries Divi-
sion). 6 mECU. Infrastructures, supply of 
equipments, line of credit. T.A. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SL 6004 A3d 
Rehabilitation of the Telecommuni-
cations network. Phase 2. 7.5 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. T.A.: BRITISH TELCON-
SULT (UK) 
EDF SL 6006 A2c 
Tourism development programme. 
Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. T.A. to the 
Ministry of Tourism and supply of equip-
ment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF SL 5026 A5c 
Sectoral Import Programme. Agric-
ulture. Resp. Auth. : SIP Steering Commit-
tee: Nat. Auth. Off. (NAO), EEC Delegation 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and National 
Resources. 6 mECU. Supply of agricultural 
inputs, machinery, spares, for agricultural 
processing, fishing equipment, T.A. (pro-
curement agent) : management and evalu-
ation. Short-list done. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF SL 6002 A3a 
Construction of the Waterloo-
Maziaka road and repairing of the 
Makeni-Fadugu Section. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Works. 16.8 mECU. Road re-
construction with bitumen layer of 50 mm 
*T.A. for supervision. Int. tender no 3429 
launched in May 91. Opening 22.8.91. 
Date financing May 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF SL 6007 A2d 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
Development of human resources in 
the rural sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Economic Planning. 4 mECU. Supply of 
equipment, T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: D.H.V. (NL) 
EDF SOL 6003 A3a 
Rural health project. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Health and Medical Service. 
3 mECU. Works by ace. tender. Supply of 
equipment by int. tender. T.A. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SOL 6007 A7a 
Honiara Urban Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Housing and 
Government Services (MHGS). Home 
Finance Corporation (HFC). 2m ECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Works partly by 
direct labour, partly by ace. tender. Supplies 
* by int. tender. T.A. : short-list done. Date 
financing April91. 6th EDF 
EDF SOL 601 3 A8a 
SOMALIA 
Bardheera Dam. Resp. Auth.: Bar-
dheera Dam Authority (BDA). 600 mECU. 
(Estimated) Dam Project 500 mECU. Pow-
erline to Mogadishu 100 mECU. Funding: 
EDF, Italy, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, 
Abu-Dhabi, Kuwait Funds, FADES, Isl. Dev. 
Bank. Local Power and river regulation for 
agricultural development. Construction of a 
concrete gravity dam with hydro-power 
station, associated infrastructure and elec-
trical transmission lines. The dam will pro-
vide water, flood protection and power for 
up to 223000 ha of irrigated agriculture in 
the Juba Valley, and energy to Mogadishu. 
Civil works: first into tender launched in 
1984. Transmission lines int. tender in 1992. 
Equipment: powerhouse main equipment 
and auxiliary equipment, int. tenders in 
1992. Gates, valves, intake equipment, int. 
tender in 1992. Int. tender with prequalifi-
cation launched in February 86 for hydraulic 
tests. Project in execution. 5th EDF. 
EDF SO 5003 A2a 
Old Mogadishu port rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Somali Port Authority (SPA). 
14.5 mECU. Works by int. tender. T.A. and 
supervision. Project on appraisal. Date 
*■ foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF SO 6005 A2d 
National Museum Rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Somali Engineering Agency. 
Dept. of the Ministry of Works and Housing. 
Total estimated cost 0.650 mECU. EDF 
0.500 mECU, Germany 0.040 mECU, local 
0.110 mECU. Restoration of the former 
Sultan Ben Ahmed Palace built in 1872. 
Works by restricted tendering procedures 
addressed to preselected and well qualified 
companies. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
* seen for financing 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF SO 6015 A8i 
SUDAN 
Sudan Railways Support Prog-
ramme (SRSP). Resp. Auth.: Sudan Rail-
ways Corporation. 19 mECU. Reconstruc-
tion of five major and 1 8 minor bridges and 
7 culverts in the line Kosti-Babanaousa. 
Supply of materials, tools and replacement 
part, for the most immediate repairs and 
maintenance of the track Khartoum-Port 
Sudan and those required for a direct 
improvement of telecommunications. Works 
and supplies by int. tender. Project in 
execution. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF SU 6011 A2d 
Post Flood Reconstruction and Re-
habilitation Programme (PFRRP). 
Resp. Auth.: agricultural part: Agricultural 
Bank of Sudan. Transport infrastructure: 
Roads and Bridge Public Corporation 
(RBPC) and Sudan Railways Corporation. 
15 mECU. Agricultural sector: supply of 
spare parts for repair and replacement of 
2500 pumps. Int. tender and direct agree-
ment. Supply of maintenance parts for 
100 trucks (6t) : by int. tender. Supply of 
100 pumps by int. tender. T A. for repair, 
control and credit allowances. Transports 
sector: bridge construction (5 χ 25 m) at 
Geneina, repair and work supervision. 
Bridge by ace. tender. Supplies for railways, 
gabions, pipes by int. tender. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SU 6020 A2d 
Dubeibat-Dilling road. Resp. Auth.: 
Roads and Bridges Public Corporation. 
16.5 mECU. Reconstruction and widening 
over 60 km including construction of bridges 
and culverts. Works by int. tender. T.A. for 
supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF SU 6006 A2d 
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Rural water supplies programme. 
Ministry of Natural Resources. 2.6 mECU. 
Works and supply of equipment for village 
drinking water supply scheme. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SW 6008 A3a 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Edu-
cation. 8 mECU. Works and supply of 
educational equipment, T.A. and training. 
Int. tender launched in July 89. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SW6010 A6a, b 
Rural dam rehabilitation prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agricul-
ture. 4mECU. Works and supervision. Pro-
ject in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SW 6012 A3a 
Upgrading ofthe Manzini -Matsapha 
Road. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Works and 
Communications. Estimated 10 mECU. 8 Km 
dual carriageway. The existing 2-lane road is 
to be upgraded to a 4-lane highway. Works 
by int. tender foreseen 2nd half 91. Short-list 
to be done for supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 5th and 7th EDF. 
EDF SW 5016 A2d 
TANZANIA 
Agricultural sector support prog-
ramme. Resp Auth.: Ministry of Finance 
and Planning. 94 mECU. Measures to 
improve food security, support for coffee 
production and processing, assistance to 
cooperative unions, repair and maintenance 
of vehicles and tractors, feeder road main-
tenance and assistance to institutions im-
plementing the programme. Supplies by int. 
tender/restr. tender or direct agreement. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF TA 6001 A3a 
Secondary roads improvement pro-
ject. 16 mECU. Repair and rehabilitation 
works on Songea-Mbinga and Iboma-
Mlangali-Madaba secondary roads to im-
prove transport of agricultural produce. 
Roads and bridges. 2 int. tenders (con-
ditional) launched in August 90. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF TA 6007 A2d 
Conservation of historical buildings. 
0.690 mECU Restoration works. Forts Ba-
-Argamoyo and Zanzibar. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF TA 601 5 A5i 
Livestock service development. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
Dept. Estimated total cost 4.2 mECU. EDF 
3.7 mECU, local 0.500 mECU. Construction 
of low-cost houses, vaccination campaign, 
credit lines, T.A. Project in execution. 5th 
EDF. 
EDF TA 5020 A3a 
Support programme to the phos-
phate mining industry. Resp. Auth.: 
Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP). 
15.7 mECU. Research actions on cadmium 
problems. Purchase of drying machines and 
shovels. Project in execution. 6th EDF. Pilot 
Trials: DUETAG (F). 
EDF TO-SYS 6015 A4a 
Rural hydraulics in the Savanes and 
Kara regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Equipement. 2.475 mECU. Wels and sour-
ces assessment. Supply and installation of 
200 pumps. Supervision of works. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. T.A. : CINAM (F) SOC. 
GRENOBLOISE D'ETUDES (F) 
EDF TO 6010 A3a 
Rural Hydraulics in the Savanes and 
Kava regions. II Resp. Auth. : Ministère de 
l'Equipement. Estimated cost 11.750 mECU, 
EDF 11.2 mECU, local 0.550 mECU. Exe-
cution of 600 drillings (positifs) and hy-
draulic facturation, supply of 600 pumps 
supervision of works. Works by int. tender 
(conditional) no 3452, launched in July 91. 
Opening 9.10.91. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF TO 6010-7001 A3a 
TONGA 
Vava'u Airport Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Civil Aviation 
2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and training. Works by direct labour, sup-
plies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d 
VAVAU development programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Vava'u Committee. 5 mECU. 
Construction of new market, road improve-
ment and maintenance, education and 
health facilities, training. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 6002 A8b 
Lupepau'u airport upgranding. Rest. 
Auth.: Ministry of Civi Aviation. Ministry of 
Works 2.385 mECU. Works, supplies and 
supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF TG 6003 A2d 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Sectoral Import programme: indus-
try. 12 mECU Allocation of currencies to 
import raw materials and intermadiate pro-
ducts. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF TR 6002 A4b 
Tourism Development Programme. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Tourism Develop-
ment Authority. 1 mECU. To enhance day-
visitor attractions, training and tourism 
+ education, supplies and T.A. Date finan-
cing April 91. 5th EDF 
EDF TR 5011 A5c 
TOGO 
Rural development programme in 
Bassar. Resp, Auth.: Ministère du Dév. 
Rural. EDF 10.3 mECU. Rural intensification 
and diversification, soil protection, improve-
ment of infrastructure, support to the small-
farmer association, marketing improvement. 
Works, studies, research, evaluation. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF. T.A. : S.A. AG RER (B) 
EDF TO 6006 A3a 
ZAIRE 
Kivu programme. 40 mECU. Action for 
crops (coffee, corn, palm-tree, rice) environ-
ment (Parc de la Virunga), lines of credit. 1 st 
int tender launched in April 89. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ZR 6002 A3a 
Kinshasa hinterland programme. 
APEK 25 mECU. To improve crop produc-
tion. 1st int. tender launched in July 89 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ZR 6003 A3a 
Rehabilitation programme of SNCZ. 
7.5 mECU. Supply of row materials and 
spares to replace railways system. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. TA.: TRANSURB 
CONSULT (B) 
EDF ZR 6017 A4a 
Apek Programme, roads section. 
Resp. Auth. : Office des Routes. 35 mECU. 
Rehabilitation of 111 Km of surfaced road on 
the Kinshasa- Kikwit route with works super-
vision — upgrading of 384 Km of major earth 
roads managed by Office des Routes. Re-
habilitation of 496 Km of country earth roads 
managed by local authorities. Bridges rep-
airs, additional technical and economic 
studies, training programme. Supply of 
equipment. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing July 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF ZR 6006 A2d 
ZAMBIA 
Smallholder development in copper 
belt province. Resp. Auth: Ministry of 
Agriculture and water development. 12 
mECU. Basic infrastructure by ace. tender 
Supply of vehicles and materials by int. 
tender T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF ZA 6004 A3a 
Smallholder development in central 
province. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Agricul-
ture and water development. 12.35 mECU. 
Basic infrastructure and social facilities. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ZA 6005 A3a 
Lusaka-Kabwe road. Resp. Auth.: 
Roads Dept. Road rehabilitation 134 km. 
* Estimated cost 36 mECU. Int. tender for 
works (conditional) launched in June 
91 no 3416 —Opening 18.10.91. Project 
on appraisal 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 6014 A2d 
ZIMBABWE 
Small scale irrigation programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Agritex Irrigation Division. 14 
mECU. Irrigation works over 700 ha. Supply 
of vehicles and equipments. T.A., training, 
studies Int. tender launched in July 90. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 6010 A3e 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp Auth.: Ministry of National 
Scholarships. 3.4 mECU. T.A. and scholar-
ships, awards, seminars. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 6020 A6 
Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT) 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
Tourism development programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Development 
Cooperation. 19.1 5 mECU. Programme for 5 
islands. Optimal use of tourism potential. 
T.A., training, promotion and investments in 
tourism infrastructures. Works, supplies, 
T.A., training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF NEA 6007 A5c 
VIII OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Business development scheme. 1.5 
mECU. T.A. for marketing, management, 
product, company and strategy develop-
ment. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF ΝΕΑ 6013 A5c 
ARUBA 
Airport extension. Extension of airport 
facilities. Apron, taxiway, new arrival build-
ing, car park, access roads, platform buses, 
fencing, security peripheral road, technical 
• studies. Estimated cost 74.5 mECU. EDF 
6.3 mECU, The Netherlands ± 8,2 
mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. (final 
design, tender dossier, supervision). Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF ARU 6003 A2d 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Norcal study. Estimated total cost 1.440 
mECU. EDF 0.800 mECU, Territoire 0.440 
mECU, COFREMMI (local) 0.200 mECU. 
Reupdating of an existing study about nickel 
production. This study will be executed by 
the former consultant in charge with the 
previous study. Impact study on environ-
ment financed by EDF: short-list done. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF NC 6005 A4a 
Improvement of the Magenta Air-
port. Resp. Auth.: Administration Ter-
ritoriale. 1.2 mECU. Works by ace. tender 
(conditional). Date financing June 91. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF NC 6006 A2d 
ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON 
Equipping of the St. Pierre port. 
Resp. Auth.: Direction de l'Equipement. 
Estimated total cost 5.5 mECU. EDF 2.6 
mECU, France and territorial collectivities 
2.9 mECU. EDF part: works. Quay and 
+ platform. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing September 91. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF SPM 6001 A2d 
MONTSERRAT 
Port Rehabilitation Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Montserrat Port Authority. Estimated 
total cost 11.350 m ECU. EDF 2.240 mECU. 
EIB. 2 mECU, local 2.390 mECU. C.D.B. 
4.570 mECU, C.I.D.A. (Canadian Int. De-
velopment Agency) 0.150 mECU. Construc-
tion of a jetty (80 x 1 5m) and an approach 
bridge (95 x 9m). Work, by int. tender. T.A. 
* and training. Date financing June 91. Pre-
qualification no 3417 launched in May 
91 — Opening 19.7.91. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF MON 6001 A21 
ST. HELENA 
Sea defences. Resp. Auth.: Public 
Works and Services Dept. 3 mECU. 2,5 
mECU EDF, 0.500 mECU UK. To protect 
shore facilities at James and Rupert's Bay. 
Rehabilitation and reinforcement of existing 
sea walls. Project in execution. 5th and 6th 
EDF. 
EDFSH 5001 A8g 
Regional Projects 
GUINEA — GUINEA BISSAU — 
SENEGAL — MAURITANIA — 
NIGER — MALI 
Soil development of the versant 
basin type in Guinea : Fouta Djalon and 
Niger Upper Basin. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère Guiñeen de l'Agriculture et des Res-
sources Animales (MARA), Direction Géné-
rale des Forêts. Estimated total cost 37.5 
mECU. EDF 31.5 mECU, Italy 6 mECU. Anti-
erosion works, technical and social infra-
structure with local NGO's and population. 
Preparatory studies for programme exten-
sion, aerial survey and mapping. Works by 
ace. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. and 
training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6137 A3a 
BURKINA—NIGER 
Timber development in the future 
reservoir of the Kompienga Dam. Resp. 
Auth: Ministère de l'Environnement du 
Burkina. EDF 5.9 mECU. Timber trees 
recuperation and processing to obtain build-
ing and service timber, fuel-wood, charcoal 
for their commercialisation. Works, supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th 
EDF. T.A.: ANERCO GMBH (BRD) 
EDF REG 6102 A3c 
BENIN — BURKINA— NIGER 
Regional road Godomey Bohicon. 18 
mECU. Maintenance for Cotonou to Niamey 
and Ouagadougou on the Godamey Bo-
hicon 119 Km. Supervision of works, short-
* list done. Date financing May 91. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF REG 6158 A2d 
Regional project for the manage-
ment of the 'W' national park and 
adjoining game reserves. Estimated total 
cost 10 200 mECU. To establish 3 manage-
ment units and 10 bridges and 20 observ-
ation posts with their equipment. Building 
and rehabilitation of administrative, tech-
nical and social buildings, tracks and brid-
ges. T.A., training and studies. Project on 
appraisal 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f 
INDIAN OCEAN ACP COUNTRIES 
Assistance to the cardiology re-
gional centres. Resp. Auth.: COI and 
Ministry of Health in Mauritius. 1 mECU. To 
purchase by int. tender medical equipment. 
Project on appraisal Date foreseen for 
• financing 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6509 A7a 
Regional programme of meteorol-
ogical cooperation concerning tropi-
cal hurricanes. Resp. Auth.: Madagascar 
as Regional Authorizing Officer. 5 mECU. 
Turchese of specialised equipment by int. 
tender. T.A. and training Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6508 A2e 
Aspects for management and regulations — 
regional programme on applied research — 
collecting, exchange and analyse of fishing 
statisticaldata-traning. Supply of equipment 
T.A. training and evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing Sep-
tember 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 5504 A3a 
PACIFIC ACP COUNTRIES 
Regional tourism development pro-
gramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth. : SPEC and 
TCSP. Development of tourism and tourism 
related sectors ofthe Pacific ACP States and 
OCTs. 7.4 mECU. Works: implementation of 
programme components, supply of films, 
promotion and teaching materials, T.A., 
support for TCSP and project. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6027 A5c 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CILSS 
Regional programme for soil protec-
tion and reafforestation. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère du Dév. Rural et de la Pêche du 
Cap Vert. 4.250 mECU. Works, training, 
supply of equipments and T.A. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6145 A3e 
Information and training programme 
on environment. Resp. Auth.: CILSS 
Secretariat. 10 mECU. Supply of ped-
agogical equipment, T.A. and training. Pro-
ject in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6147 A8f 
CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
AND ANGOLA —ZAMBIA — 
RWANDA — COMOROS 
Development of the regional cultural 
cooperation in the Bantu world. Resp. 
Auth.: CICIBA (Gabon). 5.6 mECU. Actions 
to collect and use knowledge and know-
how, cooperation pilot projects with cultural 
specialists, support actions to artists and 
shows. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6079 A8i 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for 
Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: 
Secretariat of the centre. 2.0. mECU, Widen-
ing of the capacity. Construction of class-
rooms, offices and housing. Project stage: 
identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5311 A6b 
Institutional support to Eastern and 
Southern Africa Management In-
stitute (ESAMI). Resp. Auth.: ESAMI, 
Tanzania. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. Exten-
sion of ESAMI installations plus provision of 
library, audio visual and printing equipment 
and improvement of kitchen and laundry 
facilities. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6311 A6b 
P.T.A. COUNTRIES 
(Preferential Trade Area) 
Development and management of Computerisation programme for 
the tuna resources. Phase II. Resp. customs and external trade statistics. 
Auth.: Commission de l'Océan Indien C.O.I. Resp. Auth.: P.T.A. Secretariat. 6.7 mECU. 
Estimated cost 5.450 mECU. EDF 4.9 • Date financing April 91. 6th EDF 
mECU, C.O.I. 0.550 mECU. Institutional EDF REG 6922 A1 b 
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T.A. for a fight against desertifi-
cation strategy. Resp. Auth.: IGADD. 
Supply of specialised T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5361 A3a 
TANZANIA— MALAWI 
Ibanda-Uyole road. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istry of Communications and Works, Dar Es 
• Salaam. EDF 9.1 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works of existing bitumen road. 6th 
EDF. Date financing April 91. 
EDF REG 6402 (TA) A2d 
BURUNDI — RWANDA — ZAIRE 
Institutional support to the : 'Institut 
de Recherche Agronomique et Zoo-
technique (IRAZ) at Gitega, Burundi. 
Resp. Auth.— IRAZ and Ministère des 
Travaux Publics, Burundi. EDF part 2.430 
mECU. Building of administrative and re-
search complex. Works by int. tender fore-
seen in 91. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6318 A1a 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF 
ECOWAS AND CEAO 
Automatic processing of trade stat-
istics and customs data. Resp. Auth.: 
Secrétariat Exécutif de la CEDEAO. 
Directeur général du Fonds de la CEDEAO. 
5 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6163 A1 beef 
BURUNDI — RWANDA — TAN-
ZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — 
KENYA 
Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabi-
litation of the road Kigali-Butare Bu-
rundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
• financing 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d 
Blocktrains (Tanzania Railways Cor-
poration, TRG). Resp. Auth.: TRC. 36 
mECU. Provision of main line and shunting 
locomotives and wagons. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6313 (TA....) A2d 
Northern corridor alternative. Ker-
icho-lsebania road Kenya. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Transports and Communication, 
Kenya. 9 mECU. Rehabilitation of bitumized 
road of 170 km in the Victoria lake region. 
* 6th EDF. Date financing June 91. 
EDF REG 6315 (KE) A2d 
Improvement of Burundi access to 
the central corridor. Resp. Auth.: 
National Authority Officer, Burundi. 10 
mECU. Road construction. First part: 27 km. 
Muyinga-Tanzania border. Works by int. 
tender. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6317 A2d 
Musorna — Si ra ri Road. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Works — Tanzania — Estimated 
cost 22 mECU. Upgrading to bitumen 
standard of existing road. Works, equip-
ments and supervision. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF REG 0000 (TA 6005) A2d 
CAMEROON — CONGO — 
GABON — CENTR. AFR. REP. — 
EQUAT. GUINEA — 
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE — 
ZAIRE 
Conservation and rational utilization 
of the forest ecosystems ¡n Central 
Africa. 24 mECU. Buildings, tracks, brid-
ges, supply of equipment, T.A. and training 
Prequalification launched in October 90. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6203 A3a 
KENYA—ETHIOPIA 
Isiolo-Moyale road. Preparatory 
studies. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Works, Kenya. Estimated cost 1.750 mECU. 
Separate economic feasibility and engineer-
* ing studies. Project in execution. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF REG 6324 A2d 
SADCC 
Maseru Container Terminal. Resp. 
Auth. : Government of Lesotho and SADCC. 
1.350 mECU. Construction of container 
terminal and supply of containers, handling 
equipment. Study required: detailed design 
of works. Short-list already drawn up. 
Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5421 A2d 
Mananga: agricultural management 
training. Resp. Auth.: Mananga Agricul-
tural Management Centre (MAMC). 1.6 
mECU. Supply of T.A. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6425 A6ci 
·*· Regional Wildlife Training Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry Natural 
Resources. Tanzania 5.353 mECU. Supply 
of field training and office equipment, 
teacher training, rehabilitation of college 
buildings. T.A.: Project on appraisal. 6th. 
EDF 
EDF REG 6408 A5i 
SADCC —ANGOLA 
T.A. for the Office of the Lobito 
Corridor (Project Coordination Unit). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et 
Communications. 2.400 mECU. T.A. in 2 
phases. Supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6423 A2d 
SADCC— MOZAMBIQUE 
Limpopo line rehabilitation. Resp. 
Auth.: Mozambique Ministry of Transports. 
EDF part estimated 15 mECU, Community 
contribution to an overall rehabilitation 
programme for the Limpopo railway line. 
* Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing September 91. 6th EDF. ■ 
EDF REG 6421 A2d 
Beira port contract dredging. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 
Estimated cost 9 mECU. Dredging for two 
years of the access channel to the port of 
Beira. Works: 2 years, 4 million m
3/year. 
Supervision and training. Project on ap-
praisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6401 A2d 
CAMEROON — CENTRAL AF-
RICAN REP. —CHAD —CONGO-
GABON — GHANA — NIGER — 
NIGERIA 
Aeronautical satellite Telecommuni-
cations. Project for Central and Western 
Africa. Estimated cost 22 mECU. Improve-
ment of air traffic safety. The project will 
provide high quality voice and low speed 
data links between. The Air Traffic Control 
Centres in 8 countries. Project on appraisal. 
* Int. tender (conditional) no 3442 
launched in June 91 — Opening 
31.10.91. 6th EDF 
EDF REG 6038 A2d 
ASECNA 
Regional air safety training schools 
at Douala and Niamey. Resp. Auth.: 
ASECNA. 7 mECU. Building and equipping 
of schools in Douala and Niamey. Works and 
equipments by int. tender. T.A. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6057 A6d 
BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — 
GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA 
BISSAU —TOGO 
Regional programme to grow 
Western coastal african countries 
awareness of natural resources pro-
tection. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Γ Envir-
onnement-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. 
Priorities: fight against bush fire and de-
forestation and for Soil protection. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF 
EDF REG 6113 A3e 
CARIBBEAN ACP COUNTRIES 
AND MONTSERRAT 
CARDI (Caribbean Agricultural Re-
search and Development Institute). 
Technology transfer and applied re-
search programme. Resp. Auth.: CARDI. 
EDF 5.3 mECU. Works supplies, training. 
T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6632 A3a 
OECS —TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
BARBADOS — GUYANA 
Regional fruit and vegetable market-
ing programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean 
Food Corporation. 6.2 mECU. T.A. and 
supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6620 A5de 
OECS AND MONTSERRAT 
Tertiary education. Resp. Auth. : OECS 
Secretariat. 7.2 mECU. Construction, supply 
of equipments, training, trainers training, 
T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6628 A6bcj 
CARICOM AND UK OCT 
Regional hotel training programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Bahamas Hotel Training Col-
lege (BHTC). 4.4 mECU. Construction 
region training facility, supply of equipment, 
scholarships. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6614 A5c 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Student accomodation for Carib-
bean regional educational institutions. 
Resp. Auth.: UWI, CAST and CTC. 16 
mECU. Construction of residential hostels 
with a total of 1080 beds and daytime 
accomodation in six campus concerned in 
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Contracts for architectural design 
will by awarded following a design competi-
tion. Works by restricted tender after pre-
qualification. Equipments and furnishings 
by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th and 
6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6630 A6b 
CARIBBEAN ACP COUNTRIES 
AND OCT'S 
Caribbean Tourism Development 
Programme. Resp. Auth. : Caribbean Tour-
ism Organisation (CTO), Barbados. Es-
timated cost 9 mECU. Market development 
in Europe, product development in the 
Caribbean, statistics and research, tourism 
education and training, linkages develop-
ment. T.A. after prequalification. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6917 A5c 
ALL ACP COUNTRIES 
Support programme to take social 
dimension of the structural adjust-
ment Into account. 1.500 mECU. Studies, 
statistics, reports, T.A. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6076 A1b 
ACP AND OCT COUNTRIES 
ACP and OCT countries particip-
ation in trade development actions and 
services. Resp. Auth.: Programme coordi-
nation by Trade Devpt. Unit in DG VIII-
Brussels and geographical units in DG VIII-
Brussels and EEC delegations. 6.1 93 mECU 
for ACP's and 0.375 mECU for OCT's. Trade 
fairs and tourism, seminars, conferences, 
workshops and symposia. T.A. to prepare 
programmes and actions and for training. 
Commercial missions (regional), publi-
cation of brochures and documentation. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6916 A5e 
Support programme to the hydraulic 
sector. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Equipe-
ment Direction de Développement des 
Aménagements Hydrauliques (DDAH) and 
Agence Nationale des Ressources Hyd-
rauliques (ANRH). 8 mECU. T.A. for 
National Water Plan, supervision and moni-
toring for dams, studies, waste water treat-
ment stations. Supply of equipments. Pro-
ject on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
2nd half 91. 
SEM AL 183/90 A2b 
Pilot project to develop artisanal 
fishery in Western Algeria. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche. 
9.770 mECU. Supply of line of credit and 
specialized T.A. Training and scholarships. 
Evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
* seen for financing 2nd half 91. 
SEM AL A3a 
Financing of artisanal enterprises 
from 'Société Nationale de l'Elec-
tricité et du Gaz (SONELGAZ)'. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Arti-
sanat and SONELGAZ. 9.060 mECU. Supply 
of line of credit for artisanal enterprises, 
supply of pedagogical equipment, T A. for 
bank-office in charge for credits. Project in 
execution. 
SEM AL A4d 
MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES 
ALGERIA 
Integrated training programme on 
forestry. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Hyd-
raulique, de l'Environnement et des Forêts. 
2.5 mECU. T.A. long-term and short-term, 
equipments, scholarships. Project in exe-
cution. 
SEM AL A3a 
Integrated programme to improve 
seed production for large scale farm-
ing. EEC contribution 7 mECU. Works, 
* supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 2nd 
int. tender no 3441 launched in June 91 
— Opening 22.9.91. 
SEM AL A3a 
Centre to Develop Pesticides (CDP). 
Resp. Auth.: CERHYD (Centre de Re-
cherche pour la Valorisation des Hydro-
carbures et leurs Dérivés 1.9 mECU. T.A. and 
training, supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM AL A3a 
programmes. Purchase of equipment and 
vehicles by int. tender. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 51 0/90 Aai 
Credit line for small-scale industries. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Industry, Federation 
of Egyptian Industries (FEI). 8.5 mECU. 
Credit line and T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 509/90 A4b 
Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance. 
Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Egypt. 175 
mECU. Hard currencies allowance for priv-
ate and public companies and public author-
ities, to cover import prices (CIF) for eligible 
goods. Importers have to deposit in advance 
in local currency the equivalent amount of 
the CIF prices into a special account for 
counterpart funds. Project in execution. 
EGYPT 
Egyptian Renewable Energy Devel-
opment Organization. EREDO. Resp. 
Auth.: Egyptian Government. EEC contri-
bution 7.7 mECU. Construction and equip-
ment for the centre. Works and supplies : int. 
tender with prequalification foreseen in 2nd 
• half 88. Int. tender for supplies no 3423 
launched in June 91 — Opening 12.8.91. 
SEM EGT 1002 A2a 
IUD production. Resp. Auth.: National 
Population Council (NPC). EEC 2.100 
mECU. T.A., equipments, row material for 
local production of IUD. T.A. by Organon 
(NL) Equipments by int. tender. Project in 
execution. 
SEM EGT A7c 
Food Sector Development Prog-
ramme (FSDP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Reconstruction, 
National Oil Crop Council, Livestock Pro-
duction Council, Animal Production 
Cooperatives (APC). 55 mECU Animal food 
improvement. Milk marketing. Artificial in-
semination (Al) and animal health improve-
ments, edible oil, line of credit. T.A. Projectin 
* execution. Int. tender no 3432 for sup-
plies launched in June 91 — Opening 
30.7.91. 
SEM EGT A3a 
Bardawil Lagoon development pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture 
and Land Reclamation (MOALR) and the 
General Authority for Fish Resources De-
velopment (GAFRD). 3 mECU. Protection 
of natural resources by controlling and 
improving the water salinity of the Lagoon. 
Improvement of the marketing of fish and 
reduction of losses.'' Construction of an 
additional landing place with basic market-
ing facilities and improvement of the existing 
one. Installation of a cool chain including an 
ice-making machine. Improvement of the 
Lagoon's fishing methods by introducing 
more careful fishing techniques and better 
management. T.A. for the development and 
implementation of training and extension 
JORDAN 
Study on underground water-level in 
the Azraq basin. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Hydrology and Irrigation. 3 mECU. To 
collect and exploit all data concerning water 
region of Azraq basin. T.A. supply of equip-
ment and drilling works. Works by ace. 
tender. Project in execution. 
SEM JO A2a 
Project for a national soil map and 
land utilization. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture. 4 mECU. T.A. and training. 
Project in execution. 
SEM JO A1g 
Education Improvement. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Education. 1.8 mECU. TA. byten 
experts and one project director. Scholar-
ships. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
■k financing 2nd half 91. 
SEM JO 261/90 A6a, A6b 
Improvement of agricultural produc-
tivity in arid and semi-arid zones. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agricul-
ture and the University of Jordan. T.A. by a 
European research institution competent in 
the development of arid zones. Works by 
ace. tender. Supply of equipment by int. 
tender. Project in execution. 
SEM JO 570/90 A3a 
Ground water investigation in the 
Hammad and Sirhan basins. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 
Water Authority. 4 mECU. Initial studies, 
drilling explorations, surveys and analysis. 
Project on appraisal. 
SEM JO 589/90 A2a, A9a 
Gulf Crisis Financial Assitance. Resp. 
Auth.: Central Bank of Jordan. 150 mECU. 
Hard currencies allowance for private and 
public companies and public authorities, to 
cover import prices (CIF) for eligible goods. 
Importers have to deposit in advance in local 
currency, the equivalent amount of the CIF 
prices into a special account for counterpart 
funds. Project in execution. 
MALTA 
Improvement of infrastructure. 3.1 
mECU. T.A. and supply of equipments. 
Management of natural water resources, 
long term development plan for 'Telemalta 
Corporation' Supplies by int. tender. Project 
in execution. 
SEM MAT 88 A9b 
Protection of Malta's coastline 
against oil pollution. Resp. Auth.: Oil 
Pollution Executive 2.4 mECU. Supply of 
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Project in execution. 
SEM MAT A8f 
Upgrading of standards labora-
tories. Resp. Auth.: Maltese Government. 
2.2 mECU. Identification by European T.A. 
of the present situation for standard labora-
tories. Training and organizational matters, 
purchase of equipments. Restructuring of 
different laboratories. Supply of analytical 
equipment, microbiological equipment and 
calibration equipment. Project on appraisal. 
* Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 
SEM MAT 1912/90 A1c 
MOROCCO 
Support to strengthen technologic 
and scientific education structures. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education 
Nationale. EEC 40 mECU Achievement of 
Beni Mellal and Settat faculties. Construc-
tion of Errachidian and Mohammedian fac-
ulties and CPRT of Settat. Supply of equip-
ments for faculties and CPRT, studies, T.A. 
and supervision. Works and equipments by 
int. tenders. Project in execution. 
SEM MOR A6b 
Rehabilitation and protection ofthe 
disaster areas in Ouarzazate and La 
Moulouya. Resp. Auth.: Office Rég. de 
Mise en Valeur Agricole de Ouarzazate 
(ORMVAO) and La Moulouya (ORMVAM). 
Works by direct labour. Supply of equipment 
by ace. tender. Project on appraisal. Date 
•k foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 
SEM MOR 236/90 A3a 
Support to strengthen training 
structures in the textile and leather 
sectors. Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux 
Publics, de l'Equipement de la Formation 
Professionnelle et de la Formation des 
Cadres and the OFPPT. EEC contribution 
28.075 mECU EEC part: construction of 3 
centres. Equipements for 6 centres trainers 
training and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date 
* foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 
SEM MOR 264/90 A6c, A6d 
TUNISIA 
Date-palm trees in the Rejim-
Maatoug region. Resp. Auth.: Office de 
Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maatoug. EEC 
contribution 15 mECU. Italy 7 mECU. 
Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equip-
ments— Italy. Electric equipment: Italy. 
Irrigation equipments: int. tender. T.A. Italy 
Project in execution. 
SEM TUN A3a 
Credits for S.M.E. rural sector. Resp. 
Auth.: Banque Nationale Agricole (Β.Ν.Α.) 
1 2 mECU. 1st phase purchase of 60 000 or 
70 000 t of wheat: hard and/or soft, by 
'Office des Céréales'. Counterpart funds will 
be distributed for credit operations. Pur-
chase by int. tender. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 3aA 
Financial and technical support to 
the 8th Social and Economic Develop-
ment Plan. Resp. Auth. : Ministère du Plan 
et de Développement Régional. Direction 
Générale de la Coopération Internationale 
(DGCI). EEC contribution 0.500 mECU. T.A. 
■k and purchase of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM TUN A1b 
Mobilization of water resources in 
the Kasserine Governorat. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère du Plan et du Dév. Régional. 
Commissariat Régional de Développement 
Agricole de Kasserine. EEC Contribution 7 
mECU. Water schemes, dams, drillings. 
+ Works by ace. tender. Date financing 
May 91. 
SEM TUN 254/91 A3c, A9b 
TURKEY 
Geothermal energy in Western Anat-
olia. Resp. Auth.. MTA — Institut de 
Prospection et Recherches Minérales EEC 
contribution 8 mECU. Supply by int. tender 
of specialized equipment for wells, bore-
holes and for laboratory analyses. T A. and 
training. Project in execution. Int. tender 
+ foreseen in July 91. 
SEM TU A4a 
Improvement of health services. EEC 
contribution 5.8 mECU. Master plan, spe-
cialized medical equipments, scanner, veh-
icles. T.A. and supplies. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A7ac 
Fight against environmental poll-
ution. Resp. Auth. Prime Minister's Office. 
Directorate General ofthe Environment. EEC 
contribution 2.8 mECU. Purchase of mobile 
system to measure, control, water, air, 
surface and soil pollution. Supply of labo-
ratory equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A8f 
Vocational training programme for 
tourism and mining. EEC contribution 5,4 
mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of 
equipment, studies. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d 
Programme to deepen association 
relations between EEC and Turkey. EEC 
contribution 3.6 mECU. Scholarships, 
supply of equipment for the University of 
Ankara and Marmara. Training centre and 
language laboratory in Marmara. Establish-
ment of a Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. 
Project in execution. 
SEM TU A6b 
Regional centre for training and 
development for the 'Union Inter-
nationale des villes (UIV)' for eastern 
Mediterranean countries and Middle-
East in Istanbul. EEC contribution 1.4 
mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Project in execution. 
SEM TU A1c 
Gulf Crisis Financial Assitance. Resp. 
Auth.: Central Bank of Turkey. 175 mECU. 
Hard currencies allowance for private and 
public companies and public authorities to 
cover import prices (C.I.F.) for eligible 
goods. Importers have to deposit in advance, 
in local currency the equivalent amount of 
the C.I.F. prices into a special account for 
counter part funds. Project in execution. 
WEST BANK AND GAZA 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Assistance to the Palestinian popu-
lation in the occupied territories. EEC 
contribution 10 mECU. Various projects, 
lines of credit supply of equipment, T.A. and 
* training. Date financing May 91. 
SEM OT 91 A8a, b, e 
A.L.A. 
developing 
countries 
ASIA and LATIN 
AMERICA 
BANGLADESH 
National Minor Irrigation Develop-
ment Project (NMIDP), Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 
131 mECU. EEC contribution 26.399 mECU. 
IDA/World Bank and local 66 mECU. Works 
and supplies. T.A. for environment, training. 
Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9013 A3a 
River survey project. Resp. Auth.: See 
ALA BD 9003 project. EEC contribution 
12.6 mECU. T.A. to collect reliable data on 
discharge, water levels, river velocities and 
sediment transport, provide reliable hydro-
graphic charts of key areas. Training, special 
equipment and instruments and SPOT im-
ageries. Project in execution.. 
ALA BD 9004 A9a 
BHUTAN 
Strengthening of veterinary services 
for livestock disease control. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contri-
bution 4 mECU Building works by ace. 
tender. T.A. by restr. tender after short-list. 
Short-list done. Equipment and materials by 
Specialised Procurement Agent appointed 
by the CEC in agreement with the R.G.O.B. 
Vehicles and vaccine, by int. tender. Project 
in execution. 
ALA BHU 9008 A3a 
BOLIVIA 
Protection of La Paz, Trinidad, Santa 
Ana, Villa Montes against floods. Resp. 
Auth.: CORDEBENI, CORDETAR and A.M. 
LA PAZ. EEC contribution 11.700 mECU. 
Works, supplies, T.A. and supervision. 
Studies. Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9023 A9a 
COLOMBIA 
Microprojects in the Pacific Coast 
zone. Phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Corporación 
Regional Autonoma del Valle del Canea 
(CVC). EEC contribution 11.200 mECU. 
T.A., works, equipments and line of credit. 
* Training. Project in execution. Int. tender 
for supplies no 3425 launched in May 
91 — Opening 23.7.91. 
ALA CO 9020 A3a 
INDIA 
Doon Valley integrated watershed 
management project. EEC contribution 
22.5 mECU. Rehabilitation and reaffores-
tation, soil conservation, minor irrigation, 
energy conservation, community particip-
ation, agriculture. Works by direct labour, 
supply by int. tender or ace. tender. T.A. 
Project in execution. 
ALA IN 9014 A3a 
Kerala Horticulture Development 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: GOK Chief 
Secretary and Steering Committee. 28.7 
XII  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY mECU. Supply of fertilizer, equipments 
(seeds and industry) works and T.A. (short-
* term and long-term). Date financing May 
91. 
ALA IN 9103 A3a 
INDONESIA 
Rural electrification project (hydro-
electric micro-power stations). Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Energy and Mines. Elect-
ricity and new energy Dept. EEC contri-
bution 18.9 mECU. Works, supply of tur-
bines, generators, adjusters of 1 0 KW, 25 KW 
and 100 KW, vehicles and other equipment, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
ALA IND 8719 A2a 
Punggur Utara irrigation project. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works, 
Directorate General of Water Resources 
Development (DGWRD) EEC contribution 
29.3 mECU. Civil works: main system, 
secondary and tertiary canals. Works by int. 
tender and ace. tender. T.A. for preparation 
tender dossiers, supervision and monitoring. 
Project in execution. 
ALA IND 9019 A3a 
IRAN 
Rebuilding of the Manjil and Abbar 
Tarum Hospitals. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of 
Health and Medical Education. 13 mECU 
T.A. for architectural and technical studies 
and work supervision. Building and equip-
* ments by int. tender. Date financing May 
91. 
ALA IR A7a 
LAOS 
NAM NGUM water, pumping irrig-
ation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agricul-
ture, Forêts, Irrigation and Coopératives 
Nationales (MAFIC). EEC 5.5 mECU. Build-
ing of 4 irrigation networks and drainage. 
Studies, construction of 4 pumping stations, 
supply of equipments and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA LA 8802 A3a 
NICARAGUA 
Reintegration of qualified persons 
for economic reconstruction and de-
velopment. Resp. Auth.: Organisation 
Internationale pour la Migration (OIM), 
Genève 5.1 mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA NI 9005 A1b 
PAKISTAN 
Support to the rural population of 
the Chltrai region. Resp. Auth. : Aga Khan 
Foundation, Pakistan, Karachi. EEC contri-
bution 8 mECU. Rural development, health, 
education. Project in execution. 
ALA PK 9018 A3a 
PANAMA 
Rehabilitation of Santo Tomas Hos-
pital. Resp Auth.. Ministerio de Salud. EEC 
contribution 4 mECU. Works, supply of 
equipment and T.A. for maintenance, train-
ing and management. Project in execution. 
ALA PAN 9017 A7a 
PANAMA — COSTA RICA — 
NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — 
EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA 
Regional development programme 
for agricultural research on cereals In 
Central-America. EEC contribution 10.8 
mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Project in execution. 
ALA REG 8823 A3a 
Regional support programme for 
fishery development in the Central 
American isthmus. Resp. Auth.: OLDE-
PESCA. EEC contribution 13.4 mECU. T.A., 
works, supply of equipments, line of credit, 
training, studies. Project in execution. 
ALA REG 9009 A3a 
PARAGUAY 
Rural settlement. San Pedro and 
Caaguazu. Resp. Auth.: Instituto de 
Bienestar Rural. 10.4 mECU. Settlement of 
4 000 families. Basic infrastructures, equi-
* ments, training and T.A. Date financing 
May 91. 
ALA PAR 90/24 A3a 
BCIE (BANCO CENTROAMER-
ICANO DE INTEGRACIÓN ECON-
OMICA) 
Support to the SME in Central 
America (PAPIC). Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
BCIE. EEC 6 mECU, Italy 1 mECU, Sweden 
3.8 mECU, BCIE 3.8 mECU. Hard currencies 
funds. T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA REG 8909 A5b 
IDB (INTERAMERICAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK) 
Special fund for T.A. 2 mECU. Short-
term consultancies with european experts, or 
european Consultings. Studies, T.A., train-
* ing. Date financing May 91. 
ALA REG 91 A9b 
Special fund to finance small pro-
ductive projects. Resp. Auth.: IDB. 8 
* mECU. Date financing May 91. 
ALA REG 91 A5a 
GUATEMALA  EL SALVADOR 
HONDURAS 
Trifinlo region development pilot 
project. Resp. Auth.: Ministros de Re-
cursos Naturales. Comité de Dirección. EEC 
contribution: 7.170 mECU. Reafforestation 
works, feeder roads, warehouses, supply of 
equipments and T.A. Feeder roads, irrig-
ation, warehouses and supplies by int. 
tender. Project in execution. 
ALA REG 8814 A3a 
PERU 
Rural micro-projects programme 
(Pampa-Puno II). Resp. Auth.: COR-
PUNO. EEC contribution 21.4 mECU. T.A.: 
ten expatriates. Supply of trucks, vehicles, 
equipments, training. Project in execution. 
ALAPE 8817 A3a 
Irrigation project in Tumbes. Resp. 
Auth.: Comisión mixta Puyango-Tumbres. 
Sub-comisión peruviana. EEC contribution 
21.4 mECU. Purchase of equipment and 
materials. Credit line. T.A. and training and 
research. Project in execution. 
ALAPE 901 2 A3a 
PERU—ECUADOR —COLOMBIA 
(PEC) 
Regional programme: fishing tech-
nical cooperation EEC/PEC. Estimated 
EEC contribution 6 mECU. T.A., supply of 
equipments and training. Project on ap-
praisal. 
ALA REG 8721 A3a 
COCESNA — COSTA RICA — 
EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA — 
HONDURAS — NICARAGUA 
Radar control for civil air traffic in 
Central America. EURO MAYA project. 
Resp. Auth.: COCESNA (Corporación Cen-
troamericana de Servicios de Navegación 
Aérea) and co-director EEC. EEC contri-
bution 18.5 mECU, Italy 9.5 mECU. Civil 
works, supplies, 4 radars and equipments, 
communication systems. Extension of the 
Tegucigalpa control centre. T.A. and train-
ing. Project in execution. 
ALA REG 8819 A2d 
PHILIPPINES 
Agricultural education programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education, Culture 
and Sports (DECS). EEC contribution 10.4 
mECU. Parallel cofinancing with ADB. 
Supply of equipments and agricultural 
inputs. Pedagogical equipment, furnitures, 
laboratory equipments and audio-visuals, 
books, chemicals, tools, vehicle, T.A. and 
training. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 8824 A6ci 
Earthquake Reconstruction Prog-
ramme (ERP) (July 90). Resp. Auth: 
Department of Agriculture, CECAP (Central 
Cordillera Agricultural Programme). Project 
Office. EEC contribution 20 mECU. Agricul-
tural rehabilitation, works, supplies and T.A. 
Hospital rehabilitation: works for 2 hos-
pitals, supply of equipment and supervision. 
Studies: 1) Alternative transport strategy 
study. 2) Urban planning studies for the 
cities of Bagnio and Dagupan. Project in 
execution. 
ALA PNI A8a 
SRI LANKA 
Pilot project for agricultural produc-
tivity villages under the poverty allevi-
ation programme. Resp. Auth. Project 
Implementing Unit. 2.5 mECU. T.A. training 
and supply of equipment. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA SRL 9002 A3a 
Minor and medium size irrigation 
systems in the North-Western pro-
vince. Resp Auth.: Ministry of Land and 
Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contribution 6.3 
mECU. Work, by direct labour, supplies by 
int. tender. T.A.. Project in execution. 
ALA SRL 9016 A3a 
National Irrigation Rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Project Coordination Commit-
tee. Total estimated cost 41.5 mECU. EEC 
3.34 mECU, World Bank 24.67 mECU, 
counterpart funds from EEC Food Aid 7.59 
mECU, local 5.9 mECU. Works, supplies and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing July 91. 
ALA SRL 9107 A3a 
THAILAND 
Development and extension of fruit 
and vegetable production in Northern 
Thailand. EEC contribution 9.45 mECU. 
Long-term T.A., supply of equipments, line 
of credit, training, research and follow-up 
and evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA TH 8812 A3a 
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Angola 
Rua Rainha Jinga. 6 
Luanda C.P. 2669 
Tel. 393038 — 39 12 77 — 39 13 39 
Telex 3397 PROQUIM AN 
Barbados 
Sunjet House, Fairchild Street 
P.O. Box 654 C, Bridgetown. 
Tel. 427-4362/429-7103 
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB 
BRIDGETOWN 
Telefax (1-809) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif 
Β.P. 910, Cotonou 
Tel. 31 26 84/31 26 17 
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU 
Telefax (229) 315 328 
Botswana 
P.O. Box 1253 
Gaborone, Botswana ' 
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7 
Telex BD 2403 D EC EC 
Telefax (267) 313 626 
Burkina Faso 
B.P. 352 
Ouagadougou 
Tel. 307 385/307 386-308 650 
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — OUAGADOUGOU 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre 
B.P. 103. Bujumbura 
Tel. 234 26/238 92 
Telex FED BDI 5031 — BUJUMBURA 
Telefax (257-22) 4612 
Cameroon 
QUARTIER BASTOS 
B.P 847, Yaoundé 
Tél. 22 1 3 87/22 33 67/22 21 49 
Telex DELEG FED 8298 KN 
YAOUNDE— CAMEROON 
Telefax (237) 20.21.49 
Cape-Verde 
Achada de Santo Atonio 
C.P. 122-Praia 
Tel. 61 37 50-61.32.25-61.33.23 
Telex 6071 DELCE CV 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre 
B.P. 1298 Bangui 
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI 
Chad 
Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha 
B.P. 552, N'Dlamena 
Tel. 51 59 77--51 22 76 
Telex DELEG FED 5245 KD 
N'DJAMENA— CHAD 
Telefax (19-235) 51 21 05 
Comoros 
B.P. 559 — Moroni 
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91 
Telex 212 DELCEC KO 
Congo 
Av. Lyautey 
near Hotel Méridien 
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville 
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 — Ville 
Telefax (242) 83.60 74 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Immeuble 'AZUR' Bd. CROZET, 18 
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01 
Tel. 32 24 28 — 33 29 28 
Telex 3729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN 
Telefax (225) 324089 
Djibouti 
Plateau du Serpent Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre 
B.P. 2477 Djibouti 
Tel. 35 26 15 
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ 
Telefax (253) 350 036 
Dominican Republic 
Avenida George Washington 505 
Edificio Torremar 
Apartado 302 
Santo Domingo 
Tel. (1-809)687 22 02 
Telefax (1-809) 687 26 29 
Telex 3264757 EUROCOM SD 
Equatorial Guinea 
Apartado 779 — Malabo 
Tel. 2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 EG 
Ethiopia 
Tedia Desta Building 
Africa Avenue (Bole Road) 1st Floor 
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa 
Tel. 51 01 29/51 2511/51 01 80/51 01 89/ 51 26 72 
Telex 21135 DELEGEUR— ET 
Telefax (251-1) 51 41 19 
Gabon 
Quartier Batterie IV 
Lotissement des Cocotiers 
B.P. 321, Libreville 
Tel. 73 22 50 
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO — LIBREVILLE 
Telefax (241 ) 732228 
Gambia 
10 Cameron Street 
P.O. Box 512, Banjul 
Tel. 777 — 87 69 
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV — BANJUL 
Telefax (220) 26219 
Ghana 
The Round House — Cantonments Road, 
K.I.A.-Accra 
P.O. Box 9505 
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094 
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH 
Telefax (233-21) 774154 
Guinea-Bissau 
Rua EdLardo Mondlane 29 
Caixa Postal 359, Bissau 
Tel. 21 33 60/21 28 78 
Telex 264 DELCOM Bl 
Guinea 
Commission 
Central Mail Department 
(Diplomatic Bag Section — Β 1/123) 
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles 
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479 
Telefax (224) 441874 
Guyana 
72 High Street, Kingston 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown 
Tel. 64 004-65 424-63 963 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN 
Telefax (592-2) 62615 
Haiti 
B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville 
Port-au-Prince 
Tel.: (509) 57-5485. 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644 
Telex (203) 20018 DELCCEN HN 
Telefax (509) 57-4244 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8 
P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8 
Tel. (1-809) 9246333-7 
Telex 2391 DELEGEC KINGSTON 5 
Telefax (1-809) 9246339 
Kenya 
National Bank Building 
Harambee Avenue 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi 
Tel. 33 35 92 
Telex 22302 DELEUR — KE 
Telefax (254-2) 215925 
Lesotho 
P.O. Box MS 518 
Maseru, 100, Lesotho 
Tel. 313 726 
Telex 4351 LO DELEGEUR 
Telefax 266 — 310193 
MAPUTO 
- 1-49 02 71 
Liberia 
34 Payne Avenue Sinkor 
P.O. Box 3049, Monrovia 
Tel. 26 22 78 
Telex 44358 DELEG FED LI -
Telefax (231 ) 262266 
MASERU 
MONROVIA 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares 
B.P. 746. Antananarivo 
Tel. 24216 
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO 
Telefax (261-2) 32169 
Malawi 
Lingadzi House 
P.O. Box 30102. Capital City 
Lilongwe 3 
Tel. 73 02 55/73 01 73/73 06 93 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml — LILONGWE 
Telefax (265-7) 30593 
Mali 
Rue Guégau — Badalabougou 
B.P. 115 Bamako 
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65 
Telex 2526 DELEGFED — BAMAKO 
Telefax (223) 223670 
Mauritania 
Ilôt V. Lot 24 
B.P. 213. Nouakchott 
Tel. 527 24/527 32 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN — NOUAKCHOTT 
Telefax (222-2) 53524 
Mauritius 
61 /63 route Florea Vacoas 
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas 
Tel. 686 50 61 /686 50 62/686 50 63 
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS 
Telefax (230-686) 6318. 
Mozambique 
C.P. 1306— MAPUTO 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — 
Tel. 1-49 02 66— 1-49 17 16 
1 -49 07 20 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Telefax (258-1) 491866 
Namibia 
Saniam Building 
4th floor 
Independence Avenue 
Windhoek 
Tel.:264-61-220099 
Telefax 35135 
Telex 419 COMEU WK 
Niger 
B.P. 10388. Niamey 
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32 
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY 
Telefax (227) 732322 
Nigeria 
4. Idowu Taylor Sir Victoria Island 
PM Bag 12767, Lagos 
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57 
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA 
Telefax (234-1) 617248 
Pacific (Fiji, SamoB, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) 
Dominion House, 3rd Floor 
Private Mail Bag, GPO. Suva. Fidji 
Tel. 31 36 33 
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA 
Telefax (679) 300 370 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street 
P.O. Box 76 
Port Moresby 
Tel. 675-21 35 44-21 35 04-21 37 18 
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY 
Telefax (675) 217 850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14 
B.P. 515. Kigali 
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36 
Telex 22515 DECCE RWMCI 
Telefax 25U — 74313 
Senegal 
Avenue Pompidou 57 (2
e étage) 
B.P. 3345, Dakar 
Tel. 21 13 24/2157 77 
Telex 21665 DELEGSE — DAKAR 
Telefax (675) 217885 
Sierra Leone 
Leone Wesley House 
44 George Street 
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown 
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025 
Telex 3203 DELFED SL — FREETOWN 
Telefax (232-22) 225212 
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2nd floor City Centre Building 
Solomon Islands 
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara 
Tel. 22 765 
Telex 66370 — DELEGSI 
Telefax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
Via Makka Al Mukarram. n° Z-A6/17 
P.O. Box 943, Mogadiscio 
Tel. 21 118/21 049/811 18 
Telex 628 EURCOM — SO 
Telefax 262 — 21118 — 21049 — 81118 
Sudan 
3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development Building 
Army Road Khartoum 
P.O. Box 2363 
Tel. 75054-75148-75393 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Suriname 
- Dr S. Redmondstraat 239 
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo 
Tel. 993 22 - 99349 
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN 
Telefax 93076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor 
Cr. Walker and Streets 
P.O. Box A.36 
Mbabane, Swaziland . 
Tel. 42908/42018 
Telex 2133 WD 
DELEGFED MBABANE 
Telefax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
Extelcoms House, 9th Floor 
Samora Avenue 
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam 
Tel. 311 51/311 52 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR — 
DAR ES SALAAM 
Telefax (255-51) 38575 
Togo 
Rue de Calais 22 
8.P. 1657, Lomé 
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32 
Telex 5267 DELEFEDTO-LOME 
Telefax (228) 211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
2, Champs Elysóes 
Long Circular, Maraval 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain 
Trinidad W.I 
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591 
Telex 22421 DELFED WG 
Telefax (809) 622-6355 
Uganda 
Uganda Commercial Bank Building, 
Plot 12 
Kampala Road, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala 
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304 
Telex 611 39 DELEUR — UGA — KAMPALA 
Telefax (256-41 ) 233708 
Zaire 
71, Av des Trois Ζ 
B.P 2000. Kinshasa 
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221 
Telex 00 581 154.62.21 
Telefax 00871 1546221 
Zambia 
P.O.Box 34871 
Plot 4899 
Brentwood Drive 
I lie alf g 
Tel. 25 09 06-25 07 11 -25 11 40 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA 
Telefax (260-1) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box 4252 
NCR House (10th Floor) 
65 Samora Machel Ave. 
Harare 
Tel. 470.7 1.20/39/40/43 
Telex 4.811 ZW HARARE — ZIMBABWE 
Telefax (263-4) 725360 
In the OCT 
Netherlands Antilles 
Scharlooweg 37 
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad 
Curaçao 
Tel. (599.9) 618488 
Telefax (599.9) 618423 
Aruba 
Paardenbaaistraat 12, (P.O. Box 409) 
Oranjestad 
In the Mediterranean 
Countries 
Algeria 
36, Rue Arezki Abri 
Hydra-16300 Alger 
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42 
Telex 52246 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE 
Telefax (213-2) 593947 
Cyprus 
Iris Tower, 8th Floor 
2 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue PoBox 3480 
Nicosia 137, Cyprus 
TEI. (357-2)36 92 02 
Telex (605) 4960 ECDELCV 
Telefax (357-2) 36 89 26 
Egypt 
6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek 
Tel. 340 83 88 — 341 93 93 — 340 11 84 
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK 
Telefax 3400385 
Israel 
2 rehov ibn gvirol, Eliahu House 
10th floor TEL AVIV 
Tel. 03-26 62 12/26 6213 
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL 
Telefax 251983 
Jordan 
Shmeisani Wadi Sagra Circle, Amman 
P.O. Box 926 794 
Tel. 66 81 91/66 81 92 Amman 
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN 
JORDAN 
Telefax (262-6) 686 746 
Lebanon 
Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beyrouth 
B.P. 11-4008, Beyrouth 
Tel. 3630 30/31/32 
Telex DELEUR 23307 LE BEYROUTH 
Morocco 
2 bis rue de Meknés-Rabat 
B.P. 1302, Rabat 
Tel. 61217/612 46/612 48 
Telex 32620-(M) 
Telefax (212-7) 61156 
Syria 
73 rue Rachid 
P.O. Box 11269. Damascus 
Tel. 24 76 40-24 76 41 
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY 
Tunisia 
Avenue Jugurtha 21 
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene, 1082 Tunis 
Tel. 78 86 00 
Telex 14399 —TUNIS 
Telefax (216-1) 788201 
In A.L.A. countries 
Bangladesh 
House CES (E) 19 
Road 128, Gulshan — Dhaka — 12 
Tel. 60 7016 
Telex 642501, CECO B J 
Telefax (88.02) 88 31 18 
Brésil 
Q.I. 7 — Bloc A — Lago Sul — Brasilia (D.F.) Brésil 
Teel.:(55.61) 248.31.22 
Telex.: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE 
Telefax. : (55-61 ) 248.07.00 
Chili 
Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835 
Santiago (9) Chili 
Tel.: (56) 22.28.24.84 
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK 
Telefax: (56) 22.28.25.71 
Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America) 
Centro Calón — Apartado 836 
1007 San José 
Tel. 332755 
Telex 3482 CCE AC 
Telefax (506) 210893 
India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia) 
YMCA Building 5th floor, Jaisingh Road 
New Delhi 110001 
Tel. 344 222 — 350 430 
Telex 31/61315 EURO-IN 
Telefax (91 ) 352706 
Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapur and 
ASEAN) Secretariat 
Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor 
J.L Jend Sudirman 32 
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220 
Tel. 578 0081 /578 0181 /578 01 59 
Telex 62 043 COMEUR IA 
Telefax (62-21 ) 5780072 
Mexique 
Paseo de la Reforma 1675, 
Lomas de Chapultepec CP. 
11000 Mexico D.F. 
Tel. (52-5) 540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22 
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME 
Telefax: (52-5) 540.65.44 
Pakistan 
House n° 8, Margalla Road, F 6/3, Islamabad 
P.O. Box 1608 
Tél. 82 1 8 28-8146 36/8146 86 
Telex 54044 COMEU PK 
Telefax (92) 822604 
Philippines 
c/o Executive Power Center. Inc. 12th Floor 
Hong Kong Shangai Bldg. 6780 
Ayala Av. Makati Metro Manila 
Tel. (632) 810.44.76 
Telex: 14915. EPC PS 
Telefax: (63-2) 818.27.56 
Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, 
Malaisia) 
Kian G wan House 11 — 19th floor 
140/1 Wireless Road 
Bangkok 10 330 
Tel. 255 91 00 
Telex 82764 COMEUBK TH 
Telefax 2559114 
Uruguay 
Edificio Artigas (1
o Piso) — Calle Rincón 487 — Primer 
Piso — Montevideo 
Tel.: (598) 2.96.37.44/96.37.45/96.31.66/96.31.80 
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY 
Telefax: (598) 2-95.36.53 
Venezuela 
Calle Orinoco - Las Mercedes 
Apartado 67076, Las Americas 1061 A 
Caracas 
Tel. 91 51 33 
Telex 27298 COMEU 
Telefax 918876 
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São Tomé & Principe 
B.P. 132 — Sao Tomé 
Tel. (239) 12 21780 
Telex (0967) 224 
Telefax: (239-12) 22683 
Western Samoa 
c/o Private Mail Bag 
Chief Post Office, Apia 
Telex 204 CECOF SX 
Telefax 24622 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Alpha Building 2nd floor 
Redcliffe Street 
St. John's, Antigua W.I., 
P.O. Box 1392 
Tel. and telefax (1-809) 4622970 
Bahamas 
Frederick House, 2nd floor, Frederick Str. 
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau 
Tel. (32)55850 
Telex DELEGEC NS 310 
Belize 
1 Eyre Street 
P.O. Box 907 
Belize City, Belize 
Tel. (501 -2) 72785 and telefax 
Telex 106 CEC BZ-
G ranada 
Old Fort 
P.O. Box 5, St George's, Grenada, West Indies 
Tel. (809) 440 4958 — 440 3561 
Telex 3431 CWBUR GA 
(Attn. EEC Delegation) 
Telefax (809) 4404151 (Attn. EEC Delegation) 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530 — Victoria Mahé 
Tel. 23 940 
Telex 2213 DELCAM SZ 
Telefax (248) 23890 
Tonga 
MAILETAHA 
Taufa'ahau Road 
Nuhu Alofa 
Tel. 21820 
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS) 
Telefax 23869 
Vanuatu 
Orient Investment Building Ground Floor, 
Kumul Highway 
P.O. Box 442, Port-Vila 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Telex 1093 DELCOM NH 
Telefax (678) 23282 
In the OCT 
New Caledonia 
21 Rue Anatole France 
B.P. 1100 Noumea 
Tel. (687) 27 70 02 
Telefax (687) 28 87 07 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Representation Office 
in Turkey 
15. Kuleli Sokak 
Gazi Osman Paca, Ankara 
Tel. 37 68 40-1-2-3 
Telex 44320 ATBE TR 
Telefax 1377940 
XVI OPERATIONAL SUMMARY BOOKS 
example, contains a comprehensive treat­
ment of many important areas including 
protein deficiency and malnutrition, 
children's diet, more general dietary 
patterns and wider health issues. Simil­
arly, the section dealing with production 
and trade provides a great deal of 
information concerning the agricultural 
output and potential of different coun­
tries and regions as well as about climatic 
and other factors affecting food produc­
tion. 
A work of this nature must inevitably 
contain technical terminology but, in 
keeping with UNESCO's aim of reaching 
a broad target readership (teachers, 
researchers, academics, technicians and 
decision-makers), it has been written in a 
very readable style, without in any sense 
detracting from the intellectual quality. It 
also contains many useful charts and 
diagrams. 
ooo 
'Industry and environment' — Verlag Dr. 
Gfb Nachf, Ölbergweg 8, D-7801 
Bollschweil - Telephone 07633/7025, Fax 
07633/82129, Telex 772 730 bros d 
Environmental technology is a tech­
nology of success. All engineers and all 
those involved in industrial development, 
never mind which country they find 
themselves in, are today concerned with 
solutions within the context of environ­
mental technology or will soon have to 
seek them. 
If these questions are to be solved 
successfully then information on the 
current state of development is necessary. 
The range ofinformation included in a 
new and comprehensive reference book 
brought out by UNIDO (United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation) is 
in line with the latest state of knowledge 
and relates to the areas of interest and the 
relevant industrial sectors in practically 
all the countries in the world. 
This reference work is made more 
valuable as a rest of its inclusion of 
information from the WFEO (Commit­
tee of Engineering Information in Paris) 
which is concerned with criteria for 
research and systematic ways of solving 
problems, e.g. : 
— the demonstration of methodical ways 
of analysing a practical project; 
— the identification of partners and 
sources able to provide additional in­
formation on technological solutions. 
This new reference work sets out to 
provide development engineers with 
guidelines in their search for information, 
e.g. by means of simple and reliable ways 
of analysing the situations facing them 
and identifying rapidly the necessary 
sources of information. 
This new book, 'Industry and en­
vironment', enables an engineer to com­
pare his projects with other tasks which 
have already been solved. 
In this connection, a particular ad­
vantage is offered by the inclusion of 
hundreds of addresses of various insti­
tutions, public authorities, investors and 
bodies which are concerned with ques­
tions of industry and the environment. 
This information is divided up in a user-
friendly way, both according to subjects 
and according to countries. 
The book is useful for development 
engineers but also for every specialist 
concerned with this new and promising 
technology. The book will appear on 
15 August 1991. It is available from 
Verlag Dr. Grub nachf., Ölberweg 8, D-
7801 Bollschweil. The book will be 
officially launched in October at the 
UNO Environmental Conference in Cop­
enhagen. 
OOO 
Pascal FONTAINE and Henri MALAF-
OSSE — The European Institutions ('Les 
institutions européennes') : The Alphabe­
tical Metz series — Les éditions Metz, 1 
rue du Départ, 75014 Paris — 144 pp. — 
57 FF. — 1991 
The basic idea of this little book is 
excellent because it presents, in alphabe­
tical form, that is to say very usable and 
condensed, the institutions, the history, 
the achievements, the problems and the 
hopes of the European Community. It 
covers from A as in 'Act, Single Euro­
pean' to Y as in 'YES', a youth exchange 
scheme for Europeans between 15 and 
25 years of age. 
A great success can be predicted for 
this work which has been written by two 
authors very familiar with this Europe 
whose construction should accelerate 
with the two intergovernmental con­
ferences, the one on economic and mo­
netary union, the other on political 
cooperation which should also cover 
diplomacy and defence. 
Both writers periodically publish 
pieces on the European Community and 
one may recall that Pascal Fontaine who 
is now, notably, a professor at the 
Institute of Political Studies (IEP) in 
Paris, was the erstwhile last assistant of 
Jean Monnet. 
Finally, one must add that this volume, 
which is in pocket-book form, includes a 
list of useful addresses and a chronolo­
gical listing of steps in the construction of 
Europe from 1946 to 1990 A.L. 
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